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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

CV01-16-20313
Case No.: __________________
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby plead and allege as follows:
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JURISDICTION, PARTIES AND VENUE
1.

Bennett G. Day is the trustee of the Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie

D. Day Family Trust, created by Instrument dated March 24, 1977, which trust holds a 1/9th
interest in the Day Property (defined below).
2.

Plaintiff John F. Day is and at all times relevant hereto has been a resident of

California and holds a 1/4th interest in the Day Property (defined below).
3.

Plaintiff Dan E. Day is and at all times relevant hereto has been a resident of

Boise, Ada County, Idaho, and holds a 1/4th interest in the Day Property (defined below).
4.

Plaintiff Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company,

with member Bennett G. Day, and with its principal place of business in Boise, Ada County,
Idaho, and it holds a 1/6th interest in the Day Property (defined below), as successor in interest to
Bennett G. Day.
5.

Plaintiff Donna Day Jacobs is and at all times relevant hereto has been a resident

of Boise, Ada County, Idaho, and holds a 1/9th interest in the Day Property (as defined below).
6.

Plaintiff David R. Day is and at all times relevant hereto has been a resident of

Boise, Ada County, Idaho, and holds a 1/9th interest in the Day Property (as defined below).
7.

Plaintiffs collectively own 100% of the interest in the Day Property (as defined

below).
8.

Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board (“ITD”) is the

governmental body created by the State of Idaho empowered and bound to locate, design,
construct, reconstruct, alter, extend, repair, and maintain state highways and associated facilities
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within the State of Idaho, and has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property
for rights-of-way by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.
9.

Venue is proper in Ada County, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-404 or 5-401, as it is

the county in which Plaintiffs reside or have their principal place of business and where the real
property at issue is located. Ada County is also the county wherein the improper conduct alleged
herein occurred and is a county wherein Defendant conducts business.
10.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court, as the amount in controversy exceeds the

$10,000 jurisdictional requirements for the District Court.
FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A. The Day Property’s Historic Direct Access to Public Roads.
1.

In 1935, Ernest G. Day purchased approximately 160 acres of real property, more

particularly described as the entire Northeast quarter of Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3
East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho (except for a right-of-way to the State of Idaho
for State Highway 30) (the “Initial Day Property”). The 160 acres are located in an area known
as Isaac’s Canyon, southeast of the city of Boise and in Ada County. Since that purchase in
1935, the Day Property (defined below) has almost continuously remained in the ownership of
Mr. Day and/or his family (the relevant owners of the Day Property at different points in time
shall be generally referred to hereinafter as the “Day Family”), and currently it is owned by the
Plaintiffs. Attached as Exhibit 1 is the 1938 version of the Metsker map of the Initial Day
Property and vicinity.
2.

As of 1935, the Property was bisected by U.S. Highway 30/Federal Way

(“Highway 30”), with a few acres northeast of Highway 30 and most of the 160 acres southwest
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of Highway 30, as depicted on Exhibit 1. The Initial Day Property had approximately 1,000 feet
of frontage abutting Highway 30 on both sides of Highway 30; thus, the Initial Day Property
could be accessed and was accessed directly from Highway 30’s public right-of-way.
B. The New Interstate and the Agreement About New Access to a Future Public Road.
3.

In the 1960s, the Federal Interstate was being built through Idaho and it replaced

Highway 30 in the area of the Initial Day Property. As part of that construction, the State of
Idaho, Department of Highways (“IDH”), predecessor to ITD, negotiated with the Day Family
regarding purchase of additional portions of the Initial Day Property. Attached as Exhibit 2 is
an Agreement entered into between the Day Family and IDH on November 17, 1961 (the “1961
Agreement”). The 1961 Agreement provides that IDH was purchasing an additional 9 acres of
the Initial Day Property for the construction of the Interstate, that IDH was still uncertain about
exactly where it was going to build the “interchange, frontage roads, and so forth” and was not
yet sure what it would pay the Day Family for the additional acres or any impact on access, that
the Day Family did not want to delay the construction so they gave up possession of the
additional acres, that “all access rights from [the Initial Day Property] on both sides of the
present U.S. Highway 30 . . . and to Interstate Highway 80N” were “waived and extinguished
where the property abuts upon said highways,” and that IDH would “negotiate in good faith”
with the Day Family regarding “a fair and reasonable price for the property so acquired.” (See
Exhibit 2.)
4.

In furtherance of the 1961 Agreement, on October 23, 1967, the State of Idaho,

through the IDH, entered into a “Right-of-way Contract” with the Day Family that states a
Warranty Deed for 8.99 acres was being delivered to the State in exchange for $6,000 plus the
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promise that the “Access to [the Day Family] remaining property southerly of the Interstate
Highway will be available from the future frontage road and stock drive on the southwesterly
side of I-80N.” Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the 1967 Right-of-way
Contract and an attached drawing that appears to show the location of the public right-of-way
that connected to the Initial Day Property and was intended to be the location of the future
frontage road.
5.

The contemporaneous Warranty Deed (also signed on October 23, 1967)

transferred both the 8.99 acres to the State of Idaho and “all rights of access between the right-ofway of [the Interstate] and the remaining contiguous real property belonging to [the Day Family]
except for: access to the Future Frontage Road and Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side of
Interstate 80N, Project No. I-IG-80N-2(16)(54) Highway Survey.” (Emphasis added.) The
Warranty Deed was recorded on November 10, 1967, as Instrument No. 677552 in the records of
Ada County. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the 1967 Warranty Deed. ITD
is the successor in interest to IDH and the State of Idaho as to the obligations described in
paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of this Complaint. ITD, IDH, and the State of Idaho are sometimes
collectively referred to as “Defendant” or “ITD.”
6.

In other words, the Day Family agreed to give up direct access to the public road

system through Highway 30 in exchange for direct access to the public road system through a
public Future Frontage Road that would connect to the Initial Day Property on the southwest side
of the Interstate.
7.

With the construction of the Interstate, the Initial Day Property southwest of the

Interstate could no longer be accessed from any improved public road because the Interstate did
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not allow direct access from the Initial Day Property and there were no other public roads
connecting to the Initial Day Property. The closest improved public road was Eisenman Road
that ended several miles from the Initial Day Property. Eisenman Road was expected to be the
“Future Frontage Road” to eventually connect to the Initial Day Property and reestablish access
to improved public roads.
8.

For the time being, the only access to the Initial Day Property was along a 50 ft.

unimproved right-of-way “jeep road” that ran from the Gowen interchange and paralleled the
Interstate for several miles until it reached the Initial Day Property. The Initial Day Property was
not then developed and the Day Family had no immediate plans to develop it, so the Day Family
was patient with the process of getting reconnected to the public roads. In addition, the Day
Family understood that the IDH was still uncertain about where any future “interchange, frontage
roads, and so forth” would be built, so a public road giving access to the Initial Day Property
would not be constructed until the anticipated interchange in the area was built. It was
understood that this legal access over an undeveloped right-of-way was not what had been
promised; rather, access through developed public roads, substantially equivalent to what had
been taken, was promised and was a property right that had been transferred to the Day Family
and was even a recorded property right on the 1967 Warranty Deed.
C. Purchase of Additional Property Dependent on the Promised Future Public Road
Access and To Be Developed Jointly.
9.

In 1979, the Day Family purchased another 160 acres of property that was

adjacent to the southern edge of their remaining approximately 147 acres and more particularly
described as the entire Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the
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Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. The Day Family purchased this additional land with the
intention of eventually developing the entire approximately 307 acres as a subdivision (the entire
307 acres is collectively referred to as the “Day Property”), and in reliance on the promises made
by ITD as described in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above. That plan is dependent on the subdivision
ultimately having direct access to the public roads. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct
copy of a map showing the location of the additional 160 acres.
D. The New Interchange, the Extension of Frontage Road Close to the Day Property, and
the Taking of the Day Family’s Property Right of Access Without Providing Just
Compensation.
10.

In 1996, the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation (successor in interest to

the IDH) (“ITD”) was preparing to construct the new South Eisenman Road Interchange, Exit 59
between Mileposts 59 and 60, also known as the Isaac Canyon Interchange. This was the
anticipated Interchange located adjacent to the Day Property; however, as a limited access
highway, the Interchange did not provide direct access to or from the Day Property.
11.

As part of the construction of the Interchange, Eisenman Road was extended

Southwest as a frontage road parallel with the Interstate and connecting with the Interchange.
12.

With the Interchange and frontage roads now being constructed, the Day Family

spoke with ITD about meeting its obligation under the 1961 Agreement, 1967 Right of Way, and
1967 Warranty Deed to connect the Day Property to the “Future Frontage Road” (Eisenman
Road) that was now very close. The Day Family was led to believe that ITD was working on
resolving the situation.
13.

When the construction had finished in approximately 1997, however, Eisenman

Road was not extended or connected to the Day Property as had been promised. By failing to
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restore the Day Property’s direct access to the public roads when the frontage road was extended
to near the Day Property, ITD took the Day Family’s recorded property right without providing
just compensation.
14.

The Interchange was also constructed over the top of portions of the unimproved

50 ft. public right-of-way jeep trail that had previously connected the Gowen Interchange and
Eisenman Road with the Day Property. Therefore, the Day Property was further landlocked, with
no direct access or frontage on any public road and without even access to the public roads
through an unimproved “right-of-way” jeep trail, as had been the case before the Interchange.
ITD took that right-of-way access without providing just compensation.
E. ITD’s Initial Efforts to Connect the New Frontage Road to the Day Property.
15.

ITD recognized its obligation to provide the promised access from the Day

Property to the newly constructed frontage road, and it has taken various steps to try and fulfill
its obligation. For example, as discussed below, ITD has attempted to obtain public road
easements that ostensibly create a path for a future road that starts at Eisenman Road and runs
across property owned by other entities and then ends at the Day Property.
16.

First, on or about May 10, 1996, ITD obtained a 50 foot wide “Corporation

Easement” that commences at Eisenman Road (at a location referred to hereinafter as the “Green
Gate”) and then runs south across property that was then owned by J.D. Aldecoa and Son. The
Corporation Easement, recorded on May 10, 1996 as Instrument 96039693 in the records of Ada
County, states that it was “For the Purpose of Constructing or Installing Thereon a Stock Drive
and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its agents or contractors.” Attached as Exhibit 6
is a copy of the Corporation Easement (hereinafter referred to as “Easement 1”).
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17.

Second, on June 4, 1996, ITD obtained a Highway Easement Deed “for the right-

of-way of a highway over certain land owned by the United States in the State of Idaho, which is
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management.” The
Highway Easement Deed stated, “the Department [of Interior, Bureau of Land Management] . . .
does hereby grant the State [of Idaho] an easement for a right-of-way for the operation and
maintenance of a highway and use of the space above and below the established grade line of the
highway pavement for highway purposes . . . . the use right herein authorized shall terminate 10
years or sooner if agreed upon, from the date of execution of the transfer document by the
Department to the State in the event construction of the highway has not been initiated during
such period.” Attached as Exhibit 7 is a copy of the Highway Easement Deed (hereinafter
referred to as “the Initial Easement 2”).
18.

Attached as Exhibit 8 is a map showing Eisenman Road and the Day Property

and showing the apparently intended future public road location: Easement 1 (running from the
Green Gate at Eisenman Road over the Aldecoa property and ending at the BLM property) and
then Initial Easement 2 (running over the BLM property and ending at the Day Property).
19.

It was obvious, however, that the proposed and undeveloped route from Eisenman

Road over both easements to the Day Property was over terrain that was not suitable or
reasonable for any access, let alone a public road that would meet Ada County Highway District
(“ACHD”) standards. Despite obtaining these easements for public access, ITD did not build a
road to provide the promised access to the Day Property.
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F. ITD’s Initial Failure to Get ACHD’s Agreement about Public Road between Eisenman
and the Day Property
20.

At the time of construction of the new Isaac’s Canyon Interchange, ITD was the

state public entity in charge of construction and maintenance of the interstate highway but
ACHD was the public entity with authority and jurisdiction over the other public roads in Ada
County, including the public roads that would connect to the new Interchange and that would
potentially connect Eisenman Road to the Day Property.
21.

In their negotiations regarding how the new Isaac’s Interchange would connect

with the public roads and thus serve all the surrounding properties, ITD failed to obtain an
agreement from ACHD that would allow (1) a public street connection for Easement 1 to
connect to Eisenman Road at the Green Gate, or (2) for a public road to be developed over
Easement 1 and Initial Easement 2 to connect to the Day Property.
22.

In a letter dated August 27, 1996, ITD and ACHD memorialize their agreement

upon the “future approaches from new roadways to properties being severed” by the new
Interchange. The letter lists the new extension of Eisenman Road as having various locations
where public roads would connect but the location at the Green Gate was not listed. The
agreement then states, “Future public road access as determined and approved by ACHD.”
Attached as Exhibit 9 is a copy of that letter. This agreement about public road access and
“approaches” along the new Eisenman extension was not disclosed to the Day Family.
G. The Day Family Demands the Promised Access and ITD Works on Fixing Problems
23.

For the next few years, ITD took different positions regarding its obligation to

reestablish suitable direct public road access to the Day Property. In a letter to ITD dated
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December 12, 1997, Ben Day and the Day Family explained that ITD had not fulfilled its
obligation regarding direct public road access. The letter concluded,
In summary, after being able to drive directly to the property prior to 1967 via Federal
Way and exchanging that for a “Future Frontage Road Right-of-way” on a gentle slope,
we wound up with a ‘Stock Drive’ over impassable terrain. This, in our opinion, does not
satisfy the provisions in your original contract with us.
Attached as Exhibit 10 is a copy of the letter.
24.

Thereafter, ITD began working on a new solution to meet its obligations. First,

ITD recognized that the Easement over the Aldecoa Property needed to be widened to 60 ft. in an
attempt to make it acceptable for the construction of a dedicated public road meeting current
ACHD specifications.
25.

On January 6, 1999, the new owners of the Aldecoa Property signed an Easement

document to the State of Idaho that is recorded as Instrument No. 99002305 in the records of
Ada County. This new Easement provided an additional 10 feet of width adjoining the prior
Corporation Easement. This new Easement stated it was “For the purpose of constructing or
installing thereon a Stock Drive and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its agents or
contractors.” Attached as Exhibit 11 is a copy of the Easement (this additional 10 feet Easement
and the prior Corporation Easement are hereinafter referred to collectively as “Easement 1”).
26.

Second, on February 10, 2000, Steven Parry, Deputy Attorney General for the

State, wrote a letter to Donna Jacobs as the representative of the Day Family that further
described how the State was working on a new resolution of its obligations to provide direct
public road access to the Day Property. The letter acknowledged that the current 50 foot rightof-way over the BLM land (the Initial Easement 2) was not adequate for a public road. Instead,
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the State proposed a new sixty foot “Right-of-Way Easement” running from the end of
Easement 1, passing over the BLM land, and eventually connecting to the Day Property.
Attached as Exhibit 12 is a copy of the letter dated February 10, 2000.
27.

This “Highway Easement Deed” was signed in early June of 2000 by the State of

Idaho and the United States and recorded on June 8, 2000 as Instrument No. 100044826 in the
Ada County Recorder’s Office. In exchange for this new public right-of-way easement across
the BLM property, ITD relinquished its Initial Easement 2 on the BLM property. Attached as
Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of the Highway Easement Deed, which contains an
Exhibit A that shows both Easement 1 and the location of the new Highway Easement.
(Hereinafter, the Highway Easement from 2000 is referred to as “Easement 2”). Per the terms of
the Highway Easement Deed, Easement 2 was initially a “floating easement” with a location that
could be changed but that would become permanent after 5 years had passed (June of 2005).
Attached as Exhibit 13A is a color-coded map showing the location of the various public road
easements obtained by ITD.
28.

On June 7, 2000, Mr. Parry provided a Memorandum to Loren Thomas, Leonard

G. Hill, and Lana Servatius, all of ITD, that explained what he was trying to accomplish with the
new Easement 2. He explained that the State was still trying to resolve the access issues for
getting from Eisenman Road to the Day Property. Mr. Parry expressed his thought that the new
Easement 2 over the BLM property would provide a workable public right-of-way. However,
Mr. Parry mentioned that issues with Easement 1 remained:
The [Day Family] is still questioning the adequacy of the easement from
Eisenman Road to the BLM property [Easement 1]. This easement was acquired
from the Nicholsons [Aldecoa] and abuts the eastbound on-ramp for the
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interchange. The problem being the terrain is so steep and sloping that ACHD
will not approve any public road access using the easement. I have met with
ACHD’s Traffic Engineer and he confirms that the easement does not meet
ACHD standards. Also, the approach to Eisenman Road is at a right angle and
does not meet ACHD standards. . . . With the signing and recording of the
easement from the BLM, the eastern half of the problem [Easement 2] appears to
be resolved. The problem remains with the easement through the Nicholson
property [Easement 1].
Attached as Exhibit 14 is a copy of the Memorandum dated June 7, 2000.
29.

On July 19, 2000, Mr. Parry wrote to the Day Family’s attorney:

I have had the opportunity to meet with ITD’s District 3 management and representatives
from the Headquarter’s Right-of-Way section on the access issues involved with your
clients.
To provide you with some historical perspective, when this issues first arose and the
Department attempted to resolve the problem it was the portion of the easement over the
BLM land that the engineer’s perceived to be the problem. The portion of the new rightof-way easement seems to be resolved with the new easement from the BLM. During that
process, the Department obtained an additional ten feet of right-of-way from the
Nicholson’s to increase the width of the easement over the property from fifty feet to
sixty feet. The problem appears to be the easement over the Nicholson property. The
property is over terrain with contours too great to construct a frontage road or effectively
use the easement for ingress and egress.
ITD’s District Three’s Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way Supervisor have
gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and how the easement can be
relocated. I have not heard back from them at this point in time. The District and the
Headquarter’s Right-of-Way Section are reviewing funding sources in order to reach a
solution to this problem. I would request that you provide the Department an extension
until September 5, 2000 or shortly thereafter to be able to give you a firm proposal on a
solution to this access issue. . . .
I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some type of
proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent to you that the
Department will not assert any type of statute of limitation defense if an agreement on
new access cannot be reached.
Attached as Exhibit 15 is a copy of this letter dated July 19, 2000. During the following months
and years, the Day Family relied upon this promise from the State of Idaho and ITD to not assert
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a statute of limitations defense in exchange for additional time to try and resolve its taking
without just compensation.
30.

The Day Family continued to work with ITD and ACHD to get a public road

approved for construction and then constructed over these two easements and to connect the Day
Property with Eisenman Road. ITD even developed a Department Memorandum that contained
a detailed design, by an ITD Designer Cliff Gaylin, of an access road from Eisenmann road
through the two 60 foot right-of-way easements and connecting to the Day Property. Attached as
Exhibit 16 is a copy of this Department Memorandum, dated September 6, 2000.
31.

On February 21, 2001, however, Gary Inselman, in Planning and Development

for ACHD, wrote a letter indicated that the design from ITD “makes it difficult to state
definitively if the proposed road would meet Highway District standards.” He further explained,
The District does require that all public street improvements be designed by a
professional engineer licensed in the state of Idaho. The plans would have to be
submitted to the District for review and accepted for public street construction
prior to the issuance of a permit to work in the public right-of-way. The right-ofway would need to be dedicated prior to plans acceptance.
Attached as Exhibit 17 is a copy of this letter dated February 21, 2001.
H. Day Family Cannot Obtain Title Insurance for Public Access and ITD Works With
Title Company to Fix Access Issues
32.

Because of these issues with ITD and ACHD, the Day Family learned that they

could not obtain title insurance for the property that would insure against any loss arising from
any lack of right of access to the property. For example, Pioneer Title Company provided a Title
Insurance Commitment that stated, “the Policy(ies) will not insure against any loss arising by
reason of any lack of right of access.” See p. 8 ¶ 22. The commitment then noted seven (7)
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separate reasons why access to the property was questionable or inadequate and as a result why
the title company would not insure access to the property. Attached as Exhibit 18 is a copy of
relevant portions of a title commitment from Pioneer Title.
33.

Recognizing its obligation to provide insurable access, ITD worked with the title

company to resolve the many issues with access. In an email dated January 29, 2010, Mr. Parry
explained the on-going efforts by ITD to resolve the title company’s objections to Easement 2
(originally across BLM land):
In April 2000, the Federal Highway Administration granted to the Idaho
Transportation Department the easement [over BLM property] that is depicted in
Exhibit A. . . . Subsequent to the grant of the easement the BLM disposed of the
property and it is now owned by Dennis Baker. The disposal was subject to the
easement. The easement has become permanent at the locations shown on Exhibit
A and the Department has relinquished the old stock drive public right-of-way
[Initial Easement 2]. Pioneer Title has raised questions and does not believe they
can insure the property due to defects they perceive in the easement. The
easement does not name the adjoining property owner(s) as the beneficiaries of
the easement. While this issue can be debated it is the Title Company that has the
final say on the issue where the Department is transferring an undeveloped access
road easement. . . . Andrew White and I met with Pioneer Title Company this
past week and came up with a solution that was acceptable to all concerned. The
Title Company would accept a recorded acknowledgement to the Department as
title holder of the easement from the underlying fee owner.
The
acknowledgement would need to provide that the property owner acknowledges
that the June 2000 easement was for the purpose of an access road right-of-way
for the benefit of the Day Family and other similarly situated property owners. . . .
There are other solutions to the problem but they all involve huge costs (e.g.
construction of a local road and turning it over to ACHD). The bottom line is that
before the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day Property had
insurable title to its property and had a legal right of access. With the
construction of the Interchange they will not be able to provide title insurance
without going through litigation. If the underlying property owner declines to
agree to acknowledgement then the Department may want to consider a quiet title
action on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed . . . .
Attached as Exhibit 19 is a copy of the email dated January 29, 2010.
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34.

Mr. Parry drafted an “Acknowledgement of Public Road Easement” for Baker

Investments LLC (“Baker Investment”) to sign. The Acknowledgement indicated that the BLM
Easement and Aldecoa Easement “when acquired were done so with the approval of ACHD for
the purpose of providing a public road easement to the properties to west of Interstate 84 and
south of Eisenman Road as it intersects with the Isaac Canyon Interchange.”

The

Acknowledgement further indicated that Easement 2, which now was an easement over Baker
Investment property, was acquired to provide access to the Day Property via a public road
connection. Attached as Exhibit 20 is a copy of the draft Acknowledgement.
35.

Baker Investment declined to sign the Acknowledgment. For various reasons, the

inadequacies of Easement 2 were not resolved.
I. ITD’s Efforts to Build the Road to Satisfy the Title Company are Blocked by ACHD
36.

ITD continued to try and resolve the title and access issues to establish an

insurable right-of-way connecting Eisenman Road and the Day Property. ITD determined that
the title issues would likely be resolved once it successfully built the public road over the two
easements—from the Green Gate approach on Eisenman, over Easement 1 and Easement 2 and
ending at the Day Property—to fulfill its obligation to the Day Family.
37.

On or about February 6, 2014, ITD sent an “Application for Temporary Approach

– West Eisenman Road” to ACHD seeking ACHD’s approval of an “approach,” or connection
point, with West Eisenman Road and permission to build. The Application indicated that ITD
needed a temporary access point at the Green Gate on Eisenman Road “to access an ITD-created
easement to the Day Property.” The Application admits that the “existing easement was not
identified as one of the future approach locations. This temporary approach is therefore needed
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until a permanent location is available at one of the approved locations. The permanent approach
will require access through one of the adjacent private properties.

None of the adjacent

properties is currently available.” The Application also states, “The existing easement and the
existing approach location allow the Day Family only limited opportunity to develop their rural
property to the south.

A future public road is needed to accommodate the potential site-

generated traffic volumes.” The Application then concludes:
Specific Request: ITD requests a temporary approach to Eisenman Road at the
location of the existing easement [the Green Gate]. ITD would be the applicant
for this approach. The requested approach location provides the Days with an
opportunity for development and ensures that the non-standard approach can be
eliminated with the regional development. The temporary approach will be
eliminated with the development of the alternative public street access. ITD
requests a standard 40-ft. approach. This is ITD’s standard width to allow one
inbound and two outbound travel lanes. The construction will require maintaining
the current drainage facility, adding sub-base material, adding base material, and
plant mix pavement. The standard 48” by 48” STOP sign will be installed for the
easement’s approach to Eisenman Road. The necessary forms are attached.
Several maps and airphotos are attached. A traffic control plan is attached. An
ITD standard drawing for the typical approach is also attached.
Attached as Exhibit 21 is a copy of the Application, with attachments. ACHD initially denied
the Application. ITD appealed that decision to the ACHD Commissioners but then voluntarily
withdrew the appeal in March of 2014. ITD continued to negotiate with ACHD to resolve the
issues regarding location and construction of the public road.
38.

In approximately January of 2015, ITD offered the Day Family the option of

building the public access road themselves using $560,000 from ITD. On August 28, 2015, the
Day Family attorney sent a letter that stated,
Following our meeting, my clients discussed the question as to whether or not
they prefer ITD to give them the money to build the road or whether ITD should
build the road. My clients would respectfully request that ITD take on the
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responsibility to build the road since it has the expertise and knowledge in what
needs to be done. Our clients would have to hire independent contractors to do
the same. I trust this will work with ITD and I request a time table when this
would be undertaken and completed, and what input you would request of my
clients with reference to the same.
Attached as Exhibit 22 is a copy of the letter dated August 28, 2015.
39.

After prolonged negotiations between ITD, the Day Family, and ACHD, Gary

Inselman, the Development Services Manager at ACHD, sent a email dated May 16, 2016, that
stated, “To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a public street between the off ramp
and the future Lake Hazel/Eisenman intersection which is approximately 1800-feet from the
[Green Gate]. There are existing accesses in the area today. ACHD is not commenting on these
accesses nor stating that ACHD will restrict or alter them in any way.” Attached as Exhibit 23 is
a copy of the email dated May 16, 2016.
40.

In other words, ACHD definitively stated that (ignoring all other access obstacles

pointed out by Pioneer Title) even if Easement 1 and Easement 2 are regarded as creating a
public right-of-way from the Day Property to the edge of Eisenman Road, the public will not
have any legal way to get from Eisenman Road onto that public right-of-way because ACHD
will not approve an approach at the Green Gate on Eisenman Road.
41.

Thus, after many years of ITD trying to comply with its written promises, the Day

Family still has property that is landlocked, with no legal access to public roads. The Day
Property has no adequate or reasonable public right-of-way that connects to any public road
(including specifically Eisenman Road); the Day Property is not marketable because it has no
insurable title and therefore no marketable title because of its lack of access; and the Day
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Property has no direct access to a fully developed public road, as it originally had in the form of
1000 feet of frontage on Highway 30 and as was promised by ITD in replacement.
42.

Instead, the Day Property has a questionable connection to a questionable

Easement 2 road easement that then connects to the Easement 1 road easement that is an
easement to nowhere because it does not connect to any public road. In addition, the public road
easements are too narrow, have unworkable turns, and pass over terrain that is too steep to permit
construction of a road that would meet ACHD requirements. Finally, the easements dead end at
Eisenman Road at a location that ACHD did not approve and that does not meet ACHD
standards because of its proximity to an Interchange.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION)
43.

Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to

recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.
44.

A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein,

has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of law and the
payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse condemnation.
45.

Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property may be

taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed
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by law, shall be paid therefor.” The United State’s Constitution states “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
46.

Here, the initial taking of the Day Property’s access was in 1967 with just

compensation in the form of a recorded property right that ITD would restore the direct access to
the public roads when the future frontage road was extended to the Day Property.
47.

However, at the conclusion of ITD’s construction in 1997, wherein it extended the

future frontage road but did not connect those public roads to the Day Property, ITD committed a
take of the Day Family’s recorded property right to have its public access restored. ITD took this
property right without giving any compensation and certainly not just compensation, in violation
of both the Idaho and U.S. Constitution.
48.

ITD’s taking resulted in severance damages to the larger parcel of 300 plus acres

of Day Property that was dependent upon that recorded property right to have direct access to a
public road. The highest and best use of the Day Property prior to the taking was as a future
planned community. That use is now impossible because there is no public access to the
property.
49.

This physical taking has resulted in significant damage to the value of the Day

Property, which amounts will be proven to a jury.
50.

In addition, through its construction in 1997, ITD also eliminated an unimproved

right-of-way jeep trail to the Day Property. That action was also a taking without just
compensation.
51.

ITD promised to not assert the statute of limitation defense while the parties have

been trying to work out a solution to the takings. ITD has been working on a solution since at
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least 1997. The Day Family has been incurring damage since the takings but has not acted to file
this lawsuit because of their reliance upon ITD’s promise regarding the statute of limitations.
Recently, it became clear that ITD will not be able to resolve the takings by building the access
road to mitigate the damages.
52.

In addition, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the legal prejudgment statutory rate

of 12% per annum from the date of the takes, in approximately 1997.
COUNT TWO
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
53.

ITD has breached its agreements with the Plaintiffs.

ITD (through its

predecessors in interest) and the Plaintiffs (through their predecessors in interest) reached an
agreement whereby the Plaintiffs surrendered their direct access to established public roads in
exchange for a written obligation that ITD would provide a substitute direct access to a future
public frontage road.
54.

The Plaintiffs fully complied with their obligations to ITD.

55.

In 1996-97, ITD breached the agreement by constructing the Interchange and the

extension of the frontage road but not connecting the Day Property with the public roads.
56.

ITD promised to not assert the statute of limitation defense while the parties have

been trying to work out a solution to the breach of contract. ITD has been working on a solution
since at least 1997. The Plaintiffs have patiently waited for ITD to comply. ITD’s efforts to
fulfill its promises continued through 2014 and 2015, and most recently in 2015, ITD indicated
that it was preparing to build the public access road to join Eisenman Road to the Day Property.
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57.

The Day Family has been incurring damage since the breach but has not acted to

file this lawsuit because of their reliance upon ITD’s promise regarding the statute of limitations.
58.

In May of 2016, however, the Plaintiffs learned that ITD would not build the

public road where ITD had planned (and assured the Plaintiffs that it would build it) because of
ACHD’s refusal to approve an approach and because adjoining property owner(s) would not
grant permission or acknowledge that the Day Family had any right for a public right-of-way to
traverse their properties. It is now clear that ITD will not be able to resolve the breach by
building the access road to mitigate the damages.
59.

ITD’s breach of its obligation to build a public road reconnecting the Day

Property with direct access to the existing public roads has resulted in significant damages to the
Plaintiffs, specifically in terms of the significant decrease in value of the Day Property due to the
lack of public access.
60.

In addition, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the legal prejudgment statutory rate

of 12% per annum from the date of the first breach of contract, in approximately 1997.

COUNT THREE
(BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
61.

ITD (through its predecessors in interest) and the Plaintiffs (through their

predecessors in interest) reached an agreement whereby the Plaintiffs surrendered their direct
access to established public roads in exchange for a written obligation that ITD would provide a
substitute direct access to a future public frontage road.
62.

The Plaintiffs fully complied with their obligations to ITD.
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63.

Part and parcel with the express terms of its contract with the Plaintiffs, ITD had

an implied contractual covenant to perform its obligations under the contract in good faith and
fair dealing.
64.

ITD breached that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For example,

ITD passed on opportunities to negotiate with ACHD for an appropriate approach for a public
access road to connect the Day Property to the public frontage road. Similarly, ITD repeatedly
led the Day Family to believe that an acceptable resolution was forthcoming. ITD has also failed
to utilize its condemnation powers as necessary and has failed to otherwise enforce its legal
rights to provide the promised access road. ITD has also failed to take the necessary legal actions
to resolve all access disputes.
65.

ITD’s breach of its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has resulted in

significant damages to the Plaintiffs, specifically in terms of the significant decrease in value of
the Day Property due to the lack of public access.
DEMAND FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Plaintiffs have been forced to retain attorneys, and have incurred and will continue to
incur, attorneys’ fees and costs in defending this action. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from
Defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-121
and/or 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. Rule 54, and/or any other applicable Idaho statute or case law
regarding inverse condemnation.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby respectfully demand a trial by jury as to all issues raised by the
pleadings in this matter pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 38(b).
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PRAYER

Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for judgment of this Comi as follows:

I.

For an award of monetary damages, in the form of just compensation or

otherwise, in an amount to be proven at the trial of this matter;
2.

For interest at 12% per annum from the date of the take and/or breach of contract;

3.

For costs and reasonable attorney fees; and

4.

For such other and further relief as may be deemed just and proper.

.sf--

DATED this_[_ day of November, 2016.

URKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
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AGREEMENT

-rHIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 17 T!d ay
oi

Jv.; •· ¢; ·," k c; r'

, 1961, by and between EMMA N. DAY,

a w i do w, and ERNEST E . DAY , ROBERT L. DAY a ncl DONA L D M.

DAY, each. of Boi liie, Idaho, hereinafter c alled the Owners and the
.STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, hereinafter called
the Departme nt,

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Owners hold title to the NE 1/4 of

Se c tion 19, T own ship 2 No rth, Range 3 E ast, B. M. , approximately
n ine a c res of which, along with l'elated access rights , are b elieved
by t he Departm.ent to be r equired in c onn e ct i on with the c onstruc tion

of I nterstate Hi ghway SON under the terms of Highway P roj e c t No.
l-S0N -2(3)61 ; and
WHEREAS, said P r oject terminate• a short distanc e

north of the Owner s ' p roperty aud plane have n ot yet been formulated
for the co nstruction of the n ext (northerly) eection 0 £ In terstate
Highway 80N; aod

W:HEREM, the parties a r e unaple at pruen,t to neg~

tiaie reasonji.bly for the purc ~a.se of eaid ni11.e

&CHI,

together with ,

acce111, right, by the Department becau•• of u ncertainty in the Departament as to the c haracter of future c o nat r uction plane concerning th'e
next soc tion of the highway-:fand further the effect thereof on the'
Owners ' p roperty rights, such f utu_re conatru_ction will have a d h tect
boaring on any pur chaee price, and the value of the right• a c quire4,

~HIBIT

l
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from Ownere, particularly in regard t o the p o••ible construction of au
interchange, frontage roads, and

10

forth; and

WHEREAS, t he Department is desi rous of enter ing into
poeeecsion of that portion of Owners• property deac r ibed below at the
present time, and the Owners not wiiihing to delay the Department'6
highway c onstruction program u•e willing to permit possession by the
Department in accor d a nce with the following:
NOW , THEREFORE, tbe parties h ereto as l'ee as
follows :

The Ovmers stipulate that the Department may take
p ossession of the following described property for highway constl'uc tion purpos es as above set forth:
A parcel of land being on both s idee o f the

east and west bou.nd l ane• survey c enter lines
of Interstate SON, P roject No. I -80N-2(3)61
Highway Survey a1 sbown on the plan.a the reof
now on file in the office of the Departmer.t
of Highways of the Sta te of Idaho, and lying
over and across tbe E l / 2 NE 1 / I. of Section
19 , Township 2 North, R.ange 3 East, B oiae
Meridian, dea cr ibed as follows, to wit:

Beginni ng at a point i n the north line of
Section 19, Township Z No r th, Range 3 Eas t,
B . M. whic h point is 1197. 86 feet westerly
from the nor t heast corner of aaid Section 19,
thence Southeasterly along a line parallel
with and 100. 0 feet South.westerly from the East
Boun.d lane center line of said Inte rstate SON,
P roje ct No. I-SON- 2(3)61 Hiiihway Survey, being
an 11559 . 16 foot radius curve l eft, e. dis tance
of S9. 0 feet, more o r le••• to a point that
bears South 51°37'53" West 100. 0 feet from
said east bound lane survey cante r line Station
484-KI Z.. 14; thence South 38°22.'07 " East along
said p aralle l line a d iatance of 1861. 59 feet
to a p oint in the east l ine of s aid Section 19 ,
which poi nt bears South 51°37'53" West 100. 0
feet from east bound lane survey St ation
5 03+23. 73; thence Northerly along aaid ea■ t
line a dis.tancl; oi 685. 0 feet, more or lase, to

-z-
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a [)Oint in the Nortnea11terly right of way
line of present U. S. Highway No. 30, 2.6 &
2.0 as d escribed in that certain ?"igbt of way
d eed dated June 2.9, 1936, recorded July 2.,
1936, in the records of Ada County, I daho
In Book 217 of Deeds at page 424; thence
Northwesterly along said present highway
right of way line a distance of 11 30. 0 feet ,
more or less , to a point in the north line of
said Section 19; thence westerly alon g s aid
n orth line 425. 0 feet, more or less, to the
P oint of Beginning.
Eai;t Bound Lane Survey Station Referenc e:
484+83. 03 to 501+95. 69
The area above desc-ribed contains a pp!"oximately 13. 42 ac-ree, 4. 43 &lii:r-e!JI of which is
a c knowledged to be a portion of a p ublic road .
Further, all a c ces& rights from Owners ' p r operty on
both sides of the p resent U. 6. Highway 30 to U. S. Highway 30 and
to Interstate Highway SON as constructed and all easements of access
to, from and between Owners' property a8 divided by s aid highways
shall be waived and extinguished where the property a b uts upon
said highways.
It is further agreed that the Department shall determine

its final plans with respect to Owners' p roperty w ithin a reasonable
period of time consistent with the complexity of the project, and will,
upon eucb determination, negotiate in good faith with Owners, to the
end that Owners will re c eive a fair and reasonable p ri ce for the prop•
erty so a c quired, including severance d am ages if any . ;Nothing herein
shall be so construed as to deprive Owners of any rigats which they
may have a• provided by law, t o fillrly compensate them f or sue~
dama ge as they m .ay suffer by reason of such taking and by reaaon o~•
these p r esent s.

1

-3-
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties he ret.o have be l'eunto exec uted the.G e p resents the day and year fir st above written.

ID.AHO DE?ART :.~ENT C F HIGHWAYS
.A PPROV ED AS TO FORM:
(

( "'·

/.

. /i._'

(,., . , ,.,.

.Attorn e y

.,

.!.
w ay Engi n eer

-

-

RECOMMENDED:

OWNERS:

-

z(:,,~ / .... I
I

2

ct

'- I ... .,tr:@
. " .,.) .,.,. •

Jr

I

,,{ /. .,...; .7

r,Jf-·""7- .,,._-~·
r

STAT E OF IDAHO)
) BB.

County of .Ad a

)

On thtdl~ay of N.y,t11'1',f€'<, , 196 1, before me,
the unde rsigned, a Nata r y Public in and £or said State , person ally appeared
G. B RY CE BENNETT, known to m e t o be the State Highway Er,gineer of
the Idaho Department of Highways whose name i a subsc ribed to the within
in111trun;ent, and acknowler.lged to me th.at he execut ed the same as such
State H1ghway Enginee r.

u,t,e_¼,1:(~··6--v'-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunt o set my hand a nd
a ffixed my offidtl seal the day-and
i this c ertific at e first above
written.
.,, /J"
/;

yaa
-r

.

Notary Public fol' Idaho
Residence: Boise , ! d aho

- 4-
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S TA TE OF IDAHO)
) 68.

County o f Ade.

)

):

I

On this 2day of / ~') ;1. .. (, , , ,. , l 96 I, befo re me,
t he undersigned, a Notary P ublic: 16 and for eaid State, personally appeared
E MM.A N . DAY, ERNEST E . DAY, ROBERT L. DAY and DONALD M. DAY
known to rtie to be t he pe1·son~ whose names are subs::ribed to the w ithin
instrument, au::1 acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed n·1y official seal the day and ye&.z· in tl~.!_s qirtifi::_a ie first above
'
..) , . /
written .
_/
/.:/

··,,.. .

_.,?',t/

.-.::·

/

Z

/

,

/ , ~ •::,' ;_,,,.-'

. _ i,l-..,, ,

'

'///.1.
,..
•

.
...,:;,,;,.__.
.,.,,,.-

Notary 'P'11blic for Idaho
Residence: B ,Jise, Idaho

. . ./ · V

- .:.

I

\
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DH-363 A Rev. 3-67

STATE OF IDA HO
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS

Right Of Way Contract
EAST BO!JHD LANE
Sta.

County
Project

111111.aJ

to Sta.

n3

Parcel No.

I- BON- 2(3)61

50) •95 fiQ

2

THIS AGREEMENT: Made t his UJ:d. day of
Octob"li
, 19_g_, between
the STATE OF IDAHO , acting by its Board of Highway Director s, by its State
Highway Engineer or his authorized representative, herein called "State",
and Emma ti, Day, n widow, Ernest B. Dav 1 Robert L. Dov ond Donal d ~l. Olly.
·· herein called "Grantor ( s ) '' ,
WHEREAS , Grantor (s) "her ewith de l i ver(s) to State
for highway pur poses.

Warranty !Jeed

a

(Type of Instrument)

NOW, THE$FORE, the pa r tie s hereto agree as follows:
t. 'State shall pay Grantor( s) and the lienhotder(s ), if any, such sums of moneys as
are set out below. · Gran tor( s) agree( s) to pay all taxes and assessments due and owing, including those for the year 19._a.
2. This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed by the State Highway
Engineer o~ ·his authorized representative.
The parties have herein set out the whole of
their agreement, the ~erformance of which constitutes the entire consideration for the grant
of said right of w~y and shall relieve the State of all further claims or obligations on that
account or on account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway.
AMOUN'T

,
3.

•

Pa-ent for 8 ,99 acres of lond and full control of acceoo to the
I nterstate Hi«hwav

11

.-:--•-·--- A~--.. •n

5-

Access

&

da11111~es to

DAV

thP.

ve• ___.

Al 1

....

reC11J indcr •• lumo

-$:J().O()'. Q0 ..j

11l11:1.

.1.nts ln~ludlnr. l 967 taxe9

llA!IP.4 ....

to Graitor9 re~~inin~ or o.,..rtv eoutherlv of thP. lnt.erstate

Ml«huAv

••11

•-n- •L F,••··-., •--••- !fo

'-• • •••"•'-1 -

on the southwesterly side of I - BON.

--•-' """

A

•nrelc ,1,-fv.,

(I- I G- SON- 2(16)54)

:

/

..

'

'lotfll Cn~h SetLlcment $_,i,,.O:,:o_,.o.._
. o"'o::-___

_

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the parties have executed thi3 Agrccmenl th~ clny and ycnr fu-st above written.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HlGHWAYS

Recommended !or A p p r o v n l ~ ~

9~

~;tnt.c Highway Engineer

Chl, t

'--y-,~

•

~~
="'~'=7

:: ~of:~

;;;:tzl···'
::.~··--~·. (h...,.,
:.. ·-·1
a [Ylt;. .. n,,., .,

C

19ifL.
w,, A• onl

W
--.. . . . .-'-'~. . . ......,~..-.b.
__~
. . =~'-"
,,...._.4,.,.i!-1'_:!"/..___ _ _
~••••01 M

I
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DH-351(R/W) (Rev. 7 /25/66)

Parce1 No. _ _2_ _ __

Access Rights___./_,___ Negat:f.ve Easements _ _

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENXS, TRAX EMMA N • DAY 1 a widow.
&~ES T E. DAY , liOBEiiT L· DAY & ornALp M. DAI

County of d'_,,e
, State of .,?'"~A-t:2 , f:f.r•t part _ _, for and in
consi.derat:i.oo of 2'c:ez ,<"Tl?".'.'.'. - ~ e
•
~ Dollars,
pai.d to t:-"-'r--n: • ,. recei.pt whereois acknow1edged, ha~ granted, bargained. sold and conveyed, and ·oy these presents do_grant, bargain,

sel.l. and convey unto the State .of :Idaho, grantee, i.ts successors and
assigns forever, in fee s:lmp1e, the following descr~bed parcel of land
si.tuated in the Com:ity of

Ada

• St:ate of Idaho to-wit ~ ·

A paroe1 of 1and being on both aides 0£ the East a.nd West Bound Lanes
Survey center1ines o~ Interstate SON, Project No. I-80N-2(J) 61. Highway
Survey as shown on the pl.ans thereo£ now on ~i1a 1.n the o£rice 0£ the
Department o:f Highways of the State o:f Idaho , and 1y:l.ng over and across
the E!NE.e or Secti.on 19, Townsh~p 2 North, Range J East, Boise Meridian,
descr:l.bed as £oll.ows, to-wit:
Begu:izung a.t a poi.nt i.n thel ·Horth J.ine ot: Seot1.on J.9 , Township 2 North,
Range J East, Boise Meridian, which point 1a 11.97 . 86 feet Westerl.y
£roM. tn.e !wrtheast oorner o:J: said Section 19; · tbence Southeaeter1y
a.l.ong· a ·J.~~- para.l.J.el w.1.th and 100.0 i'eet Southwee't;er1)'" i'rom the East
Bc;,und...Lane··.1Jenterl.ine o .: £ sai.d Interstate SON, Project No. r-SON-2(3)61
·Ri.ghva~ Sbrv:ey and bei.ng an l l , 559.16 .foot r~di.us curve l.ei't a distance
_-o~ ?,9.b £~et~_more or l.ese. ~o a point that bea.%"a South 51°37' 53" West
~ l.GO.O :feet Q-om said Eastbound Lane Survey centerllne Stat1.on 484+62. 14;
·~.J:;Ji~c:e· Squi;b.- J8°22'07" East al.ong said para11&l. 11.ne a distance of 1.861. 1
f,eat · 1.a•,,f.1.': P61nt in the Ji;ast line of :udd Section l.9 wh1.ch point bears
Sou.th, S,J. 11'57' 53" Wef)t 100.0 .fti!et. f'rom Ea~J: ~~d _Lane Survey Statl:on-:"303-+ } . 73
thence Nortberl.y al.ong said East .1.1.ne a di.stance of' 685.0 feet, more or
l.e:ss • to
Point i.n the Northeaster1y r:1ght o£. way line o:f present U. S .
Highway N • JO-, ~6 .nd 20 as described ·in that certain right of' way
Deed , dated- Ju.ne 29, 1936,· recorded Ju1y 2, 1936 in ~hu Records of Ada
County, Idaho ~n Book 217: 0£ Deeds at page 424; thence Northwesteriy
al.ong said prese.n t Highway r:l.ght or way l.ine a di.stance 0£ l.l.JO.O f'eet,
more or l.ess, to a poi.nt in the North line
said Section 19; thence
Westerly al.ong said - North line· 425 . 0 reet, mor1:t or 1ess, to the l'OINT

.
I

e

oC

OF BEG:rlm'ING.,

.

464+g3.03 to 501+95.69.
The area above described contain8 approJd.matel.y lJ.42 acres, 4.43 acres

Ea3t Bound Lane Survey Station Rererenoe:
0£

w.bic~ 1.s acknowl.edged to be a portion 0£" a public road.

The bearinss ~• shown in the above 1and desori.pti.onJ unl.ess otherwise
noted. are .f'rom t .he Idaho Pl.ane Coordinate System, oaaed on the transverae mercator project~on £or the West Zone 0£ Idaho. To convert to
geodeti.c bearing3~ a correction o.f' 0°15'52" muet be subtracted :from aJ.1
Northeast a.tld Southwest bearings and added to a.11 Northwes~ and Southeast bearings .
.

.
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000044

TOGETHER WITH ali rights of access·between the right of way of
the said project and the remaining contiguous real property belonging
to the Granter£_, except £or: access to the Future
Stock Drives on the Southwesterl side of In

that no building

on any of _ _ _ r
the sa~d project. and the
, and devices within 660
to business conducted

mitted not

o

the Gren.tor

. tan 20 feet therefr01!1,

.

.

,v.

rema
be peron land utiliz

9¥:t fFlY

Q
♦#

'.t'O HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances,
unto the said Grantee and its successors and assigns forever.

And th~

Grantor£_ do_ hereby covenant to and wi.~h the said Grantee, that t_he~
a ~ the ar.mer_:! in fee simple of sai.d premises; that they are free from
al.l. incumbrances and that ~he_l'. will warr11nt and defend the smne from al.I. lawful. cl.a:fms whatsoever.

:tN WITNESS ~O..f',
this 2L!:_~day of

Ck'c~

4

ha.e::::• here"1~o
• 19te:7

seal.z

STATE~~~w:::;--~~'-.co
_ _ _ _~)
Co1D:1ty

a-,,...,.

> ss.

of ___a.;;.;;.~--=;._---->

-J

i' -

,.
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' ...•..

. . ...

.: .

2019000013
CORPORATION EASEMENT

°/(oS9f:, CrJ

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That J. D. Aldecoa and Son,
Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of

,

Idaho, and having it.1! principal office in Idaho at 12 Mesa Vista Dr. Boise, in the (
County of Ada, Grantor, for value received, does hereby grant unto the STATE
OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPAR'l'MENT, by and through th~

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, Grantee, 3811 West State Street, Boise,

Idaho 83703, and its successors and assigns, an easement and r:ight to go upon,
occupy, and use a portion of NEl/4SWl/.t of Section 18, Township 02 North, Rat1ge
03 East, Boise, Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows, to-wit:
A strip of land 50.0 feet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way
bour,dary of Interstate 84,Project No. NH-84~2(047)59 Highway
Survey, aa shown on the plans thereof now on file in the office of the
Idaho Transportation Department, and as described in that certain
Warranty Deed to the Micron Technology Inc. executed by the
Grantor herein on the .8!.!.\aay of May, 1996, and lying between
Eisenman Road Survey Station. 86 + 88.83 as shown on said Highway
Survey and Grantor's Southerly property line.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING- OR INSTALLING TfiEREON a
Stock Drive and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its agents or
contractors.
The aforesaid facility once established shall remain in place as constructed
or installed for its intended purpose and shall not be removed or relocated by the

Grantor, its successors and a::;signs, without the prior approval of the Idaho
Transportation Department, or its assigns.

Pagel
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000047

2019000014
CORPORATION EASEM:ENT
The Idaho Transportation Department, its agents or transferees, shall have
the right to perform any maintenance they may deem necessary or wish to
exercise in connection with the aforesaid facility (including but not restricted

thereto, the right to make necessary repairs, alterations, removals or replacements
thereof), together with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to and from
said prope:ty for said purposes.
Grantor grants the Idaho Transportation Department an easement to use

the above-described real property for cattle and stock access purposes and for a
future public road. Such easement for cattle and stock access purposes shall be
held on behalf of those members of the public who reasonably require access by
their stock and cattle to property in the area of the above-described easement.
It is expressly intended that these burdens and restrictions shall run with
the land and shall forever bind the Grantor, its successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the G:rantor has caused its corporate name to be
hereunto subscribed b ..i+-""""'c.,"'1,'f"-"""'~~President and its corporate seal to be

affixed

by'iabtt /f, 1v;-1.r,'!'1- its Secrete.ry, the ~day of\n,air

,19!{b

J. D.<fs.l~ecoa and Son, Inc.

:~:1!Ja.'~
Page 2
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,019000012
CORPORATION EASEMENT

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) es.
County of Ada

)
11

On tlris {i! , day of m/J;,e
, in the year 199'-, before
me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, personally appeared
/}.e,qko/1
, known or identified to me to be the
(:;;,.,
of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person who
executed the instrument on behalf of saic corporation, and acknowledged to me
that such corporation executed the same.

~,..;Y

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day B!l.d year first above written.

Notary P lie for Idaho
Residing at: _fo~,:,'-1...., _e_ _ __
My commission expires: 1 a :f-"'1£

96039693
•

,t

..~LLIANCE TITLE ~

AC.,.\ C:".J. R:C•')?.DER
. -1,,.,.
J.
Uk• n ..· ••~'-JA?"O
.,,,
0

I

'

BOISE lD

3M

•ss rmv 10

_
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(9 p~5)
Project No .
Key No.

Parcel

96059985

0~

~~

HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED~
NH-F-84-2(047)59
.... ' . ••-: r:ORCEP.

6173
No. 7 ID.

No.

/~o~,.::j·
.~,:-i.\i~ilO
yJ.~
S"
(7

617BM07

'IlfIS DEED, made this

;.J

y{tL...

day of

j

'II

C. • ••

1

-f::;

(pl-'

~

, 191', by and

•as 1111 1 A nl'l 11 1°0
•
between the UNITED ~TATES OF AHERICAy '«et:g ,:;~~~ g h tha

..

DEPARTMENT Of TRANSPORTAT ION, FEO&AAL ~\~~~r ~J?~.l~l~~BM\tOH, herein-

after referred to as the OEPARTM£NT, and the STATE OF IDAHO, hereinafter

referred to as the STAT&:

WITNESS ETH . :

20•l7fJ01-l51

WHEREAS, the STATE has filed application under the provisions ol
the Act of Congress of Augu~t 27, 1958, as amended (23

u.s. c.

sec tion

J1 7), for the right-of-way of a highway over certain land ovned by tho

United States in the State of IDAHO, which is under the jurisdiction

01

the Department of Interior , Bureau of Land Hanagement; and

WHERUS, this transfer is !urther authorized under the provisions of the Act o! congress approved October is. 1966 (80 Stat. 9Jl,
9J7,

section 6fa][1J{AJ); ~nd
WHEREAS,

the

Federal

Highway

Administrator,

purauant

to

delegations of authority from the Secretary of Transportation, hao

determined that an easement over the land covered by the application is
reasonably necessary f or right-of-way for Interstate 84, Isaac's C~nyon
Interchange, Project No.

NH-f-84 - 2(047)59; and

WHEREAS, the Deparbllene of Interior, acting
I

j

I
I

Bureau o!

Land Management, has agreed to the transfer

by

and through the

by the OEPARTMENT

of an easement over the land to the STATE;
NOW THEREFORE, the DEPARTMENT, as authorized by law, docs hereby
grant to the STATE an easement for a right-of-way !or the operation and
maintenance of a highway and use of the space above and below tha

Pagel
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000050

HIGHWAY EASEMENT-~

Project No.

NH-F-84-2(047)59

Xey No. 6178
Parcel No. 7 IO.

No.

2047001~52

6178H07

established grade line of the highway pavement !or highway purposes on,
over, across, in, and upon the following described land ot the United
States:
SE►.SW►•

and

SW►.SE~

Section 18, Township 2 North, Range

J

East,

Boise Meridian as shown on Exhibit A, attac~ed hereto and mode a part

hereof,

subject,

however,

to the following tel"Jlls,

conditions,

and

covenants:
1.

If outstanding valid claims exist on the date of this use
authorization, the STATE shall obtain such pernission as
may be necessary on account of any such claims,

2.

The use right herein authoriz.ed shall terminate 10 years,

or sooner if agreed upon, from the date of execution of the
transfer docuMent by the DEPARTMENT to the STATE in the

event constru·ction ot the highway has not been initiated
during such period.
J.

The use right herein authorized is limited to the described
right-of-way ·and the space above and below for highw;,y

purposes and does not include ·any use rights for nonb ighway purposes.

4.

Retention of rights by the Bureau o! Land Hanagement to
use, or authorize use on, any portion
for

or

the right-of-way

non-h~ghway purposes provided such use would not

interfere with the free flow of traffic, impair the full

use and safety of the highway, or be inconsistent with the
provisions of Title 23 of the United states Code and the
Page 2
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT PEED

3

204 7001~!:;J

Project No. NH-F-84-2 (047) 59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7 ID. No. 6l78K07

regulatio~s p~rsuant thereto, and the DEPARTH£NT and th~
State

agency

concerned

shall

be

consulted

prior

to

exercising sueh ~i9hts.

s.

Location by the Bureau of Land Management of any Bureau
intormation signs on the portions of the right-of-w~y

outside of construction clearing limits except that such
signs shall not be located on the ,ight-of-way oC .!In
Interstate system.
6.

Consistent with highway sa!ety standards, the STATE agency
shall:
a.

Protect and preserve

soil and vegetative cover

and

scenic and esthetic values on the ri9ht-of-vay outsid~

of construction limits.
b.

ouring construction activity, gmetgenc:t erosion

control

erosion JDate,

filter

material

(straw bales,

cloth/sedi=ent fences)

fi.ber
vill

be

available

for

tho

installation o! sediment traps if such is ne~ded tram
a cat~strophlc rain.

If erosion control ~itigation is

not fully in place prior to completion o! d~ily vork,

all areas that

h4ve

potential to erode and contribute

sediment to live waters will have sediment trapo in

place (straw bale traps, sediment !encen, nulch) to
prevent erosion/sedi~ent reaching live vaters.
c.

All disturbed soil/vegetation areas should be seeded,

t:ertilized,' and mulched iuediately a!ter construction
Page J
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HIGliHAX

Project No.

EASEMENT

PE&Q

4

20-17001-154

NH-f-84-2(047)59

Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7 ID.

No.

"6178~07

activity is completed.

practical seeding and

If

mulching should take place the day of the disturbanco,
and

if ~arranted

conditions.

re-seeded during more

favorable

The following seed mix will be used for

seeding disturbed areas associated with this project:

Nordan cre~ted Wheatgraas
Siberian Wheatgrass
Secar Snake River Wbeatgrass
Russ hn Wildrye

2

Firecracker Penstemon

l

Lewis Flax

l

Scarl~t Globe-mallov

2
4

2
_l.

13

7.

lbs.Jae

lbs,/ac.
lbs. /ac.
lbs./ac.

lbs.Jae.

lbG,/ac.
lbs. /ac.
lbs. /ac.

No sites for highway operation and maintenance tacilitieo,

camps, supply depots, or disposal areas within the righto!-w-ay 111ay be established without obtaining approval of the

Bureau of Land Management authorized officer.
8.

Application of chemicals shall be pursuant to the Hational

Environmen~ Policy Act and shall be approved by the
DEPARTMENT prior to applicati-on by the STATE,

9.

The provisions

of

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act ot 1964

(78 Stat. 242} shall be complied with.
10.

The halder(s) shall comply ~ith all applicable federal lawn

and

regulations

promulgated.

existing

or

hereafter

enacted

or

In any event, the holder(c) shall co~ply with

the Toxic 5Ub$tances Control Act of 1976, as amended (15
u.s.c. 260i,

.el;.RQ....)

With regard to any toxic substances

that are used, generated by or stored on the right-of-way
or on facilities authorized under this right-of-vay grant.
Page 4
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HIGHWAY EASFJreNT DEED
Projec:t No.
.Key No.

Z047001-l55

NH-F-84-2(047)59

6178

Parcel No. 7 IO.

No.

6178M07

(See 40 CFR, · Part 702-799 and· espec:ially, provisions

polychlorinated

biphenyls,

CFR

011

7Gl. 1-761, 19:l)

Additionally, any release .ot toxic substances ( lcaku,
Gpills.

etc.)

in

excess

established by 40 CFR,
required

by

the

or

the

reportablo

Part 117 shall

Comprehensive

quanti~y

be reported

Environmental

.111

Responsu,

Co~pensation and Liability Act of 1980, Section 102b,

A

copy of any report required or requested by any Federal
agency or State 9overnment as a result of a reportable
release or spill of any toxic substances shall be rurnishecl

to the authorized officer concurrent with the filing or th~
reports to the involved Federal agency or State g~~errunent.
11.

The

holder

of

Right-of-Way

No.

IOI-31669 agreeo

to

inde~nify the United States against any liability arisin9

from the release of any hazardous substance or hazardous
waste (as these terms are .defined in the comprehensivr

EnviroMental Response, Compensation and Liabllity Act of
1980, 42

u.s.c.

9601 .e.t s.eg.

and Recovery Act of 1976, 42

.or the Resource Conservation

u.s.c.

6901 at .G.Wi•l

on th·

right-01-.ay (unless the release o~ threatened release is
wholly un~elated to the right-of•vay holders activity on
the ri9ht··of-11~y), or resulting frolll the acti'Vity of the
right-of-way holder on the right-of-way.

This agreement

applies without regard to whether a release is cause by the
holder, its agent, or unrelated third parties.
Page S
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I
000054

HIGHWAY EASEMENT QEED

6

2047001456

Project No. NH-F-94-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7 tr. No. 617BM07
1.2.

•the STATE, in consideration of the grant of this easement,

does hereby covenant and agree as a covenant running with
the land for itself, its successors and assigns that:
a.

No person shall, on the grounds of race, color, uex,
age, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in,

be denied

the

benefits

of,

or

be

otherwise

subjected to discrimination vith regard to an)' facility
located wholly or in part on, over or under such lnnds

hereby conveyed;
b.

The STATE shall use said easement right-of-way so
conveyed, in compliance with all requirements imposad
by

or

pursuant

to

Title_ 49,

Code

of

Federal

Regulat"ions, Department of Transportation, Subtitle A,

Office of the secretary, Part 21, Nondiscrimination in
federally

assisted

programs

of

the

Department of

Transportation, effectuation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. and ·as said Regulations may be
amended.
13.

When need for the easement herein granted shall no longer
exist, the STATE shall give notice of that fact to the

Secretary of Transportation and the rights herein granted
shall tenninate and the land shall !~mediately revert to
the full control of the Department of Interior, Bureau of
Land Management.
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000055

HIGffHAX EASEMttfl' PEEP
Project No.
Key No.

7

20-17001457

HH-f-84-2(047)59

6178

Parcel No. 7 ID.

No.

6178H07

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I,

Regional Counnel

Robert B. ·Rutledge,

pursuant to delegations of authority from the Secretary ot Transportation,

Highway

the Federal Highway Adainistrator,
Adininit.ltrator,

Administration,

by

and

Chief

the Regional Federal

Counsel,

Federal

virtue of authority in me vested by

H1qhvay
law,

havo

hereunto subscribed my name as of the day and year first ~bove written.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OtPAR'l'MENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

STATE OF OREGON

)

)ss:
COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH)
I

I

clt;~ lo~

r

&,J,,£;,S€R

I

}9_p•:

a Notary P1

in and for the Stat oC Oregon, do !l_e;eby certify that on the -5:1..:.___
day of
:fuo.JE:
·
, 19.7.(;, before me personally appuaretl
Robert B. Rutledge, Regional Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
and acknowledged that th~; foregoing instrument bearing date of
.Tc,r,tE
~
, l9_pp vas executed by him, in his of!icial
capac1ty an by authority 1n him vested by law, for the purposeo and
intents in said instrwnent described and set forth, and ackno-wledged th<?
sum to be his free act and deed as Regional Counsel, Federal Hiyhvay

Administration.

19.J.k

,/

Witness Jay hand and seal this

1

day of J;:,tJlC:

_,

My couission

Pc1ge 7
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000056

UICHWAX EAStMDfT DEED
Project No.

8

NH-P-84-2(047)59

Key No. 61-78
Parcel No. 7 IO.

No.

6178K07

In compliance with the conditions set forth in the foregoing
deed, STATE certifies, and by the eeceptance of this deed, accepts the

right-of-way over certain land herein described and agrees !or itsolf,
its successors and assigns forever to abide by the conditions set !orth
in said deed.

STATE OF IDAHO. Acting by and thr'lugh
the Idaho Transportation Board

J~~

By,~
MONTE
~ ! H!ghway
Operations,
Idaho
Transportation

Department
STATE OF

county of

_J__l_/4.....~_ _ _ )
AJ

) ss.

(E'\

)

On this iJ.JJ:__ day. of 1'-i .. t
~ 19~, before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared
MONTE J. FIALA, known to ae to be the Chief of Highway Operations for

the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department, by and through the

Idaho Transportation Board, and acknowledged to me that he execute~ as
such Chief of Highway Operations for the State of Idaho,

Notary Public ~r-

Residing in.
Ny commission

\

I·
I

I

~

J'44
"""

expires

J. f.-t.l_z
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U.S. BUREAU OF LA1VD lv/A1VAG£j)!JE1VT

PERJrfJT No. llJI- 31669

IDAHO TRA1VSPORTATI01V DEPARTlvlE1VT
'U\\\U\l f FAP 1Vo. 1VH- 84-2(047) 59
EXHIBI T ".4,, . 11~-~t•·:·,,: ! ,.
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!vl..r Loren D lnom~. P.E.
Di.suic1 Engineer
State of Idaho
Transpo.rution Depan:ment
P.O. Box 8028
Boise, !daho 83707 - 2028

710 VISTA

80)( 8286

BOISE.

PHON E 342,3S28

IDAHO 83707

Ucl.:.c:mhc:r 12, I 997

Dcilf Sir.
This letter is addressed to you at Dan Cantrells suggestion.
-~ of this writing, chere seems to be no provision for !he "Future Frontage Road" into
ba~n:':s Canyon .i!i shown in yow- Right of Way Contrnc1II I-80-2{3 }61, and
accompanying Warranty Deed inst.# 677552.{Artached} [n !he 1960's. the Day family
ncgo1ia1ed a number of Right of Way properties to facilitate the occurrence of nn lnterstale
Highway ro enhance the Boise Valley. This was done with a certain amounl of sacrifice by
~ for I.he good of che community.

Prior co 1967, our property in Section 19, 2E,3N B.M fronted on Federal Way/ Highwnys
'.W.26 and 30 as they eniered Isaac's Canyon. We had a number of roads leading south and
,vest from 1his point.
ln re rum for abandoning our .frontage, the State agreed co provide a .Right of Way for a
fromage road along the west side of the Interstate. This right of way shows quite clearly
on 1he drawings provided to us in 1967, as well a~ on the plans for the L~aac 's Canyon
ln1erchange. {Attached;highlighted}
In tvlarch of 1996, your Department held an informational meeting for the public. Afler
scc:in.g the proposal, I made an appointment with Dick Krietzcr for further dis~ussion. Al
chat time, he assured me you were only in the planning stage and a final location for the
new interchange had not been determined and our concem.s would be addressed.
Larcr cha1 year, 1 scopped by to follow up on the progress and was shown a drawing t:h.:it
had a "Stock Drive" traversing 20% contOW"S, changing elev ations of 100+ feet three times
in less th.an o half of rnik. At that time, I ~de a date with Mr. Kreitzer to further discuss 1
1his mailer. When I went back, he told me that unless I could show evidence for access
other t:han a stock drive, the State had fulfilled its obligation.

EXHIBIT
OC'VU.OP'ICfU OF
VIS.T A 't'tLL.t.C: t Sl'IO,,IHC: CCr-(7t"II
D"4'f v,S TA 4-DO I HOl'f
C:N UlltT W'l$TA
Mt.S4 'ol'l&T A
COVHT IO CI..Ull

co~, cnu•~c

I

JO
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We then produced our copies of the Contract and accompanying Warranty Deed between
the Days and the State and was told that they brought "new light" to the matti:r. Mr.
Kreitzer said he· d discuss this with his superiors and get back with me, but he did not.

In the spring of this year, I began an earnest effort to contact l\.1r. Kreitzer; I made a
nuraber of phone calls with no reply. His last answering machine message said he had
retired.
We immediately contacted tv1r. Cantrell and Jack Sparks. After discussing the m.atter with
them, they assured me they would have an answer for me by the middle lo late July of this
year.

In December, we received a drawing of a Jeep Trail across steep BLM ground and an offer
to discuss this matter with Mr. Cantrell, which we did. At that meeting. on Tuesday,
December 9: 1997. Mr. Cantrell first told us he wasn't sure you could provide access
across the BLlvi ground and suggested we hire an anomey. We said we would like to
avoid hiring an attorney, so he suggested we write to you.
ln summary. after being able to drive directly to the property prior to 1967 via Federal Way

,ind exchanging that for a "Future Frontage Road Right of Way" on a gentle slope, we
wound up with a ''Stock Drive" over impassable terrain. This, in our opinion, does not
satisfy the provisions in your· original contract with us.
As you no doubt know, the property needed to comply with this Contract is about to
£ransfer from the BLM to private ownership. Therefore, y0ur prompt consideration of this
marrer i~ imperative.
On a related matter. we are also no longer able to drive to our parcel on the north side of
the freeway. It seems the new interchange has covered the road thal the telephone
companies and the owners have always used co maintain this Parcel. ft also appears chat
the survey
. on our north border on the west side of the freeway. doesn ' t follow the section
line . We would also appreciate an opportunity to discuss both of these issues \'.ilh you at
your earliest convenience. As noted above1 time is against 1;1s. Please advise.

J,?r~ty-~

~1
Day Family
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STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT Or-' HIGHWAYS

Right Of Way Contract

EAST BOUND LANE

County
Project

Sta .

to Sta •

£,Alt+R3 03

Parcel No .

I-SON- 2( 3 )61

5Q1 • 9~ fi9

2

THIS AGREEMENT', Made this 2ltJ1. day of
October
, 19 67 , bet ween
the STATE OF I DAHO , acti ng by its Boa rd of Hi ghway Directors , by its State
Highway Engineer or hi s a uthorized representative, herein call ed "Sta te",
and Emma N, Dav. n widow. Ernest E. Dav, Robert L. Dav and Donald ~l. vay.
·· her e in called "Gran tor ( s ) " ,
WHEREAS, Gran tor( s) 'herewith deliver(s) t o Sta te a warranty Deed
f or highwa y purposes.
(Type of I nstrument)
NOW , THE~FORE, the parties hereto agree as fo llows:
l . 'state shall pay Grantor(s) and the lienholder(s), if any, such sums of moneys as
are set out below. · Grantor(s) agree(s) to pay all taxes and assessments due and owing, including those for the year 19_u_.
2 . This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed by the State Highway
Engineer or'-·h is authorized r epresent ative.
The parties have herein set out the whole of
thei r agreement , the ~erformani:e of which constitutes the en.tire consideration for the grant
of said right of way and shall relieve the State of all further claims or obligations on that
account or -on account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed h i ghway.
A>IOUNT

·'

?avrne nt for 8 . 99 a cres of l and and ful l control of access to the

3.

Int e rs t ate Hi ~hwav & da111A~es to the r emainder
to

..

lump

~'.§',9~Q:;J;)Q.~

SUCJ,.

88SP.~Sl!l!!ntS i.ncludiru! 1967 taxes

4

er~ ft+:nri:; 89.' """"P.;

s.

Access t o Gr at tors rell'.aini nS! or ooer tv sout hC?rlv of tile Interstat e

DAV ,a} l

tll><eR on-'

Hi ,rh ,,nv ,.,11 1 hp - --~ 0 "" 1., " - nm . ..... ~, -- ---.. F~nn•• <ro ___ ,. j\n .-l ~•nclr d .. ive

on the s outhuesterly side o f l-80N.

{I-IG- 8ON- 2 (16)54)

;
'.

/
~

'

Total Cash Settlement $,-'~"-'o"-'o"-'o"-',..,o"-''o--.....;._ __
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed th is Agreement the day and yenr first above writteri,
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
'
:;con:~~~de~:/p:::v.al~

By
By

~

~fr~

~

~A,,n,

Aru Rl;M
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DH-351(R/W) (Rev. 7/25/66)

WARR.ANrl DEED

Access Rigbes___✓------ Negative Easeiuenes _ _

Pa:rce1 No. _ _2_ _ __

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PP..ESENI'S, THAT
E.'C/J'! ES T E •

DAY I

EMMA N • DAY I

a widow,

nOBERT L• DAY & 00,JAL O M. DAY

Councy of &--"-£
• State of ~..,;,,k,::> , fi.rst part __, for and i.n
consideracion 0£ Z::.cz
.,-v.../2,e
~ Dollars,
paid to ;r'./4.,.1?'7 • • receipt whereof is ackn.owl.edged, h ~ granted, bargained, so1d and conveyed, and · oy these presents do_
gra:nt, bargain,
.
se1 1 and convey unto the State . of Idaho, grantee, its successors and
assigns forever, :in fee simple, the following described parcel of land 1
si.t:uaced in ehe County of
Ada
, State of Idaho t o-wi.t ~
A parcel or land being on. both aides 0£ the East and West Bound Lanes
Survey center1ines 0£ Interstate SON, Project No. I - SON- 2(J) 6J. Highway
Survey as shown on the p1ans thereo£ now on ~i1e in the o£rice 0£ the
Departm·e nt of' Highways of: the State of' Idaho, and lyi.ng over and across
the E¼NE! 0£ Sect~on 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian,
described as f'o11ows, to-wit:

,_,.a::;

j

BegiZJn.iog at a po1.nt

;1.n

thel-North J.ine 0£ Section 19, Township 2 North,

Range J East, Boise Meridian, which point is J.J.97.86 feet Westerly

£rom_ t"h.e ~rtheast corner 0£ said Section l9; ' tbence Southeasterly
al.ong·a -i~n~. para1le1 ld.th and 100.0 £eet Southwes~er1y £rom the East
J BC?und ~La.ne··:Benterllne o;f' said :Interstate 80N • Project Mo. I-80N- 2(:3 )61
1·ru.gbva-i Surv.ey and being an l l , 5 59.16 f'oot ra.d:J.us curve lei't, a distance
: -of ?9. 0 f~et,s.- .more or 1es a, to a point that bears South 51°37'53" West
i 100.Q :feet . A"om said Eastbound Lane Survey centerline Station 484+62.14;
·•.1,hence S9~h..·.38°22'0?" East a.l.ong said para1lel. 1ine a distance of 1.861. 9
f~~t · ~a;·~ J)6int in the East line 0£ sa:ld Sect~on l.9 which point bears
South. s:J.!>'Y-7' 53" Wei;it 100.0 .£.i!et. .f'rom East ~01.UAd _Lane Survey SUtb>n"'.'303➔ ~ - 73
thence Norther1y along sai.d East line a ' distance 0£ 685.0 £eet, more or
l.ess, to e, po:int :J.n the Northeasterly rlght or. way line 0£ present u. S.
Highway N • 30-, 26 and 20 as described ·i.n that certain right o.f way
Deed- dated- June 29, 1936,· recorded Ju1y 2, i936 in uie Records 0£ Ada
County, Idaho in Book 217:cf Deeds at page 424i thence Northwesterly
al.Ong said present Highway right or way 1in~ a distance of 11)0.0 .feet,
more or l.ess, to a point in the North line
said Section 19; thence
Westerl:Y a1ong said -North line · 425.0 .f'eet, more or less, to the POINT
OF BEGINNING.
.

or

4g4+e3.03

East Bound ~ane Survey Station Re£erence:

to 501+95.69.

The area above described contain8 approx:1mate1y 13.42 acres, ~.43 acres
0£ whic~ is acknowledged to be a portion of" a public road.
The bearin§S as shown in the above 1and description, un1ess otherwi.se
=ted. are :Crom the Idaho Plane Coordinate System, baaed on the transverse mercator projeceion £or the West Zone 0£ Idaho. To convert to
geodetic bearings, a correction o.f 0°1.5' 52" must be subtracted i'roJD ail
'Northeast and Southwest bear~ng~ ana adaed to al.1 Northwest and Southeast. bearings.
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TOGETHER WITH al.i rights of access ·between the right of way 0£
the said project and the remaining contiguous real property belonging
to the Gra:ntorL, except £or: access to the future Frontage Road and

Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side

I-IG-80N-2(J6)54 H1ghway Purvey.

or

Interstate

aoN,

Project

fu2.

ee that no building
g~ti':'°' or drainage stru
the right of way of

II

on any of - - - r
• land ~th:i:n 1.000 _feet:
the said project, and the rig
ohi.bit
, and devices within 660 feet ther
i
to business conduct:ed.~IQ--mrf"or the Granter
rema
be permitted not:
therefrom, ~ t ff11Y on land util z
~~~~~~~~~........- - -•.--V. Q
♦#

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, wit:h their appurtenances,
unto the said Grantee and its successors and assigns forever.
And th~
Grantor,£. do_ hereby covenant to and wi~h the sa:id Grantee, t:hat -t_he~
. s , ~ i:he owner~ in fee simple of said premises; that t:hey are free from
al.1 incumbrances and that t._hex will warrant and defend the same from al.l lawful cl.a.i ms whatsoever.

m

WITNESS ~ O _ j " ,

~

seal~

this 2E_~day of ..:a:!=..::cc=~:...:=~------

STAXE OF

-~:-.::=;...:;.~a.._Co
____~~

County of

ada...

ss.

)

on· thi.s ~"<,lay of -.U~:::!::::~~~-...;.;~...:...:..,_,, l9f;z.
ore me. th
undersigned, a Notary Pub1ic, :f.n and for. said St:ate. personally appeared·
Emms l L - - • Erne•t E. Day. Hobert· t. Day e.nd ;Qpnpld M, »KY
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fECORDED· REQU£NOF.'

.AO~&~m:lftfa.f.J- 'ft!}

Project No. STP-84 -2(047 )59
901S(. IOAHO
~~f'E_E -DEPUTY
Key No. 6178
~P~
Parcel No. 06 Parcel ID No.Jffl~tr~ PH 2=31
99002305
!<NOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That THOMAS T.
DIANA R.

NICHOLSON,

NICHOLSON and

husband and wife, as to an undivided one-half

interest, ANO RONALD C. YANKE and LINDA L. YANKE, husband and wife, as
to an undivided one-half interest, Granters, for value received, do
hereby grant unto the STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
by and through the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
state Street, Boise, Idaho

Grantee,

33ll West

83703, and its successors and assigns, the

right to go upon, occupy, and use a portion of the NE~SW~ of Section
18, Township 02 North, Range OJ East, Boise, Meridian, in

Ada county,

Idaho, described as follows, to-wit:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking. the South ½ Sec t i on
Corner of Section 18, Township 02 North, Range 03 East,
Boise, Meridian;
thence along the North-South center ~ section line of said
Section 18, North 00° 10 1 46" East - 1319 , 16 feet to a point
marking the Center-south 1/16 Section Corner of said Section
18;
. .
thence leaving said North-South center % section line, and
along the south 1/16 section line of said Section 18 - North
89°38 1 38" West - 643.56 feet to an Aluminum cap on the
Westerly Right-of-Way line of Isaac's Canyon Interchange,
said cap being 1133. 65 feet right of I-84 East bound lane
centerline station 462+68.57, as shown on the plans of
Interstate 84, Federal Aid Project No. NH 84-2(047)59
Highway Survey; .
thence continuing along said South 1/16 Section line of said
Section 18, North 89°38 1 38 " West - 50.69 feet to an Aluminum
cap on the Westerly boundary line of an existing so.a foot
wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said cap being
1178 .53 feet right of I-84 East bound lane centerline
Station 462+4 7 .16, also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
thence leaving said South 1/16 Section line of said Section
Page 1
RECORD AT THE REQUEST OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FEE EXEMPT - I.C. 67-2301
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EASEMENT

Project No. STP-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 06

Parcel ID No. 0039340

18, and along said Westerly boundary line of an existing
50, O foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement the
following courses and distances;
North 09°50 1 10 11 East - 618,.36 feet to a point, said point
being 150. o feet right of Eiseman Road centerline station
91+66.77
thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 678.00
feet, a central angle of 51°51 1 49", an arc length of 613.72
feet, and a chord which bears North 41°15 1 14 11 West - 592.98
feet to a point, said point being 150. 00 feet right of
Eiseman Road centerline station 86+88.83;
thence North 15°19 1 19 11 West - so.no feet to a point marking
the Northwest corner of said existing 50.00 foot wide
Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said point being
150.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station
86+38.83;

thence leaving said Westerly boundary line of said existing
so.co foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, south
74°40 1 41 11 West - 10.00 feet to a point, said point being
160.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline station
86+38.83;

thence South 15°19 1 19 11 East - 50.00 feet to a point, said
point being 160. oo feet right of Eiseman Road centerline
Station 86+38.83;
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 688.00
feet, a central angle of 51°12 1 00 11 , an arc length of 614.80,
and a chord which bears south 4oa55•19 11 East - 594.55 feet
to a point, said point being 160. oo feet right of Eiseman
Road centerline Station 91+60.65;
thence South 09°50 1 10" West - 612.12 feet to a point on the
South 1/16 Section line of said Section 18;
thence along said South 1/16 Section line, South 89° 38 'JS"
East - 10.14 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING.
This easement contains approximately o. 29 acres, more or
less and is subject to any easements of record or in use.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING OR INSTALLING THEREON a Stock
Page
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Drive and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its agents or
contractors.
The aforesaid facility shall remain in place as constructed or
installed for its intended purpose and shall not be removed or relocated by the Grantors, their successors and assigns, without the prior
approval of the Idaho Transportation Department, or its assigns.
The Idaho Transportation Department, its agents or transferees,
shall

have

necessary
facility

the
or

right

wish

to

to

perform

exercise

any

in

maintenance

connection

( including but not restricted thereto,

necessary

repairs,

alterations,

with

they
the

may

deem

aforesaid

the right to make

removals or replacements thereof),

together with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to and
from said property for said purposes.
It is expressly intended that these burdens and restrictions
shall run with the land and shall forever bind the Grantors, their
successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this

t,,Ii

day of

JQ..!)ua,v~

, 199:i_.

~i

LINDA L. Y A N K E ~
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STATE OF

Parcel ID No. 0039340

Th e'4A

)

) ss.
County of ~t?i-_:t:>_.._f!r,,_____ )
on this l.~ day of Jo...wo..,v
, 199S,_, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and fo~ said State, personally appeared
THOMAS T. NICHOLSON and DIANA R. NICHOLSON, husband and wife, known or
identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the
same.

(SEAL)

(SEAL)
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 10, 2000

ALAN G. LANCE

Donna Jacobs
Day Realty Co.
.
710 S. Vista Avenue
Boise, Idaho 83705
Re:

Isaac's· Canyon

Dear Donna:
I believe we may have reached an agreement on the new right-of-way easement on the Isa~c•s
Canyon property. Enclosed is a proposed Highway Easement Deed that is acceptable to the
federal government and the nature conservancy.
The Right-of-Way Easement is sixty feet in width. The easement is still a floating easement, but
with several restrictions which are contained on pages 4 and 4a of the enclosed Easement Deed.
The presumptive alignment is what is shown as cross-hatched on Exhibit A to the Deed. The
Deed assures you, "the same or equivalent accessibility" to your property as that shown on ·
Exhibit A.

If an access road is constructed on the Exhibit A alignment and the underlying property owner
wants it moved, the relocation of the road will be at the Department's expense. The realigned
road will still have the same point of beginning and ending and provide the same or equivalent
access. Utilities will not have to be relocated.

If nothing happens within five years then the easement as shown on Exhibit A will become
pem1anent.
Also, the Department relinquishes the old fifty-foot easement.
Please let me know your thoughts on the easement at ;your ·earliest convenience. I will be out of
the office February 14-18, 2000. You can call me on February 22, if that is convenient.
S~ncereo

~~

:~

..

Deputy Attorney General
SMP:ss
enclosure

000076
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THIS DEED,

(;±L

made this

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DEPARTMENT

BOARD,

3311

West

State

by

-b-

·

--'.EE-DEPUTY

~r1/i
I 00044826

A.J.J.

A~u; I

day of

,

2000,

by

acting by and through the

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, herein-

after referred t:o as the D&PA.RTMENT ,
TRANSPORTATION

....

PH ~: 33

~/lot~vi

and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.,

t,sf RECOROED-REO~U
· s OF

·-~, o-"'"
\

and

Street,

and

through
Boise,

the STATE OF IDAHO,

the
Idaho

IDAHO

IDAHO

TRANSPORTATION

hereinafter

8370) ,

referred to as the STATE :

WI T N E S S E T H :

the STATE has filed application under the provisions

WHEREAS,

of

the Act

of

Section :317),

Congress
for

the

of

August

27,

1958,

right-of-way of a

aa

amended

(23

U.S .C.

highway over c ertain land

owned by the United Sta~es i n the State of IDAHO, which is under the

j urisdiction of the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management;
and

WHEREAS,

thi s

transfer is further authorized under the provi -

si ons of the Act of Congress approved October 1 5, 1966 (80 Stat, 931,

93 7, Sect i on 6 [a I [ 1 I fAl ) ; and

WHEREAS ,
delegations

of

the

Federal

authority

Highway

Administrator,

from the secretary of

puraua~t

Transportation,

to

has

Page 1
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Parcel No. 7

Parcel I.D. No. 0039339

determined that an easement over the land covered by the application
is

reasonably

necessary

for a

right-of-way

property as

a result of Interstate

Project No.

NH-F-84-2(047)59; and

for access

Isaac' a Canyon

84,

to private
Interchange,

WHEREAS, the Department of Interior, acting by and through the
Bureau

of

DEPARTMENT

NOW

Land

Management,

has

agreed

to

the

transfer

by

the

of an easement over t:he land to the STATE,·

THEREFORE,

the

DEPARTMENT,

ae

authorized

by

law,

does

hereby grant to the STATE a 60. 0 foot wide floating easement for a
right-of-way for access on,

described land of the

over, across,

in,

and upon the following

United States more particularly described ae

follows to-wit:
A strip of land, 60. 0 feet in width, over and across
portions of the Southeast ;( of the Souchwest ;( and the
Southwest~ of the Southeast~ of Section 18, Township 02
North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian; Ada County, Idaho;
the beginning and ending points of which are more
particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the ~ Section
Corner -common to Section 18 and 19, Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Bojse Meridian;
thence North 00°10'46" East - 13,19.16 feet along the
North-South center Section line of said Section 18 to the

Page 2
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project NO, NH-F-84-2(047)59

Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7

Parcel

r.o.

No. 0039339

Northeast corner of the SE~SW~ of said Section 18;
thence North 89°"38'38" Wesc - 673.97 feet along the North
line of said SE~SW~ to the POINT OF BEGINNING of
said floating easement and being 1160.57 feet right of I84 eastbound lane c~nterline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:

commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the ¼ Section
Corner common to Sect.ion 18 and 19, Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Boise Meridian;
thence along the section line common to said Sections 18
and 19, South 89°37'39" East - 24.9. feet to a point;
thence leaving said common Section line, North 00°22•10 11
East - 30.00 feet to a point. said point being the ENDING
POINT of said floating easement and being 1222. 40 feet
right
of
I-84
eastbound
lane
centerline
Station
4'75+85.34.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that t:he specific location of
the 60. o foot wide easement granted from the DEPARTMENT to the
STATE shall be allowed to float within the Southeast ¼ of the

Southwest X and the Sout~west

~

of the Southeast~ of Section 18,

Township 02 North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian.

IT

IS

FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that at

construction,
agreed
assigns,

upon
and

the
by

location of
the

the

underlying

road .easement

landowner,

the

the time of road
will

be

DEPARTMENT

mutually
or

the STATE through its Transportation Department.

its
The

Page 3
RECORD AT THE ~EQUEST OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FEE EXEMPT - I.C. 67•2301

000079

HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED

Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
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underlying landowner may give his final approval to the location of
the road easement in which event the floating easement shall become a
permanent easement.

In the event the adjoining property owner wishes

to develop its property and cannot come to a final or preliminary
agreement with the underlying property owner, then the Department or
its assigns may use the alignment as shown crosshatched on Exhibit A
until such time the underlying property requests that the road be
moved as provided herein.

If the road is constructed on an alignment

other than that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit A, the alignment will
provide the same or equivalent accessibility· to the adjoining property
owner as that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit "A", and be approved by
the STATE through its Transportation Department.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD. AND AGREED that the party needing the
road constructed will be responsible for the cost of construction.

If

the road is constructed and should have to be moved in the future
because its location is detrimental to the underlying property owner,
the

STATE

will

construction.

be

responsible

for

the

cost

of

realignment

and

The realigned road will provide the same or equivalent

access to the· adjoining property owner as that shown crosshatched on
Exhibit A hereto.

The realigned road will be built to the same

standards as the original road and have the same point of beginning
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Parcel No. 7
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and ending point as

described in this Highway Easement Deed.

If

utilities have been installed in the original road right-of-way, they
will

not

have

to be relocated and each utility shall

retain an

easement to service its facility as if the _original road remained
public right-of-way.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that, if within five years of
execution of this Highway Easement Deed, the underlying property owner
does not elect to have the floating easement moved as provided for
herein then the easement as shown as crosshatched on Exhibit

A

shall

become a permanent easement.

IT

rs

FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that, as a result of securing

this easement,

the STATE will relinquish the existing 50 foot wide

easement that is adjacent to the Interstate right-of-way located in
the above described quarter sections.

IT

IS EXPRESSLY INTENDED That these burdens and restrictions

shall run with the land and shall forever bind the DEPARTMENT, or its
assigns.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, Mary E. Gray, pursuant to delegations of
authority from the Secretary of Transportation,
Administrator,

by virtue of

the Federal Highway

authority in me vested by law,

have

hereunto subscribed my name as of t h i s ~ da; of June, 2000.
UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDE

HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

of

IN

WITNESS

WHEREOF,

I,

Steven

C.

Hutchinson,

Way

pursuant

delegations of authority from the Idaho Transportation Board,
hereunto subscribed my name as of this

2......

to
have

day of June, 2000.

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD
STATE O

By

IDAHO//_, -_1-1--+--t-t---·

➔~&41-~~(.!_,,=-~!::2::~~:::t.u~lo....l

even C. Hutchinson
Assistant Chief Engineer
( Deve 1 opmen t)
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STATE OF IDAHO )

) ss:
)

COUNTY OF ADA

I,
L ·, ~.Ci~ ~ e eJ(.E:~
,
a Notary· Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby. certify that on the ~ day of June, 2000,
before me personally appeared Mary E.
Gray,
Federal Highway
Adrninistrat~nd acknowledged that the foregoing instrument bearing
date of
, ~ ~ 1Z.(}{J)
. , was executed by her, in her official
capacity and by autliority in her vested by law, for the purposes and
intents in said instrument described and set forth, and acknowledged
the same to be her free act and deed as,
Federal Highway
Administration.

Witness my hand and seal this

_L

day of June, 2000.

/-V:.__oa.~

~
Pu~uwo1: ,,.4<219 C4
Residing in _:_s__,_.s~,-s...
My commission expires S7«ooQ
I

c:;.._-_ ___,__ __

STATE OF IDAHO)
)

COUNTY OF ADA

)

'?A~~
I,
a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of June, 2000,
before
me
personally
appeared
Steven
C.
Hutchinson,
Idaho
Transportation Department, "..aDd ackno~ed that the foregoing
instrument bearing date of -tt~ 1 L.. Cc.. 1 '2.
, was executed by
him,
in
his
official
capacity
as
Assistant
Chief
Engineer
(Development), for the purposes and intents in said instrument
described and set forth, and acknowledged the same to be his free act
and deed as, Idaho Transportation Board.
e-c--=-1'.l.:::....:)
.M
___
...J_~•______
,-_,
______ ,

Witness my hand and seal this 2::__ day of June, 2000.

Y:.-~C?~
--c-uA-E+o
Notary Public for
Residing in -.i3c:>l.S.E
My commissio=n---exp-1-·r_e_s_~~:}.......,0

~--2..CO-f
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MEMORANDUM

DA.TE:

JUNE 7, 20

TO:

LOREN Tj MAS - DISTRICTTI-ffi.EE ENGINEER
LEONAR~ . HILL- RIGHT-OF-\VAY !VIANAGER
LANA SE ATfUS- DISTRICT THREE RJW SUPERVISOR

FROM:

STEVEN n . ARRY
DEPUTY 1 ORNEY GENERAL
YON/DAY FAMILY PROPERTY

RE:

Enclosed is my letter and R• 1ised Highway Easement Deed to Federal Highways. l11is should
resolve the access issues over 1e BLM property.
The property owner is stillJ: ··stioning tlic adequacy of the easement from Eismann Road to the
BLM property. 1l1is casem
was acquired from tlie Nicholsons aud abuts the eastbound onramp for the interchange. 1 problem being the terrain is so steep and sloping that ACB..D will
not approve any public ro d access using the easement. I have met with ACHD's Traffic
Engineer and he confirms thj& tlle easement does not meet AC.HD standards. Also, the approach
to Eismarm Road is at a right, nglc and does not meet ACHD standards.
Prior to tl1c construction of t 1c lnterstatc, the Day property had access to their property from
Federal Way. Wben the mt r tate was first constructed in 1967, the Day property ,vas bisected.
T11e Right-of-Way Deed and ontract provided:

\

Acee t tl1e Future rontaae Road and tock Drive n the ut twesterlv side
of Interstate SON. Pr&· ct No. l-lG-&0N-2 16 54 Hi2hwav Survev

When the Isaac's Canyon
interchange.

1j~ rcbauge was constructed, the easement V.'l!S moved to adjoin ci1e

I

Enclosed is a letter from l 99 Tom the Day Family to District 3 outlining the problems. With the
signing and recording of the , sement from the BLM, the eastem half of the problem appears to
be resolved. Tue problem reri1 ins with the easement through the Nicholson property.
Continued...

EXHIBIT

I

,,,.

1'-1
000086

Loren TI10mas, Leonard g. I ii l, and Lana Servatius
June 7, 2000
Page 2

As I see it, the Day Family i
Transportation Board, at w -1i
respond. Tiie second alte , ,
condemnation) and ITD's b1e

two probable courses of action. They could talce the matter to the
h time the District and Headquarters need to be in a position to
ive would be to file suit based upon a taking of access (inverse
ch of its covenant in the original deed.

I believe that over 80 acres o the Day property is affected by the problems associated ivith th.is
casement. Also, there may e (and probably are) other property owners in the same situation with
regard to this easement.

SMP:ss
enclosures
cc:

ACE-D
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFACE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ALAN G. LANCE

July 19, 2000

A.J. Bohner
Bohner Chasan & Walion, L.L.C.
1459 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box I069
Boise, Idaho 83701

Re:

Right of Way Contract, Project No. l-80N-2(3)6J Entered imo by State of Idaho
Department of Highways and the Day Family on l 0/23/67 (lsaac 1s Canyon)

Dear Tony:

Please excuse the delay in responding Lo your letter of June 27, 2000 concerning access
issues involving the Day family property around Isaac's Canyon. I have bad the
opportunity to mtet with ITD 1s District 3 management and rc1fresentative1s from the
Headquarters Ri~1t-of-Way__s~ion on the access issnes involved with your clients.
To provide you with some historical perspective, when this issue first arose and the
Depa11ment attempted to resolve the problem it was the portion of the easement over the
BLM land that the engineer's perceived to be the problem. That portion of the new rightof-way casement seems to be resolved with the new easement from the I3LM. During
that process, the Department obtained an additional len feet of right-of-way from the
Nicholson1s to increase the width of the easement over tht::ir property from fifty foet to
sixty feet. 'the problem appears to be the easement over the Nicholson prope1ty. The
property is over terrain with contours too great to co11stn1ci a fr{mtage road or effectively
use the easement for ingress !llld egress.
JTD District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way Supervisor have
gone out to the site and viewed the property to detemline if and how the easement can be
relocated. 1 have not heard back from them at tl\is point in time. The District and the
Headqua1ters Right-of-Way Section are reviewing funding sources in order to reach a
solution to tbis problem. I woaJd request that you provide the Department an extension
uutil September 5, 2000 or shortly thereafter to be able to give you a finn proposal on a
solution to this access issue. Part of the re11son for asking for this length of extension is
that I wm be out of the oflfoe for the lust two weeks of August I will make an attempt to
provide you with a status update uro1.md August 17, 2000.
Continued ...
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I truly believe the Department is taking this matter setiously and will have some type of
proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I ,;;ill also represent to you that the
Department will not assc1t any type of statute of limitations defense if an agreement on
new access cannot be reached.
Tf an agreement can be reached oo a new access e11seme11t, we will need to discuss
obtaining M easement from the Day family to recon.uect the new right-of-way tJ1rough
the BLM property to the existing frontage road stock driveway. The new casement
created a small gnp in the right-of-way and there may be property owners to the east of
the Day property, which have historically used the stock driveway.
Thank you in advance for your patience with the Department in trying to resolve this
issue.
Sinceroly,

~Q

ST£VENM.~
Deputy J\ttorney Generai

SMP:ss
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IDAHO TR ...~SPORTATION .DE A:. fMENT
Department Memorandum

DATE:

Wednesday, September 06, 2000

TO:

Lana Servatius
Dist. 3, Right of Way
Cliff Gaylin
Dist 3, Design East
ISAAC'S CANYON (DAY FAMILY PROPERTY ACC SS FROM EISMANN ROAD)

FROM:
RE:

The design standards listed below were used to create an ccess road from Eismann
road through the 60' easement adjacent to our Ri9ht of Way.
1 ). I used the typical section of a 24' wide road (EAGLE CR EK WAY) that Ada county
accepted on project: NH-F-3271(052), (JCT SH-44, N. T BEACON LIGHT RD.),
sheet 55 of 174 for copy of plan and sheet 8 of 174 for py of typical section.
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I designed the road for a speed of 15-20mph similar to u an subdivision access.
This will reduce the AASHTO standard requirements an design standards to
minimums.

2). The horizontal alignment provides a 50' staging tangent ff of Eismann road to the

EXHIBIT
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oegInrnng of the first curve (C1 }. Curve one has a radiu of 50', curve two has a
radius of 658', and cun 'hree has a radius of 50'. The xist' 50' access opening
that the alignment pass£:1::; through to the easement woul need to be 60' and the
existing Right of Way monument at station {86+88.83 1 0' Rt.} would need to be
relocated at station (86+88.83 160' Rt.).
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Curve two is parallel to the alignment curve of Eismann r ad and the Right of Way.
Curve three keeps the alignment in the center of the 60' asement and the catch
point lines within the easement.
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3J. 1ne vertical a11gnment (profile) meets the AASHTO Loda! Roads & Streets
requirements. The diagr-.., below represents the app ch rF · 1irements.
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(SEE PROFILE PLOT FOR THE ENTIRE LIGNMENT)

NOTE: This design is preliminary and uses minimum stand rds to represent a road can
be built through the existing 60' easement.
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Ada County Highway District
Judy Peavey-Derr, President
Dave Bivens, 1st Vice President
Sherry R. Huber, 2nd Vice President
Susan S. Eastlake. Commissioner
David E. Wynkoop, Commissioner .

318 East 37th Street
Garden .City ID 83714-6499
Phone (208) 387-6100
FAX (208) 387-6391
E-mail: tellus@ACHD.ada.id.us

Febmary 21, 2001
A. J. Bohner
Bohner Law Office
P.O. Box 16789
Boise, IdaJ10 8383 715

RE:

Isaac's Canyon / Day Family Property

Dear Mr. Bohner:
The limited amount of information submitted with your letter of Janu
31, 2001 makes it difficult
to state definitively if the proposed road would meet Highway Distric standards. One deficiency did
stand out. The District standard minimum centerline radius for a loca street is 100-feet. The
drawings indicated at least two comers with a 50-foot radius. Mored tailed plans would be required
for review to determine if the design meets all District standards.
The designation of the road would depend on the land use planned an the volumes of traffic
anticipated. These issues could affect the design standards. For ex
le, a local residential street
has different standards than a local commercial street.
The District does require that all public street improvements be desi ed by a professional engineer
licensed in the state of Idaho. The plans would have to be submitted t the District for review and
accepted for public street construction prior to the issuance of a pem1i to work in the public right-ofway. The right-of-way would need to be dedicated prior to plans ace tance.

If you have any questions you may contact me at 387-6180.
Sincerely,

6 4-Jl__
Planning and Development

EKHIB11'

I
000093

18. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106028400
19. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7855
Survey No.:
Recorded:
March 27, 2007
Instrument No.:
I 07043450
20. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7936
Recorded:
June 7, 2007
Instrument No.:
107081394
21 . Mortgage to secure an indebtedness of$6,500,000.00, and any other obligations secured thereby.
May 15, 2006
Dated:
Mortgagor:
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Jnc., an Idaho corporation
Mortgagee:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Fan1ily Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as
his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David
R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Recorded:
May 23, 2006
l 06081744
Instrument No.:
22. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects that property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate.
NOTE A: Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 does not state the subject property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrument No. 100044826 were to state the subject property is appurtenant, the
subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a dedicated roadway. It does connect to
Easement Parcels llA and IIB. We question access over those parcels at this time
NOTE D: If the State ofldaho extends the roadway to the North, across Parcel Easements IIA and IIB,
access to Eisenman Road is restricted by Instrument No. 96040862, which states the point of access is Station
86+88.83 feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is given for the
access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to the West (Parcel No. S0618314950) is
owned by the Ada County Highway District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide
access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State ofldaho (Parcels IIA and JIB) is sufficient for access to
Parcel I.
NOTE F: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of the Quarter corner common to
Sections 18 and 19. We question if this creates adequate physical access. We have checked the West half of
Section 19 and do not find an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 is not excepted or reserved in Patent recorded as Instrument
No. 100097111, which conveys the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and
the East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. S1618438400)
23. INTENfIONALLY DELETED

EXHIBIT

24. INTENTIONALLY DELETED

25. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
ALTA Commitment Form 2006

Page 8 of 16
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From:

Steven Parry

To:
Date:

ddjacobs@mindspring.c m
J/29/20105:5 1:54 PM

Subject: To49.doc

To:

Bill Smith
Andrew White
Dave Jones
Lana Servatius

From: Steven M. Parry
Re:

Isaac Canyon/ Day Famil Property I Access

The Day family owns a tra of land east and south of the Isaac Canyon Interchange.
Historically the property had acces from US Highway 30. With the original construction of the
Interstate the property had access om the stock drive public right of way which bordered the interstate.
With the construction of th Isaac Canyon Interchange the stock drive for th.is property was
obliterated . At the time the prope between the Day property and Eisman Road was BLM property .
The Department negotiated an easement withdrawal from the BLM for the Section J8 property.
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of e map showing the 2.83 acre easement. After the easement leaves
Section 18 it adjoins public right o way of the Ada County Highway District.
In April 2000 the Federal ghway Administration granted to the Idaho Transportation
Department the easement that is de icted in Exhibit A. Exhibit B is a copy of the easement. Subsequent
to the grant of the easement the BL disposed of the property and it is now owned by Dennis Baker.
The disposal was subject to the eas ment.
The easement has become ennanent at the location shown on Exhibit A and the Department has
relinquished the old stock drive pu lie right of way.
Pioneer Title has raised quettions and does not believe they can insure the property due to
defects they perceive in the easemtt. The easement does not name the adjoining property owner(s) as
the beneficiaries of the easeme.nt. While this issue can be debated it is the Title Company that has the
final say on the issue where the De artment is transferring an undeveloped access road easement.
Enclosed as Exhibit C is a py of a letter I wrote to the Day fami ly attorney in September of
2000 which recounts the meetings "th ACHD and the preliminary design work that the Department had
done to insure that the new easeme twas on a constructable alignment. The letter closes:

Andrew White and I met wi Pioneer Title Company this past week and came up with a solution
that was acceptable to all conceme . The Title Company would accept a recorded acknowledgement to
the Department as title holder of th~ easement from the underlying fee owner. The acknowledgement
would need to provide that the prodeny owner acknowledges that the June 2000 easement was for the
purpose of an access road right of ay for the benefit of the Day family and other similarly situated
property owners.
I don't believe there are an other similarly situated property owners and once the road is
constructed it would be turned ove to the Ada County Highway District. l have prepares a proposed
file://C:\Documents and Settings\u r\LocaJ Settings\Temp\FD63 IB75-C1FB-4E29-B I 83- L

8/8/2012
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acknowledgement fonn which I be ieve would be sufficient. There are other solutions to the problem
but they all involve huge costs (e.g construction of a local road and turning it over to ACHD).
The bottom line is that befi e the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day property
had insurable title to its property a d had a legal right of access. With the construction of the
Interchange they will not be able t provide title insurance without going through litigation.
[f the underlying property
er declines to agree to an acknowledgement then the Department
may want to consider a quiet title
·on on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed, executed
by Mary Gray in June of 2000.

file://C:\Documents and Settings\us r\Local Settings\Temp\FD631B75-ClFB-4E29-B 183-1... 8/8/2012

000096

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PUBLIC ROAD
EASEMENT
WHEREAS, when the Idaho Transportation Department designed and constructed
the Isaacs Canyon Interchange on Interstate Highway 84 in Ada County Idaho it
unintentionally obliterated an access easement on the westerly side of the interstate in
Sections 18 and 19, Township 02 North, Range 03 East, Boise Meridian; and
WHEREAS, the [daho Transportation Department negotiated an easement from
the United States of America to replace the obliterated easement. The easement is dated
April 6, 2000 and was recorded on June 8, 2000 with the Ada County Recorders
Instrument No. I00044286; and
WHEREAS, the Idaho Transportation Department met with represenatives of the
Ada County Highway District to obtain their approval of the new replacement easement
as an acceptable right of way for a local public road; and
WHEREAS, the right of way for the new public road would have a connection to
Eisemen road at Highway St. 86+88.83; and
WHEREAS, the April 6, 2000 Highway Easement Deed had provisions that the
60 foot wide easement granted to the State shall be allowed to float with the Southeast ¼
ofSouthwestl/4 and Southwest¼ of the Southeast¼ of Section 18, Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian; and
WHEREAS, the Department, the adjoining land owner and the underlying
property owner have certain rights construct a public road on the Highway Easement
Deed.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties to this acknowledgement, Baker Investments LLC and
the Idaho Transportation Department acknowledge:
I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

That by the terms of the Highway Easement Deed dated April 6, 2000 the
location of the permanent easement has become fixed at the location
described in the easement.
That the Highway Easement Deed allows access to the underlying
property and property to the south in Section 19 Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian.
That the Department has previously acquired a similar easement in the
No11heast ¼ of the Southwest ¼ of Section 18 for a public road connection
to Eisman Road at approximately Highway St. 86 + 88.83
That these easements when acquired were done so with the approval of the
Ada County Highway District for the purpose of providing a public road
easement to the properties to west of Interstate 84 and south of Eisrnen
Road as it intersects with the lsaac Canyon Interchange.
That the Highway Easement Deed dated April 6, 2000 and recorded as
Instrument I00044286 by the Ada County was acquired to provide

I
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replacement access to the property in Section 19 Township 02 North,
Range 03 East Boise Meridian.
DA TED this_ day of _ _ 20 l 0.
Signatures and acknowledgements by Baker Investment LLC and Idaho
Transportation Department.
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fobruary 6. 2014

G::uy fnsclmao
Ad.i County Highway District
3775 /\dams Street
Giirden City. TD 83714 VJA EMA1L

Re:

Applicntion for

.1

Temporary Approach - \Vest Eiscnmn I Rond

The Idaho Transporiation Department submits this application for, tcmpon1ry approach to
Eisenman Road. •..vest of the Interstate 84 interchange. The purpos of the new approach is io
provide access to a 1961 ITD easement that predates the lTD road ay transfer to ACHD.
The requested easement will be temporary until an :ilternative pubr street access is available
rhrough the adjacent properties. IID and ACHD previously agreed fO the locations of fi.lture
approaches on Eisenman Road. The existing easemenl was not idemrified as one of the future
approach locations. This temporary approach is therefore needed u llil a pcnnanenl location is
available al one of,he approved locations.
Tbe permanent approach wiU require access through on!! o.f !be adj cent private properties.
None of the adjacent properties is cutTently available.
Pr oject History: This temporary approach is needed to access an D-created easement to the
Day property. Figur e 1 shows the location of the Day pl'Operty. T e original 80-acre parcel
had direct access to old LIS 30. ITD purchased right-of-way for Int rstatc 84 (1-80 No1th) and
prohibited access to the oe\.v interstate highway. !TD provided an e sement (Figure 2) for s.ite
acce.~s. fumre public street and a stock road. This original easeme paralleled lnterstate 84.
The original casement and stock road were reJocated with the const ·uction of the Micron
Interchange. JTD comracled with the Day Family for the revised e 1sement (Figm·c 3). The
adjacent land owners also developed an informal access route lhat i · undowrnented but still in

;:: right-of-way conlracls (Figures 4 and 4A) detail the origillal _ld revised agreements and
,he noration that the easement is for a "future public road."'
!
Figure 5 illustrates the Eisenman Road location of the present ease· 1ent and the separation
distance from adjacent intersections. Figure 6 illustrates the speci c !TD and ACHD roadway
scgmcuts on Eisenman Road. The bandwriting lists the future app1 ach loca.1.ions identified
during the transfer of maintenance. The meeting minutes (Figure i show that a future public
road approaches will be decennined by ACHD.

j

The existing casement and the existing approach locotion t1llow ch Day Family only limited
opportunity to develop their rural property lo the south. A future p 1blic road 1s needed to
accommodate the potential site-generated trafiic voltune.).

EXHIBIT

1000099

Ij
The loca1io11 oflh,;; easctnenl's approach due:. not ,11~..:l ACHD policy (7'.!05. ~.}} for ialersec1ion
-.;cpaii111011 for a public road pikrseclioo. Cunenl ACI-10 policy requires local street spacing on a
principal arterial of 1,320 teet from lhe ramp terminr.l iuterseclion. ACHD's corridor plan
requir~s one-hair miJe spacu g on 1.his segmc.nl of Eiscnmau Ro3d. The Day family cannot
consrrucc a public sn·eet ai a ocarion that meets ACHD policies because of intervening property
owners. The Da:1 Family do soot control any o[thc parcels with a potemi:1! access to Eisenman
Road.
Specific Request: ITO !'eqt ests a temporary approach to Eiseurmm Roa<l al the location of the:
existing eAsement. ITD wou d be rhe applicant for this approach. The requested approach
loc11rio11 provides the Days, --ith an opportunity for development <1nd ensure.s that the nonstandard approach can be eli 11inal'cd with the regional development. The temporary f1pprnach
vvill bi:: eliminated witi1 the evelopment of an alternative: public street :iccess.

JTD l'equests a stanclnrd 40-ilt approach. This is JTD's standard width ro allow one inbound and
two outbound travel lanes. · he constmctio□ will requil'e maintaining the current drainage
f'ucility 1Jdcling !\uh-base ma erial, adding base: material, and plant mix pavement. The standard
48'' by 48" STOP sign will I e insralled for che easenicJ1l's ~ppro:lch to Eisenman Road.

fhe necessary tom1s are att hed. Several m::ips and ai1photos ore aunched. A 1ralfic control
plan is attached. An !TD st daTd drawing for the typical app1'0ach is also att::icbed.
If you hi!ve :my questions, y u may contact me dircccl y al 334.83 77
Sincerely,
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Dave Szpletr
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o:= AMENDMENTS/REASON

•OR DECLINING
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~ STAMDARDS:

1. Max 20' driveway throat widtl at lot line per ACHD policy.

2. Max 2% cross-~lope in sidewrll<@ drivew ay, per Standard Dra wi ng SD-710B or similar.

3. Dnveway should be paved tjir full width at least 30-feet into the site beyond tho edge of pavement per
standard drawing SD-609.

>•• Please at1ach comments an a detail ed drawing of proposed project for this submittal.
Applicatrons without a detail cl drawing will be d~layed.

UPON APPROVAL. RE~J!EIVJBE. A PERMIT IS ST ILL REQUIRED BEFORE COf\JSTRUCTIOI\I BEGINS!
•I
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to 3ta.
Perce1. No.

Project

THIS AGREEHENT, Made this _::~r,: i.daY of _ ...:::~;c..::.t;ob
:;:aao:.ar'.-,,_ __ _ , 19 -...;;f ., between
·t he STATE OF IDAHO, acd ng by its Board of Highway Directors, by its Stat:e
Highway Engineer or his }authorized represent.?.tive, herein called "State" ,

r.

and

r~"° Uo

.£a;~..

tl <J~c10<1o >p"wl:',~ll'.

~o

L'a :.'o

!loll\'ifl! ~,. l'.ln~• 1(111(1 l:\.~11&l(; !Hn l'l!:.1fo

,...__,

he;:-ein called "G-cantoi'( ) 11 ,
WHEREAS, Gnm.tor(s) herewith deliver(s) to S'i:at:e a TJ.:.11.-.:::mtl' ;.~~~
fa highway pm:'1rnses.
(Type of Instn1rr.ent)-----•r---·- - - -

hereto agree as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE,

State shall pay Gr t or(s) and the lienholdec(s), i.f any, such s.ims of moneys a.s
Gra.ntor ( ) agree(s) to pay all taxes l!ncl osaessmen-::s due and 011ing, in cluding tho:;e for the. }'ear l _Qi_.
1.

3i;-e s~t out below.

2. This contract sbaL not be binding unless and urltil" executed by the State Highwa'J
Engineer or hill authori=ed rtpreseatative.
Th.e parties have ncrein set out the whole of
tlutii: e.greeraent, the pe.rfoI"llt n.ce of '1hich constitutes the c."\tire consideration for the grant
o f said i:ig'ht of'
on- tha:
- ,-1ay acd sha l r 0 li-0 ve the State of :ill further. claims or obliuatioas
"'
accoun1: or on account of the loca tion, gr3cJe and con.ctruc tion of the proposed highway.
~

..
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KNOT/if ALL M •N BY·I'HESE PRESENTS, ThatJ. D. Aldecoa a;1d Son,

!·

t

Inc., a corporation duli organized and existing under the laws cf the: St:.te of
Idai10, and having its r.incipal office in. Idaho at 12 Mesa Vista Dr. Boise, in the: /
I

County of Acia, Granto ·, for value :.:eceived, tloes hereby grant ante the, S'fATE

-:SPORT.ATJON DEPAR'l'.ME:NT, by nnd thTough th-,

OF IDAHO, IDAHO

I
I

IDAHO 'l'RANSPO:RT--TION BOARD, G1·antee, 3311 West State St:reClt, Boise,
Idaho 83?03, and its

s ccessors and nssigns, an ea~ement and i-:ight to go upon,

occupy, and use a porl.-i n ofNE1/4SW1/,t of Section 18, Township 02 North, RaugG
03 East, Boise, Mericli

1,

.io Ada County, Idaho, described as follows, to•wit:

A
stTip ofiand 5t.o foet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way
bour,da.ry o{.In~E!fstate 84,Project No. NH-84-2(047)59 Highway

Surv~y, .as sho"'1 dn 'the plans thereof now on :file in the office of the
fdaho TransporiJ_tion Department, and as described in that; certain
Warranty Deed 1f' the Micron Technology Inc. executed by the

Granfor b,er~in op the B,!.!-laay of May, 1996, and lyjng between
Eisenman l1oad·· urvey Station 86 + 38.83 as shown on said Highway
Survey and Gr or's Southerly property line.
FOR THE PURP SE OF CONSTRUCTll.~G OR JNSTALLING TEEREON a
St{jck Drive and Futur Public Road by the state cf Idaho or its ;;gen:;s _or
contractors.
The aforesaid fac ·cy on.ce established shall remain in place as constructed
er installed foi· its in.ts~ed purpose and shall not be !'GJ!)OVed or relocated by the
Grantm·,

It.s successo.:-s

f

d ru;signs, without the prior approval of foe Idcl.o

'I'ranspori~tion Dep:trtn!eut, or its assigns.

-

l

?age l

,RECORD A T""J:IE REQulTIST OF THE STATE OF .ID.AHO
- - -EEB.Ji!XEi.\{P'.T' ~ LC. 67-2201

·· ·--------:---------- -- - ------------~-~- ...
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P:cJect N;Ei8i'2(Q47i59 K.:y 6 in

F urure Aodraw:a lodtioris

P~r'nnEili~~=t·-- --.-~- ---.~
....
r'!f.!rt7"~<'•

.: ~:::!in:·., , :.?."; ::.:1~ Mcr.ia~,. Auc;wt' 26, 1996 ir Ao.a Cour:t"'/ ::!lgb.w:;.:; Di.s.ria (ACEDJ,
..; pi-2::!et:::,cizll: fut}lre appro.i::ll Jornior.s.

'

Teey Litue;.~'\CHD T,affio•Eiiginecr
S~"'Ve Splok~~•,_ACHb Plan.<1.&Sll.,vuys Supe!Vi:ior
L,;..Y'('J Sa)~; Ji.GED Developmc;it S"i:,-vil:c:;

.r. !:!~ei:tt:S~ :q-il:P~lW/ ~a::i..<µ11~t
..

.R. 'D. Cnl!!~t-l:~jo~t OoordJ!!abl'

'

. . .

.

.

Tl.JJs m_e::~1ff;WJlil_sc11.~tr;:aJ.Qw:e•(!pp.'!'PYI:·tt1.<; lof:;mons or.furµre appw::ich~~ t±om n.:::•.v
~:>~ways fo'},top~~ ·b~i_11g_se•,~r:-:d_. ·~r~~ .1v·;iaway; ~ ~om~·lllidm-:-~ 9ID,
J(ln~didion Wilen c~fu.l~'ti.and :ill nvi:iro..1ches,wil! b~ r.o!L<t1\lc~d-to..•'..CE;ID sraripazd~.
Di1}
c;:o~t;t:B w[tb. ~ ;!I\b-..,dtr.enr,.i~·i~ ne:~itli.;r'/ (0 limitucw ilP'!JCOfU=J-!e's.

to'p~~si1J(f.

1}.a~c lli:!.ir:uion$ nr¢ as follows:
F'!c:~:".!l '~ia}(!(-ci;~(Lllg) AQHI;> S]Lludad ippti;>~ci:i.po!iny.

2.

Fed.!:.-.J '\1/!ii(uew ~ i~q~t).
A.

S:atiou i6-l•O"J;!:'1'-48!ic, pubiic rpad ~orm,::crit;u ,q ,;::-:i~ng :F~ger.:i \Vay .-,.~it
b~ c~u;:e:i .Y.irJ,j,T9-:!fJ-/i/&,GaJl//li1/} I;/;'r;:/c:,or -
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RLAWOFFICE
AITORNEY AT LAW

A.J. Bohner, Attorney at Law
Karen L. Weybright, Administrative As istant

7280 Ustick Road
Post Office Box 16789
Boise, Idaho 83715
Telephone: (208) 376-5595
Facsimile: (208) 376-0998
E-Mail: bohnerlaw@gmail.com

August 28, 2015

J. Timotb.y Thomas
Idaho Attorney General 's Offic
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707

Re:

Day Fa ily Property Located at Isaac's Canyo1t

Dear Tim:
Following our m eting, my clients discussed the question as to whether or not
they prefer 11D to give them th money to build the road or whether ITD should build the road.
My clients would respectfully r quest that ITD take on the responsibility to build the road since it
bas the expertise and knowledg in what needs to be done. Our clients would have to hire
independent contractors to do e same. I trust this will work with ITD and I request a time table
when this would be undertaken d completed, and what input you would request of my clients
with reference to the same.
Thank you for y ur attention to this matter and in working with us in getting this
endeavor completed. It is great appreciated by myself and my clients.

,.
. .,

.

,
_..,,·

..

,,,.,,,,.,,,

,,,,,:.. -: G.,,/.,,
./.:,,

A.J. Bohner

AJB:kw

cc: client

EXHIBIT

I
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Gmall - Day Prop

5'16/2018

Work (208) 332-7191
Fax(208)334-8917
jim. morrison@itd. idaho. gov

'HCONFIDEI\ITIAU TY NOTLCE This e-mail message may contain legally privileged and confidential
information exempt or prohibited from disclosure under applicable law. If you are nol lhe intended recipient of
this e-mail, please notify this sender immediately and do not deliver. distribute or copy this e-mail, or disclose its
cont~nts or takt' any action in reliance on the informalion it contains.

From : Donna Jacobs [mailto:donnadjacobs@gmail.com]

Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 10:33 AM
To: Amy Revis; Jim Morrison (Property Manager); Ben Day; andrewjacobsiv; Tim Thomas
Subject: Fwd: Day Prop
(Quoted text hidden}

Gary l nselman <ginselman@achdidaho.org>
Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:19 AM
To: "Jim Morrison (Property Managert <Jim. Morrison@itd.idaho.gov>, Oonna Jacobs <donnadjacobs@gmall.com>,
Amy Revis <Amy.Revis@itd.idaho.gov>, Ben Day <benday@spro.net>, andrewjacobsiv
<andrewjacobsiv@gmail.com>, Tim Thomas <Tim. Thomas@itd.idaho.gov>

Jim,
To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a public street between the off ramp and the future
Lake Hazel/Eisenman intersection which is approximately 1800-feet from the current gate. There are
existing accesses in this area today. ACHD is not commenting on these accesses nor stating that
ACHD will restrict or alter them in any way.

Thanks,
Gary.

Gary lnselman
Development Services Manager
Ada County Highway District
3775 N. Adams Street
Garden City, ID 83714

EXHIBIT

Office: (208) 387~6170
Fax:

(208) 387-6393

.I

23
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Electronically Filed

11/25/201612:05:44 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVE OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV0l-16-20313

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

COMES NOW Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department (ITD), and for
an answer to the Complaint of Plaintiffs (collectively "Day") admits, denies and alleges as set forth
below. In its Answer, ITD has maintained the general format used by Day in its Complaint.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 1

000117

1.

ITD denies each and every allegation in the Complaint not specifically admitted

herein, to specifically include allegations that any particular Plaintiff has standing or is the real
party in interest.
2.

The claims set forth in the Complaint fail to state a cause of action against ITD

upon which relief can be granted, and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
JURISDICTION, PARTIES AND VENUE
3.

Answering Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the Complaint, ITD is without sufficient

information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies them.
4.

Answering Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, ITD denies the allegations therein as they

pertain to ITD, and admit them as they relate to the Idaho Transportation Board.
5.

Answering Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Ada County is the proper

venue for this action.
6.

Answering Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, ITD admits that this Court has

jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in this action.
FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A.

The Day Property’s historic direct access to public roads.

7.

Answering Paragraph A.1 of the Complaint, ITD is without sufficient information or

knowledge to admit or deny the allegations, and therefore denies them.
8.

Answering Paragraph A.2 of the Complaint, ITD admits that at some point in time,

the property Day refer to as the “Initial Day Property” had frontage along SH 30, and lacks
sufficient information or knowledge regarding the remaining allegations and therefore denies them.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 2
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B.

The new interstate and the agreement about new access to a future public road.

9.

Answering Paragraph B.3 of the Complaint, ITD admits that during the 1960’s, I-84

was constructed along the general route of SH 30. ITD admits that the Idaho Department of
Highways entered into the agreement that is found at Exhibit 2 to Day’s Complaint and that the
document speaks for itself. All other allegations in Paragraph B.3 are denied.
10.

Answering Paragraph B.4 of the Complaint, ITD admits that on or about November

7, 1967, the State of Idaho, Board of Highway Directors, acting through the State Highway
Engineer, entered into the Right of Way Contract found at Exhibit 3 to Day’s Complaint, and asserts
that the document speaks for itself. ITD denies the remaining allegations.
11.

Answering Paragraph B.5 of the Complaint, ITD admits that certain members of the

Day family executed the Warranty Deed dated October 23, 1967 and found at Exhibit 4 to Day’s
Complaint, thereby transferring certain real property and access rights to what Day identifies as the
Initial Day Property to the State. The remaining allegations are denied.
12.

Answering Paragraph B.6 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the documents found at

Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4 speak for themselves, and denies the remaining allegations.
13.

Answering Paragraph B.7 of the Complaint, ITD admits that following construction

of I-84, the Initial Day Property did not have access to the system of public roads via an improved
public road, and denies the remaining allegations.
14.

Answering Paragraph B.8 of the Complaint, ITD admits that the predecessor of the

Idaho Transportation Board acquired a fifty foot wide right-of-way to provide access from the
public system of roads to the Initial Day Property and denies the remaining allegations.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 3

000119

C.

Purchase of additional property dependent on the promised future public road
access and to be developed jointly.

15.

Answering Paragraph C.9 of the Complaint, ITD lacks sufficient information and

knowledge regarding the allegations and therefore denies them.
D.

The new interchange, the extension of frontage road close to the Day Property,
and the taking of the Day Family’s property right of access without providing
just compensation.

16.

Answering Paragraph D.10 of the Complaint, ITD admits that in the latter half of the

1990’s, it constructed the Isaac’s Canyon Interchange and that the interchange did not provide direct
access to the Initial Day Property. ITD denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph D.10.
17.

Answering Paragraph D.11 of the Complaint, ITD admits that as part of the

interchange project, Eisenman Road was extended to connect with the new interchange, and denies
the remaining allegations.
18.

Answering Paragraph D.12 of the Complaint, ITD denies the allegations therein.

19.

Answering Paragraph D.13 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Eisenman Road did

not extend or connect to the Day Property as defined in the Complaint, and denies the remaining
allegations.
20.

Answering Paragraph D.14 of the Complaint, ITD admits that the new interchange

blocked the fifty-foot wide right-of-way from connecting the Initial Day Property to the system of
public roads, and denies the remaining allegations.
E.

ITD’s initial efforts to connect the new frontage road to the Day Property.

21.

Answering Paragraph E.15 of the Complaint, ITD admits that it has made efforts to

provide improved direct access to the Initial Day Property, and denies the remaining allegations.
22.

Answering Paragraph E.16 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Exhibit 6 to the

Complaint indicates that J.D. Alecoa and Son, Inc. granted the State of Idaho a fifty-foot wide

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 4
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easement for the purpose of constructing a stock drive and future public road, and asserts that the
document speaks for itself. Any remaining allegations are denied.
23.

Answering Paragraph E.17 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted language from Exhibit 7 to the Complaint, a document that grants a highway easement to the
State of Idaho.
24.

Answering Paragraph E.18 of the Complaint, ITD admits that there is an Exhibit 8

attached to the Complaint, but given the poor quality of the exhibit cannot admit or deny anything
about it, and therefore denies the allegations in Paragraph E.18.
25.

Answering Paragraph E.19 of the Complaint, ITD admits that it did not build an

improved public road to the Initial Day Property, and denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph
E.19.
F.

ITD’s initial failure to get ACHD’s agreement about public road between
Eisenman and the Day Property.

26.

Answering Paragraph F.20 of the Complaint, ITD admits that it has jurisdiction over

the construction and maintenance of I-84 and related improvements, and that the Ada County
Highway District has general jurisdiction over non-state roads in Ada County. ITD denies the
remaining allegations in Paragraph F.20.
27.

Answering Paragraph F.21 of the Complaint, ITD admits that ACHD has indicated

that it would not allow a public road intersection for what Day refers to as “Easement 1” with
Eisenman Road and denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph F.21.
28.

Answering Paragraph F.22 of the Complaint, ITD denies the allegations therein, and

specifically lacks information or knowledge about what was disclosed to Day and so denies the
allegation that the Day Family was not aware of Exhibit 9 to the Complaint.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 5

000121

G.

The Day Family demands the promised access and ITD works on fixing the
problem.

29.

Answering Paragraph G.23 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from a December 12, 1997 letter attached as Exhibit 10 to the Complaint, and denies the
remaining allegations of Paragraph G.23.
30.

Answering Paragraph G.24 of the Complaint, ITD admits that it sought to widen the

easement over the property formerly owned by J.D. Alecoa and Son, Inc. to sixty feet, and denies
the remaining allegations of Paragraph G.24.
31.

Answering Paragraph G.25 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from Exhibit 11 to the Complaint, a deed from various individuals granting the State of
Idaho property for a stock drive and future public road, and denies the remaining allegations of
Paragraph G.25.
32.

Answering Paragraph G.26 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the February 10, 2000

letter that is Exhibit 12 to the Complaint speaks for itself and denies the remaining allegations of
Paragraph G.26.
33.

Answering Paragraph G.27 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the Highway

Easement Deed attached as Exhibit 13 to the Complaint speaks for itself, and denies any remaining
allegations in Paragraph G.27.
34.

Answering Paragraph G.28 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the June 7, 2000

Memorandum attached as Exhibit 14 to the Complaint speaks for itself and denies any remaining
allegations in Paragraph G.28.
35.

Answering Paragraph G.29 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from Exhibit 15 to the Complaint, asserts that the document speaks for itself and denies any
remaining allegations in Paragraph G.29.
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36.

Answering Paragraph G.30 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that Exhibit 16 to the

Complaint speaks for itself and denies any remaining allegations in Paragraph G.30.
37.

Answering Paragraph G.31 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has accurately

quoted from Exhibit 17 to the Complaint, asserts that the exhibit speaks for itself and denies any
remaining allegations in Paragraph G.31.
H.

Day family cannot obtain title insurance for public access and ITD works with
Title Company to fix access issues.

38.

Answering Paragraph H.32 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted a portion of Exhibit 18, and denies the remaining allegations.
39.

Answering Paragraph H.33 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted a portion of the email that is attached as Exhibit 19 to the Complaint, and denies the
remaining allegations of Paragraph H.33.
40.

Answering Paragraph H.34 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted a portion of Exhibit 20 to the Complaint and asserts that the document speaks for itself. ITD
denies any remaining allegations of Paragraph H.34.
41.

Answering Paragraph H.35 of the Complaint, ITD lacks sufficient information or

knowledge to admit or deny the allegations, and therefore denies them.
I.

ITD’s efforts to build the road to satisfy the title company are blocked by
ACHD.

42.

Answering Paragraph I.36 of the Complaint, ITD lacks sufficient information and

knowledge to admit or deny the allegations, and therefore denies them.
43.

Answering Paragraph I.37 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from Exhibit 21 to the Complaint. ITD lacks sufficient information or knowledge to admit
or deny the remaining allegations, and therefore denies them.
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44.

Answering Paragraph I.38 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from Exhibit 22 to the Complaint, and denies any remaining allegations in Paragraph I.38.
45.

Answering Paragraph I.39 of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day has correctly

quoted from Exhibit 23 to the Complaint, and denies the remaining allegations.
46.

Answering Paragraph I.40 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the paragraph contains

conclusions that do not need to be addressed, but denies them in any event.
47.

Answering Paragraph I.41 of the Complaint, ITD admits that the Initial Day

Property does not have improved direct access to the system of public roads. ITD asserts that the
paragraph otherwise contains conclusions that do not need to be addressed, but denies them in any
event.
48.

Answering Paragraph I.42, ITD asserts that the paragraph contains conclusions that

do not need to be addressed, but denies them in any event.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION)
49.

Answering Paragraph 43 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the paragraph contains

legal conclusions that do not need a response.
50.

Answering Paragraph 44 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the paragraph contains

legal conclusions that do not need a response.
51.

Answering Paragraph 45 of the Complaint, ITD asserts that the paragraph contains

legal conclusions that do not need a response.
52.

Answering Paragraphs 46-52 of the Complaint, ITD denies the allegations therein.
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COUNT TWO
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
53.

Answering Paragraphs 53-60 of the Complaint, ITD denies the allegations therein.

COUNT THREE
(BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
54.

Answering Paragraph 61of the Complaint, ITD admits that Day gave up the access

rights to the Initial Day Property in exchange for a promise to provide access at a later time via a
future public road and stock drive.
55.

Answering Paragraphs 62-65, ITD denies the allegations therein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

Day’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations established by I.C. §§ 5-216 and

2.

Day’s contract claims are barred due to the indefiniteness of the contract terms, to

5-224.

specifically include the lack of a time for performance and lack of lack of identification of a location
of any future public road to provide access.
3.

Day’s inverse condemnation claim is barred by the statute of frauds, specifically I.C.

§ 9-503.
4.

Day has mitigated its damages by the sale of its property, and ITD is entitled to a

complete or partial setoff against any damages Day may have suffered as a result of ITD’s conduct.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant lTD prays for Judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
1.

That the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that the relief requested by

Plaintiffs be denied.
2.

That Judgment be entered in favor ofiTD on all claims for relief.

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.

DATED this 25 1h day ofNovember 2016.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General for the
Idaho Transportation Department
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25 1h day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
_FAX (208) 319-2601
_x_EMAIL fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General for the
Idaho Transportation Department
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Signed: 12/21/2016 11:13 AM
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3) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE:
a) The Pre-trial Conference will be held in open court on the record on October 11, 2017, at 3:00p.m.
b) Failure to Appear. Each party shall appear in person and be represented by trial counsel or an attorney full
knowledge of the case and with authority to bind the party by stipulation. If a party fails to appear at the
Pre-trial Conference without good cause, such failure shall be sufficient ground for entry of judgment
against such party or dismissal of the action of such party, with prejudice, without further notice.
c) Attorney Conference. Counsel for Plaintiff shall convene an attorneys' conference not later than one week
(7 days) before the Pre-trial Conference to exchange marked exhibits, exchange witness lists, identify any
foundational objections to exhibits or witnesses, stipulate to uncontested facts, explore settlement
possibilities, and address all matters set forth in Rule 16(c) I.R. C.P.
d) Settlement. At the Pre-trial Conference, Counsel shall be prepared to discuss settlement possibilities, and
all items set forth in IRCP16(c).
e) Exhibits & Witnesses. Exhibit lists and witness lists shall be filed with the court not later than the date of
the Pre-trial Conference. Witness lists shall briefly describe the subject matter of each witness's anticipated
testimony.
f) Findings of Fact. If this case is a court trial, each party shall file proposed findings of fact and conclusions
oflaw not later than the date of the Pre-trial Conference.
g) Jury Instructions. If this case is a jury trial, proposed jury instructions must be submitted at least 7 days
before the Pre-trial Conference. IRCP 51 (a). However, contrary to Rule 51 (d), if counsel requests standard
Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (IDJI) instructions, counsel should only submit a captioned document listing
the requested instructions by number. Counsel need not submit the actual instructions with duplicates. If
counsel requests modified instructions, counsel should submit only one copy of those requested
instructions, as modified, clearly identifying the source upon which counsel relies for the instruction.
Requested instructions should also be submitted to the court in digital Word format.
4) PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA: Not later than seven (7) days before the Pre-trial Conference, the parties shall
each file a Pre-trial Memorandum that will include the following:
a) Elements of Plaintiffs case (Plaintiff1),
b) Defenses ofDefendant's case (Defendant 2 )
c) Statement of uncontested, agreed or stipulated facts,
d) Statement of contested facts,
e) Contested issues oflaw,
f) Evidentiary issues,
g) Itemization of special damages (when appropriate), and
h) Points and Authorities on issues oflaw
A paper copy and an electronic copy in Word format, of the Pre-trial Memorandum must be sent/delivered to
Judge Hoagland's Court Clerk, Stephanie Hardy at: shardy@adaweb .net.
5) MOTION PRACTICE:
a) The moving party shall contemporaneously file and serve the Motion, Affidavit(s) or other documentary
evidence upon which the moving party intends to rely, and a separate Briet/Memorandum containing all the
reasons and points and authorities relied upon by the moving party.
b) Reply affidavits and briefs, and responses thereto, must comply with the deadlines in IRCP 7(b )(3)(B).
c) Hearings on Motions should be scheduled through Judge Hoagland's Court Clerk, Stephanie Hardy at (208)
287-7541, before a notice ofhearing is filed.
d) Any party who does not intend to oppose the motion should promptly file a pleading showing nonopposition.
e) Counsel should comply with local rules, including page limitations in Local Rule 8.
f) On motions for summary judgment, the alleged undisputed material facts must be documented, excerpted,
or cited in the briefing. A separate statement of undisputed material facts is not necessary, but may be
helpful in complex cases.

1

In this Order, "Plaintiff' includes any Plaintiff, Counterclaimant, and Third Party Plaintiff.
In this Order, "Defendant" includes any Defendant, Counterdefendant, or Third Party Defendant.
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g)

Parties shall also send/deliver a paper copy of all motion materials to the court, and an electronic copy in
Word format of any memorandum to Judge Hoagland's Court Clerk, Stephanie Hardy at
shard y@ada web .net.

6) MOTION DEADLINES
a) Non-dispositive motions:
i) 150 days before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional parties to the lawsuit.
ii) 150 days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the claims between existing parties to the
lawsuit, including adding a claim for punitive damages.
iii) 119 days (17 weeks) before trial is the last day for filing motions for a physical or mental examination.
iv) All other non-dispositive motions (including motions in limine) must be filed and scheduled for hearing
not later than twenty-eight (28) days before trial.
v) Exceptions may be granted, but only for good cause shown and in the interests of justice.
b) Dispositive motions:
i) All motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions must be filed at least ninety-eight (98)
days (14 weeks) before trial (preferably sooner, if possible).
ii) No hearing on any motion for summary judgment will be permitted within sixty (60) days prior to trial.
7) EXPERT WITNESSES DISCLOSURES AND DEADLINES
a) Plaintiffs experts:
i) 160 days before trial is the last day for plaintiff to disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as an
expert witness at trial and shall state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify, and
shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b )(4) IRCP regarding expert witnesses.
ii) 30 days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the plaintiffs initial expert witnesses.
b) Defendant's experts:
i) 100 days before trial is the last day for defendant to disclose each person defendant intends to call as an
expert witness at trial and shall state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify, and
shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b )(4) IRCP regarding expert witnesses.
ii) 30 days before trial, plaintiff shall complete any depositions of the defendant's initial expert witnesses.
c) Plaintiffs rebuttal experts:
i) 70 days before trial is the last day for plaintiff to disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as an expert
witness at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed or raised by the defendant, and shall
disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) IRCP regarding the rebuttal expert witnesses.
ii) 30 days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the plaintiffs rebuttal expert witnesses.
8) LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND DEADLINES
a) 130 days before trial is the last day for plaintiff to disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as a lay
witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses).
b) 100 days before trial is the last day for defendant to disclose each person defendant intends to call as a lay
witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses).
c) 70 days before trial is the last day for plaintiff to disclose each lay witness (excluding impeachment
witnesses) plaintiff intends to call at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed or raised by the
defendant.
d) 30 days before trial, all parties shall complete any depositions oflay witnesses.
9) WRITTEN DISCOVERY DEADLINES
a) 60 days before trial is the last day to serve written discovery requests (interrogatories, requests for
production, requests for admissions, and requests to permit entry upon land or other property).
b) 30 days before trial, all parties must serve any and all final and supplemental responses to discovery and
expert disclosures.
10) EXHIBITS:
a) An original set of trial exhibits, plus two paper copies, shall be provided to the Court not later than the
beginning of trial.
b) Exhibits should be pre-marked prior to opening of court. Unless otherwise indicated, Plaintiffs exhibits
should be identified numerically and Defendant's exhibits should be identified alphabetically.
c) All videotape or audiotape presentations must be cued in advance and all equipment tested for sound,
picture, etc., prior to presenting evidence contained therein.
ORDER SETTING TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, AND SCHEDULING DEADLINES -Page 3
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d)
6)

The parties are responsible for reviewing proposed exhibits for redactions to ensure that objectionable
material is not seen by the jury.
Electronic pdf or jpg copies of exhibits should be served by email attachment, or on CD or ﬂash drive, on
Judge Hoagland’s Court Clerk, Stephanie Hardy at: shardygzDadawebnet.

If the parties agree to mediation, then such mediation shall begin at least 60 days prior to trial.
Unless othelwise agreed in writing between the panics, the cost of mediation shall be equally divided among
the parties.

11)

MEDIATION:

12)

AMENDMENTS: The parties may seek amendment hereof by Couﬂ order, and to request fulther hearing or
status conference for such purpose, in accordance with IRCP16(a).

13)

COMPLIANCE AND SANCTIONS: In the absence of a written stipulation providing otherwise, a party may
be excused from strict compliance with any provision of this Order only upon motion showing extraordinary
circumstances and good cause, and lack of prejudice to the timely administration of justice. Failure to strictly
comply with this Order may subject a party or its attorney to appropriate sanctions under Rule 16, including, but
not limited to costs and reasonable attorney fees, exclusion ofwitnesses, evidence or testimony, or the dismissal
of claims or striking of defenses, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated Signed: 12/20/2016 04:03 PM

SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVE OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW the Defendant, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department ("the
State"), and submits this memorandum in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 56, I.R.C.P., the State seeks summary judgment on the following issues:
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Day Family
Day as

(1/9
Dan E.
John F.
F. Day
E. Day
Holcomb Road
Road Holdings,
Holdings,
interest); John
interest); Dan
interest); Holcomb
(1/4 interest);
(1/4 interest);
(1/9 interest);
Day (1/4
Day (1/4
LLC (1/6
Donna Day
LLC
R. Day
David R.
1/9 interest);
and David
Jacobs 1/9
interest).
interest); Donna
interest); and
(1/6 interest);
(1/9 interest).
Day Jacobs
Day (1/9
“Agreement” dated
Day’s breach
in part
Day’s
breach of
part on
of contract
contract claims
to rely
on an
an “Agreement”
appear to
dated
claims appear
rely in

November 17,
2 to
for sake
which for
1961 (Exhibit
to Complaint,
of convenience
November
convenience is
sake of
attached as
is attached
as
(Exhlbit 2
Complaint, which
17, 1961

A to
That Agreement
Exhlbit A
the State
the Afﬁdavit
Exhibit
Affidavit of
Agreement allowed
to
to the
submitted herewith).
State to
allowed the
Counsel submitted
herewith). That
of Counsel
1
acres1 of
“Initial Day
Propeny” (consisting
take
purchased
the “Initial
13.42 acres
of 160
take possession
of 13.42
of the
160 acres
possession of
acres purchased
(consisting of
Day Property”

right-of-way that
the 13.42
the existing
ran through
the
4.43
13.42 acres
existing SH
4.43 acres
of the
of the
SH 30
that ran
through the
acres of
acres consisted
consisted of
30 right-of-way
in
the
for
the
Day
property,
leaving
8.99
in
additional
acres
to
be
acquired
by
the
State
of
Idaho
for
the
new
leaving
additional
to
of
Idaho
new
acres
State
8.99
be acquired by
Day propeny,
interstate.
interstate.

11
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by Ernest
build the
in 1935
in order
Ernest G.
the new
the Complaint)
per the
to build
interstate highway
order to
new interstate
1935 per
G. Day
(I-80N,
Complaint) in
highway (I-80N,
Day in
by
(“SH 30”)
30”) ran
as
it was
In 1961,
the time).
ran through
through the
the northeast
known at
northeast
at the
State Highway
as it
was known
30 (“SH
time). In
1961, State
Highway 30

corner
Initial Day
Initial Day
for the
the Initial
the Initial
corner of
of the
providing public
public road
road access
access for
See
Propeny. See
Propeny, providing
Day Property.
Day Property,
Exhibit
Affidavit of
B to
Exhlbit 11 to
Exhlbit B
the Aﬂ’idavit
The new
interstate
to Complaint,
at Exhibit
to the
new interstate
found at
Counsel. The
also found
Complaint, also
of Counsel.
right-of—way through
Initial Day
Exhlbit 5
expanded
through the
the Initial
the existing
existing SH
SH 30
upon the
expanded upon
30 right-of-way
See Exhibit
5
Propeny. See
Day Property.

to
Affidavit of
Exhlbit C
the Aﬂ’idavit
The Agreement
to Complaint,
at Exhibit
to the
Agreement further
futther
found at
Counsel. The
also found
C to
Complaint, also
of Counsel.
I-80N
soon-to-be-built I-80N
indicated
rights from
from the
Initial Day
all access
the Initial
the soon-to-be-built
that all
to the
indicated that
access rights
Property to
Day Property

interstate
was signed
by Emma
N. Day,
Emma N.
The Agreement
Ernest E.
Agreement was
interstate were
to be
E. Day,
signed by
extinguished. The
were to
be extinguished.
Day, Ernest
Day,
Robert
whom are
in this
Plaintiffs in
Robert L.
L. Day
Donald M.
M. Day,
none of
of Whom
and Donald
are Plaintiffs
this case.
case.
Day and
Day, none
the State
the Agreement
the new
The only
The
under the
completion of
obligations the
Agreement included
of the
had under
new
included completion
State had
only obligations

highway
within aa reasonable
with the
faith negotiations
time and
the Days
determine
to determine
negotiations with
and good
reasonable time
plans Within
good faith
highway plans
Days to
compensation
right-of-Way and
for needed
to loss
of public
compensation for
public
and severance
loss of
severance damages
needed highway
damages due
due to
highway right-of-way
road
Initial Day
for the
the rest
the Initial
rest of
of the
road access
access for
Property.
Day Property.

The
The State
met its
its obligations
the
obligations under
State met
under the

Agreement.
Agreement.
Right
Another
which Day
Another document
its contract
the October
on which
contract claims
October 23,
document on
1967 Right
bases its
claims is
is the
23, 1967
Day bases

(“ROW Contract”)
Contract”) found
of
D to
Exhlbit 3
Exhlbit D
the Complaint
the
of Way
Contract (“ROW
at Exhibit
to the
to the
at Exhibit
and at
found at
Complaint and
3 to
Way Contract

It was
Emma N.
Ernest E.
Affidavit of
was also
by Emma
N. Day,
E. Day,
Robert L.
L. Day
and
Counsel. It
also signed
signed by
Afﬁdavit
Day and
Day, Ernest
Day, Robert
of Counsel.
in this
Donald
plaintiffs in
provided, among
The ROW
Donald M.
M. Day,
none of
of whom
Whom are
Contract provided,
among
are plaintiffs
ROW Contract
this case.
case. The
Day, none

I-80N
other
would pay
the State
for 8.99
other things,
control to
of land,
to I-80N
that the
State would
full access
acres of
8.99 acres
access control
things, that
land, full
$6,000 for
pay $6,000
Initial Day
and
the remaining
for loss
the system
remaining Initial
to the
of access
to the
and any
loss of
severance damages
damages to
access to
Propeny for
system
any severance
Day Property

of
of public
public roads.
roads.
The
that “[a]ccess
remaining property
The ROW
further provided
Contract further
to [Day’s]
“[a]ccess to
ROW Contract
provided that
[Day’s] remaining
propeny
southerly
will be
from the
the Interstate
the future
Interstate Highway
frontage road
of the
stock
and stock
road and
future frontage
available from
be available
southerly of
Highway will
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I-80N. (I-IG-80N-2(16)54)”.
drive
(I-IG-80N-2(16)54)”. The
the southwesterly
The ROW
not
on the
of I-80N.
contract does
ROW contract
side of
drive on
does not
southwesterly side

obligate
jurisdiction over
maintain or
the State
the future
frontage road
to build,
or take
take jurisdiction
obligate the
State to
stock
and stock
over the
road and
future frontage
build, maintain
drive.
Nor does
who is
build or
the ROW
the future
maintain the
Contract indicate
indicate who
to build
or maintain
frontage road
ROW Contract
road
drive. Nor
does the
is to
future frontage
and
when itit would
would be
be built.
nothing from
from the
The ROW
the State
or when
built. The
Contract required
required nothing
stock drive,
State
and stock
ROW Contract
drive, or
than payment
other
provision of
the $6000
the provision
the easement
for the
the future
other than
of the
of access
to the
easement for
and the
future
access to
$6000 and
payment of

frontage
both of
which the
the State
frontage road
of which
stock drive,
State did.
and stock
road and
did.
drive, both
drive” is
“future frontage
The
plans for
from the
The location
the “future
the plans
for
location of
of the
frontage road
stock drive”
and stock
evident from
road and
is evident
I-IG-80N-2(16)54.
project I-IG-80N-2(16)54.
project

A to
See
Affidavit of
Jim Morrison,
Morrison, on
which the
Exhlbit A
the Aﬂ’idavit
the
to the
on which
See Exhibit
of Jim

easement
in red
for the
the future
for convenience.
frontage road
outlined in
stock drive
Those
easement for
and stock
red for
convenience. Those
road and
future frontage
drive is
is outlined
in the
the plans
the ROW
are
plans referenced
Contract.
referenced in
are the
ROW Contract.

(“Deed”)
Another
by Day
Another document
the 1967
relied upon
upon by
1967 Warranty
Deed (“Deed”)
document apparently
is the
Warranty Deed
apparently relied
Day is

referenced
E to
in the
4 to
Exhlbit E
Exhlbit 4
the
the Complaint,
the ROW
to the
to the
at Exhibit
Contract. See
referenced in
ROW Contract.
located at
See Exhibit
also located
Complaint, also
rightI-80N rightAffidavit of
the 13.42
for the
the new
The Deed
13.42 acres
transferred ownership
of the
ownership of
new I-80N
Deed transferred
acres for
Counsel. The
Afﬁdavit
of Counsel.
“access to
I-80N to
of-way
rights to
the Future
the State.
The Deed
the “access
all access
to the
to I-80N
to the
references the
and all
Deed references
Future
State. The
of-Way and
access rights

Frontage
the Southwesterly
The Deed
Frontage Road
on the
of Interstate
Interstate 80N.”
Stock Drives
and Stock
Drives [sic]
Road and
side of
Deed is
80 .” The
is
Southwesterly side
[sic] on
silent
who would
would build
build any
would maintain
silent as
frontage road,
to who
maintain itit or
or when
when itit would
who would
would
as to
future frontage
road, who
any future
be built.
built.
be

the easement
for the
the
The State
its obligations
the Deed
The
fulfilled its
providing the
State fulfilled
obligations under
easement for
Deed by
under the
by providing

future
project plans.
plans. Emma
N. Day,
the project
Ernest E.
frontage road
on the
E.
stock drive
shown on
and stock
road and
Emma N.
future frontage
drive as
as shown
Day, Ernest
Day,
the signatories
the Deed.
Robert L.
L. Day
M. Day
on the
are the
and Donald
Donald M.
signatories on
Deed.
Day and
Day are
Day, Robert
in 1979
According
property
the Complaint,
an additional
additional 160
of propeny
According to
to the
160 acres
1979 Day
acres of
purchased an
Complaint, in
Day purchased

adjacent
in an
Initial Day
the Initial
to the
at 6.
This purchase
an
Para. 9
resulted in
adjacent to
purchase resulted
See Complaint,
9 at
6. This
Complaint, Para.
Property. See
Day Property.
“Day Property”,
ownership
which Day
in contrast
Property”, in
the “Day
the
of about
refers to
to as
contrast to
to the
ownership of
about 307
307 acres,
as the
acres, which
Day refers
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Initial
Initial Day
Exhlbit 5
Exhlbit C
the Complaint,
the
on Exhibit
to the
well as
on Exhibit
to the
shown on
and is
is shown
5 to
as well
as on
C to
Complaint, as
Property, and
Day Property,
Affidavit of
Counsel.
Afﬁdavit
of Counsel.
The
by December
The Isaacs
IC project
project was
completed by
December 5,
1997. See
Isaacs Canyon
was substantially
See
substantially completed
Canyon IC
5, 1997.
Exhibit
Affidavit of
Jim Morrison.
Morrison. At
punch list
At that
B to
that time,
Exhlbit B
the Afﬁdavit
of items
to the
to
items remained
remained to
list of
time, only
only aa punch
of Jim
April 6,
be completed.
Id. By
was fully
Id.
the project
project was
completed. Id.
completed. Id.
be
1998, the
fully completed.
6, 1998,
By April

In 1997
In
the State
the Isaacs
Bennet G.
when the
State constructed
constructed the
1997 when
Donna Day
Isaacs Canyon
G. Day,
Canyon IC,
1C, Bennet
Day
Day, Donna
th
1/9th
Jacobs
their 1/9
the Day
R. Day
of the
obtained their
and David
1/9 of
each owned
each obtained
David R.
owned 1/9
Jacobs and
Propeny. They
They each
Day each
Day Property.
rd
1/3rd
in the
ownership
when The
ownership
The Donald
its 1/3
the
interest when
transferred its
Donald M.
M. Day
Trust transferred
ownership interest
ownership in
Family Trust
Day Family
2
Property2 to
Day
Affidavit of
F to
Exhlbit F
the Aﬂ’idavit
them. See
to them.
to the
Counsel.
See Exhibit
Day Property
of Counsel.

in the
in
the Day
Robert
Robert L.
L. Day
L. Day
Charlotte L.
obtained aa 1/3
ownership in
and Charlotte
1/3 ownership
Property in
Day and
Day obtained
Day Property

1989
when Robert
interest to
Robert L.
L. Day
to himself
L.
transferred his
Charlotte L.
himself and
ownership interest
his ownership
and his
1989 when
his wife,
Wife, Charlotte
Day transferred
Day.
Affidavit of
that Robert
Exhlbit G
The fact
the Aﬂ’idavit
Charlotte Day
fact that
Robert and
to the
and Charlotte
owned aa
Counsel. The
See Exhibit
G to
Day. See
Day owned
of Counsel.
in equal
1/3
their 1/3
from aa July
transferring their
interest is
interest in
to
evident from
1/3 interest
1/3 interest
shares to
1998 Deed
Deed transferring
equal shares
is evident
15, 1998
July 15,

the
B of
the Ernest
Ernest E.
the Donald
Living Trust
Marjorie
E. Day
H. Day
of the
Donald M.
M. Day
Trust and
Trust B
and Lois
and Trust
and Marjorie
Lois H.
Day and
Day Living
Day and
H to
D.
Affidavit of
Exhlbit H
the Aﬂ’idavit
D. Day
to the
Trust. See
Counsel.
See Exhibit
Family Trust.
Day Family
of Counsel.

The
by the
in the
in 1997
The remaining
the Day
the Ernest
Ernest E.
remaining 1/3
interest in
E. Day
1/3 interest
1997 by
owned in
was owned
Propeny was
Day Property
Day
from Ernest
Ernest E.
Its ownership
interest was
Living Trust.
and
was obtained
E. Day
H. Day
ownership interest
obtained from
and Lois
and Lois
Trust. Its
Lois
Lois H.
Day and
Day Living
in 1992.
H.
Affidavit of
Exhlbit II to
the Aﬂ’idavit
H. Day
to the
1992. See
Counsel.
See Exhibit
Day in
of Counsel.

Of
in December
April 1998,
the owners
the Day
through April
Donna Day
Of the
of the
December 1997
owners of
1997 through
Propeny in
1998, Donna
Day Property
Day
in this
Jacobs
plaintiffs in
the only
R. Day
this case.
David R.
are the
who are
are plaintiffs
and David
ones who
Jacobs and
case.
only ones
Day are

The
The remaining
remaining

The
parcels, one
which is
Merrigan
The Day
the Merrigan
often referred
of two
of which
referred to
to as
one of
consists of
two parcels,
is often
as the
Property consists
Day Property
Parcel
and
is
described
as
the
SE
1/4,
Section
19,
Township
2
North,
Range
3
East.
The
2
Parcel and is descrlbed as the SE 1/4, Section 19, Township North, Range 3 East. The second
second
1A: , Section
Isaac’s Canyon
NE ¼
parcel is
parcel, and
the Isaac’s
the NE
referred to
to as
parcel
and is
descrlbed as
is referred
as the
is described
as the
Canyon parcel,
19,
, Section 19,
NE
Initial
Township
Range
3
East.
The
NE
1/4
is
the
Initial
Day
Property
–
See
the
property
description
The
1/4
the
the
Range
Township 2,
East.
description
3
is
property
Day Property See
2,
in
in Exhibit
4 to
Exhlbit 4
the Complaint.
to the
Complaint.
22
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,

plaintiffs – Trust
B of
plaintiffs
the Donald
Dan
Trust B
Marjorie D.
of the
Donald M.
M. Day
D. Day
John F.
F. Day,
and Marjorie
Trust, John
Family Trust,
Day and
Day Family
Day, Dan
7 did
E.
in the
LLC –
not have
the Day
interests in
E. Day
ownership interests
Holcomb Road
and Holcomb
did not
Road Holdings,
have any
Holdings, LLC
Day and
Day
any ownership
in 1997
Property
when the
breach of
the alleged
condemnation or
or breach
of contract
contract occurred.
inverse condemnation
alleged inverse
1997 when
occurred.
Property in

(“Edmonds
In
In 2005,
the Day
Land Holdings,
Inc. (“Edmonds
to Edmonds
Edmonds Groves
sold the
Groves Land
Holdings, Inc.
Property to
2005, Day
Day sold
Day Property

Groves”) for
Groves”)
for $10,010,000.
$10,010,000.

Day’s answer
Exh1bit JJ to
See
Affidavit of
the Afﬁdavit
to the
to
and Day’s
answer to
Counsel and
See Exhibit
of Counsel

12 found
K to
Interrogatory
Affidavit of
Exhlbit K
the Afﬁdavit
at Exhibit
to the
N0. 12
Edmonds Groves
found at
Groves eventually
Counsel. Edmonds
Interrogatory No.
eventually
of Counsel.

defaulted
purchase of
the purchase
the Day
the
on the
of the
on discovery
to date,
of the
out of
defaulted on
conducted to
Based on
Property. Based
discovery conducted
date, out
Day Property.
million sale
million from
$10
price, Day
from the
the sale,
retained about
got to
to keep
keep
and obviously
sale price,
about $4.9
$4.9 million
$10 million
obviously got
sale, and
Day retained

the
the Day
well.
as well.
Property as
Day Property
II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

Standard of
A.
A. Standard
of Review
Review

The
judgment motion
well known:
for aa summary
motion is
The applicable
of review
known:
applicable standard
review for
standard of
is well
summary judgment

“An appeal
“An
judgment is
under the
from summary
the same
standard aa
appeal from
reviewed under
same standard
is reviewed
summary judgment
judgment.”
motion for
for summary
district
judgment.”
Campbell
v.
district court
when granting
granting aa motion
001111 uses
uses when
Campbell
v.
summary
Kvamme, 155
judgment is
Idaho 692,
155 Idaho
316 P.3d
107 (2013).
P.3d 104,
is
Kvamme,
104, 107
Summary judgment
692, 695,
695, 316
(2013). Summary
“if the
proper “if
pleadings, depositions,
and
admissions
on
file,
together
with
the
with
the
the pleadings,
together
on
proper
and
admissions
depositions,
file,
if any,
affidavits,
that there
there is
no genuine
genuine issue
to any
fact and
material fact
and
show that
is no
issue as
as to
affidavits, if
any material
any, show
law.” I.R.C.P.
that
party is
judgment as
that the
the moving
entitled to
moving party
to aa judgment
matter of
of law.”
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
as a
a matter
is entitled
56(0).
”The facts
non-moving party.”
“The
party.”
in favor
the non-moving
to be
of the
facts are
favor of
are to
construed in
be liberally
hberally construed
Blackmore v.
LLC, 149
TriiCities, LLC,
149 Idaho
Idaho 558,
237 P.3d
Re/Max Tri–Cities,
P.3d 655,
Blackmore
658
v. Re/Max
561, 237
655, 658
558, 561,
“may
the party
not rest
the
(2010).
judgment “may not
upon the
rest upon
opposing summary
However, the
summary judgment
(2010). However,
party opposing
party's response,
mere
party's pleadings,
pleadings, but
by
the party's
mere allegations
allegations or
or denials
of that
that party's
but the
denials of
response, by
in
affidavits
otherwise
provided
in
this
rule,
must
set
forth
specific
facts
forth
affidavits or
or as
this
must
facts
set
speciﬁc
otherwise
provided
as
rule,
trial.”33 I.R.C.P.
showing
for trial.”
there is
showing that
that there
genuine issue
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
is a
a genuine
issue for
56(0).
Path to
Health, LLP
LLP v.
Long, 161
1224 (2016).
161 Idaho
Path
Idaho 50,
P.3d 1220,
to Health,
v. Long,
383 P.3d
1220, 1224
(2016).
50, 383

Additionally,
the
Additionally, the

“moving party
the nonmoving
entitled to
“moving
party is
judgment when
when the
showing
to make
to judgment
nonmoving party
make aa showing
fails to
is entitled
party fails

case....” Silicon
party's case....”
sufficient
Int'l
the existence
sufficient to
element essential
to establish
of an
an element
to that
that party's
essential to
existence of
Silicon Int’l
establish the

Ore,
LLC v.
Monsanto Co.,
Badell v.
314 P.3d
Idaho 538,
155 Idaho
P.3d 593,
599 (2013)
v.
v. Monsanto
(quoting Bade]!
Ore, LLC
544, 314
C0., 155
538, 544,
593, 599
(2013) (quoting
Beeks, 115
115 Idaho
127 (1988)).
P.2d 126,
Idaho 101,
765 P.2d
Beeks,
101, 102,
102, 765
126, 127
(1988)).
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B.
with the
Initial Day
The State
not breach
its agreements
the owners
the Initial
State did
agreements with
B. The
breach any
of its
of the
did not
owners of
any of
Day
Property
the Day
or the
Property.
Property or
Day Property.
The
breached any
upon by
by Day
The State
not breached
the agreements
for its
its breach
of the
relied upon
of
State has
has not
breach of
agreements relied
any of
Day for
the State
for any
all severance
contract
contract claims.
to
State compensated
and all
compensated Day
severance damages
claims. Specifically,
damages to
Speciﬁcally, the
Day for
any and

“a future
the
provided access
from loss
Initial Day
the Initial
resulting from
frontage
of access,
to “a
and provided
loss of
access to
future frontage
Property resulting
access, and
Day Property
drive” by
road
by obtaining
plain reading
A plain
for such
the
obtaining aa public
reading of
of the
stock drive”
public easement
easement for
and stock
road and
such purposes.
purposes. A

1961
possession, the
that the
the
for possession,
the 1967
the 1967
1961 Agreement
Agreement for
make clear
Contract and
clear that
ROW Contract
and the
1967 ROW
1967 Deed
Deed make
State
not breached
its contractual
obligations.
contractual obligations.
has not
breached its
State has
“When interpreting
language.”
document's language.”
interpreting aa contract,
“When
begins With
with the
the document's
contract, [the
court] begins
[the court]
Ass’n v.
Potlatch
148 Idaho
226 P.3d
1280
Potlatch Educ.
Potlatch Sch.
Idaho 630,
Dist. No.
N0. 285,
P.3d 1277,
Sch. Dist.
Educ. Ass'n
V. Potlatch
285, 148
1277, 1280
630, 633,
633, 226
144 Idaho
(2010)
Pentecostal Church
Paz, 144
Church v.
Idaho 304,
747
160 P.3d
P.3d 743,
Viene Pentecostal
Crista Viene
v. Paz,
(citing Cristo
743, 747
304, 308,
308, 160
(2010) (citing

“In the
in its
(2007)).
be construed
plain, ordinary
the document
its plain,
the absence
of ambiguity,
must be
and
document must
construed in
absence of
ordinary and
ambiguity, the
(2007)). “In
instrument.”
proper sense,
plain wordjng
wording of
from the
the plain
the instrument.”
the meaning
meaning derived
of the
to the
proper
according to
derived from
sense, according

“If the
the terms
C&G,
Inc. v.
contract are
25 P.3d
terms of
Idaho 763,
ofaa contract
are
135 Idaho
P.3d 76,
v. Rule,
78 (2001).
C&G, Inc.
Rule, 135
763, 765,
765, 25
(2001). “If
76, 78
law.”
clear
unambiguous, the
their meaning
the interpretation
meaning and
interpretation of
of their
legal effect
effect are
of law.”
clear and
questions of
and unambiguous,
and legal
are questions

Opportunity,
LLC v.
1261 (2002).
Idaho 602,
136 Idaho
P.3d 1258,
v. Ossewarde,
38 P.3d
Ossewarde, 136
1258, 1261
Opportunity, LLC
602, 605,
605, 38
(2002).
The
that the
its highway
The 1961
the State
1961 Agreement
Agreement only
complete its
State complete
and
plans and
requjred that
highway plans
only required
negotiate
in good
faith for
for payment
for loss
the
of severance
of public
public road
negotiate in
and the
loss of
road access
severance damages
good faith
damages for
access and
payment of
right of
necessary
of way.
necessary right
way.

The
plain language
The State
The plain
the Deed
the ROW
of the
did so.
and the
ROW
Deed and
State did
so. The
language of

Contract
that the
the Day
frontage road
to aa future
Contract only
required that
stock
and stock
have access
road and
access to
future frontage
Property have
only required
Day Property
that access
The State
for the
the future
drive.
provided that
public easement
frontage
State provided
purchasing aa public
easement for
future frontage
drive. The
access by
by purchasing

road.
road.

The
The ROW
not require
the State
maintain or
Contract and
to build,
or take
take
ROW Contract
and Deed
Deed do
State to
require the
do not
build, maintain

jurisdiction over
the future
frontage road
stock drive.
and stock
jurisdiction
over the
road and
future frontage
drive.

Based
plain language
the plain
the
on the
of the
Based on
language of
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Agreement,
in relation
the State
met its
its contractual
the
obligations in
relation to
to the
Contract and
State met
contractual obligations
ROW Contract
and Deed,
Agreement, ROW
Deed, the
Initial
Initial Day
Property.
Day Property.
in its
Nowhere in
provide access
its Complaint
the State
that the
failed to
to provide
to aa
Nowhere
State failed
assert that
Complaint does
does Day
access to
Day assert

“breached the
future
in 1996-97,
that in
the State
the
frontage road
stock drive.
1996-97, the
and stock
asserts that
road and
State “breached
future frontage
drive. Rather,
Rather, Day
Day asserts
the Interchange
the extension
the frontage
not
agreement
Interchange and
frontage road
extension of
of the
constmcting the
agreement by
and the
but not
road but
by constructing

roads.” Complaint,
connecting
with the
the Day
the public
21. Day
connecting the
at 21.
public roads.”
Para. 55
futther
55 at
Complaint, Para.
Property with
Day Property
Day further
“date of
asserts
breach of
first breach
that itit is
from the
its alleged
the “date
the first
entitled to
interest on
to interest
on its
of the
of
alleged damages
asserts that
is entitled
damages from
1997.” Complaint,
in approximately
contract,
22. There
the
There is
which the
at 22.
no evidence
of which
Para. 60
evidence of
60 at
is no
contract, in
approximately 1997.”
Complaint, Para.

State
point in
prior to
in
in time
that at
time prior
indicating that
the construction
the interchange
interchange in
at any
to the
of the
construction of
State is
aware indicating
is aware
any point
with the
that the
not complied
the requirements
the 1961
the State
1997,
believed that
requirements of
of the
1961
complied with
had not
State had
1997, Day
Day believed

Agreement,
the 1967
the 1967
Contract and
ROW Contract
and the
1967 ROW
1967 Deed.
Deed.
Agreement, the
Day
breach of
time frame
not identify
for its
its claim
the implied
implied covenant
frame for
on breach
of the
claim based
covenant
does not
based on
identify aa time
Day does
post-date the
of
faith and
fair dealing,
the 1997
the
the allegations
of the
allegations clearly
of good
construction of
and fair
but the
1997 construction
good faith
dealing, but
clearly post-date

“ITD passed
Isaacs
passed on
In support
that “ITD
its claim,
on opportunities
to
of its
opportlmities to
1C. In
asserts that
support of
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon IC.
claim, Day
Day asserts
negotiate
with ACHD
ACHD for
for aa public
the Day
for an
to connect
an appropriate
connect the
public access
appropriate approach
negotiate with
approach for
road to
access road
Day
“to believe
road”, and
Property
was
the public
frontage road”,
to the
that an
an acceptable
public frontage
resolution was
and led
led Day
believe that
acceptable resolution
Propeny to
Day “to
forthcoming.”
forthcoming.”

Complaint,
64 at
at 23.
Para. 64
23.
Complaint, Para.

“ITD failed
that “ITD
its
Day
utilize its
failed to
to utilize
also claims
claims that
Day also

“failed to
necessary” and
condemnation
powers as
the necessary
all
legal actions
to resolve
condemnation powers
to take
take the
actions to
and “failed
resolve all
as necessary”
necessary legal
disputes.” Complaint,
access
which agreement
not identify
64 at
at 23.
or
Para. 64
agreement or
upon which
23. Day
access disputes.”
does not
Complaint, Para.
identify upon
Day does

faith and
fair dealing.
the agreements
its claim
contract
contract itit bases
of good
none of
of the
dealing. However,
claim of
agreements
and fair
bases its
good faith
However, none

referenced
in the
things of
the Complaint
the State
which Day
to do
of those
of which
required the
those things
referenced in
now
State to
Complaint required
do any
any of
Day now
complains.
complains.
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State’s
Assuming
judgment motion
that the
for purposes
motion that
the State’s
of this
this summary
Assuming only
purposes of
summary judgment
only for

construction
in 1997
the Isaacs
the loss
the future
of the
IC in
of access
to the
construction of
1997 may
have caused
loss of
Isaacs Canyon
access to
caused the
future
Canyon IC
may have
frontage
breach of
would
not aa breach
frontage road
of contract.
contract. Rather,
stock drive,
and stock
road and
such loss
loss is
such loss
loss would
is not
Rather, such
drive, any
any such
fall
under the
fall under
the rubric
which Day
of an
an inverse
inverse condemnation
rubric of
condemnation claim,
alleged.
has alleged.
claim, which
Day has
The
The Agreement,
not continuing
not
Contract and
continuing contracts
contracts and
ROW Contract
and Deed
and did
did not
Deed were
were not
Agreement, ROW
“a future
impose
provide access
the State
frontage road
obligation to
timeless obligation
to provide
to “a
State a
stock
and stock
road and
impose upon
upon the
a timeless
access to
future frontage
drive”.
drive”.

Nothing in
in those
Nothing
the State
performance by
those documents
State once
contemplates future
once access
documents contemplates
future performance
access
by the

If future
to
was provided.
not required
performance is
to aa future
required
frontage road
stock drive
and stock
road and
future performance
provided. If
is not
future frontage
drive was
under aa contract,
AG v.
Nursery, Inc,
Inc.,
Teufel Nursery,
not aa continuing
continuing contract.
contract. See,
under
Credit Suisse
is not
Suisse AG
v. Teufel
contract, itit is
See, Credit
24
321 P.3d
156
Fidelity &
Deposit Co.
Idaho 189,
156 Idaho
P.3d 739
S.W.2d 17,
739 (2014);
& Deposit
Co. v.
v. Stool,
607 S.W.2d
Stool, 607
189, 321
17, 24
(2014); Fidelity

(Tex.Civ.App.
All that
that the
that the
Initial Day
the Deed
the Initial
contract required
and ROW
ROW contract
Deed and
required was
was that
(TeX.CiV.App. 1980).
1980). All
Day
“access to
drive”. Nothing
Property
Nothing in
in either
either the
the ROW
frontage road
to aa future
stock drive”.
and stock
ROW
road and
have “access
future frontage
Propeny have

Contract
jurisdiction over
that the
the Deed
the State
the
Contract or
or the
to construct,
maintain or
or take
State is
states that
Deed states
take jurisdiction
over the
is to
construct, maintain
road”. Those
“future frontage
“future
plainly not
not continuing
continuing contracts.
frontage road”.
contracts.
Those agreements
agreements are
are plainly

Because
based on
the claim
the implied
implied covenant
no breach
of contract
contract exists,
on breach
of the
claim based
covenant
breach of
breach of
Because no
exists, the
An implied
of
faith and
fair dealing
implied covenant
dealing fails
matter of
of law
cannot create
of good
well. An
and fair
create
covenant cannot
fails as
as a
a matter
law as
as well.
good faith
the terms
obligations
obligations that
that are
to the
of an
an agreement:
agreement:
terms of
are contrary
contrary to

No covenant
will be
implied which
the terms
the contract
which is
terms of
N0
to the
of the
contract
covenant will
be implied
is contrary
contrary to
“that the
negotiated
by the
the parties.
The covenant
the parties
parties
parties. The
negotiated and
and executed
executed by
covenant requires
requires “that
agreement,”
perform
in
good
faith
the
obligations
imposed
by
their
agreement,”
and
in
faith
their
perform
the obligations imposed by
and aa
good
“either party
violation of
when “either
violates, nullifies
the covenant
of the
or
Violation
covenant occurs
nullifies or
occurs only
only when
patty ... violates,
contract...”
significantly
impairs any
the ... contract....”
benefit of
of the
signiﬁcantly impairs
any benefit
146 Idaho
Bushi v.
Health Care,
PLLC, 146
Idaho
Idaho 764,
203 P.3d
P.3d 694,
Bushi
v. Sage
Sage Health
698 (2009)(quoting
Care, PLLC,
764, 768,
694, 698
(2009)(qu0ting Idaho
768, 203
121 Idaho
First Natl.
Natl. Bank
Bank v.
824 P.2d
The only
P.2d 841,
First
Idaho 266,
Bliss Valley
v. Bliss
863 (1991)).
Foods, 121
841, 863
266, 288,
288, 824
Valley Foods,
only
(1991)). The

obligation
was to
the State
the 1967
obligation imposed
Contract or
or Deed
to provide
to aa
on the
State by
imposed on
ROW Contract
1967 ROW
Deed was
provide access
access to
by the
“future frontage
drive”. The
that obligation,
The State
met that
the
“future
use the
frontage road
cannot use
stock drive”.
State met
and stock
and Day
road and
obligation, and
Day cannot
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implied
faith and
fair dealing
implied covenant
of good
dealing to
to impose
additional obligations.
obligations. Bushi
Bushi v.
covenant of
and fair
impose additional
good faith
v. Sage
Sage
(“The court
Health Care,
PLLC, 146
in any
146 Idaho
at 768,
at 698
reiterated that,
Idaho at
Health
203 P.3d
P.3d at
court reiterated
698 (“The
Care, PLLC,
that, in
case,
768, 203
any case,
dealing.”
contract
by the
faith and
fair dealing.”
the implied
implied covenant
contract terms
of good
overridden by
covenant of
are not
not overridden
and fair
terms are
good faith

(emphasis
Ins. Exch,
Exch., 115
in original)
115 Idaho
P.2d 768,
Farmers Ins.
Idaho 298,
Clement v.
v. Farmers
766 P.2d
original) (citing
(citing Clement
(emphasis in
298, 300,
300, 766
768,
770
Idaho State
125 Idaho
P.2d 505,
Idaho 177,
510 (Ct.App.1994)).
Olson v.
v. Idaho
State Univ.,
868 P.2d
770 (1988);
Univ., 125
182, 868
177, 182,
(Ct.App.1994)).
505, 510
(1988); Olson
As
was only
provide the
with
Initial Day
the Initial
matter of
the State
of law,
to provide
As aa matter
State was
required to
Property with
law, the
only required
Day Property
“a future
drive” and
access
pay $6000
for severance
frontage road
to “a
stock drive”
and
and stock
and pay
road and
severance damages
access to
damages and
future frontage
$6000 for
right-of-WW needed
right-of-way
breach of
for the
the new
The State
therefore no
interstate highway.
no breach
of
State did
new interstate
and therefore
needed for
did so
so and
highway. The

contract
breach of
faith and
fair dealing
the implied
implied covenant
dealing claim
of good
contract or
or breach
of the
claim exists.
covenant of
and fair
exists. Summary
good faith
Summary
Day’s contract
judgment as
therefore appropriate.
to Day’s
contract claims
appropriate.
judgment
as to
claims is
is therefore
at time
an inverse
time of
standing to
condemnation have
C.
of property
of an
have standing
to
inverse condemnation
owners of
C. Only
property at
Only owners
bring
bring aa claim.
claim.

“litigants generally
In
jurisdiction of
In order
the jurisdiction
the Court,
standing to
must
to have
to invoke
invoke the
of the
order to
have standing
generally must
Court, “litigants
in fact
that the
the judicial
relief
allege
judicial relief
likelihood that
fact and
or demonstrate
an injury
demonstrate an
allege or
substantial likelihood
and aa substantial
injury in

injury.” Taylor
requested
will prevent
146 Idaho
the claimed
prevent or
or redress
Idaho 705,
claimed injury.”
requested will
redress the
v.Maile, IV,
Taylor v.Maile,
IV, 146
705, 709,
709,

201
Miles v.
Idaho Power
Power Co.,
201 P.3d
116 Idaho
1286 (2009)
P.2d
Idaho 635,
P.3d 1282,
778 P.2d
v. Idaho
1282, 1286
(quoting Miles
641, 778
635, 641,
Ca, 116
(2009) (quoting
757,
763 (1989)).
757, 763
(1989)).

As
plaintiffs, only
all the
the plaintiffs,
Donna Day
As noted
of all
R.
noted above,
David R.
and David
out of
Jacobs and
above, out
only Donna
Day Jacobs

Day
period from
in the
in the
from December
the Day
the period
through
interest in
an ownership
ownership interest
December 1997
1997 through
had an
Property in
Day had
Day Property
April 1998.
in this
in
April
with two
the plaintiffs
plaintiffs in
this case
cannot demonstrate
an injury
demonstrate an
1998. Thus,
two exceptions,
case cannot
exceptions, the
Thus, with
injury in

fact
because they
were not
time the
the time
the alleged
not owners
the Day
fact because
of the
at the
inverse
owners of
alleged inverse
Property at
they were
Day Property
condemnation
condemnation occurred.
occurred.
In order
In
prosecute aa claim
party must
been an
for inverse
to prosecute
must have
an owner
inverse condemnation,
claim for
owner
order to
have been
condemnation, aa party

of
property at
time of
the relevant
the time
the alleged
of the
relevant property
at the
of the
alleged damage:
damage:
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“any damage
The
well-settled that
taking
The law
that “any
result of
of [a]
suffered as
law is
is well-settled
damage suffered
as a
a result
[a] taking
time the
... would
would have
been suffered
by the
the owner
became
the time
the damage
at the
owner at
suffered by
damage became
have been
ascertainable
based on
not
on inverse
condemnation [does]
inverse condemnation
claim based
ascertainable [.]
damage claim
[does] not
[T]he damage
[.] ... [T]he
land.”
pass to
the land.” Crede
to subsequent
of the
grantees of
subsequent grantees
Crede v.
S.W.2d
Oak Grove,
979 S.W.2d
pass
v. City
Grove, 979
City of
of Oak
529,
see also
Langenberg v.
St. Louis,
Louis, 355
M0.
534 (Mo.App.
355 Mo.
also Langenberg
v. City
(Mo.App. W.D.1998);
W.D.1998); see
529, 534
ofSt.
City of
making
from
634,
(damages
resulting
resulting
from
making
unauthorized
unauthorized
197 S.W.2d
625 (1946)
S.W.2d 621,
621, 625
(damages
634, 197
(1946)
permanent improvements
would go
time the
the time
the permanent
permanent
improvements on
on land
to owner
at the
owner at
permanent
land would
go to
improvements
were made
not to
the plaintiff,
improvements were
to the
and not
WhO was
subsequent grantee).
made and
plaintiff, who
was aa subsequent
grantee).
if the
then
This
for if
the damage
the land,
This approach
to the
approach is
has already
is correct,
damage has
occurred to
correct, for
already occurred
land, then
the
the sellers
the damage
at least
notice of
of the
sellers and
least constructive
and buyers
constructive notice
and could
could
had at
damage and
buvers had
land's value
in negotiating
accommodate
price. To
its effect
the land's
the purchase
negotiating the
effect on
on the
To
accommodate its
purchase price.
value in
also
for inverse
to recover
condemnation
inverse condemnation
allow subsequent
recover damages
subsequent grantees
grantees to
also allow
damages for
would result
windfall.
in aa Windfall.
result in
would
.

State
Blue Springs
Nixon, 250
Springs v.
250 S.W.3d
rel. City
v. Nixon,
State ex
ex rel.
S.W.3d 365,
370 (Mo.
(emphasis added).
added).
ofBlue
2008) (emphasis
365, 370
(M0. 2008)
City of
in an
Idaho
standing in
an inverse
condemnation case.
inverse condemnation
Idaho lacks
addressing standing
lacks case
case.
case law
law specifically
speciﬁcally addressing
in order
However,
jurisdictions leaves
that in
from other
other states
no doubt
to
federal jurisdictions
order to
and federal
doubt that
leaves no
states and
case law
law from
However, case

the party
the owner
an inverse
condemnation action
action must
must have
have
party prosecuting
prosecuting an
inverse condemnation
owner
have standing,
have been
been the
standing, the

20-21, 78
of
Dow, 357
the property
of the
the alleged
taking. See,
the time
time of
S.Ct.
alleged taking.
US. v.
v. Dow,
357 U.S.
US. 17,
78 S.Ct.
at the
property at
See, US.
17, 20-21,
of the

1039,
2 L.Ed.2d
it is
‘(since) compensation
For it
1043-44, 2
1109 (1958)(“
that ‘(since)
at
compensation is
L.Ed.2d 1109
undisputed that
is undisputed
is due
due at
(1958)(“ For
1039, 1043-44,
the
time of
the time
the owner
not the
the owner
the
earlier or
of taking,
at that
that time,
at an
an earlier
or later
owner at
owner at
later date,
receives the
taking, the
time, not
date, receives
payment.”’)(quoting
payment.’”)(quoting Danforth
Danforth v.
240
84 L.Ed.
L.Ed. 240
S.Ct. 231,
v. U.S.,
308 U.S.
US. 271,
60 S.Ct.
271, 284,
284, 60
231, 236,
236, 84
US, 308

(“It is
(1939));
Enterprises, Inc.
Inc. v.
well
1249 (Fed.Cir.
CRV Enterprises,
626 F.3d
F.3d 1241,
v. U.S.,
is well
1241, 1249
(Fed.Cir. 2010)
2010) (“It
US, 626
(1939)); CRV
‘only persons
established
persons With
with aa valid
valid property
property interest
taking are
that ‘only
time of
the time
the taking
interest at
entitled
at the
of the
are entitled
established that
compensation.’”) (quoting
to
271 F.3d
to compensation.’”)
F.3d 1090,
1096 (Fed.Cir.
United States,
v. United
(Fed.Cir. 2001));
States, 271
(quoting Wyatt
1090, 1096
Wyatt v.
2001));

Huntleigh USA
Bair v.
1323
Huntleigh
USA Corp.
525 F.3d
515 F.3d
Corp. v.
F.3d 1370
1370 (Fed.Cir.
F.3d 1323
v. U.S.,
v. US.,
(Fed.Cir. 2008);
US., 515
US, 525
2008); Bair
(Fed.Cir.
Department of Forests,
1319 (Fed.Cir.
331 F.3d
Gardens v.
F.3d 1319
Cienega Gardens
v. US.,
(Fed.Cir. 2003);
(FedCir. 2008);
2008); Cienega
US, 331
2003); DepartmentofForesm,
Town of
Parks and
Ludlow Zoning
Board, 869
Brooks
Zoning Board,
A.2d 603
Parks
and Recreation
Recreation v.
v. Town
869 A.2d
603 (Vt.
ofLudlow
(Vt. 2004);
2004); Brooks

Investment Co.
Bloomington, 232
N.W.2d 911(1975);
Los Angeles
Angeles v.
Ricards,
232 N.W.2d
Investment
Co. v.
v. City
v. Ricards,
ofBloomington,
ofLos
911(1975); City
City of
City of
515
Majestic Heights
Heights Co.
Board of County Commissioners
Jefferson
P.2d 585
515 P.2d
Commissioners of
585 (Cal.
Co. v.
v. BoardofCounty
(Cal. 1973);
1973); Majestic
ofJefférson
County,
banc.; Boyd
Boyd v.
Atchison, Topeka
Railway
P.2d 745
en banc.;
Fe Railway
476 P.2d
745 (Colo.
and Santa
Topeka and
Santa Fe
v. Atchison,
(Colo. 1970)
1970) en
County, 476
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Co.,
Monen v.
Department of
Highways, 515
4 P.2d
1246
P.2d 1246
P.2d 670
515 P.2d
v. State
State Department
670 (Ariz.
(Ariz. 1931);
C0., 4
1931); Monen
of Highways,
(Colo.App.
Eminent Domain,
on Eminent
Nichols on
cert. denied;
Vol. 2,
See generally,
Domain, Vol.
denied; See
(C010.App. 1973)
1973) cert.
generally, Nichols
2,

§§

rd
3rd
5.01[5][d][i]
p. 5-37,
ed.
for no
The ownership
other
no other
at p.
5-37, (rev.
requirement makes
ownership requirement
makes sense
sense for
ed. 2003).
2003). The
(reV. 3
5.01[5][d][i] at

reason
the alleged
the
another lawsuit
than the
to another
to the
condemnor could
requiring payment
reason than
alleged condemnor
could be
subject to
lawsuit requiring
be subject
payment to
actual
property for
the property
for the
the same
of the
owner of
same damages.
actual owner
damages.
Donna Day
Only
standing to
to assert
an inverse
R. Day
inverse
assert an
and David
David R.
have standing
Jacobs and
Only Donna
Day have
Day Jacobs
in relation
condemnation
the Day
therefore grant
condemnation claim
relation to
to the
This Court
grant summary
claim in
should therefore
Court should
Propeny. This
summary
Day Property.

judgment to
brought by
by any
plaintiff who
the State
all inverse
not
to the
on all
condemnation claims
inverse condemnation
State on
claims brought
who did
did not
judgment
any plaintiff
in the
the Day
the inverse
have
interest in
an ownership
ownership interest
when the
condemnation cause
of action
action
inverse condemnation
have an
cause of
Propeny when
Day Property

allegedly
accrued.
allegedly accrued.

Initial Day
D.
limited to
are limited
the Initial
contract damages
D. Any
damages are
to the
Property.
Day Property.
Any contract

if aa contract
Although
Although the
the State
that no
no breach
of contract
contract claim
contract claim
claim exists,
claim did
State asserts
did
breach of
asserts that
exists, if
exist,
potential damages
would be
limited to
Initial Day
the Initial
for the
the reason
all of
to the
that all
of
reason that
damages would
be limited
exist, any
Propeny for
Day Property
any potential
the
by Day
with the
Initial Day
the agreements
the Initial
relied upon
fact is
agreements relied
upon by
deal only
This fact
is obvious
obvious
Property. This
only with
Day deal
Day Property.
because, as
purchase the
in its
form the
its Complaint,
not purchase
the additional
the
to form
stated in
did not
160 acres
additional 160
acres to
as Day
Complaint, itit did
because,
Day stated
“Day Property”
Propelty” until
the future
the agreement
“Day
until 1977.
to provide
to the
public road
agreement to
provide access
and
road and
1977. Thus,
access to
future public
Thus, the

stock
breach of
Initial Day
the Initial
to the
of contract
contract
stock drive
easement only
and any
alleged breach
relates to
drive easement
Propeny, and
only relates
Day Property,
any alleged
Initial Day
the Initial
to the
claim
claim can
can only
recover damages
related to
damages related
Propeny.
only recover
Day Property.
in aa contract
the Court
the language
its meaning:
As
meaning:
determine its
contract to
to determine
As noted
to the
noted above,
looks to
Coutt looks
language in
above, the

“When interpreting
language.” Potlatch
document's language.”
“When
Potlatch Educ.
with the
interpreting aa contract,
the document's
begins with
Educ.
contract, [the
001111] begins
[the court]
Ass’n
Ass'n v.
Potlatch Sch.
Dist. N0.
No. 285,
148 Idaho
226 P.3d
1280 (2010)
Idaho 630,
P.3d 1277,
v. Potlatch
Sch. Dist.
(citing
1277, 1280
285, 148
630, 633,
633, 226
(2010) (citing

Cristo
Paz, 144
144 Idaho
The
Idaho 304,
160 P.3d
747 (2007).
P.3d 743,
Viene Pentecostal
Pentecostal Church
Crista Viene
Church v.
v. Paz,
304, 308,
743, 747
308, 160
(2007). The
agreements
upon by
by Day
breach of
for its
its contract
the implied
implied covenant
relied upon
contract and
of the
agreements relied
and breach
covenant claims
claims only
only
Day for
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relate
Initial Day
for the
the Initial
frontage road
cannot
to access
to aa future
relate to
road for
access to
future frontage
Therefore, Day
Property. Therefore,
Day cannot
Day Property.
claim
was not
not aa subject
for property
that was
of those
claim damages
those agreements.
agreements.
damages for
subject of
propeny that
Direct
breach of
from aa breach
Direct damages
of contract
contract are
are recoverable,
but consequential
consequential (indirect)
damages from
recoverable, but
(indirect)
damages
breach of
parties had
if the
in mind
from aa breach
mind
the parties
of contract
contract are
are only
had such
recoverable if
such damages
damages from
damages in
only recoverable
when contracting:
contracting:
when
Damages
not have
Damages need
and specifically
but only
need not
have been
been precisely
such
foreseeable, but
speciﬁcally foreseeable,
precisely and
only such
as
the
parties
at
the
time
they
contracted.
Id.;
time
the
the
parties
at
contracted.
foreseeable by
were reasonably
as were
reasonably foreseeable
1d,;
they
by
Suitts
First Sec.
Idaho, NA,
N.A., 110
110 Idaho
Bank of
P.2d 1374,
1381
Idaho 15,
713 P.2d
Suitts v.
v. First
Sec. Bank
1374, 1381
22, 713
15, 22,
of Idaho,
(1985).
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contract and inverse condemnation claims would amount to double recovery. Judgment should
be issued holding that Day has mitigated its damages to the extent of the proceeds it received
from the sale of its property in 2006.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, as well as any that may arise at the hearing on this
matter, the State respectfully requests that the Court grant the State's motion for partial summary
judgment.
DATED this 28th day of April 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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1. I am the attorney of record for Defendant and authorized to make this Affidavit based
on my own personal knowledge.
2. Attached hereto are true and correct copies ofthe following documents:
a. Exhibit A: Exhibit 2 to the Complaint.
b. Exhibit B: Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.
c. Exhibit C: Exhibit 5 to the Complaint.
d. Exhibit D: Exhibit 3 to the Complaint.
e. Exhibit E: Exhibit 4 to the Complaint.
f.

Exhibit F: December 30, 1994 Deed from Donald M. Day Family Trust to
Bennett G. Day, Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day, produced by Plaintiffs
in discovery.

g. Exhibit G: Certified copy ofNovember 15, 1989 Deed from Robert L. Day to
Robert L. Day and Charlotte L. Day.
h. Exhibit H: July 15, 1998 Deed from Robert L. and Charlotte L. Day to Ernest
E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and
Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, produced by Plaintiffs in discovery.
1.

Exhibit I: March 16, 1992 Deed from Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day to The
Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust, produced by Plaintiffs in
discovery.

J.

Exhibit J: December 2005 Buy/Sell Agreement for Day Property between
Day Family and R. Craig Groves.

k. Exhibit K: Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 12 regarding sale of Day
Property to R. Craig Groves in December 2005.
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1.

Exhibit L: Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory 6 regarding the date of valuation
Plaintiffs believe is appropriate.

Further your Affiant sayeth not
DATED this 28th day of April 2017.

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 28th day of April2017.
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Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at ~, ~~.
Commission expires ~ .21. ;;lC> I '1-

.........

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of April 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
~Court Service

D Email:

fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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lcGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMF..:NT, made and entered into this I 7 Ta d ay
of

/V.J •. ¢

-,,, j; ~

v

, 1961, by and between EMMA N. DAY,

a widow, and ERNEST E. DAY, ROBERT L. DAY and DONALD M.
DAY, each of Boise, Idaho, hereinafter called the Q;,,1 ners and the
STA TE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 01" HIGHWAYS, hereinafter called
the Department,

WITNESSETH;

WHEREAS, the Owners hold title to the NE 1/4 of
S ection 19, Township Z North, Range 3 East, B. M., approximately
nine a c res of which, along with related access rights, al;'e believed
by the Department to be required in connection with the construction

of Interstate Highway SON under the terms of Highway P roject No.

I-80N-Z(3)61 ; and
WHEREAS, said Project terminates a short distance
north of the Owners' property and plans have not yet been formulated
fo1• the construction of the next (northerly) section o£ Interstate
Highway SON; and
W:.HEREA$, . the pa:i;tiSls, ~.re .. ~Pa.:Ol~ .ail pr~s~n,t;. to _ne.g ~
ti~te

.reason!'-}'ly _for . the. purchase of said nia·e

ac-ees.s ..dghts by the Depa..rtment

beeaus~

ment as to the character of future

~(;ret, tog~th,er

of ·unce·r tainty in the

cone.truc~ion .,p.lane

with •
Depar~

conce·r ning tlf'e

1~~xt ~ectl.on o£ the highway~ and further the effect thereof on the'

Owt1ers' .p.rope:J;"ty right!>, eucn future construction :wiU h~ve a dil\ect
bea_#ng

Ott

any 'p·urohase price, and the V$-lue of the :J:'~gb.ts acq\lire~

000156
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f rom Owners, p articularly in re.gard tQ the possible construction of a"n
interchange, frontage· roads, and so forth; anti
VtHEREAS, the Department is d esirous of entering into

p OfilfJe ssion of t hat p orti on of Ow ners' p rop erty d es c r i b ed below at the
p;:esent tirne, and the Ow n ers not wishing to del a y the Depa rtment ' s
higb:way constru c tion p rog.-am a1•e willing to pe rmit possession by the
Departrnent in accordance with the following:
NOW , T HEREFORE, the pa rties he rete, agre e a s
follows :
The Owners stipulate that the Department may take
possession of the following described property for highway c onstl·uc t ion purposes as abo ve set forth:
A pa1•c el of land being o n both s i d ee of the
east and west bound lanes ·s u rvey c e nter lines
of Interstate SON, P roje ct No. I ~ SON-2(3)61
Highway Survey as shown on the plans thereof
now on file in the office of the Department
of Highways of the State of Idaho, and lying
over and a c ro s f;l theE l/2 NE 1/4 of Section
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 E ast , B oise
M:eridian, d ee c ribed as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a p oint in the north line of
S ection 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 E ast,
B. M. which point is 1197.86 feet westerly
from the northeast corner of said Section 19,
t hence Southeasterly along a line parallel
with and 100. 0 feet Southwesterly from t he E ast
Bound lane center line of said Interstate SON,
Project No. I-SON-2(3)61 Highway Survey, being
an 11559, 16 foot radius curve left , a distanc e
of 59.0 feet, more or lest;, to a point that
bears South 51037'53" West 100. 0 feet £rom
said east bound lane survey c enter line Station
4 84+62.. 14; thenc e South 38022'07 " East e>.long
said parallel line a distance of 1861. 5 9 fe et
to a point in the east line of said Section 19,
which point bears South 51°37'$3'' West 100,0
feet from east bound lane s urvey Station
503 +23. 73; thence Northerly along said e ast
line a. distanc~ of 685.0 feet, n1ore or les s, to

-2-
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a p oint in the Northeasterly right of way
line of present U. $ . Highway No. 30, 26 &
20 as d escribed in that certain :right of w ay
d eed d ated June 29, 1936, recorded July 2,
1936, in the records of Ada County, Idaho
in Book 217 o£ Deeds at page 4Z4; thence
Northwesterly along said present highway
right of way line a distance of 1130. 0 feet,
more or less, to a p oint i n t he north line of
said S ection 19; thence westerly alo ng s aid
north line 425. 0 feet, more or le ss, to the
P oint of Beginning.
East B ound Lar.e Survey Station Reference:
484+83. 03 to 501 +95. 69
The area above described contains approxi.mately 13. 4Z ·acr~s, ,~ 4'; :43 acj:,dJ1l of which is
acknowledged to be a portion of a p ublic road.
Further, all a cce ss rights from

Owne~:s '

prop erty on

both sides of the present U. S . Highway 30 to U. S. Hig hway 30 and
to Interstate Highway SON as c ons tructed a nd all easements of access
to , from and between Owners' property as divided by said highways
shall be waived a nd extinguished where the property abu.ts up on
said highways.
It is further agreed that the Department s hall determine
its final planE with respect to Owners' property within a reasonable
period of time consistent with the complexity of the proj ect , and will,
upon such d etermination, negotiate in good faith with Owners, to the
end that Owners will re c eive a fair and reasonable price for the pl"operty so acquired, including severanc e d amages if any.

Nothing herein

shall be so construed as to deprive Owners of any rights which they
may have as

provid~d

by law, to fairly compensate them for sue! <

da-m age as they _may _suffer by reason Qf slich t-a king and by reason o ~ •·

these presents.

-3-
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partie s hereto have hereunto exe c uted thes e p resents the day a nd year fi r st a bove written .

IDM10 D EPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
APPROVED A S TO 1'-0RM:

(' '(.;> < L. '/<'.'

//~ /

Atto rney

'

!.

./

RECOMMENDE D :

t%fi8i()TJ'"
Head
1_ _/
OWNERS:

S TATE OF IDAHO)
) 88 .

County of Ada

)

_.§d.

.. /

On thi~/ day of Novf!rlf~eC. , 1961, before me,
the undersigned, a Notary P ublic in and for s aid State, pe rsonally appeared
G. BRYCE BENNETT, known to me to be the State Highway Engine er of
the Idaho Department of Highways whose narne is sub scribed to the within
i n strtm"lent, a nd acknow ledg e d to me that he execute d the same as suc h
Stat e Highway Engineer.
U·1 WITNESS WHEREOF , I have hereunto set my hand and

:~~~:~.mr offi cial se al the

day and

y~ this certif'i~at:,,!!!-~t ~bove

I ij~ ,_ ~· i /·:~/ l ./:(_:.. ·"~ .
_
~J-tv~c f"....... • \,..,,::..-- ~v .v "----·· ...
N otary Publi c for Idaho
Residence: Bois e , !daho
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S TA T .E OF IDAHO)
) ss.
County o f Ada
)

/

) ,'
Onthis '7 dayof
/~ 2 ·-' · , . L ',· , 1961, be!oreme,
the undersigned, a Not~ Public ih a!fd for said State, pers onally ar>peared
EMMA N. DAY, ERNEST E. DAY, ROBERT L. DAY and DONALD M. DAY
known to rne to be the peL·s o ns wh.o se nan>eS are subs ::ribed to the within
instrul'nent, and acknowledged to rne that they executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHERE OF, I have hereunto set m y hand and
affixed my official. seal the day and ye;;.:r· in tl1_!s C <?rtifi~ate fi:rst above
written.

·~-~ /

__ /}: / ' '/> . ./

. ; ./ . / .

.. ~. ,--

~/

" . / .-'1, (.

• 7

''/4

/ ' : 7 . · _l.:: £:_{;.. ._,s

.·

I

"' ~ / ·

. .- / '
//

'

/._::-.-:7 . - ./ .,_.. ?... ~~

/~·...- · ·

· Nota'1·y Public fo:r Idaho
Re sidence: Boi se, Idaho

.::J'

L./ ~ .:

\
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./W) DH-363 A Rev. 3-67

STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS

Right Of Way Contract

EAST BOUND LANE

Sta.

County
Project

LtB Lt+B 3 .. oa

to Sta.

Parcel No.

I-BON-2(3)61

50lo~-95.fi9

2

THIS AGREEMENT~ Made this ~.day of
october.
, 19_sL, between
the STATE OF IDAHO, acting by its Board of Highway Directors, by its State
Highway Engineer or his authorized representative, herein called "State",
and Emma Ht Day, a widow, Ernest E. Day, Robert L. Day and Donald N .. Day.
,
-·herein called "Grantor(s) ",
WHEREAS, Grantor(s) herewith deliver(s) to State a Warranty Deed
(Type of Instrument)
for highway purposes.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
l. <state shall pay Grantor(s) and the lienholder(s), if any, such sums of moneys as
are set out below. · Grantor(s) agree(s) to pay all taxes and assessments due and owing, including those for the year 19~.
2. This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed by the State Highway
Engineer orc·nis authorized representative.
The parties have herein set out the whole of
their agreement, the ~erformance of which constitutes the entire consideration for the grant
of said right of way and shall relieve the State of all further claims or obligations on that
account or-on account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway.
AMOUNT

·'

3,.

Payment for 8.,99 acres of land and full control of access to the
Hi~hway

Interstate

&

rlaro.R~es

to the rel'::la inder

••

lump

$'fj():~Ol.QQ ~£

sum.,

4.

Grantors a?.ree to nav a 11 taxes and assessm~nts j_ncludirur 1967 taxes

s.

Access to Gran tors
Hirrhwav will hP

rewainin~

property southerly of the Interstate

-Frnm

av.<~ilnhlP

fnt-ltr"" f?-nnt-.,rrP.

t.hP

on the southwesterly side of I-SON,.

rn.<~o

And

!'lt-oek

drive

(I-IG-SON-2(16)54)

'

:
'

('/

....

I

-..
'

Total Cash Settlement $__::o:...::O:..::O:..::O:..:~~,.~.:::O:..::O~-_..:._--IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement tho day and year first above writte:ri,
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
.
Recommended for
By

Approval~~

W.W. SACHT. P.E.

~

(!!}:

ytrict Engineer

~~T~ri(~
By~~Agent

By

Area

Approved for

[\tate

Right of Way Supervisor

9I"Cft'

m::.:.,"'" ' w~

_.,_{l..JI.V6...li...L...L.-~-L---,, 19~.
.,.,,
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..
-

.

ln=--~~1(R/W)
Pa:ree~

(Rev. 7/25/66}

No . _ _2;;;_._ __

WARRANTY DEED

Access Rigbts~--~~~~--Negative Easements ____ 1,11
EM1-M N• DAY, a widow,

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PP..ESENI'S, THAT
&~~EST

E. DAY, ROBERT L· DAY & DCNALD M. DAY

Begizming at a point in thet·North

~ina o:f:

,

~9. Township 2 North,
~~97.66 :f:eet Wester~y

Section

Range J East, Boise Meridian, which point is

:;~~~-. t"h.e N.9rtheast corner o£ said Section 19; "thence Southeasterly
a ~~n~.para~lel ~th and ~00.0 :f:eet Southwester~y £rom the East
ii.
:S ,Lane··.'Benterline o£ said Interstate SON, Project !•o. I-SON-2(3 )61.
~urv.ey

and being an 1.1,559.16 foot radius curve left, a distance
a point that bears South 51 °37' 53" West
Lane Survey centerline Stat>ion 484+62.14; n
,;..;.'-<i. ;.._,)8-"'~'07" East al.ong said parallel. line a di·+
of 1.861. ;>
~<:i:':~. ta;:a.:- <'< · ... in the East :p.ne o£ said Section 19 which ~o·•~':"t':·+i.t,""~,':::sciJ"'W?
73
t.h~nceS-i;~:.:f: 5 w:i~n~0 ~,j/'~:;-/·i~eE:s~i!~:i~.l~e 6~roe~eet, more or
'
less, "t.O
::< ;:.
the Nort.heast.erly right o£. way line o£ present U. S.
H:i.ghway N .·30,:
and 20 aa described ·in that certain right of" way
'
Deed dated- ~un~ 29, 19,36; recorded July 2, 19.36 in the Records oi' Ada
County, Idaho in Book 217:o£ Deeds at page 424; thence Northwesterly
along said present Highway right of" way line a distance o£ 11)0.0 f"eet,
more or less, to a point in t.he North line o£ said Section 19; thence
WesterlY al.ong said-North 1ine· 425.0 f"eet, more or less, to the POINT
OF BEGINNING.
·

iHi

i ;:~ ,1'.;t .q ~
more or less, to
'"'". ·r. J"!';et_~g~:;rld Eastbound

e

:3.:

East Bound Lane Survey Station Reference:

464+63.03 to 501+95.69.

The area above described contrlns appronmately 13.42 acres, 4.43 acres
of" which is acknowledged to be a portion o£· a public road.
The bearin~s as shown in the above land description, unless otherwise
noted, are £rom the Idaho P1ane Coordinate System, based on the transverse mercator projection f"or the West Zone of Idaho. To convert to
geodetic bearings, a correction o£ 0°1.5' 52" must be subtracted :rrom ~l.
Northeast and Southwest bearings and added to al.l Northwest and Southeast bearings.

.z:... .:.. .

•

. :·.

....

.
:' _.'.

., ..

:::.·

. ..

.

.

.
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TOGETHER WITH all rights of access·between the right of way of
the said project and the remaining contiguous real property belonging
to the GrantorL, except for: access to the Future Frontage Road and
Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side of Interstate SON. Prqieet No.
I-IG-SON-2 P6) 54 Highway nwyey.
that no building or structur
ted to be constructed
the right of way of the sa

&:>-tion or

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances
unto the said Grantee and its successors and assigns forever.
And th~
Grantorz. do_ hereby covenant to and wi~h the sa'!.d Grantee, that t_he!£
~--:.,>;~ t:he owner~ in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from
incumbrances and that :t_he~ wil.l warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

4

IN WITNESS .JiHE_3EO..f,
this 2E•day of ~Cki~~<=-<::..;:,:.L~~:!::::::::!l::...-----STATE OF

--

set:-~ hand.z and seal.z

.

_,~~-='-"a.:=.L;:...;;;..,___,)
/7 . ./

)

County of --~C4~·~~<0~~=-------->

ss.
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PEED OF GIFT

r.

TlttS XNIJEN'J:URJ!, made til.,

by Donald H. Day • as Trustee of THE DONALD M.

DA~E~~):.~: 'B~.:otfli;·:sr OF

created under a Trust Aqree•ant dated October 5, 1989, and his
substitute and successor as Trustee thereunder, as owner of the

SUbject Property, the owner of an undivided three-ninths (3/9)

interest in the Subject Property, the "GRANTOlt11 , and BENNETT G.
DAY, a sinq1e aan, DONNA DAY JACOI\S, a married woman, and

DAVID R- DAY, a lDarried man, in the interests shown below,
collectively the

0

GRANTEE 11 •

WITNESSETH:
That the GRANTOR, FOR AND IN CONS'IDERAT:ION of the love
and affection which the GRANTOR has and bears unto the GRANTEE,

does by these presents qive, grant, and confirm unto the GRANTEE
a11 of the GRANTOR'S interest in the SUbject Property, in the
following undivided interests:
1.

As to aENNETT G. DAY, a sinqle man, one-ninth

(1/9) interest in the Subject Property, as tenants-in-common;
2.

AS to DONNA DAY JACOBS, a married woman, as her

sole and separate property, one-ninth (l/9) interest in the
SUbject Property, as tenants-in-common; and
3.

As to DAVl:D R. DAY, a married man, as his sole and

separate property, one-ninth (1/9) interest in the Subject
Property, as tenants-in-commonr

DEED OF GIFT - 1
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~

;

18Z30011SO
The

11

Subject Property" is the rea1 property situated in

the COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF IDAHO, and more particularly
in Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof by

desc~ibed

reference.
TOGETHER

with a11 and singular, the tenements,

hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonqinq, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder
and remainders, rents, issues, and profits thereof, and the rents
and profits thereof shall be applied to GRANTEE.

SUBJECT TO encumbrances, covenants, conditions,
restrictions, reservations, rights-of-way and easements of
record.
The address of GRANTEE is:

cjo Day Realty company,

P.O. Box 8286, Boise, Idaho 83707.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and sinqular, the Subject
Property, together with the appurtenances, unto the

GRANTEE

and

their successors and assigns forever.
IN

Wl:TNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has hereunto set their

band and seal the day and year first above written.
THE DONALD M. DAY

By:

FAMILY TRUST

4

"
v-/
Day Trustee '

(J
4/~~
~

Donald M.
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STA'l'E OF IDAHO

ss.

of December, 1994, before me,

~~~~~~~~~~~--------~~' a notary public in and for
te. personall.y appeared DONALD M. DAY, known or

identi ied to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
foreqoinq instrument as ~rustee of The Donald M. Day Fami1y TrUst
and acknowledqed to me that he executed the same as such Tl:ustee.
:IN WJ:TNESS WHEREOF, I: have hereunto set my hand and
my official seal. the day and year in this certificate
first above written.
af~ixed
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EXHIBIT 11A"

1823001152

PAB.CEL 8 (Merrigan)

THE SOOTHEAS'r QUARTER OF SECTION 19 1 TOWNSHIP 2 NOR'rH 1 RANGE 3
EAST, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COONT'.l 1 IDAHO. EXCE?'l' THEREFROM
THAT PORTION DEEDED TO ADA COONTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT BY DEED
RECORDED FEBRUARY 4:, 1980 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 8005941. 1 OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY 1 IDAHO.
PARCEL 9 (rsaac • s

canyon)

THE NORTHEAST QUAR'rEll OF SEC'riON 1.9 1 TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 3

EAST OF BOISE MERIDIAN, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY 1 IDAHO.
EXCEPT THAT PORTION DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO BY DEED RECORDED

JULY 2, 1936 AS mSTRUMEN'r NO. 170934, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA
COUNTY, IDAHO.
ALSo·· EXCEPT ANY PORT!ON THEREOF WHICH LIES_ WITHIN THE RIGHT OF
WAY FOR I-84-

:

000175

EXHIBIT G
EXHIBIT
G
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~-

.

1172000228

8959449

'

·.·

DEED
THIS INDENTURE, made this 15f;vday of

,t/a t/@11.5

, 1989, by and

f}2..-

between ROBERT L. DAY, a married man, the "GRANTOR,'' and ROBERT L DAY and
CHARLOTTE L. DAY, husband and wife, the "GRANTEES.•

W I T N E S S E T H;

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the GRANTOR has granted, conveyed, bargained
and sold, and does hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to the GRANTEES,
their successors af1d assigns, as community property, all of the GRANTOR'S interest in
that certain real property in the COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF IDAHO, described in
Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference (hereinafter referred
to as the "Subject Property..).
TOGETHER with all and singular the buildings, structures, improvements,
tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise
appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof;
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Subject Property as community property, with
its appurtenances, unto the GRANTEES and their successors and assigns forever.
The current address of the GRANTEES is: c/o Day Realty Company, P.O.
Box 8286, Boise, Idaho 83707.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Deed has been duly executed by the
GRANTOR the day and year first above written.

(I

Rooert L Day

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

On this /.5~ day of Afodf???.S iiJ'2..- , 1989, before me,
, the undersigned, a Notary Public in an-.d'"Tfo~r~s-a;-;id-::S:-:-ta~te-,
persorfally appeared ROBERT L DAY, known or identified to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

J.Uau 8. 'ff(:-ume;/4..-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.
p'"t"lir
,· ,...
•.·· ... , ,'·

..

1

/;~>::~:~:~~~~fi\

-

'

1\

~

: •' ... ,'!' •
: ,l 'i-_
L.

,.

:~

,...\. \ ._.

•

.

-

•
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I

:
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\;., ..r"~"'.:;.
. '"' .-~·· :~-:.~.. ~/
; . lioc~ ... ~· , •. • .,....
~_,~~}·;·:....

1', ..

;:;;;:-;:

Notary Publi~for Idaho_
Residing at 21t(-< / L.-:.4--r'k
My commission expires
? - ~

•

•f
0

~i"'.. ·~.-,..~
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, Idaho
19 9itt
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EXHIBIT A

:11.72000230

PARCEL NO. 1 (Collar)
CC~~~NC!NG

AT ~EE NORT=~EST CO?.NER OF SEC::ON 7, ~. 3N., ?..
2E., B.M., ADA CCUNTY, IDAEO: TEENCE
s o DEGZ\EES 1 o I 15" E ( s:ow"N OF RECORD ~.s s o DEG:tEES 12 1 ::: >
ALONG ~E~ WEST SEC:!ON LINE OF SA!D SEC~!ON 7, ol.SO
FEET ~0 A ?O!NT; TEENCZ
TE~ ~XT~NC~D SOO~EERLY R!GET-O!-WA1
AV~NOZ, AND ALONG '!'E SOUTEERLY R!GE'!'-·:·!WAY OF FA!~V!ZW AVENUE, 193.00 rEZ~ TO T~E '!'ROE ?O!~T
OF BEGINNING; TEENC~ CONT!NO~NG
DEGZ\EES 55' E ALONG SAID SOO'!'S~~y R!GHT-OF-WAY, 20.00

S 88 DEGa!!S 55' ! ALONG
OF :.a..!?. V!z-.i

S 88

FEET TO A POINT; TEENCE
S 0 DEGREES 10 '15" E ( SEOWN OF RECORD ~.S S 0 DEGREES 12 1 !)
ALONG A L!NE EAST!P~Y OF AND P~~~LEL TO SAID WES:E?.LY
LINE OF SECTION 7, 160.00 FEET TO A POINT; TEENCE
N 88 DEGREES 55' W, ALONG A LINE SOOTE~'LY OF ANO PARALLZL TO
SAID SOUTE~~LY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF FAIRVIEW ' AVENOE,
180.00 FEET TO A POINT ON TEE EAST~LY RIGHT-OF-WAY
LINE OF NORTS COLE ROAD; '!'BENCE ·
.
N o DEGREES 1 o' 16" w <s:oWN or RECORD ~.s N o DEGREES 12 ' w>
ALONG SAID ~.STERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY, 20.00 FEET TO A ?O!NT;
TEENCE
S 8 8 DEGREES 55 ' E, 16 0. 0 0 FEE'!' TO A PO!~'!'; TEE~~CE
N 0 DEGREES 10 1 15" W, 140.00 FEET TO :EE :ROE POINT ·op
:SZG!NN!NG.

PARCEL NO.2 (Merrigan)
~~E SOUTP.EAST 00~-~T!R OF SECTION l9, ~OWNS?.!? 2 NORTH, ?~NGE 3
~AST, OFFICI.~ RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, !DAEO.
~XCE?T ~gERE!?.O~
~EAT ?ORTION DEED!D TO ADA COUNTY P.!G~wAY DISTRICT BY DEED
?.ECORDED PEBRU~~y 4, 1980 AS I~STROMENT NO. 8005941, OFF!C:~L

RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, !DAEO.

PARCEL NO.3 (Isaac's Canyon)

THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 19, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 3
, EAST OF BOISE MERIDIAN, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
EXCEPT THAT PORTION DEEDED TO THE STATE OF IDAHO BY DEED
RECORDED JULY 2, 1936 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 170934, OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
ALSO EXCEPT ANY PORTION THEREOF WHICH
WAY FOR I-84.

LI~S

WITHIN THE RIGHT OF

000179
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PARCEL NO.4 (Curtis Road)
?;-~T OF LO~ 2, ~~ ELOCK !2, SCOT='s ~E!~D S~ED!V:SZCN,
30!SE C:'!'Y, !:J..~..EO, ALSO DESC~!aE!J .~S C:'.u_J.!~~lC:~G .;'!' '!'::~

SEC':':CN CO?.NE?.

1::, 3.M.,
0

CO.!-'-~ON

COUNTY,

~OA

:a,

':0 SEC'!'!ONS 7 '· 8, 17, ;..ND
!DA~O; ':EENCE

T 1N,

~

D~G~~ES 02' WEST ALONG TEE S!C=!CN L!N~ 11~9.54 F~~T
TO A ?OI}iT OF !~T~?.SEC'!'!ON 0! s.;!D s::c::o~ ~~~::: ft!!'E

NG?.TE.E:?.LY

'

c:-:::rT""' ) •
( ...,_\.,;;\

-. -'
. ---o"D
-· ...-;w
""
·----··

EOOND;~.Y

---

-~ '

...

'T'O::':'Nc-:o

.,..----

NOR!'E 41 D.E:G?.EES j 2 ' E.:I.Sl' ALONG SAID ?./W J;7 • 6a ::::::::'! ':'0 A ?0 !NT
ON T;E ~~ST SIDE OF CURT:S ?.0~~' TEE F~~~ ?LACE OF
EEG!NN!NG; TgENC~ .
NORTH 41 DEGREES 32 ' ::AST ALONG SAID R/W 15 7·. 59 FEET '!'0 A
?OINT ON TEE SOOTS SIDE OF CEDAR S~.EET; ~~~CE
NORTE 89 DEG?.EES 49' WEST ALONG TEE SOOTH SIDE OF CEDAR STREET
111.20 FEET TO A POINT ON TEE ~~ST SID~ 0? C~?.T!S ROAD;
'!'E!NC~

SOOTE 0 DEGREES 02' E}.ST ALONG TF.~ ~;ST SIDE 0~ Ct7.T!S ?.OAO
125.97 FE~T TO T~ ?LACZ OF E~G!NNING, S!T~A=ED IN TEE
SW l/4 OF TEE SW l/4 OF SECT!ON 8, T ~N, a 2E, 3.M.,
ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.

. . ...

-=-· ·

• >

t '·

..:·,.:·,-··
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.• .:..:

...•·:.,

. ~.
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STATE OF.IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA,ss. · : ·:.:. .
.

I~Christ~ D. R~h;Ada County .~«Older, ~~fy that~ '?!ud ::.-..·

lniC and ,,m.'Ct copy orJ~stru~t

rumbr:t

I . )•

.J.S:..:t$':1 .:;t)t' ~·

· u it appeurs in t~ ~onk:d documents ~yscem Of~hCAdl CountyRecimler,
Slale oq~ l,N -W~~ss. Wll~REO llljt~"c;:~et.~ pnd and arri~tcrd my
·1
Seal this·~ l.o
d;AY ol-.--f-~ffi··~:.....,...___._ _,_,;jU...""'""'
Cb .

• .

JJ .

•,' I
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EXHIBIT H
H
EXHIBIT

000181

AI!~J{itffl
J. DAVID

ifAVARF.O

901SE.IO~\HO

1998 JL 23 M1 8: 39
DEED (Issac's Canyon)

THIS INDENTURE is made this /~day of July, 1998, in order to convey the
property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto from the following GRANTORS to the
following GRANTEES:
GRANTORS
•

ROBERT L. DAY and CHARLOTTE L. DAY, husband and
wife, as to an undivided one-third interest in the property.

GRANTEES
•

The ERNEST E. DAY and LOIS H. DAY LIVING TRUST,
created by instrument dated February 1, 1991, as to an undivided
one-sixth interest as tenant in common, and
Trust B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY
FAMILY TRUST, created by instrument dated March 24, 1977,
as to an undivided one-sixth interest as tenant in common .

WITNESSETH
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the GRANTORS have granted, conveyed, bargained
and sold, and do hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to the GRANTEES, and to
their successors and assigns, all of the GRANTORS' undivided one-third interest, as a tenant
in common, in that certain real property situated in the COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF

1

G. \CLIENT10417810EEC.2J

000182

IDAHO, more particularly described in Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference (the "Property").
TOGETHER with all and singular the buildings, structures, improvements,
tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,
the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof;
SUBJECT TO the exceptions to GRANTORS' title which are of record in the
office of the Ada County Recorder on the date of this Deed, and all easements and rights-ofway that are open and obvious on inspection of this Property.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Property, with its appurtenances, unto the
GRANTEES and their successors and assigns forever.
The current address of the GRANTEES is: P.O. Box 8286, Boise, Idaho
83707.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTORS have executed this Deed the day
and year therein first above written.
/-.

I/) .~£-.-~~

.:z· ,{./~-/~

Robert L. Day

Charlotte L. Day

2

~(J

G: ICLI [NT\0417" ,D[E0.13
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Ju/y_ , 1998, before me,
---"""""LM<...L..:l;;..._L....J.....:........._-.."-LJ_........,.,__, a Notary Public m and for satd State, personally
appeared Robert L. Day and Chari teL. Day, known or identified to me to be the persons
whose names are subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public
Residing at -..J'-tl:!!!.I.~~~~--+-My commission expires ......:IVJ-~(..4.~Z'

3

G:ICLIENT\04]16\0EEO ?3
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EXHIBIT "A" (Isaac's Canyon)

THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 19, TOWNSIDP 2 NORTH,
RANGE 3 EAST, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
EXCEPT THEREFROM THAT PORTION DEEDED TO ADA COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 4, 1980 AS
INSTRUMENT NO. 8005941, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO.

4

G ICLIENT\0417'10E£D 23

000185

EXHIBIT "B" (Isaac's Canyon-Merrigan)

The Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise,
Meridian, as shown in the records of Ada County, Idaho,
together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

5

G: ICli[NT\04!78\DEED. 23
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EXHIBIT II
EXHIBIT

000187

':H: S 1:-lDENTU:RE, ha-:le
.YS~ ,

':'h •:

bet,..;:,;<:-:.

Frne2:~

E.

l.~:FST

E.

D01y <1nd Lois H. Day Living

s tr~·~--:- ·-· ~e s,

'!" ••

r.:.. .

~

DA'f,

·:Jf

htlsl; <md and wi. tl:'

'J'rll':-"lt~

1

!

~n~ated

unde.r

~cr~ted

herPJn b y

cl

E S S E T E:

:e (thf.:! "St:.J:ject Propert:x·").

'!"t..ft:rt:r

•

./ ~ ·- -~~~ day

Dl\.1 and LOIS H.

W1 T

.. !

thls

impro v;..,rnents : te:-rem(:nr.::.,

hert>d:i :: .'t men t '" nn·l

,

.~.
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TO HAVE AND TO HOLD th.e Subj ei:;t Property, with its
appurtenances, unto the GRAN'I'EE and

its successo:t"s and assigns

forever.
Grantors do hereby warraut. tc Grantee. that their
interest in the individual parcels conveyed hereunder whi ch
comprise the Subj.:act Prore rty is as follows:
Parcel No.
Pc:..rcel 1 (No. 3 Juniper}

undivided 1/3 interest

Parcel 2 {Aldape)

"ndivich. d 'l /3 5. n t.-::I:est..

Po.:ccel

(Whitehead

3

Parcel 4 (Whitehead

-

1·~)

Ul'.divided l i

1)

l'nd i v i 'ied 1/J .i.n t e·.n:: s t

~~

.,J

i.nten. . s t

Parcel 5 (800 RoLer"t.)

Vndlvlded 1/3

int e res~

Pa.r c e l

Un d i v ided 1/3

i ~teres ~

Parcel 7 (Collar)

Undivided 1/J

i n~er~~t

Fa.ccel 8 (Merrigan )

Undivided 1/3 inte re s t

Parcel

Undivided 1/3

lnt e ros ~

Parcel 10 (Curtis Road)

Undivided 1/3

int~r e st

Parcel 11 (Country Club #3150)

Undivided

Par<.>.:: l ] 2 (Vista and :t-:ooter.a i )

Und i v4ded 1/ 3

(1018 Day)

6

(Isaac's Cdnyon)

9

Parcel

iJ

('.' l sta Pla za.)

1-' 3. r- :.:_c~ --~

1.:.

(B ar.qs 1

r-·::trl.-:e l.

-

( :t) 1·~

;

a!".J

:c~-~

~/l~

intere s ~
int~res t

JJ:.l.,~o, )

Lndivi1ed 1,

J inte : 2~ t

000189

Parce..1.. 20 (S • Orchard)

Undivided 1/3 interest

Parcel 21 (Whitehead)

Undivided 1/3 interest

Parcel l2 (719 Robert)

Undivided 1/3 :i::1terest

Parcel 23 (String Bean)

Undivided 1/3 inte:r:est

..

intere~t

Parcel. 2A (FC Brown)

Undivided

Parcel 25 (Overland Road)

Undivided 1/6 interest

~-/3

The current address of the GRANTEE is:

P •. o. Box 8286,

Boise, Idaho 33707.
IN WITNESS WHERF.OF, this Deed has been duly F.!X.ecuted by
and on behalf of the GHANTORS the day anu year thendn first
above written.

DI::ED -

;'!

000190

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Ada

GS.

)

J. ~92, before. me,
1
a Notary Public j n and for said
st.ate,ersonally ap!)eared ERNEST E. JJAV a:-..f LOIS H. Dl.Y, husband
and t>Jife, known or· identified to me to b>':i c:he persons whose nam,~s
are. subscribed t .o the within instrument, and acknowledged to me
that they executed the same.
qn :this /?/It

.,.

day of

I)',1J...(,.:t:-:J..UlA ~JkA /

J/1a.1.:::J.
.

1

IN WI':f'NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my ha.nd and
a.t:fixed my official seal the day and year in this c£-~rtifi~Jate
first above written.

DEED -

4
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EXHIBIT A
"PARCEL 1 (No. 3 Juniper}
LOT 17 IN BLOCK 1 OF NORDIN SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO THE
OFFICIAJ.J PLAT "!'HEREOF, FJLE') IN BOOK .10 OF PI.ATS AT PAGE 5 18,

RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
PARCEL

~

(Aldape)

I'HE .EAST 1/2 SOU1'HWEST l/4 ~0 GOVERNMENT LOTS 1 AND 4 IN
SECI'ION 7, TOWNSHIP ·3 ~lORTH, RANGE J EAsT, BOISE M~RIDIAN, ADA
•.:Ot.TNTY, I !JAHO
:.::xcEPTI"l~

THEREFF.OM the

foll~wlnq

descn~ec:i

prcpe.r:t'{

; parcel of ldnd situated 1n the Southwest 1/4 of Sect1on 7,
~ownsnip 3 North, Range J East, Boise Meridian, Ada County,
::iaho, ··i S .shcwr. en Recorrt of .3•Jrvey no. !H4 , tiled as r.nst:r'.J:1ent
~ o. 3859(19, at Book G, Paqe 1364, ot the recor~s of Ada county,
:dar.o, ::~ore particularly descn.bed as follc-•Js:

.•

Jcgl.nr.il}..g :.t :he Southwesc Corner of sat.d Si:!ct::.on
"':'lar;.;ed c:y .l i:rass ..:ap: thence along the West -:!:..lne of
I

.~ect.i.:: r.

~

pcn : lt

$·3ld

~

Sast: . 1658.87 feet to a po1nt
:~or'th 1'02'07
in..:h iron pn; thence l~av .. ng sa1.d sect1on line
Sou:"l 66'49'32" East 270.50 feE..t to a point
5." 8 ~ncn .J.ron pin; thence
Sout.h 55'50'42" East H6.65 feet to a po1nt
:i I .s:! .~ncn c.. ron p1n; thence
.S O'J ·:!;. 47'31)'~0" :.ast 2 04 • .30 feet. to a po .trrt
=/ .3 ~ :icn ire~ ;:: ll'~ ; thence
?cut!": :2·oa•:.;" £ast: ~37.54 f e et. '.:0 a po.tnt
. ....,_!""
_, ;1n; thence
. . ::·::!": ....
!S'OUt.:1 :.4-46 1 : : .. Ea·;;;t: 382.48 feet to a point:
.3 . . .
ir::n ;:in; thence
~ou'::: la'S9'S6" East 327.57 :.'eet -:o a poi~t.
:.:::-:n ?tn: tl":er.ce
-:1
. '..... (. ·.. .: t!': 59' 06'C7" Sast 107.~6 f€:2t: ~0 a ~oint

~at· .~t..:ed

t:y a

5, 8

,.
J
l
t

)
I
1)

.
•4
.l

.

.)

::larked by a

::larked by a
-::tarJt.:ed by

3.

::Jark t .,'

~y

.j

::lar.ked oy

3.

~-,.....

,...

'

-

'

I I._ ~ •

..

::13 t'XZ\J

l::y a

... . ...... r"!

~ ~

:4arkea by a
.__-. ......... 1:-cn Lin; th~nce
scu ~:h o · 0 ·1' 4 J" East 169. 15 fE· ~t. to a point :nar.ked by a
...i _;:;:.;::. ~r,:;:-: p l. n, sald point b..;ing en the :Scuth Line uf said

:;/
s~cL~~n

-;

P. ~~j Jl n ~'1S!. ·

~henca ~lcnq
so u~~ 89'55': ;
~a!d

p~rce l

said South Line
» West 1494. 5 3 feet to the Point of

-ontains 37. 7 79 acres.
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..

PAA~,.;El,

(Whi tah&ad -

3

l4l

:.4

.l\. l''AAT ~;f WF.S~ 80 rEET '.:.: F
:)f:SCRlEED AS F•~;!:..LOh'S:

BE:.:;rNNim; P.'l' ·:"HE NORTHJo.T.::'T CCmi:£R CF :..8::' :;.4: TI:lE.NCE NO~TH 63
·~ I ·:on £~ST g 9. 2 n:ET; rHENCE
SCUTH 4 6 . J FEET: THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGF..f.£S ': ~' !J:J" WEST ;:s. 0 FEET :
:'HENCE SOt:TH S8 DEGREES 4: 5 1 r_: C n W'fS'!' •P . .) FEE':' 'T.'O THE ;..'EST
BOUNDAR':' OF SAID LOT ::.4; THENCt

r:EGREE$ :

NO.RTH 7. 0 FtE'l" TO TH.E rXli~lT Of EEG YriNI:.l:G.

r".F,CEL •
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PARC!:L 7

iI
!

:collar)

CCMM.ENC!!lG AT THE NORTirw"ES': CC:RNER ·;f·
B.l\. ADA COUNTY, IDAHO: Tiif.:NCE
S 0 DEGREES 10 '16" E i SHOWN Of RECCF.C

THE WEST .::EC'!'IC;N LINE

· ~

;~s

:SA.:;; SEC'I'!ON ~,

·~F

.S

::; DEGREES

~~ '

E)

-.,,

.

.{

A! .C i~(;

s1. ~c F£E:; ·::·;l A rc·::•·r;

THENCE
S . 88 DEGREES 55'

E .td..C;JG ':"HE EXrENDEO :i 0tr:'f!£RL·(· Rl.CriT· .')F·-1-.' A"i CF
FAIRVIEW AVENUE, A."lD . Ai.DNG :'HE SGUTH.E f: :.;i :RI~HT-OF-W'Ai ~F' FArp:;:~~
AVE:!nJE, 193. OC FFET TO THE TRUE POINT Cf' Sf:Gtlf.NING 1 :'IJ!:NCt.
-:ONTINtTING

s as DEGREF.S 55 • E ALCNG

s~r!)

sou-rHEf/.1.'1

;:: . ~:: o

;~_.n:;zrr~·~f-).;AY,

f::t:·::.·

TO .\ ?<:>:NT; THENCE
:S i; DEGREES 10'16" F. (SHOw'N ny· REC';R~ ,;.:; 5 .,; :::t~G~£ES 'Z' Z: j .; ;:..:.:!:;.;
A. !_...: NE EASTERLY OF ~~J r~:~R J~:.:.E!.. ~ 0 ~A.!;; ;..-£ :::-T~:-- u1 : .. :~-r ~ :!-· ~;£(.::: . ~ !;
.. 60. :;o FEET TO A PO ;~;T; ·;: ;rE~1 ~:· E
N 5 8 DEGF...EES 55' W, ALCNG ,~ .:...:;;£ :-:;:t' TH.Fx :;.i ::: : ,\1~·:: ; ,!.,; ,;..;..:..:.:,",::_. :· ::
3A!:J SOL'rl!ERLl R!G11"~!'-r~. f-¥.;..y :. .:.!:E · ~f .f". l F~'./!~.Y .~~~ . E~r:.:E . .~B -~ . :- -::. Ft. :: ~
:: ·~) i'\ P«:tiNl' ON THE EJ..s:;t,,::~ :_ y ~. : : lf!" - ~ .,.F-t.fA "I .:.. !~·t.E --:_:r ! ; ·.",.." F ': !.-: £ ?~~: ... ::.:·:
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,. . ._ .... ..... '... ... ..
...,' •
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lb C . : :.;

w : ~ .·;

EE C : ~: NI~l r;.

f' );.RCfL a

(!'Iarrigan)

r r:E .:;JUTHE~\ST _QUART!:~ CF ~: .E:_.-:': ::N l. 9 , ·:rcJ.tNSH:P : ~~G~t!'P , ~::; ;::; ~
EAST, OFFIC.!:.iU RECORD$ :f' A:JA •..:7·:.:N:''! , ~:l. .HO.
'C:XC'EPT :~ ! F.?.fFFC :~
THAT PORTION DEEDED 70 ;.:::;;.. ·.:::t:~TY HI G!fWAY ~::TR::::::- E'i
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PARCEL 10 (Curtis Road)
P.1\RT OF LOT 2, IN BLOCK 12, SCOTT 1 S THIRD SUBDIVISION, BOISE
CITY, IDAHO, ALSO DESCRIBED AS COMMENCING AT THE SEcTION CORNER
COMMON TO SECTIONS 7, 8, 17, AND 18, T JN, R 2E, B.M. ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO; THENCE
.
..
..
NORTH 0 DEGREES 02' WEST ALONG THE S£GTION LINE 1129.84 FE£T ':'0 ;,
POIN'l" OF INTDSECTION OF SAID SECTION . LINE WITH THE NORTHERLY
BOUNDARY OF THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD R/W · (SPUR): ·THENcE
NORTH 41 DEGREES 32' EAST ALONG SAID R/W 37.68 FEET TO A PO!Wr CN
THE EAST SIDE OF CURTIS ROAD, THE REAL PLACE OF BEGINNING: '!'HENCE
NORTH 41 DEGREES 32 1 EAST AI.DNG SAID IVW 167.39 FEET '!'C A POINT
OH THE SOUTH SIDE OF CEDAR STREET; THENCE
NORTH 89 DEGREES 49' WEST ALONG THE SOUTH SIDE OF CEDAR STREET.
111. 2 0 fEET TO A POINT ON THE EAST SIDE OF CURTIS ROAD~ 'r'HE!lCE
SOUTH 0 DEGREES 02' EAST ALONG THE EAST SIDE OF CL~TIS ROAD
12 5. 97 FEET TO THE ?LACE OF BEGINN'ING, SI'fUATED IN THE SW 1 .. 4 CF
THE SH 1/4 OF SECTION 8, T 3N, R 2E, B.M., ADA COUNTY, ICAHO.

PARCEL ll (County ClUb #3150)

in

the Ncrthei'ist : .'4 :: t '::: <:!
A parcel of land located
1/4 of Section 28: 1'o~,o~nsn~p J North, Rant;ra .-: :.J:;t;
Boise ~er1dian: Bo1se C1ty; Ada county, Id~ho: more fart~cu~~r~y
descrlbed as fcllo~,o~s:
North~,o~est:

Beginning at the l/4 section corner common to s.ud
section 28 and S~ct16n 21, T.J N.; R.2 E.: a.M.;
thence, ~long the center l/4 s~ction !ine. S c• 27" E 6 0 8.4~ Eeet
a polnt::
thence. leilving sa ... d cem:er ·.!./4 line, S 89" ~ 9' 13" w _;:: <=. :;:r: : ct~ t
to the Real Po1nt of 3eq l nnlng;
<:hence, -;cnt:lnuinq S 89' :g• : J" ~. :::: 60 ::.o feet: t c.; i: -=~· i:; ~;
t~ence , s a · J4' J6" E ~06 . :4 teet t~ a poln~;
thence, :l 89" ~~' 04" w 27 :. -.t 2 te~C•t t.o a p::nnt;
thence , S 5 8" Zl' :J" W l!9 . ~J fee~ to a pc1nt;
thenca, ~ · • JS' 37" E : ;2 . ~1 !set to a po1nc;
thencP~ N 70
4 7 ' ~5" E :J6. J2 feet to a polnt;
~o

tnence, N
~hence, N
thence, N
thenca, ~
~ hence, N
thence, N
t~ence, H
thence, s
Be<;.in:unq.

o• 04'

Jti~ W 65. 3 3 f~~t to a pa~~t :
36" Jl' 20" w ::s.Jo fee~ to a poi~t;
Jl" ~l' :s" W ·9.14 feet ~a~ point;
l J" 06' 52" ~ 63.02 feet to a poinc;
s ~· lZ' 25" E :1J.J7 feet loa polnt: ;
BJ" 25' 45" E :63 . 97 ~~et ~o a po1nt;
68" 08' J7" E 176.91 feet to d polnt;
~· 09 1 JB" E J28.il feet t~ the Real Feint

r
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(Vista and Xootenai)

PARCEL 12

THE WEST 150 FEET OF LOT 1 AS MEASURED ALONG TaE SOUTH.LiNE OF
WHITEHE}.D'S SUBDIVISION NO. l . ACCORDING TO THE OFF.ICIAL PLAT
'.l'HEREOF, FILED IN BOO!{ 10 OF PLATS AT PAG.E 542, RECORDS OF ADA
.:·om~TY,

IDAHo.

EXCEPT THEREFROM THAT PORTION DEEDED TO BOISE CITY, DESCRIBED AS
FOLLO\o$:
BEGIN~JNG AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAI"> LOT 1, THENCE NOR'.~H
1 2 • 5 FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER THEREOF' , THENCE NCJRTH 6 3 • 10 1
EA.ST, 12 • J 3 FEE'!' TO A POINT ON THE NOR'I'HERLY LINE OF SAID LO'l' 1,
THENCE SOUTH ALONG A LINE PA.FALLEL WITH VIST.?\ AVENUE A DISTANCE
Or' 21. 03 FEE't' TO A POINT, THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY .?U.ONG ~ CURVE TO
THE LEFT WHOSE RADIUS IS 17 FEET · AND LONG CHORD BEARS SOU'rH
4 5 "0 0 1 EAST, 2 4. 04 FEET TO A POI.NT ON •rHE SOUTH LINE OF SAID LOT
1 1 ':ECNCE, SOUTH 89"50 1 WEST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF SA ID I.O'I' 1;
-; CISTANCE OF '28 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

1~

PARCEL

(Vista Plaza)

LOT5 ::.. THROl.TGH 3 INCLUSIVE OF BLOCK A AND ALL OF BLOCK 3 AND THE
NORTH 2 FEET C}' BLOCK F, DAY VISTA ADDI'l' ION ACCGFDING TO THE
OFflCIAL PLAT THEREOF FILSD IN BOOK 11 OF PLATS rl.T. PAGE 560
REC()RDS OF ADA . COUNTY 1 IrAHO.

EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE WEST 11 FEET CONVEY~D 'l'O ADA COFNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT .(ACHD) ACCORDING TO WARRAN'l'Y CEED NOS. ~04479
A.Jo{D 8044~0, REC')RDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
PARCEL l4 (Banqs)
LOTS 2 AND 3, l»JPBRTS FIRST SUB01VlSION AS FILED FOR RE•:.:ORD IN
BOO'K 8 OF PI..A'I':'i A'T PAGE 357, RECCR.DS OF ADA. COUNTY, l:./"CErTlNG
THE .REFRO.M 1'HE EAST 4 FEET CONV:BYED TO ACHD BY wAP.'RAN'i'Y DEED NO.
~FJ 'l 7 9 4 , R tCOF:.DS OF .l,.OA COUNTY, IDAHO.
PH~ C'EL

i. V I 'S 7
?~:.,:

-:

1 5 (1614
1

8
OF

1

ana 1622 Abba)

1.1 l\.N.J 12, .9LOCK :4, EAGLESON PARK ADDITION, FILI: D IN
:F·IJ,TS AT PAGE 279, RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHC'· .
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(Noble BuilcH!lq!

PARCEL l6

:.OT 5 IN 8LOCK 16 OF' EO .~SE C!TY ORIGI!lAL TOWNSITE, ACCO"RDING TO
THE OFFTCIAJ... PLAT THEREOF, FILED !N BOOK 1 OF PLATS AT PAGE 1,

RECOPDS OF AnA COUNTY, !DAHO.
PARCEL 17 (Gea SUildinq)
::.CT 5 IN BLOCK 1.6 OF BOISE CITY ORIGINAL TOWNSITE, ACCORDING TO
nu: CFF!C!A!. PLAT TiitREOF, F!~D IN BOOK 1 OF PLATS AT PAGE 1,
RECORDS or ACA cou'N·rY, !DAHO.
PARCEL ·II

(ALDAPE -

3.892 Acres):

A parcel ~f land telng l cor~i~n of the SW 1/4 of the NE ~/1
"' ,t" ..; ec~l. ·:)n 1:2, -r.JN., ?.:! . ,. ~ . .M·., 8o1se,. Add Cour.t·y, rdano anct
~ar~lCUlarly descr:=~~ 1S foll c ws:
.;~.t <:i po.1;.~ ~ar..o~;.l. na th~
·:e, · ~: ~:: n '_2; t:n~nce a! •..-:;:: :· :~ e Dc<Jt.!-.er.!.y
~ore

;:: c~enc1nq

l .-4 :j·;:r.;!1 d9.,o' ·n :· • West :. J J J.:4
·.:. ::n.t

...: ~:-~g
:; ::-::.:-:

East 1/4 •::crner of sald

boundary ot· +.:he sa1d :1E
feet to a p.:a.nt; thence

:.~

::.-·...:::-.·...:so:

~9"l€;'2J "

.:crr:~r

.·. ~:.::

·...·es:.
~!':e

,.,f

''2. :.::1

. .: : ~c~t <;o a [.o.lnt -::..s.rk1:1q t~e
: '4: ':!':.ence alGng ;..he iolest.~r.!.'f

~.E

.:: .Y.1r.:.idr.· ::>t the said ;1E :_, 4
'! :;_;~h. -') C"IJ'?il8" ;;est:, ::: ~ :.:er-ly 'lorth 89'09'16" West, JOO.OO
:'ee~ to d po .lnt~, ...llso ';.:lL.l f:Olnt. belr.g t:he i'O!NI Of ·~t:G~NNI~:
t.":en;:: e r;on~J )"lUlng

414.JS free ~o a pc1nt mdrklnq ~ po.lnt
':!ience a .L:mq Southeasterly along a sa1d
.:; ur\'e ·.on.;;s e-ce:ltrdl anal.P. i::; :J'Jl'ZO", •nose r.aaius 1s
. ····J·-.
, ,., "e~.,..
-·'"'-:-,-::""
·~· n· ... ,- •, ':s ..· ·;.,~. 84 •eet and whose· l"•nq .-hord
~
~-· "' ··
Ncr~h

:f

.....

JO'Q3'l~n

b;~(Jl:1:1lng

..............

'·

__ ,

· ~~:!1

.· :.:-;"',

-:.f

.... , .....

·•'-

-, 9·:-."47"
~- •.:.:.j

.L c:.::.:

Wes~

'; u::::~,e:

··"""'··

~~s1::

t:olnt

-

.~

•

..

.J

-

.. o.q; !: et:t: ':c a point of en::1ing

;..t::-l G--:1'

J:'

>:~t.~

;.;e~:oterl.y

!Jf

b<::undary of

· :""· 1 '.J .....
. ; :; .-I . . ~~)
..
~~
t!. ,_.._.. ~.· ~·-"" ·.~ :.'.l!::~..,.._d in ·~::·.. . e l)r~ · i·---· -~
~.. . ~ .c
; :~ ...
~; .. .ia ,_' .;; un t ·r' ~ec'::~· :i c" r . :ic.J..se . _:: j Jh:. •Hld 'lr:;oint :;;f =;eQL'l:oJ.nq
t ::: · :::~.·•:: -: r; ;~nce 'llonq ~~e •.;<J .i ..l \.;er;t: e rlv boundar: ; .:il.:.:;ng a '. :\.1r"IJ e. ·
- ~. . c ·~. . :. -~ ~ t ...- ~-.~ o ~- f'~ _e. i"t !.: :· •.~ ... ~ :·. q .: c ~ ..!. ..: .; • -:-: a ' : J " ~· n :> !1 c ::: J. d i t: ~ .= s
.; ..... . . ~~:>-..:. ct. , ·-wL c ze : r: . :-:: r.~: !3 .... ·~ .;;; tt;.~t :Jnd ·wr·o s.e long cnot-·:!

. : :·:; l -:. ;• : :. .:.· ~ J..?
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I <
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J~~i;t:l ._ .;·~_ )'21" nE;:I:t.,
:c:-;-;f;!rll 3c·Ut:h .!5•(; 4 5 ~" ~-t:!St., ~6.96
"'"-'': -:-:o -~ :::c.:.nt c:J f -~anql:.'nt. : ::l':e ' ' c e ::en• . L1Ul:'lg
:;:.:;:.H :-~ .: G' : d'Jl '' ·..;F. :.;r., ".::r::; ~ rly :;~~th 17'.1-~' We-st, 91. 0 0 ~eet
1 e• t
.... .'-~.·~
r-~
t· ..1•r t· "l·
r. r! -~l ..) '1q·
" ,...l'"""'e
•·o
t;;..; . ~ ~ r ,. .'1 ~ -:". ") 1. .........
.. r. ,· ~'-P
·- •• - ''l'···e
.,_.
-- . . . .· ,··
~~....~~ · •· • -1
• ; ....
":" ... '"' ~
"·
..
\,
1

r • · ....._, •. .,..::11

·;~
::;g-;h
. ........;; ....
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)"""-

.~..

-r--:le

.>:

'·1'09':1(.",

..;fa!;S~

T.-ld-:. ·.ls

i..:S

<!)4.~ ·

; 'lo7.:S ~aec ~ nd ~t ose :eng ~n0 r~ bedrs
....

:ee\:. ,

.

i:::.lt.l". 09."!4 '0 1 11 ~es-r., f o r :ne-:r:y Souch 10.:9'3 0 " '..Jes t ,
: ~et =~ 1 ra i n~ c f ~ndi~; -f curve: t:hence continuing

l06.'H
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South 87•:0 1 29" East, fonn~rly South 86"45' East, 50.;00 feet
to a po.int: of beginninq of cun•e; thence cot1tinuing along a curve
to the left whose central angle is l3"J9'22", .whose radius is
334.00 feet, whose length is 91.53 feet and whose lonq chord .
bears
South 04"20'10" East:, forme:o. ly South OJ":l4'4l" East, 9l.Jl
feet to a po~nc of ending of curVe: ~~ence continuing
;?o~.ith 8.6"45'29" East:, formerly south 86" East, 90.:16 feet: to
a point~ thence continul.ng
·
South 47'45'29" East, formerly Souch 47" East, f;';.89 feet to
a po1.nt: thence leaving sa1d bo1mdary
South 71.41'58" West 1J4.~.Z feet to a po1nt· th~nce
North 89"!7'13., West 84.68 feet, for.nerly 84.88 feet, to a
po1nt; thence
South 00"09'18" East 49.50 feet to a point; thence .
North 89"16'29" West 300.04 feet to the POINTOF BEGINNING.
1

PARCEL 19 (ALDAPE- 5.21 Acres):
A parcel of land beln':i a portion o f •he N"W 1/4 of theSE 1/4
Sec";;.lO'l 12, T.jN., R 2E., S.M., Ada County, Idaho and more
pan: icularly described as fellows:
r,;~mmenclng at a po1nt marx.inq the Fast l/4 c..;rr:er of sa1d
Sect!on 12; thence along the Northerly boundary of th~ NE 1/4 of
t~e S£ 1/4 of Sedtlon li
~iorth 89"16 1 3.3" West: :0.333.14 feet: to a point mar1.ing th~
Nort~f:ast corner of the sa~d NW 1/4 of the SE 1/ 4 of Section 12 ~
+.nence ol ~ ong the Easterly boundary of t!'le said NW 1/4 o·f the SE
?t

•

'

A

• I 't

OO"C!'~8" West lJ17.98 feet: to a pctnt: ~ark~ng the
corner of the s:ud NW 1/4 ·~f the SE 1/4 of <;;eccl.on 12;
thence along the Southerly boundary of the sa1d NW l/4 of the SE
so~ch

.:: outheast

1/4 of Sect1on 12
North a9•JQ'lO" West 100 . 00 feet to a po1nt,
::,e:&.ng the POINT OF 8EGI~NlNG; the,,ce contimunq
North :39.10'!0" West 823.49 feet to a oo1nt;
~aid

~outheriY bound~ry

Nort.h

oa·~o7'~9"

West :96.01 feet:, L..1l:1Ilerly

also sa1d point
thence leaving

Nor~h 00"37'40n

r.:ast:. 317.65 teet -r..o a po1nt ~.:m the Southerly boundary of
~lorthridge 5ubdivlsion No. 2, as filed for record in the office
of the Ad~ county Recorder, B~1se, Idaho; thence along the sa~d
Southerly bcunaary
so•Jth Si9 ·52' 11"
~~st

West: 687.56

fe~c.

formerly South 89 • 52' ll"
s~1d Southerly

6S7. S6 teet to a paint; thence leav1ng

bound,~ry

.

S(Juth 24"09'02'' East 333.94 feet., formerly 3c.,uth :2.42'52"

!.:ast J SJ. SO

teet: t o the .PO!NT OF B.E;GINNING.
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PARCEL

2~

(SOUTU ORCHARD):

LOT 4 !N BLOCK ~ COUN'l'R'i t::r.trB ACRES .. SUBDIVIS:tON, ACCCRDING TO THE
OFFICIAL ?LAT THEREOF, HLED IN BOOK 9 OF PIA'IS AT PAGE 44 7,
RECORDS OF ACA COUNTY, !OAHO.
EXCEM' '!'HEREi1\!.1M ·l'HE EASI' i.S FEET DEEDED TO S'I'ATE .GF :DAHCI FOR
ROAD PURPO~ES . BY RIGH'l'~•:JF-~A.l' 0EED REC(lRDED MJ.Y 20 I ~.941, AS
INSTRL"Ml~N'l'

PARC.'tL

~1

NO. 204t!4J,

F.LCCRD~

OF' ADA COUNTY . IGAhO.

(WHITEHEAD) :

Iots 9 and 10 of Whitehead Sucriivisi >:m No. 1 , accordinq to tne
offic.1al t:lat thereof, filed J.n Book 10 of Plats at page 542,
reco~ds

of Ada county, Idaho

PARCEL 22 (719 ROBERT):
Lot 4,

Block A, Day V1st.a Addition, .Jccordinq to the af.! iciai

plat theteof, flled 1n Book 1: ot Plats at ~age ~60, recoras ~f
~da

County 1

PARCEL 23

~daho.

(STRING

BEAN)~

A PART OF THE WEST HALF ·,_;f' SEC~'.!ON 15, ·roWNSFI? 'J 1_j0R:'H, RANGE ~
EAST OF TilE BOISE MERICI>.N, ADA 1'":0UN'fY, IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BE!W~£N THE SOUTHWESTERLY FIGHT cr WAY.
LINE OF ~'YE F<ICENBAC'CH ·:.ANAL AND THE NORTHeASTERLY RIGt-rr rJF ';IA 'i
LINE !JF 'J.S. HIGIIWAY ~W. J O, THE NORTHERLY EXTRDUI'Y C)f SAI:J
TRACT BEING DEFINED B~ ~E COMMON INTET:SEC.r"'l:DN OF THE
SOUTHWESTERLY LINE OF TilE: f'ILENBAlJGH CANAL WI'l'H 1'Hr: NORTHEASTERLl:
LINE OF HIGJWA'i NO. 30, :-HE . SOUTHERLY EXTREMITY BE.CNG TERMINATED
BY TBE WESTERLY LINE Of' P-=\OTEST AVENUE.
.
.

ALL !HAT ?RCFt-:RTY r-:r:G

PARCEL~~

(FC BROWN):

A POR'I'ION Uf LOT 22 , F.C'. BRm-iN SUEDIVtt::ION, ACCCRDING TO ·~'HE
P LAT 1'HEREOF', FIL.ED TN AOOK lU OF' PL.l\TS Al' PAGE ">.01, RF.GOHDS Jf
,\ 0~ COU,a'Y, IDAHO, F.XCZ::I-'1' :\fi F'OI...U.-:lWS:
U:M!"!ENCI:-l'G .:\T "::'HE MOST ·;~r.STEr:LY CORNER GF UYr ;~ ~ ,
S UBDIV!SIC~;

;;-. C.

BR/JW'N

rHr~cE

N'ORTlf l5 Dl::GRE F.S 54 1 :::AS! tiS. 5 FEET ~LONG THE WfS!'ERLY 1\Qt.f:.;n,.;,:~y
OF Sl,iD ~C 'T' 22 TO A ?OINT OF GURVF: THENCE 23. 6~ FEJ.. r
~L<'rlG A CfJRVf: TO THE F.TGHT WHO;~E RADIUS IS 70.0 FEET .\N!'l

000199

tr. ence, .s ~· C9' 38"
Beqinninq.

.t;

J..:ti ..... j,

.;.~t::'-

'-.J

Lu.c

,{'\c;;u..a..

• ...., . . . '""

..... _

CENTRAL ANGLE IS 23 DEGREES 28 1/2' TO A POINT ON THE
CURVE: THENCE
SOUTH 53 OEG·PEES JO' l:AST 127.66 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH
EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF S.\Ir: LOT . 22; THENCE .
.
SOUl~ 53 DEGREES 15 1 WiST 57.32 FEET ALONG THE SAIO SOUTHEASTERLY
BOUNDARY TO THE M'JST SOtlTI!ERtY CORNeR OF SAID LOT 22;

THENCE
N.JR'I'H 7f, DEGREES C6 1 ~;n:::r 8 7. J FEET ALONG Tm:: SOU'!Y.WESTERLY
BOUNDARY OF SAID :CT :Z :! TO 1'HE POINr OF BEGIHUING ~

PARCEL 25 (OV£RlJUm

RO~):

PARCEL A:
THAT CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND LYING AND BEING IN ·rHE COUNTY OF ADA,
STAT.E OF IDAHO AND LOCATED WITHIN THE BO~DARIES OF . THE NORTHWEST
1/4 OF 'l'liE NORTHEAST 1/ 4 • SEC'I'ION 19 , TOWNSHIP 3 NOR'l·H, RANGE 2
EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN.

BE·.:i1UNING AT A POINT LOCATF.P 4 ~0 f'EET EAS'!' OF THE 'hEST LINE N"
THE NORTHWEST 1/4 NORTHEAST 1/4 OF SAID SECTION 19 AND 315 fEET
SOUTH OF THE NORTH L!!it Cf T!!E NORTHWEST 1/4 NORTHEAST 1/ ~ OF
SAID SECTION 13: THENCE
NORTH 117 FEET MOR.E. OR .: .zss TO THE SOUTH BOUNDARY OF A
PARCEL OF !...\NO _RECORDEP IN ADA COUNTY ' .DEED
NO. 216522 IN BOOK ~lO. 260 OF DEEDS AT PAGE 60,
JANUARY 20, :943, TOR. U:E AND BLRNICE. F •.
roRNER: THENCE
~ST :20 fEET; THENCE
SOUTH ll J FEET -:JR EQUAL ::'0 :'HE WEST BOUNDARY QF' THIS
PARCEL; -!' HENCE
c;.iEST ::;:a FEET '~0 THE POINT ,·;F BEGINNING.

TH£ N0:-.TP. BOUNDARY i)F :'HIS PARCt.L .;·orNS 'I'HE SOUTH FJOUNOARY ;.W
LAND ~OVERED BY DEED RLCCROED -::N BOOK : 61J OF DEEDS i\T PAGE 60,
ABOVE

FARC!:!..

~ENT!ONED.

a:

BEGINU
AT A POINT ON '!'HE .'lORTH LINE OF THJ:. NOR'!'HWEST 1/4 OF
THE Nf'
AST '!./ 4 SECT!CN 19, 'l'OWNSH!P 3 'lOR'l'H, RANl';E 2 lAST,
BOISE MER! DIAN, ACA COIJN'l"i, TDAHO 460 i£E'I.' E..3oST Of THE: HORTHWEST
CCRNER Of THE N'O~THWEST 1/4 NOF\'fHE.-&; ST :;4 OF '!'HE :;;..r::: Sf.C'l':C·N ·LrJ;
TP.DlCE
EAST ALONG 'THE NORTH :::..1NE or. THE NOR'rHWF.ST 1,14
NORTHEAST 1/ ~ Of SA I D SEC!I\)N 19, A PI S '!ANCE OF
:20 FEET; THENtE
SOUTH 198 fEET: THENCE

000200

------- ·- ·-- - - - - - - - - - - -

WEST

~20

FEET; THENCE

NORTH .:.98 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

FARCE!. C:
BEG!!ffilNG AT A POINT 680 F'EET EAST OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF '!HE
NO:R"i"flWEST 1/4 NORTHEAST 1/4 SECTION 19, TOw"NSHIP 3 NORTH, RANGE 2
E"..ASl'. BOISE MERIDIAN, ADA CCUNTY, IDAHO; THENCE
SOU'I'H J 15 FEET 'rO THE NORTHERLY BOUNDARY OF BLOCK 6
OF BO~ HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION NO. 2: THENCE
F.AS1'E.:R.L1 ALONG THE NORTHERLY BOUNDARY OF BIDC::X 6,
BOF.AH HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION NO. 2, 280 FEET
MORE OR LESS TO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF U>T l,
BLCCX 6, BORAH HEIGHTS SOBOIVISION NO. 2; -

THENCE
NORTHERLY ALONG THE Wi:ST BOUNDARY OF SAID LOT 1
(EXTENDED; 315 FEET MORE OR tESS TO THE NORTH
BOUNDARY LI_NE OF SAID NORTmfflST l / 4

NOR'r.:!EAST 1/4 ; THENCE
f.f"EST ALCNG SAID NORTH BOUNDARY TO THE PLACt OF

BEGINNING.
i:.XCEPI' FROM PARCEL A DESCRIBED ABOVE, THAT POR'l"ION DEEDED TO ADA
HIGh"WAY DISTlUC':' BY DEED RECORD£0 OCTOBER 5, 1979 AS
:iNSTRt,"MENT NO. -:"955046, OFF!CI.~L RECORDS -OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.

~CUNTY

r.:XCEPT FROM PARCELS A AND •:

A...'iY POPTION THEREOF WHICH MAY !..IE

WI7HIN THE RIGHT OF WAY rOR

C"JE~D

ROAD.

000201

EXHIBIT J
EXHIBIT
J
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od
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RE-24 VACANT LAND REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
.
AND RECEIPT FOR EARNEST MONEY
THIS IS A.I.EGA~I. Y BINDING CON'rRAC'I'. READ THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLlJDING ANY ATTACHMENTS. IF
YOU HAVE /\NY QUESTIONS, CONSULT YOUR ATTO~NEY ANDIOR ACCOUNTANT eEFORE SIGNING.

LISTING AGENCY------=D:.:a:..o.v..:.A.:.:e::.a~ltv,...,_.~lnc:C::..._ _ _ _ _ Office Phone#

D..<?.r:t.na

3424528

"'*...............
OMliO'I.tfl~

Day--~....~'· .(-.~-Mail

~me#

. 'PhOne#----------

SELLING AGENCY __ ,...~say Real Estat_el_Mel_Day Realt~s .. .... ... Office Phone#

Selling Agent_ ......... _LvnrVRod
1.

~

DAT£ ________~1=~~0=~~2~0~~-------

ID# _ ·- ••. .',; .. 986783.89. ··-·-

LisUng Agent

j0.2

E-Mail..

. ... .. -· _ - - ...

Fax 11 _ _ _ _ __

Phone#----------

8UYER;

A. Craig Graves andlar Assigns
{1-toroinDitor Cllllod ''BUYER")
underoi9~ELLER . a!JreeStose'iithe following described re;,l estate hereinl'!fter referr"d to 11~ "PREMISES"
COMMONLY KNOWN AS - a.. ·•·
.
Oay 300
.
city
gOJse
County
~
1o:·Zir> ,. __
3grees to pvrchase:anc(tiie
Lcgoly dO~CI'ibt:d

,.

.

Ex:bjbit "A"

01\ Legal Description Atlacnad os nodendum #

15

u.

2.

$ 10,01·0,000

1u

3.

~,

s -~-o...o.®

~a

z1

~

· ·----

(Acldclndum must accompany original offer.•

r

Ten Million Ten Tho.usancL ____.. DOLLARS,

PURCHASE PRICI::

FINANCIAl.. TERMS: Note: A•C+D•E must add up to total purchase price.
A.. EARNI:ST MONEY: BUYER hereby deposits
Three Hundred Thousand ........ DOLLARS
"" EHm11st Mon~ty uvidunOOd by:
C'rlGtl
f)I.'I'~OilOII Cheek
e:~~hlcl"s check
r\Cic (due Clalc):
oth!.'l' • - - - - - ·· . .. .... .
..
. lind ~ receiplls llereby ·acknowled!)ed. Earne9l Money to be deposited In lrunt tl(;(;Olrnt [ ' .''fiOII
t9colpt,
u?QI'HltC•~~t:Jncr: by Qlf parties nnd $hall be held by:
Ll~lng Broker
Scalng &rokor
other ~er~O"Tttle
for the benefit of the psrtias hereto. Til& Jll&f>l>n~ib~ U<vker thttU b11
~~y

0

0

0

I!J

r!J

0

1"''1

2e

e.

27

u.

f· ' 8 \;
7

payaDhl ui)QI'IIhu follOwing T!RMS AND CONDITIONS (not Including cloolng cosls) :

11

22

snos__

E

~;

ALL Cr\SH

OfFER;~

NO

0

---------=:---

(-I

YES lflhl5 h; illfl all

lXI

Susan

Cil&hofferdonolo~mplete lines $ub&ectlon C,lln blilnk$wiUt

JU

••o• (Zero}. IF CASH OFFER BUYER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY FINANCIAL
CONTINGENCY,BUYER liQ'IIll~ lo provid" SELLER w1lhln
10 buslnt~s$ d<lyt; lrom 11\e d~le Ollhi:i 8!}re~!r'lltlnl, evldeno!l of SVIIiCienl fui\O!l
and/or proccr.:d~ nii{;C;;Saty to ctooc lr.lll:lllCiion. Aa:cplllblo clocumcotaUon lnclvdot:, but i~ not limil!ld to a cop;y or il recant bank or 1ioonclal

J1

statP.ITient or conlf(1Ct{s) 1or tht'! ~II!! of BUYER'S ~nt ret~idP.noo or oth~r prof)flrly

2s

~
33
:14

J)
36
Jt

J!
:Ht
~~

41
~2

43

lt__..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C.

to bP. sold .

~NEW t:OAN ?ROCEEDS:

0

FIR.ST I..QAN of-~ 0
1101 iri(:IIJ(IIilg rnorlg(lgU lnwrc~ncu. Thi~ ~crncnt fl; ountlogllnt up011 eUYI::.R
ODialning tho following typo( G) of flllllncing:
FHA
VA
CONVENTIONAL
IHFA
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
OTHER • . - - - - - - - - wilh inler~st not 10 exceed
'X. tor 11 parlod ol - - - vear(i<) fll: [! f'IKQ(l )(;Ito
Olher
•
BUYER sh<lll pay no more than - - poiot(s} ;>lusD!Iginatlonfee II:Yiy. SELL.ERsn~lpaynornor.
th..n ___.___poinl(!i). Arry r&ductlon in poln~ ~h:.ll fir&t a~ rue to the beoefll or I he ,.I BUYER ['(SELLER[' j Divided EquaHy I.JNIA.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

l.

n

SECOND LOAN of !J
for a period o r . = yo~G) at~
F"l)(od Raton Oll,or - - - - BUYER choR
oav no more thilfl --_POint(~ origiMiiD1'1 r~e if any. SEI.I.ER ~;tU pa~ roo rn(lre than--== pOint(s). Any 1\!dvetiOn in po;nl!l snail
fi~t ocx:rue to the t>eneftl of the U BUYER
SELLER
DiVIded Equally
NIA.

I]

0

D

D

C

0

53
S4

nas applid
shall apply lor such looo(!l) within-==.business d3y{s) of SELLER'S acceptanoo.
LOAN APPLICATION; BUYER
Wllltin ..== bUisine8• d>~y• or fiMI ~Jeecptonec or all pilrtiOII, 13UVER ugrvD» lc lurnillh SELLER wilh a wtitten contllrnatiofJ
showing lelldcr approval of crcrliit report, income verification, debt ratios in 111 manner ac:c;eptabla tDltle SELU:R(S) and ~11bjl!d only
to ~tl!~fli<Otory appraisal and final lander underwriting. tr auc:h wrltlon confttmauon iS not roccivuct by SIOLLe~($) witnln the strict time
allotted, SELLER(S) mtty ::tt their Qplion cllncel this agreement by notifying BUVER(S) in writing ot such c!lnoeiiRtion within - buslnsscr; aily(s) aner wtittan conflrmatloll was tDqu4rad. If SELLER doas not eaneal within rna rarla: tlrM porlod spoclflod :IS sot fonll herein.
SEUER aha II be deem~ 10 h3Ve accepted such written oontlnnation ollender approval and shall be deemed to heve 11lected top~ will'!
trans:~ction. SI:LU:R.'S a~pr011al shall nor bo unroasonably withhold. If an approlsalls roqLirocl by loodor. lha JWOI)er\Y mu&t Dppraiso at
not loss than purchase price or BUYER'S 'Earnest Money may be returned Ill BUYER'S reques\. BUYER may af:so apply far a loan with
diHwent ccndltions and roslk Mid clo&c Y.ariSlltliol! pl'tNickd all olhot rotms Md condi/Jons of this "9-rocmont atYJ fu/lillcd, and tho new loon

5~

docs not in =su tho costs or roqui..._ffJI716nls to tfJe SEilER.

••
~g

!JJ
M
~2

Sit
liT
S9
lj(1

too

FHA 1VA: If 1riPPii¢ablt:l, il i~ wtpK:ss~ lliJI'COd tnar notwilht~lanelil\g tlfl)l olhor provision~ of this conltuct, OUYeR Sholl not be abliQotcd to
oomplctc tho purchase of lt1e propetty de&aibed herein or to incur any penalty or forfellurc of Eornest Money dep~l!; or otherwise vnleG:!:
BuYeR hilS beAtl ~ivet~ln accol'danco wllh HUOII=HA or IIA I'I!QUirorn~ml~ a w'Jitten l:tatamAntlly Ul~ Fl!(ferall-iou~lng Comm~lonar. Vctorons
Admlnilltratlon oro Oired Endorsement lender setting rorth the approls~ V,'Jiue the property of not less lh"n tile soles price as sflltelf In the
conl1acl. &LLER. 'llgrer:>~ to p~y fo1es ,..,quiff!d by FHA or VA.

or

111

BUYER'S lnlliHb; (

JJ._~_)(

N" ,.,.,.... "rlrin•cd ~ Ulfllrihd.:d lr)·

__)Oat¥U=~._!>"-'{"-----

''"'It~'"''

SELLER'$ lnlll.als (

l"""'

A""'":i.iili.nn arJEAI..TQA~. ,..... T'IW!o Jitnn ..... l···~·· ,1,:-i:711-.f rnt#...
N••illft~~IAwllli•~"' tf6"111\Ar,1'0R'f"'. USr.
"~V t)TIIf~R PWR."

"V

I

r~l I!* II")' lf'tlt ~"-1

,ortl':'oi.wctl• wl•• .. , •• fll4:tnht••~o ur lla-

tinUTn\1.

Copyria:}!t ld:.&t:oA"14.:bliouorJU!ALTOI~.. htc. AHri~>tws tt1ti'Yttl
~e-1~ VA~NT I...'INCI rUACH.IIS!t .liND SAL~ ACft~UJI:NT ~Aut: 1 01 f JULY ZOO:, !;PIDON

ozse·2t.e·so2

~so:co

so so

Q~a

000203

DAY00158

Dec 07 05 10:21a
Dec OS 05 03:llp

[B

r

od
Da~

da~

208 343 - 8444

Realt!1

p. 1

208.342.3520

p.B

RE-11 AOOENDUMIAMENDMENT ti_--'-(};_Wl.........,E.,=----<1,2,3, etc.)

IIULTO~

THIS ISALEGN.I.Y 8111QNGCCNlltACT. ~111E em~ OOCUMEWTINCW®IG.AN'I' ATT~ FYOIJ
H.\VE NoN CUasnoNS. COIISUL1 YOUA A'TTOIIHEY AHDIQRA<:t.:Outn'ANt'8£FCR£ SIGNINCl.

Thl$1a an CADOENDUM or att OAIADIIEHT 10 llle ~ Estase Purdlor.z aad Sere AgNemenland Recolpt for Earnest Maney.
r~· ~
the iftlalmalionllllll- iS eddlld rn;;N>n.l *tl'e ~ {Uid\ a li~Bor~JI.
\Amendlllent' ma.ts '1111 fonn i5 being u..t 10 cflanta, ~ on~a 11e ~ (I;IJC.h as rncdfiellf.an, .$ddilloQ or dolllliQn of a lerrn)).

....

~amcatMoneyD

/ol -:/-- ~oe>,r:

10~

•

9;?&

---:n-..=..c...u.;;..o:::,s.t..,~.~

~5: __~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~--0CN~(~:~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~-------0

~~; ~~~~~~~~~-------------------------------------------

,

10

12
,~

~

I

.

14

..

1$

17

..

18

.. .,.

-

20
21

22
2J

z,.
~

28
~

211

2f

To tiE Cldertt lhlt letm!l:.of lhis ADDEND\JM or AM£t,JDM£NT IIIOdify or COfl(lict ~ any~ of the ~eat Estill& Purchase 8nCI Sale
AQr~ lnclldlng .ol .... Addl!ndUIM«AmendrntnCS.Iheae letms Sftilfl conlrol. AI 0Ht-tlml$ of the Reef €stale Ptnhase llnCJ Sale
Agreerneft indudrlg :111 priol' Adde:ndums, Amandrnents. orCOII!IferOfliftnot modi6ed lrJIIdsADDei'<IDUN 01" ~ IIIVIII '*'T'oaln
lhesame.

000204

DAY00159

r

Dec 07 05 10:22a

od

208 343

da~

p.3

8444

·"·

Rl:•21t ~f\:111~ ~If(,) O;tlf' AQ(ftl)hlf'll lor VllC31ll LinO I"IJII 2 OJ f)JlA X 2QXi f:IQIT!O!IJ

Dav 300

PROPf!RTY ADDRESS:

Boise-

ID#: ----"~~98~6.uZu.6flil3:ll.l89

&7 •

"''

$ ..2.._iQ.Q,OOO

r,r·IAddlllonm fin:.nelaltonnc arc specified under !he hcDding "OTHER TERMS AND/OR CONDITIONS" (Sectio114).
0Ad~itiotlallinanclal terms .-re contained in <t FINANCING ADDEPIIDUM of ~a""" datP., atla~nod hcralo. :;lgnt:d by btllh purtluu.

&!)

70
11

72
t ;l

S _3 21 0

71

7~

7!1

&0

e·.
82

@p

E. APPROXIMATE FUNDS DUE AT CLOSING: Cash 111 do5ing, not includin\1 clositl!) CO!Sls, to bt! PHid hy BUY!OR :.1
closing, In GOOD FUNDS. whic!llndlJ(I()~ : cnsh, olcctronic transfer funds, cartified check Dl' cashier's cl~eelt. /lnj net dlfferP.ncP. bl!lwBAn
the aDDrQXim<~te b~HnC~<~ of th .. tonn(~) 5ill0Wtl atlOIIff. which ar& to ba <~ssumed or IIIS<<~n subject to. and the acruol bllllll"lt:e~ of soid loM(s) ot
cro~ng or "scrow sh:lll bo adju.~lcd In ll'l Cash I ! Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1~

78
1T

0. ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS;

OTHER T~RMS ANO/OR CONDmONS; a) Buyer to execute a note secured by a mortgage in the amount of
SG,SOO,OOO due in two cgual onnuallnstallments of $3,645,000 including interest at 8"/;per·a~~_!!m. _!:)} ~l.lers
anornev will draft tho note cmd mortgage to be reviewed and~~J.!l.I!Y.ers attornf!y..!".!!J:i.Jn.!W days
_a~~!ptance. ~f!ht~. ~~.er. c) Buye~ ac.~!'o.wi~~9!!SJ!ta_t_D.o."~-a ..D_afll~-~ licen~d Real Estate Broker in the
.J~tat~. ~i l.daJ:t~':.-d)_~)lers acknowledge that R. Craig Groves is a liceneed Real Estate Broker in the State Of
Idaho. e) Buvcr and S.:ller agree to $pllt the real eS1.ate c:omJniS$IOn due 50150.
- ·

4.

,"'.'
-· ··- ···· .. -··· ·,"-

6~

88
07
~

eg

w
'1
~1
~3
94

S.
"NOT A~PLICABLE DEFINED:" ThP.IeUI!f!l "n/>t," "NIA," "n.a.," s.na 'N.A... as u!led herein are abbreviation& of lho term "11ot ~pplic;lblo. "
Where lhis agr~Jement uses lhe term 'no! applicabl~· or"" r~bbreviijUtm ther~l, it sh~ll be uvillet~W (hut thu P"rti~-s 11rwc contemplated certoin
r~ct& or condlilans ond hovo dctcrmiolcd th:.t !lllch facta or COtlditlonc do not apply to the o QfC<:rncnt or tranooellon herein.

6. INSPECTION: Su'I,;R IS S'tRONOt.. Y AOVISED TO INVESTIGATE THE CONOITION ANO SUITABILITY OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE
PROPERTY AND ALt.. MA rt£1lS A~FECTING r~ VALUE OR !JESIRA81LITY OF THE PROPERlY INCLUDING. BUT !IIOT UMITEO TO, THt=
FOLLOWING:
A . SIZE : Sq~are foob!)e and lo\ size . (Any roumeriC!II s~~nls re(lftrdin!J lhi!!.">e item~ lll"l!l APPH0XIMAT10N ONLY, anCI Mv4! not bP.*In and
wll r10t IX: voriOccJ (lnd shOUld not be relied upon by BUYER.
8 . LINES AND BOUNDARIES: F'roperty l i ne~ 11nd boundar~. Sf!Plic, 11nd !P.ach HnP.!i (F1t11ce1, walhi, iled9P.s, and oihur ni~tural or con&lructod

bart1t:ll's or marker~: do not necessarily identify true property bound:nies. Properly •nes may be verified by surveys.)
C. :ZONINC AND LAND I)$E: Inquiries, inve~ligalions, studios or any other moilns concoming po:~sl , present ot propo ~c.:d l;:rw:;. ordlm1nc.::;,
rofcronduma , inlli:ltilioc. votes. appf1e<1lions DM pctmltt atroctinp tho current usc o! the property, SUYER'o IntendeD V&l! o! the praperl1,
h.tlure development, zoning, building , sil;e, govemm~mtal permits and in!;pecfions. Bolll pllrtles Ill\' i:ldvi~t:d thcol Bn.>k~r t:lOc!:l no1 ~~~~:lranlc::c

the: ~t.atu~ or permits, zoning or codo comp~once. The partlefl are to $Otisfy l~&msclves concemlng tl'oe~e ~::sues .
D. liTILITlES ANC SERVlCe: AviiH!ll)lllly. c;Otil~. iln!l r11slr icllon.~ Ol uliliU~ ilnd sel'lliet!s, inetudinQ hut not HtrWIIileltc, MW • • ~:anilation. WiliOr.
etectrlclty. go&. telephone , c11ble TV and drninage.
E. IJTII.inE$, IMPROveMeNTS & OTHER RIGHTS: SELLER. teplesenla lllal lne propetty doafi have lh& following u[jJitics, improvomon!G,
services and other rights ovoUable (describe avllilabllity):'---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

None

r-.

-----·-. .
. ·----. ..... ·--·- ... ·-·- . ....... . . . .. .. ....
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: The real estate broker(s) or their
in this tr.:ms;,clion have no expertioe wilh respect lo toxic waste,
~entc

-.

·-~-

hi\7.RrdoU5 mAIP.riiiiK or undt!ldr~tbl" ~ul:t!411Bees . BUYERS who are concern.d abOul t~e presence of sucn matorial& should havo tho
property in~pected by qu21lifoed experts. BUYER acknowledgeli that he/she has notrelfed upon any representations by ~:ilher ltle Broker or
Ills SIOLLI~R with rcopccl to tho cMditiOtl or 111c ,OI'Opcrty lhot are not contained In thi1l Agroomont 01 in ony disclosure ~talernent~ .
G. TAX LIABlllTV: 1l'1e BlNER and SELLER acknowl~e thai they have nol received or relied upon ar~y sl<ltemenlli or •ttP~»ent~tions ll\r
the qrokcr INilh rc~pact to tho effect of thlc tmn!lllctlon upon BUYI:R':> Ot SCLLER':~ tax liability.

118

0

, ,,
120
,,.

BUYIO:R chooooa l.lc:l to hilve inspection:
not to have im:peCiion. If BUYER chooSes no110 htwe inspection skip ll1e remainder of section 6. BUYER
s-11&11 ho!'ve the right to c;ondvc;t l""pe<:t;on,;, lrw.,stigDiiona, h•~t.... a~~r~oya lind olhar studloa 111 BUV.ER':9 expense. GUYER shuII. wlthin
,.38""'
businoc~ day(s)
aceoplanca . complete lhcso inspections and give to SELLER written notice of ilems disopproved of. BUYER ill stnonoty oovlsed to
elalf"Cise t"ese rlghls and to make BUYER'S QWI\ !iVIuetion or professton~l~ with appropn~t~ QVal~~tiQrw to cooour;t n~pcellon:; o! lhc on~re propefty.
BUYER'S acc•ptonco of tho condition of tho propony is a co~ttingo11cy or tltls Ag roomonL

U2
~~
12 ~

SATISFACTION/REMOVAL OF INSPECTION CONTINGENCIES;
1. tf BUV!:A does not witllln !hi '!riel Um11 poc1od ~o,oocillod gi~o to SELLER wriUen no~ce or items disappr011od of. BUYER sha~ oonclu:livdy bo

, .,
f 18

or

deemed to have: (a) completed all in:Jpecliorts. inve~tigaUons. review of 3pplicable documenl5 and di5Glosure:;: (b) eleGted to proceed with the
ttans.!I~Uon <tnd (c) <Js~urne<;t ,Q linbmly, Mip~:tnlllbllity anciU?<put'ltu rcr ropain. or COTTuclions clhar !nan for ltorrlll whlc;h SELLER h01:o o~lCMiSc agrood
in writin~ to rapair or correct.
128
2, If BuYER does wilhin tile strict tine period speclfred give 10 SELLER written rotice or items di5ilppr~d ot. SUYER $hall provide lo SI!LLER
120 pelthl•nt &ection(s) of writttn inspection report&. SELLER shall have __3Q_ business doy(s} in which to rospot~d in writino. The SELLER. at
t30 lhelr option, may correct !he items liS 5PP.cified by the BUV~S iro th~ir 1!!\\111'" or m~y elect n()l to <lo '!10 . lllhtll SE;LI,EH »g111ffil to c»trod tiKI itoms
131 nskcd ror in ltlc BUYERS letter. then bo~ partietl ::tgree lh::tl they wWI continue With tile trans:Jction and p
d to closing. This will rem!'w the
~~ BUYERS inspccllon conting~rn;y.
' :
(
1 ., / - J.
•33
BUVER'S lnili:!l!:. ( ~)( _ _ )Dote
SEUER'S Initio Is (
02!~

, :-:;
rze
, .,

ttbf·
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135
130

137
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'fhlt> ltlmt H f'N:W i nn.J tlfs.lrih\ill!IJby the kbflft 1\'Ji..-.ci:Wio. o( ftGALfOK"k:,lnc... 1 ~1 ftmn ....... " IICII tJttii int:~ (OT...J ;,pruvi®dordy
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PP.OPERTY ADDRESS: -----~-_::0_~.'l.~90.. .
IJD
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.
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14f.

3. II the SELLER elec;tt. not to oorrttetth" dl~•>pproveiJ ilom~ . tncn the UuYE:R(S) 111.1vo 1no opllon of o\thor coPimuing tnc lrons::~ction without the
SI;LLCR lloiog tcspon~lblo for correeling the&& deficier>cies or !Jiving L'le S5LI.ER written I'IOti_ca within
-tS
bl.l~inoss doy:o lhullncy will not
continue with tne.. tn•ns11otie>n ('lnd wiR I'P.Cf!ive their Earnw~t Money back.
~
~
-~ OO.,S
4. If SELLm cloea no~ respond within the slricl time period speclRed,9~ER sh~D 'h11ve the right to <;<'"celt hi:~ ao~m~tnl in writlr!H1). If BUYER does not 9ive such wrlltun nollco of canoulh:ltior) within lh.: strict time pcdodc spoc;frcd, BUYER ~holl conclucively be deeml'o<l to hiiVe
elected to proceee with :he transaction wltllOut repslr.; (lr corr~cllon~ olh"r than
items whlet• SELLEN hA~ Othl!rwHiP. agrA9d In writing to rcpilir or

1"6

W<T~~ -

:47

SELLER shall rntJ~e the property :>v~iiRbh>. fQr liS tnspP.J:Iion~ . BUYER sh;~ll ki' ..P lhe properly free and ct .. ar of fiilns: indemnify and hold SELLER
twmlo~s from 0111 li>lllllity, d:>lms, Clcmonds, d.:Jmoge!> ond cost&: and repair any damages arising from the intpeclions. No in&pection$ may ~ milde
by any governmental building or ~oning insptoctor or govammanl emptol"'e without the prior Cbn&ant of !!ELLER, unlass roquinld by local

,_.,
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111

·•a
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100
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151
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7.
TITLE CONVEYANCE: Till~> ol SELLE:~ l:s lobO ~onvcyod by warr;;aoty deed. unlc:~G olhc:rwi~c providc:d, ond i:o to be m..vketoole and insur~bte
except ror ri!Jhls reserved In federitl Pi'tent<;. ~l,.l~;~ 01' ,.... ilroMd rJQAC!s, building or u~e rAstrictiOM. bullafng Qn!l zonlno ro<~ulallons :md ordinances of any
govcmmental unit, and lights of way ond easements estebll5hed or of record. Liens, Mcumbr11nces or defects to be dlsc.harllf'd by SELLER muy tx:
p;,ld out of purch3se money at datP. of oto,.lng. No 119M. eru:umbranc:u or defects, which ar! to be- disd\argod ot auumod by BUVER or to which tltle
I$ taken subject to. e~i&t unles!l otherwise s;>eclfled in thls Agreement.

1~7

TITLE INSUAANCE:
(A) mL.e COMMITMENT: PriQr IO clo~i119 the tronsaclion,lxJ SJ:LL~R Of 0 t!UYIZR shall furniSh lo f!UYE:R ll COn'll\'lilm~nt of 3 title Insurance
tao poll(:y &hOWin!J the oondnton ot the title to ~~~id prnmt!iP.!. BUYER sl'lall have _15_ bu~lness day(~) from receipt of tho c()rnmifmont or not less th:m
"l, twenty-four (24) hours Pflor to closing. within which ro object In wriliJ19 to the oondilion of tile tilf11 i:!5 ~~~~forth in lhe ~;ommilmt~nl. II OUYER ~Otnl not so
1&2 ot>je~\ , eUYER she~IL be dfiP.med to hBvB acahptnd lhn toetldltlon of the IIIIo . It IG oorucd !kat il the IIUc of ~aid promise~ i!l not motkctabto, or connot be
u13 made sowilhin_l,S_bU$lness day(&) l.'lfter Jioooe c:ontalnln(l "'wrllt~n statement ol dttfeclts dMIIv..red to snu:~-t, I:IUYER'" EAtnAst Money deposit
1!.11

8.

IGQ

1a~

187

1~e

UJD
110

111
1'r.t
173
174

175
•7r.
17r
17u
110
180

161
1a2
i83
184

wat bG rl!1l.llntld \Q BUYEI{ ..,,1(J S£LU:R Qh::.fl ~Y for !he coot of IItie lnsur/lne~: Cllncellatlon fee. escrow and legal fee~. if any.
(B). TITLE COM~ ANY: The partie:. ~re. tl\al
Lawyers
___ , .. ·- ·- •. ..
Title

Company loc;ttod :Jt
-~=-:-::-:~2.2.3_1.~_._Discovery Way Su1te 100 Bo1se, ID
shall provide title policy and preliminary report of commitment.
(C) STANDARD COVERAGE OWNER"S POL.ICY: SE:LLER shalf within a reasonabl& time alter clo~ing furni5h tt> BUYER a ll1tu in~uruneu
policy In rho amount of the purchooc price of the premlt:es showin~ ml!rkelotble ancl insurnllle title subject to the liens, "ncumbrllnr.:es Mrl ctP.fP.Cil:
el5eWhere set out in this Agreement to ~ dis~;h;uyuel or a:;~vmud by OUYER. 'The ri ..k .,.,.unlcad by tht Iillo! compj)ny in tho &l~ndard coverage
policy Is limited to ~Nttors of public rocorcl.
(D) EXTENDED COVERAGE LENOER'S POliCY (Mortgagee policy): Thf! l~ndertn"Y fti.,UI'I! th>ll BUYER (BotrowAI') f!Jmlsh an Extondod
Coverage Lender'~ Policy. This elctended cover11ge lender·~ policy con~ldel'$ mallei'$ of J)u~ic reeord and .nddltlon<llly insuros D9Din:ll ccrluln mauura
not •hOWn in the pvblie ~11rd . Thl!i •xtend41d coveraao Iandor's policy ic se>lely for tho banefit of tbo lander and only protocts tho londor.
(E) EXTENDED COVERAGE OWNER'S POLICY: A standard titre policy does not cover. certafn potential problems or risks such Cis liuns (i .e . ;~
legal claim Against premi~a& for p11ymonl ol ..orno dt:bl ot obtig111ion, boundol'y di~putaG, cloimG of oacomcnt and e>tl!or mattorc of claimc if ti>ey ;:>re not
of public record ot limo of cto,ing.) However. under ld:Jho t::~w, such potential ~ims against the premise& may lu•ve ~oma llt!)i4t CllllfAAIIM~ befoM
th11 Pllrr;h;"" or tho homu und yul mily not be of pubHc rj!:OO~ until after the put~Ge . It i$ recommended lhat BUYER talk to 3 dtte company aboUt
what It offer.; in the W1:JY of e~tended oover;,g11 lilt.,. pollcie~ 11nd .,.,~l'$"m"'nts. This •xtended cover01!1" own"''"' policy is for the benafit of tho
OWI'lar llftd pmvielu ~:lmilar coverage like provldl!d by tho oxtondod c:ovorago Iandor's policy.
Extended C0Vei"3!Je 0\.lmer's J'>oQcy reque~teO
Ve~ [RI No. Additional premium p~~id by:
BUYER
SELL~R .

0

9.

~~

tro

U

ATTOR~EY'S FEES: If either porty in~lales or defends any l!rbitratloll or legal aclion or proceedn!Jll whi<;h ant if' ~ny W<"Y tOM~tCl~ witt• tnil\
1t>e J1QI)oprevallino party tea~oooble coGts onel 11ttotney'$ r~s, Including such co~t"

~toorl\Or\1, the prevtlilingo p:.fly ahDII be entitled to recover from
11nd IP.I:!S on appe11t.

1U.~

1011
1111
Ill&

0

/ ......

""Y

terminellon of lhis oonlrae!, BUVE.R ;~nd SELLER ;~groo thot in tho
event of any controversy regarding t"e Earnest M011ey and tltinos or value held by Broker or cto~lng Ctgeocy. 11nle~s rnullll41 written instructions Qto
re<;lllivad by lh11 holder or lhu ~most Mone:y unci things of valJc. Brokt:r or ciocing agency shall not bo required to take ony 3ction but f\13y ;,waK a~y
proceed'•ng, or o\ Broke(& or ckl~>ino 11oency's option :.nd 1>0lf: di~eretion. mAy il'lt~:~l':'l~"'d all pattiP.s and dll$>0~11 any rnontys or thlngs Of value into a
COUfl or oompctllnl iurisdiction and shalf recover court costs and reasonable :~ttorney's fees.

10. EARNEST MONEY DISPUTe { INTERPLEADER: Notwlll\.o;lllndlng

ll1

=

19:1

11 . . COVENANTS. CONDfttONS ANO REST~ICTIONS (CC&
applrQ!'bJe) . euVER has reviewed CC& R's.
Yao;
No
N/A

0

U

I!J

R'S) ; BUYER is responsible to obtain and review a copy of the CC& R's (if

1114

199

12. SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNER'S ASSOClAT!ON: 5UYER is aware th!lt membership In t1 Horne OWner's AssotiijliOn m;oy b~:~ tlt(lWeo ana
BUYER Dgrcos to obldc by the Artic;Jell of Incorporation, By•Ltlws 11nd rule& :md reovt11tion:~ of the A~soolotlon. BUYE;R i5 lvrtllflr ewan• that the
Property may be ~ubj~t to "~~es!;ml;!nls levH!C by IJIP. A~~oci3tioo dl!scribfld In full In tM Dacl ar~tlon of covenants. Conditions and Re91rlctiom~.
BUYER has reviewed Homeowner'~: Associ:ltlon Documentu;
Yes
No
NIA As60cllllkm rees/due5 are $ _
........ _ _ ... _ . . .
per
_ -·--- ·· QGUYeR
SELLE<I't [!) N/A lo pay Homellwr>er's A!<sociaticln SE'T UP andlot property TRANSFER FEES of

200

S

196
1~

197

1~

0

0

0

ot closing.

1

00

5
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PROPERTY ADDRESS: _ _ _ _ _ _........:;D;;.;:a:.~.v..::3;.;:;00,;__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _B;:;O::..:i::SC:...,__ID#: ----.9.8.61.6.3.6.9_ _
"''
2n
21~

7tG

21a
211

13. FARMICROP~BER RIGHTS: SEL~H. or <.Jny lcnanl Dl SELL~R, shun bo u\lowDd k> huov011l, ~oi l or nl'i9" uny <~nnuul uup$ w!~ch hu\IC
bAll!' plHnl~d on lh!l' Property pric;~r to lM !WI! ot lhis Coni mel, """n lhaugll sill:J !'liltvft5111r'll« fn.ty oc:tut •uMP.qu1mt to fill! dFrll! of I~ Jlellll!t\1&1\1 0111\ls
conv~ct. uotecs olheiW!se agreed by att.1CI\ed 3ddendl.rn. If the crop oonsietl: of limber, Ihen neither SELLER nor any tenant of SELLeR$ sh61t have ilflY
righllo h;vv~t_lhetimber unl..,;,; thP. ri;l'lt lo rP.mOWP ~.llm!l ~hal b& .. ~lllbli~hi!d by altad'led addo!ndum. NOiwilnstandll'lg llle I)I'(WisioM horoor. any tonanl
who shnll bele.1sing the Properly r.hi!ll bl-allowed to complete the h;.moesl of any annual crops !hut have been planted p1ior to the dille ol Contmc;l
Accl!pk11\C.!l a6 previously apreod b11lwoun SELLER Olnd Tcn;ant. A.l\1"1' AND ALL SUCH TENANT AGREIEMENTS ARE TO BE ATTACHED.

21Q

m

22~

n1

14. NOXIOUS WEEDS: BUYER or the property in 1t1e Sta:" of ldllho should be :r.Y3re lh31 some ll'OPertle& contain IIOXIol.ls. weed~. The I:JW:~ "' ll'lt1
StElle of ldllho requlr~ own('!l; ot tmllf!rty within thi~ !;filM to control, Md to tfu! f!ICIP.nl po!ISble, P.radlcalit noxfaU!\ ~~. !='or mo ... infcrmallon COI'ICHmlng
noxiGus WDodll and your obllgatiorn: as on owner of property, cont:~ct your loc:JI oounty extension offiCe .

n~

22:1

15. MINERAL RIGHTS: f\ny ond :111 mineral r1j;llts which are 31ready Included with the property will be Included in the s;~le of thl& property unles,;;

224
:n:.

olh!l'twise stipulated,

22e

16. WATER RIGHTS: Dcsctiplit>n of wntcr r~hl:i, water SYIJ\Cmo. !Neils, npringn. water. ditcJ\CG. ditch rights. etc... if ~ny, !hot arc oppurtonoot
thereto th:lt are now on or ul:ed in connection with tile premise~ Md ~all be included in the cafe unl~$ otherwise provided herein:

~~?

22t
??&

2JQ

17. RISK OF LOSS: P~Of toctosif!Q o11111s sale, .,. rlsk oflo!IS shall romalnwltn SE'llER.In aMtlal, Mol.lk2 tM !lfOmiS41s bo motarially d.'lm<lQcd by fire
or oli'ler dl!!llructlve cau~e ~rior to closin9, lnll; A9rucmon1 ~hall bo voidable at tho opUon or BUYER.

231
~32

233
2J4

23!>
:131>

18. BUSINESS DAYS & HOURS: A bu~IMt!l day is hert!in defined -'!l Mol\d3y lhTOU!Jh Frld:l)', S:OO A.M. lo 5:00P.M. in the

loc<~l tilTH! :>nne
where the subject real property is physically located. A business day shall not include any Saturday or Sunday, nor shall a business day inc:lvde any
la;al holid;ry "'""9nized by the alllle of Idaho us foul'ld In ldCltlo Codo § 7$-108. The limo in whlcn any acl roquired under lhls u~rocmonl i3 to be
per1ormed ah..'ll be computed by exclUdinG the dilte ol execuUon and tnwdln!J the last d~:~y. The llr~t day shall be tl1e d3y lift.,.- the dlfle ol ex.ewlion .
If lht:: tu~L Cl~)l is a IO$llll notill~y. tllo•l U\c limo ror p<:rtom'IOr'lCf: ehollllo tne ooM au !>sequent busioo~"!l <loy.

n11 19. SEVERABIUTY: II\ ln1t c:a!le thilt af\Y. ooQ or nroro of the provision,; <Xllltairlf!d l•llhi~ Agrt\Qmtnl or ifl~ appicetoo thereof, sha~ be invalid. ilogal or
231)

I.Jneonlorc;e~le in any

2o11

20. FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: F<Mmllv 1)1' uluGII\lnic: \r.m:;misslln ol <my~~ Qfigirwl dowmenL ~rid relf!tn:11ni$~n ol i:lll)' ~!Pled r,.~n*.H.>r
electronic transmlscion Gh:lll be the t:ame ns de~~~~ry of ~n cn1oilot. 1\t lhe request ote!ther pal1y odhe Closing Al)ency,llle p;utie& will ct111firm facsim~
<~l'ld P.leetronic 11ansm~ted ~ign:.b,n'"$ by ili!)l'ling an otiginl'll aoc:um!!n1.

21o:r.
2•~

respect, !hP. vl!llidlty, le'g;.llly 01' t,Jnen~-'ll;!lllty ot the remaining piQVi$10ns shall not in ;rny W"-Y be atfedtld or impoirod lhorcby.

244

ADDITIONAL. CONTINGENCIES AND COSTS: Tho clo$1ng or thi& transac~on ;c oonlioQont upon Wl'kton G>~ti~f:tetion or w;~iver ofehe
,.a · 21.
following contingencies. COS\s il'laddilion 10 those 115ted below may be incurred by BUYER 3nd SELLER unle95 othelwlse agreed herein. or provided by

245

2•o

law or required by lander, or otherwise lilalad Mroin. Ti'KI bulaw cor.!~ will ba paid a11 inclicalod anti by no )<liar lhan Limo oF dooing . St>mc co!il:i urc:
subjecl to loon progrom requlremenls. In ~ddition. the p:.tes &tl;ll &:~tisfy 311 contingencies :;et forth in this !)edlon by (Dale}: .J/02/0~ .Lflleoo otherwise

218

&IQI'UUd ID b'( lhl> pilrtit:S

117
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Equally
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X
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TtloliO.!l:t'dliVC:...;y.~
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98w:67""-"63u.&.~ot89~K..._
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2&1

2e2
;!I;J

22. COUNTERPARTS: This Agreement may be e~ecuted in counlerpar1.6. Exe<:uting an agreement In counterparts 'hllll mean the sign!Jll'lv uf

two

ldentic::ll copi~s of the snme ~eement. Each iden11eo:~l copy of an Cl{lrP.P.ment sl!)ned in counterp:utr. lr. deemetl to ~ :ln Dri(liMI, :v1d .all
itklnliCIII eopiYt; si'IIJIIl<~!lSlhol constitute one: (JMJ lllc a.:.me Jnst1urnc:ru.

264 '

:x-1..
2e11
'N '

:2119

270
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272
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271
27S
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2a1
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2~. ENTC:E AGREEMENT: This Agn:cmont contains 1he cnti~ Agroernoot of !he partlca rcspcclog the maucrs: heroin set forth and cupersedes all
prior Agreernenl~ ~en the p~rties resp~ing lluc.h m~lt.,r;. No wmrnnlln!;, including, vnthoutlimllilllon, ""Y w>~rrunty of h<Jbilability, i.ll,I'Ut:nu:ot:> 01
representation~ not cKp((iaaty act forth horcin sh~ll be binding upon oithcr pony .

24. QEfAUL T: If BQYEB d9f3ultt. In the performance of lhi~ Agreement. SELLER hoo the option of; (1) 3COeptin(l the ~st Money~~ tiqvidRted
d.o~et> Or {2) Pl115Uing ~ny olhlll' t;swl~o~l n!'J~t 0t ~mP.dy to whid\ SELlER m:.y M P.niJI~. II $€Llffi P.l~!'i 10 pi'OOI'!OO IM1CJP.r (1), SELt.£R shallrooko
demand uponlhf: holder of the E3/Tl8Dt Money. upon which dem~~nd SlJid holder she~ ~yfrom lhe Earnest Money the C05ts incurred by SELLER'& Broker
on behAlf of SELLER and BUVE~ rr.lllled to lhA triln~H~cllon, including, wllhoulilmilaliDn, the coni& of Utko lnsurltfl<;e, ese.row lov<i, ctadil roport loo3,
inspection fees ond attorney's fees; 31d said holder shaA pll)l ony lxll3110e of the Ellme~;t MDneY. one-h31f fo SELLER and one-half lo SELLER'\; Broker,
p1011ld9d that I~ nmounl. to be paid to SELLER'u Srokur t;hOIII nol oxcucd lha Srokor':; ugrood-to a>mmi»iOn. SELLER ond OUYSR :lP<:ciOC.llly
~cllnowledge OlOd <:ll)ree tlat if SELLER eleele lo "c:cept the E(Jrne!.t Money ac UQLii~::ttP.d d3m"')e5, ~uch ~h;otl be SEI.l.F.R'~ 5ole :incl mr.tul<ivR rt!ITIIIdy,
ilOCJ such shall not be consleltlt(ld fl pc~nalt)l or fotfCIIIXC. If SELLER elects to procoea ul)(lcr (2), the hOir:Jcr ot the Earnest Money shall be enlltied 10 PilY
the cosb iocurfad by SELLER'~ Brol<.er on be Mil of SELLE I'(. 3t1d 6UYER reloted to lhe lr~aclion,looluding, wilhovt limitAtion, the co"'" of brokowaga
foo, title insurance, occrow foos, crodit roport fees, in~poction foes ond ottomoy's f(!()9, With MY balanco of the Eornel;l Money to be held pending
r~lutJon oflhe matter.
!1W;LLeR dlfilulti h<Jving approvod s:Jid s:Jio ond foil~ to consummmc the s;,mc ll3 heroin agreed. BUYER'!: Eamc&t Mollcy dopor..it sh<~ll be relllmed
to hlmlher e~nd SEL~ER si1Ciil p~y ror 1)>1;1 QO~IIs ol tillulnliUI""""CII, esc;~QW ~~~~. crv<~il reoort l~t~~~. in~-peel/on fellS. ~r-~e IIII!S ant:l ~<Uornoy'& fcc~. If rJny.
This snail not be conflldered a~ o woiver by BUYER of :my oth!'t' l~ful rigl'.t or reml!dy to willet> 6UYI;;R m3y be enl~/(1(1.
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25. SALES PRICE INFORMATION; SELLER ~~nd BUYER hereby !,Pill [)el111issiofl to the brok~ tvld either PM!)' to this J19neemenllo ~IQso ~CI
dala from lhls \ranuctlon. includi"9 aelti"9 priea o>l'ld j:lroparly addrus11 1o tho loc"l Assoclution I Board cl R~ALTORS®, rnulliptc liGting ~~1\!iec, itQ
members, ita membl!!l'-' proljf)ecl5, {IPD'lli3ll~ Mnd oli'ler DtOie~sionttl Ulillrl' ot !'IIIII e~t11le :~<~le:~ cl!>ltt. The partie~ to tl'>is A!)teement neknowit)(tgl) tMt
sol~ price infom'lalion OO!l'()iled as a Rl9Uit of this Agreement ITI3Y be provided to tile County As&ecso(& Offrce by eilher p.~rty or by either pArty'!! 6roluor.

~9
200

26. liM!! IS 0~ YHE ESSENCE lN THIS AGREEMENT.

2~

ZT. CLOSING: On or boforo tho closing dote. BUYER ond SELLER sh;ll dcpc!:it wilh tho closing agency all funds Dnd instnuments ncccss;uy to
cornpklto thi:s lron~oclion. Clo~ means tho d~to on which 311 doe....,Of'lts .,,.. lli1tter rveotded or accopt,q .bv 3J:Ij)serow ;2gont :!nd the salo
proc:oods aro ;svailablo to SELLER. Thf.do~tno &h;,ll b~ no rater tht'ln {D:tle)
04/CJ1/110
.
The portle~ agree that the CLOSING AGE~CY for this transaction sii:!U be
Lawyers Title
IQC8ted t'lt .... _, ·--- _.....
6223 N. l:!•~.o_v~.l'l.W~y.... .... .
.!! a long-tetm escrow I collection is irwolvod, thon the long.term
escrow holder sholl be
none
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po~sesston~pondooing or Cjdotc

t ___ []arn,[}m. Propertybl<eG:JNI
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28. POSSESSION:

H9

wa1er assessrnems (usinolhe l!l~lavaibtbl.., (11;5!"li111enl <ts a ba.sis), nmus. 1nlef1lst ~nd relierwli, Uens,

l:XI

::noN be pro-rCJted B!l or

BUYER Rhall be entitlad to

Closang

.

encumbnmctt~ or obO(liiiiOOs aSSI.II'Oed<'lfl(l utilities

3~1

~!>':
lo:J

29. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION$ ANO CON'nNGeNCIES: This AQroon'ltnt Is macte $<al>jt~ct to tM fo110Winli9Pllcilll considora~ion~: :mdlor
c:onlin9f!ncH!s which mu~l be sa Us fled priDI' lo closing: None

~1>4

3ll6

30. REF>RESENTATION CONFIRMATION: Cl\edlone (11 box in Section 1 andon11 (1) bol< in Seetio" 2 below to confirm that lr> this

w

tr~C1io~.

m

~tin 1;
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31~

tho brokeragc(s) Involved h;Jd the following rci"UDnship(s) with tho BUYERS(~) ;.,nd SELLE:R(s).
A. The llrokel3(1e working 'Nilh ltw 1\!UYER(S) is i.iding as ~;~n AGENT for the SUYE~(S).
(2g B. The brf>ker:~ge workinp With the BUYER(S) is ooling as a LIMITED DUAL AGCNT forlle BUYER(S), w!tllout an 1\SSIGNEO IIGENT.
Q C. 1M brokerllgP. woricing wilh lM 8Uvef.<(S) iS ildlng M A LtMrr~C> OUAL AC'.SN'!' lor lhP. SUV~R(S) and ha~ an ASSIGNED AGENT
acting solely on behalf of the BUYER(S).
0 0. Tho brokllf~o woflcing with lho BUVER(S) is acting a~" NONAOENT for tho eUVER(S).

IJ

313

31~

a.~
311
an

Section 2:

318

lll'i

A. Tho brokorage working with the SELLER(S) is acting ~ an AGENT for llw SELLE R(S).

0

aGtingsolely on beha~ of lhe SEit.LER(S).
0 . 1he blokE!tag~ working wllh the SELLER(S) i& acting as a NONAGEN'I' lor th~ SELLER($).

[j B.1hebrokei'3Qewor1<ing wi1htheSELl.ER(S) l$:~ctng oo :1 LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SElLER(S). wtthoutoni\SSIGNF.O AGENT.
0 C. The Mlkorogc worldt'l9·w\lh the SELlER(S) Is :.ding M a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S) ood 11oo on ASSIGNED AGENT

319
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:.21

322

Ea¢h pal(y oigning this dooull'enl confittn!l lhElii'IO llaa rooeiv&d, rtoo<! llnd undel".llo<ld the Agency Dl$doaula Broc:huro Ddoptod or tlpjliOVod by IM ld:ll1o
re:JI estate c:om~ion and has c:onsenl2d lo the rel:ltionship oonfilmed :lbove. In addition, each party OCJnfirms th311he blokem!)e'$ ilgeney office poflcy
was mllde I!VIIilabf~ lor lm;pet:Uon ;md ruvluw. ~CH PARTY UNOE~S'I'AND$ 'l'HAi HE IS A "CU$10MER• A.NO IS NO'I' R5PReSI:I\/Tl!tO OV A
BROKERAGE UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPR -S
AiiON.

BUYER'Sinitlot~( tJ'. )( __ }~e-.nbio(
~2T

32~

'Nt ruru• h

c__ )Oote

seu.ER'Sinillom(

l'f~lr-:1 ;hi '"''r1.9ttt\'LI ~tiM.: hill•' A.!11Dl;,..~"r ltf!" l..llJit.'\at.lt44.·. 'N' r~.ml"~ l1~vn th.,ip,ai r~rqnd~
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A:C <l4 Pu1~11rJt- a.r~~lle/ye~'nwt~ r«V~1t L2'nd P~ So! 6 AJLY ZQM t:DIT!QN

__________B_Oj,!l~---10#:

PROPERTY ADDRESS: _ _ _ _ _ _.......;Da~y 300

986763&9_ _

3J1

~:11
~:14

31. ACCEPTAN.CE: BUYI:R'S olfcr iG made subject I~> 1he accP.pt~n<;e oi SELLER on or bt'!lor~ (C~Itt)
1~QS.Lrui
at
('l'irno) ,1·00 (~jA.M.l, I P.M. If SELLER does not accept this Aoreernent within the tim~t &pe~ifiad, lhe <>ntire Enrnos1 Money sh;JIIIl!J
rP.fullded to SUYe:R on dermM.

x.u;

32. BU'ft?R'S SIGNATURES:

333

JJT

""" 0
~.:

SEE ATTACHED BUYER'S ADDENDUM(S): _ _ _ _ (Specify number of BLJYER addandum(s) allachldd .)

BUYER Signature ..' __j4.~

:141

3<12

Date __1.2/.02l0.5_ ... Time. . .2;00__

)11

Address

516

0

BUYER (Print Name)·-- __ _ ..... R.

A.M. f!J? .M.

6223 N. Dl~~~v.ery ~ay_~.!Jll~JJtO__

e-Mail Address

Craig Gr«?.V~--

Craigg~_Johnlscott.c;om

State..JD... Zip

Boise

City

''

8371 3

Fax# __________~2~~~3~2~3~~1~Q2~-------

:.oil
).otS

••••••••••••••••••••••••••,.••••.,•••••••••••••••••••••~••••••••••• ••.,••••• •••••.,•••••••••••••••••.,••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

"''~

BUYER S i g n a t u r e _ L - - - - - - - - - - - -

~S1

as~

03le _________ Time ____ CA.M.

0

BUYER (Print N a m e ) - - - - - - - - - - - - -

P.M.

Phone#· ·----·------- Coli# _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~Gl

Stato _ _ Ztp _ _

3Sc

Address-------------- ___ .· -· .

City ·---·

~50

E-Mail Addrese ______

Fax# _____________________

~50

33. SELLER'S SIGNATURES:
Jso On thio dale, W/e I'M!reby &WfOve a1l<.l aocept tho tmriS<lctioo set forth
3c.o on the part of the SELLER.
~111

~
:

~=

U

~tho

oboVo Agrccmcnt ;vld ogrcc to cany 01JI3U 1he terms thereof

SIGNATURE($} SUBJECY YO ATTACHED COUNTER. OFFER

~NATURE(S~ SUBJ

:r YO AirA

D ADDENOUM(S) t#___::;C._u....;..:::t.£_.:::::;-_ _

!z/4/0,6.- Timo z;'to'S':

~JAJiR.I~.M.
~:: Address 2 'f3.s ~
/£t1..«A/
~:~ E-MaUddress ~/4//-,sJIP/1-{?/-. CcOt11

:: Dat.o

Q~ .07

SEUER (Print Name} ___

SEllER Signature

02S£:'2v£:'BD2

Phone#
City

,.

Fax#

t?

t;2·q-:Jl(_~ . cett#_qfP· II~Pfi:.{L_
0 f(t=
State _rJ Zip ~~?/'l' "C

~-K-"7-25;-(~

dtt:eo so so oaa
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EXHIBIT "A" (Isaac's Canyon)

THE NORTIIEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 19, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH,
RANGE 3 EAST, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.

EXCEPT THEREFROM THAT PORTION DEEDED TO ADA COUNTY
IDGHWAY DISTRICT BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 4, 1980 AS
INSTRUMENT NO. 8005941, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO.

4
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EXHIBIT K
K
EXHIBIT

000211

Company, so they generally acted as their own real estate agents, especially for transactions
dealing with the family property. In approximately 2002, Providence Development made an
offer to purchase the Day Property from Plaintiffs, which was accepted, although because of
market conditions it exercised a right under the contract to not proceed with the closing. In
2005, the Day property had several perspective buyers including, Catalyst Development, Dennis
Baker (DMB Investments, LLC) together with Dave Leader, and Craig Groves with Wirt
Edmonds (Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc.), who ultimately purchased the property for
approximately $10,010,000. The purchase by Groves and Edmonds ultimately failed during the
economic downturn. Following the failure of the Groves deal in 2008, the Plaintiffs began
actively marketing the property again and listed it with Rod Day of Mel Day Realtors. In 2014,
Sandy Sanderson also made an offer to purchase the Day property for $12M.
In conjunction with the Edmonds/Groves purchase and other proposed purchases, Day
Realty employed closing agents and title officers, including Transnation Title and Escrow,
Lawyers Title of Treasure Valley, Pioneer Title Company and Alliance Title & Escrow. Also,
Asay Real Estate was involved as the selling agent for the purchase of the Day Property by
Craig Groves.
For additional information regarding the efforts to sell the property, please see
documents produced herewith.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please state whether you have ever sold all or any part

ofthe Initial Day Property or the Day Property. As part of your answer, please state when the
sale occurred, to whom, the sale price, the particular parcel sold and whether the purchaser

PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
19807-001/915383
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS -18

000212

defaulted on the purchase. If the purchaser defaulted, please state whether and how much of the
purchase price you kept.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

See General Objections. Without

waiving any objections and subject to them, the Plaintiffs negotiated numerous purchase and
sale agreements, but eventually sold the Day Property to Craig Groves with Wirt Edmonds
(Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc.) for $10,010,000 on or about December 2, 2005. In or
about December, 2008, Groves and Edmonds defaulted on the purchase of the Day Property
during the economic downturn. Groves and Edmonds had paid approximately $4.9M of the
principal purchase price to the Plaintiffs, calculated as follows: $2.3M received before closing;
$973.5K received at closing; less $87.9K interest paid to the Plaintiffs' bank; and, $1.75M
principal received on Note post-closing from Edmonds/Groves. Plaintiffs also paid insurance,
attorney fees ($56,000), real estate taxes (approximately $48,757 for 2006-2017), title insurance
($20,000), thereby reducing the amount "kept" from the sale.
For additional information regarding the sale of the property, please see documents
produced herewith.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: For each expert identified by you in answer

to Interrogatory No. 3, above, please produce for inspection and copying each such expert's file
or files maintained in relation to this matter.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: See General Objections.

Plaintiffs further object that this Request seeks information that is protected under the attorney work
product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. Without waiving these objections and subject to

PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS -19
!9807-00! /9!5383
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EXHIBIT L
L
EXHIBIT

000214

Although the property has been valued for sale and purchase at various times throughout
the years, the Plaintiffs are not in possession of any other formal appraisal reports at this time.
For additional valuation information, please see documents produced herewith containing
various letters of intent to purchase, option agreements and proposed purchase and sale
agreements.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' experts will be preparing additional reports pertaining to the fair
market value of the property, which reports will be produced in accordance with the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and the orders of the Court.

INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please identify the date of valuation you are using in this
case to support your damage claims and whether the valuation applies to the Initial Day Property
or the Day Property.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

See General Objections.

Without

waiving any objections and subject to them, Plaintiffs believe that the actual date of the taking
may need to be ultimately determined by the Court; however, at this time it is Plaintiffs'
preliminary opinion that the taking took place between 1997 and 2016, with the earliest being at
the time of substantial completion of the Isaac's Canyon interchange. Further, it is Plaintiffs'
opinion that the date of valuation applies to both the Initial Day Property and the Day Property.
Discovery is ongoing and Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response in
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the orders of the Court.

INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please state your opinion as to the highest and best use of
the property as ofthe date of valuation and as part of your answer specify each fact relied upon in
support of your opinion.

PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS -14
!9807-00! /9!5383
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Electronically Filed
4/28/2017 11:06:52 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVE OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
State of Idaho
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON

)
: ss.
)

James Morrison, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON - 1

000216

1. I am employed by the District 3 office of the Idaho Transportation Department as a
Property Manager.
2. Part of my duties and responsibilities include maintaining files containing documents
relating to various Idaho Transportation Department highway projects, and I am
therefore making the following statements regarding such documents based on my
own personal knowledge.
3. Attached hereto are true and correct copies of the following documents that are public
records made at or near the relevant time, and created and maintained in the regularly
conducted course and practice of business activity:
a. Exhibit A: Plan sheets 29-32 and 34 from the 1967 Project 1-IG-SON-2(16)54.
b. Exhibit B: August 17, 1999 Idaho Transportation Department letter setting
forth completion dates for the 1967 Project 1-IG-SON-2(16)54.

Further your Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this~i~·day of

Apr:/

2017.

Property Manager, District 3
Idaho Transportation Department

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON- 2

000217

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22._ day of

A-f'r;/

2017.

SHONA TONKIN
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 9-16-21

SHONA TONKIN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

\CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

this21~ay of ~'l.A.\

2017, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601

~ iCourt Service
Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

0

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON- 3
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950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATION
DEFENSE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby move this Court for an order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment that:
•

the Property has no Direct Access to the public roads,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- Page 1
19807-001 I 943577.doc
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•

the State is liable for taking the Property's Direct Access to the public roads,
which must be justly compensated,

•

this taking occurred in 1997-98 at the completion of the Isaac Canyon
Interchange, and

•

the State has waived any defense related to the delay in bringing this inverse
condemnation action.

This Motion is supported by a Memorandum and an Affidavit of Donna Jacobs, filed
concurrently herewith. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this V7*day ofMay, 2017.

r I Loren K. Messerly
iffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

t /.f1-.-day of

~

, 2017, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt
Efile System which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
DATED this

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
~ Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

f]ncta_y ofMay, 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATION
DEFENSE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A. , hereby move this Court for an order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment that:
•

the Property has no Direct Access to the public roads,
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l9807-00I/943577.doc

000228

•

the State is liable for taking the Property's Direct Access to the public roads,
which must be justly compensated,

•

this taking occurred in 1997-98 at the completion of the Isaac Canyon
Interchange, and

•

the State has waived any defense related to the delay in bringing this inverse
condemnation action.

This Motion is supported by a Memorandum and an Affidavit of Donna Jacobs, filed
concurrently herewith. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

[/~ay of May, 2017.

r I Loren K. Messerly
iffs
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Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATION
DEFENSE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs" or the "Day Owners"), by and through their counsel
of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A ., hereby submit their Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of
Limitation Defense.
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I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE

This breach of contract and inverse condemnation litigation involves two adjoining
parcels of real property (approximately 300 acres, collectively the "Property") owned by the Day
family which cannot be developed at their highest and best use because of inadequate access to
the public roads. The State of Idaho, through its agencies and agents (collectively, the "State"),
created that inadequate access in 1997, when it relocated a frontage road within one mile of the
Property but failed to reestablish the required public road connection from that frontage road to
the Property. For the last two decades, the State has been trying to fix the Property's inadequate
access to the public roads, without success.
The Day family purchased a 160 acre parcel in 193 5 for future development. At that time,
a state public highway bisected the parcel, so the parcel could be accessed (getting onto and off
the parcel) directly from the public roads. A parcel's access to the public roads by way of
frontage on a public road or buildable right-of-way will be referred to herein as "Direct Access"
to the public road system. 1 Direct Access to the public roads is essential to developing large
parcels (like the 160 acres owned by the Day family) for their highest and best use.
In 1961, the State replaced the state highway with a controlled-access federal interstate, I80N. The State took the parcel's Direct Access rights to the state highway, but contracted (via a
1967 contract and warranty deed) to restore the parcel's Direct Access to the public roads
through a "future frontage road." As an initial step in developing this future frontage road, the
State acquired a 50 ft public right-of-way for the future frontage road and this public right-of-

1

In contrast, a parcel's access to the public roads via a private easement over other private
property, and without frontage on a public road or right-of-way, will be referred to herein as
"Indirect Access" to the public roads. A large parcel, like 160 or 300 acres, cannot be developed
for its highest and best use of a mixed use or residential development if its only access to the
public roads is via the Indirect Access of a private driveway.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
ACCESS AND WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- Page 2
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way bisected the Day family parcel. In 1979, the Day family bought a second parcel, adjoining
the first parcel, intending to jointly develop the two parcels, which would both have Direct
Access to the public roads through the future frontage road.
Thirty years later, in the late 1990s, development (the Isaac Canyon Interchange) and a
frontage road (Eisenman Road) finally came to the vicinity of the Property. The State obtained
public road easements for construction of a frontage road located less than a mile from the
Property; plus the State obtained public road easements connecting the frontage road, known as
Eisenman Road, to the Property, which ostensibly would continue the Property's Direct Access
to the public roads.
However, the connecting easements were too narrow, over too steep of terrain, and with
too sharp of turns to be usable for building an acceptable public road connecting Eisenman Road
with the Property. Even more problematic, the connecting easements were pointless because they
connected to Eisenman Road at a location (which we will call the "Green Gate") where no public
road was currently authorized to be built. In sum, after construction of the Isaac Canyon
Interchange, the Property no longer had Direct Access to the public roads through the future
frontage road, as had been promised and as had existed (in some form) since 1967.
The State soon recognized that the Property no longer had Direct Access to the public
roads because the connecting public road easements were unusable for a public right-of-way.
The State repeatedly tried to reconnect the Property's Direct Access to the public roads. The
State recognized that the Property could not be developed for its highest and best use as a mixed
use or residential development if it lacked Direct Access to the public roads. Based on the State's
explicit waiver of the statute of limitation and its repeated reassurances that this taking of Direct

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
ACCESS AND WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- Page 3
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Access was only temporary, the Day Owners patiently waited for the State to restore the
Property's Direct Access to the public roads.
In 2016, however, the Day Owners learned that no reconfiguration of the connecting
public road easements would work. ACHD stated that it would not allow a public road to be built
at the location of the State's public road easements, i.e. at the Green Gate. Therefore, the
Property has no Direct Access to the public roads and cannot be developed for its highest and
best use. The Day Owners were forced to bring this litigation to recover the Property's value
they lost when it lost Direct Access to the public roads.

II. FACTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Initial Parcel for Development, with Essential Direct Access to the Public Roads.
Day family members have been developers in the Treasure Valley for decades. (See

Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs, filed concurrently ("Jacobs Aff."),

~2.)

In 1935, they bought a

parcel of 160 acres of development property located on a beautiful plateau southeast of Boise,
with views to downtown Boise and the Foothills. (Jd.) The parcel was bisected by the main
highway (State Highway 30) heading in and out of the Treasure Valley. (Jd.,

~3,

Ex.A) There

were little or no rules controlling access to and from parcels with frontage on SH-30. (!d.,

~4)

The Day family's parcel had Direct Access to the public road system anywhere along its
approximately 1,000 feet of frontage on SH-30. (!d.)
B.

Interstate Taking of Direct Access to Public Roads and Replaced By Direct Access
to Future Frontage Road.
In 1961, the Day parcel's access to the public roads changed dramatically when the

federal interstate was built on top of SH-30. The federal interstate is controlled-access, meaning
the Day parcel had no access to that public road, despite its 1000 feet of frontage on the
interstate. The Day family sold their parcel's Direct Access rights to the State in exchange for
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
ACCESS AND WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- Page 4
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replacement access to the public roads from the southwest. The 1967 contract stated that the Day
parcel would have access from the "future frontage road and stock drive on the southwesterly
side of I-80N." (!d.

~6,

Ex.C.) This language was also recorded in a 1967 deed: "access to the

Future Frontage Road and Stock Drives on the Southwesterly side oflnterstate 80N." (!d. Ex.D.)
The parties understood that it would be some time before development and a "frontage
road" came to the vicinity of the Day parcel, so the 160 acres would have to wait for its public
road access to be finalized. In the meantime, the State provided a 50 foot wide public right-ofway as a place holder for the future frontage road. 2 (!d. ~8, Ex.G.) This undeveloped public rightof-way connected to the developed public roads, ran parallel to the Interstate for several miles
over rough and sometimes impassable land, and then apparently bisected the Day parcel.
(Id.)The public right-of-way provided the Day parcel with Direct Access to the public roads that
would someday be morphed into an actual constructed frontage road giving Direct Access to the
Day parcel.
C.

Abutting Parcel Depending on Same Promise of Access to Future Frontage Road.
Through the years, development and the frontage road moved closer to the Day family's

160 acres. In 1979, with an eye to these changes, the Day family bought another approximately
160 acres, directly adjacent to the first 160 acres, creating the combined approximately 300 acre
development Property. (!d.

~7.)

The existing, undeveloped public right-of-way (place holder for

the future frontage road) provided Direct Access to the public roads for both parcels. Once
constructed, the frontage road would provide Direct Access to the public roads for both parcels.

2

Even in 1961, the parties realized that there would be an additional interchange east of the
Gowen Road Interchange. (Jacobs Aff., Ex.B: "possible construction of an interchange, frontage
roads, and so forth".)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
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D.

Building of the Interchange and the State Tries But Fails to Provide the Promised
Public Road Access.
In the 1990s, development finally came to the doorstep of the Property. The State began

working on the new Isaac Canyon Interchange less than a mile from the Property. As part of the
project, the State decided upon the permanent location of the frontage road that would connect to
the Isaac Canyon Interchange. The State acquired the easement rights needed to build that
frontage road- Eisenman Road. (Jd.

~~12-13,

Ex.G.)

During the development of the Isaac Canyon Interchange, the Day family reminded the
State of its thirty-year old obligation to make sure the Property was restored to its Direct Access
to the public roads from this "future frontage road." (Jd.

~10.)

The State located the frontage road

within less than a mile of the Property but the frontage road did not connect to the Property
(there were two parcels in between Eisenman Road and the Property) so it alone did not provide
the Property with Direct Access to the public roads. (Id.

~11,

Ex.G.) Instead, the State acquired

two public road easements to connect Eisenman Road (from the Green Gate) to the Property,
ostensibly to provide a location for a public road that would restore the Property's Direct Access
to the public roads. (Id.

~~11-12,

Exs. E, F.)

The Day family recognized that these public road easements likely could not be used to
build a public road to restore the Property's Direct Access to the public roads. (Id

~13.)

The

width of the easements was inadequate, the terrain it passed over was impassable, and its path
and shape (e.g., dramatic 90 degree turns) was unworkable for a public road. (Id.) ACHD, the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
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public entity to whom the State had ceded control over these public roads, would never approve
a public road built on those public road easements. 3 (Id.)
In addition, in 1996, during the construction of the Isaac Canyon Interchange, the State
and ACHD agreed upon the locations for "approaches" on the new Eisenman frontage road. (!d.
,-r25-26, Exs. R, S.) An "approach" is a technical term for locations along Eisenman Road where
public roads could be built to branch off from Eisenman Road. Inexplicably, although the State
obtained public road easements branching off Eisenman Road at the Green Gate and connecting
to the Property, the State did not get ACHD to approve an approach at the location of the Green
Gate. (!d.) Without an approach at the Green Gate on Eisenman Road approved by ACHD, no
public road could be built, so the public road easements connecting Eisenman Road to the
Property were useless. (!d.) The State did not inform the Day family that the public road
easements had no approved "approach" on Eisenman Road. (Id.)
Thus, at the end of the construction of the Isaac Canyon Interchange in 1997-98, the
Property no longer had Direct Access to the public roads. Instead, though the frontage road was
less than a mile away, the Property's only connection to that public road was via an easement
over private property and that easement, for multiple reasons, could not actually be used to build
a connecting public road.

3

Single County-wide Highway Districts essentially have all the powers of other highway
districts plus the additional authority needed by virture of being "county-wide" and are governed
by a specific chapter in the Idaho Code, Chapter 14 ofTitle 40. Ada County Highway District
("ACHD") has exclusive jurisdiction over all the "county secondary and city highways" in Ada
County as provided in I.C. Section 40-1406. It has supplanted the authority of cities and counties
in Ada County pursuant to a vote of the electorate in 1971. Excluded from the ACHD' s
jurisdiction in Ada County are state highways and Federal highways. See
http://www .achdidaho .org/Departments/PR/A CHD_anniversary_history .aspx. Eisenman Road,
at that point where the parties contemplated an access would be provided to Eisenman Road, is
under the ACHD's exclusive authority and jurisdiction.
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E.

The State's Admission of Obligation to Return Public Road Access and Initial
Efforts to Provide that Access.
The State soon recognized that it had not met its obligation to restore and maintain the

Property's Direct Access to the public roads. The State began taking steps to try and remedy the
problem. During this process, the State repeatedly told the Day family that this access issue was
only temporary and was being resolved. (!d., '1[14.)
The State began working on widening and moving the location of the connecting public
road easements, in order to create easements where a public road could actually be built
connecting to the Property. (!d., '1[15.) In 1999 and 2000, the State widened the public road
easements from 50 feet to 60 feet and moved a portion of the easement. (!d., '1[16, Exs. J & K.)
However, the State admitted that the location of the easement was still inadequate to build a
public road that ACHD would approve:
The [Day family] is still questioning the adequacy of the easement from
Eisenman Road to the BLM property. This easement was acquired from the
Nicholsons [Aldecoa] and abuts the eastbound on-ramp for the interchange. The
problem being the terrain is so steep and sloping that ACHD will not approve any
public road access using the easement. I have met with ACHD's Traffic Engineer
and he confirms that the easement does not meet ACHD standards. Also, the
approach to Eisenman Road is at a right angle and does not meet ACHD
standards. . . . With the signing and recording of the easement from the BLM, the
eastern half of the problem appears to be resolved. The problem remains with the
easement through the Nicholson [Aldecoa] property.
(!d., '1[16, Ex. L.)

F.

The State Waives its Statute of Limitation Defense In Writing.
The State continued to work on the access issue and asked the Day family to be patient.

Specifically, on July 19, 2000, the State wrote,
I have had the opportunity to meet with lTD's District 3 management and
representatives from the Headquarter's Right-of-Way section on the access issues
involved with your clients.
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To provide you with some historical perspective, when these issues first arose and
the Department attempted to resolve the problem it was the portion of the
easement over the BLM land that the engineer's perceived to be the problem. The
portion of the new right-of-way easement seems to be resolved with the new
easement from the BLM. During that process, the Department obtained an
additional ten feet of right-of-way from the Nicholson's to increase the width of
the easement over the property from fifty feet to sixty feet. The problem appears
to be the easement over the Nicholson property. The property is over terrain with
contours too great to construct a frontage road or effectively use the easement for
ingress and egress.
lTD's District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way
Supervisor have gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and
how the easement can be relocated. I have not heard back from them at this point
in time. The District and the Headquarter's Right-of-Way Section are reviewing
funding sources in order to reach a solution to this problem. I would request that
you provide the Department an extension until September 5, 2000 or shortly
thereafter to be able to give you a firm proposal on a solution to this access issue.
I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some
type of proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent
to you that the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitation
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached.
(Id,

~17,

Ex. M, emphasis added.)

The Day family took the State at its word. (Id,

~18-19,

33-34.) They believed that the

taking of its Direct Access to the public roads was only temporary, that the State was taking the
issue seriously, and that the State had waived any statute of limitation defense until a new access
agreement was reached. (Id) With the new interchange, the property in the area was primed for
development. However, without Direct Access to the public roads, the Property could not be
developed for its highest and best use of mixed use or residential development. (Id,

~24.)

See,

e.g., State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972); Eagle
Sewer Dist. v. Hormaechea, 109 Idaho 418, 707 P.2d 1057 (Ct. App. 1985).
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G.

The State's On-Going Efforts to Address Access Issues and the Short-Lived Sale of
the Property.
The State was apparently "road blocked" in its efforts to fix the legal access issue. The

existing easements were inadequate for the construction of a public road that would meet the
existing ACHD standards, and the two property owners between Eisenman Road and the
Property would not agree to further changes to the easements. (!d.,

~19,

Exs. N, 0.)

In approximately 2004-05, the real estate market was extremely active. Despite the access
issues, the Day family was able to successfully market the Property for sale for $10,010,000.
(!d.,

~20.)

The winning bidder, Craig Groves, was aware of the access problems but understood

that this was merely a temporary issue that was being resolved by the State. (!d.) Groves
finalized his purchase of the Property in May 2006 and financed it with a promissory note and
mortgage to the Day Owners for $6,500,000. (!d.) After the market crashed, Groves executed a
contract in December 2008 returning the Property to the Day Owners. (!d.) With the failure of
the sale to Groves, the Day family returned to negotiating with the State regarding lack of access.

H.

Additional Efforts By the State to Fix Title Issues, Build the Public Road, and
Obtain an Approach.
The State renewed and continued its efforts to fix the access issue. In early 2010, the

State met with Pioneer Title that had identified seven different issues with legal access to the
Property and was refusing to insure legal access. (!d.,

~21,

Ex. P.) The State worked to resolve

these issues, and it continued to assure the Day family that it was working on solutions. The
State tried various approaches, e.g., negotiating with the two intervening property owners
regarding changes to the existing public road easements, negotiating with ACHD regarding the
construction of a public road on the existing road easements, and pricing the cost of building the
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public access road from Eisenman Road to the Property over various potential routes. (Id.,

~22,

Ex. Q.)
By 2014, the State still hoped that the existing public road easements could be utilized to
build the public road from Eisenman Road to the Property that would both satisfy ACHD and not
be blocked by the two intervening property owners. (Id.,

~~25-26,

Ex. R, S.) However, the State

had to fix the issue it created in 1996, i.e. not having an approved approach from Eisenman Road
onto the public road easements. (Id.) The State asked ACHD for an approach at the location of
the public road easements (the Green Gate):
Specific Request: lTD requests a temporary approach to Eisenman Road
at the location of the existing easement [the Green Gate]. lTD would be the
applicant for this approach. The requested approach location provides the Days
with an opportunity for development and ensures that the non-standard approach
can be eliminated with the regional development.
(Id., Ex. R.) ACHD denied the application, and the State continued to negotiate with ACHD and

with the Day family to find a solution. (ld.,
I.

~~27-28.)

The State Learns It Cannot Provide Public Road Access.

On May 16, 2016, ACHD made it clear that it would not accept an approach for a public
road at the Green Gate, the location of the existing road easements:
To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a public street between the
off ramp and the future Lake Hazel/Eisenman intersection ....
(ld.,

~~29-30,

Ex. V.)

With this final pronouncement from ACHD, the State learned that it would never be able
to provide a public street from Eisenman Road to the Property at the location that the State
intended and had been trying to utilize since 1997. Even if the road easements from Eisenman
Road to the Property were sufficient for a public road for development of the Property (i.e. wide
enough and level enough and with manageable turns, which they are not), the road easements
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still cannot be used to build a public road because ACHD will not approve a public road at that
location.
Following ACHD's firm and final denial of the public road, the State did not suggest any
new alternative for restoring the Property's Direct Access to the public roads. (!d., ,-r,-r31-32.) The
1997 "temporary" taking of the Property's Direct Access to the public roads was now permanent.
Therefore, the Property's only access to Eisenman Road and the public road system is via a mile
long private easement (that is not even insurable access) that is wholly inadequate to develop the
Property for its highest and best use. The Day Owners were forced to file this lawsuit.

III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." "The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party."
However, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 383 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2016) (internal citations

omitted). Additionally, the "moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case .... " Silicon Int'l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 544, 314 P.3d 593, 599 (2013)
(internal citation omitted).
In inverse condemnation cases, all issues other than just compensation are resolved by the
Court as the trier of fact. See, e.g., Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828,
831 (2002) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1979), for the legal holding that
"all issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial court, except the issue
of what is just compensation"); see also State v. Hi Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 337,282 P.3d
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595, 598 (2012) ("The issues ofthe nature ofthe property interest alleged to have been taken and
whether a taking has occurred are questions of law."); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho
851, 853 P.2d 596,602 (Ct. App. 1993) ("all issues, whether legal or factual, other than just
compensation, are for resolution by the trial court").
Where the Court will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325,
17 P .3d 266, 269 (2000); see also Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr.,
147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009) (When ... the action will be tried before the court
without a jury, however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts.").

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
The Day Owners bring this motion to address several preliminary issues related to their
claim of inverse condemnation (rather than their contract claims). They ask the Court to rule that
(1) the Property has no Direct Access to the public roads, (2) the State is liable for taking the
Property's Direct Access to the public roads, which must be justly compensated, (3) this taking
occurred in 1997-98 at the completion of the Isaac Canyon Interchange, and (4) the State has
waived any defense related to the delay in bringing this inverse condemnation action.

A.

The Property Does Not Have Direct Access to the Public Roads.
As a starting point, it should be indisputable that the Property lacks Direct Access to the

public roads, i.e. there is no public road (or even a usable easement to build a public road)
connecting the Property to the public road system. Without Direct Access to the public roads, the
300 acre Property cannot be developed for its highest and best use as a residential or mixed use
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development located on a plateau with views of the Boise downtown and Foothills. The Day
Owners ask the Court to make the factual finding that the Property has no Direct Access to the
public roads.
The crucial facts are all indisputable. ACHD is the authority for where public roads can
be built. (Jacobs Aff.,

~23,

26, Ex. R.) In 2016, ACHD confirmed that no public road (no

"approach") will be approved at the Green Gate. (Id,

~~29-30,

Ex. V.) The Green Gate is the

location where the State has obtained public road easements for the public road that was intended
to connect to the Property. The State has no other easements or plans for how the public roads
will connect to the Property. 4 (Id, ~31.)
Thus, it cannot be disputed that currently, and since at least 1997 when the State turned
over control of Eisenman Road to ACHD without obtaining an approved approach at the Green
Gate, the Property has no Direct Access to the public roads. The Day Owners ask the Court to
make that factual finding.

B.

The State Took the Property's Public Road Access, A Compensable Taking.
Direct Access to the public roads is a valuable property right. It is particularly valuable in

this instance where the Property is a beautiful plateau, with views of the Boise downtown. (Id,
~~2,

7, 23-24.) The highest and best use of this 300 acre Property is unquestionably as a mixed

use or residential development. Direct Access to the public roads is essential to developing the
Property for its highest and best use. (!d) Here, the State took the Property's Direct Access to the
public roads. (See supra, Part IV.A.)

4

Even if ACHD were to belatedly approve an approach at the Green Gate, the State's public
road easements from the Green Gate to the Property are unusable for the construction of a public
road to develop the Property at its highest and best use.
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Access to a public way is a property right and the taking of a substantial access right is a
taking of a property right that requires just compensation. See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,
291-96, 328 P.2d 397, 399-402 (1958) (impairment of a right of access constituted a "taking of
property"); see also State v. Hi Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 337-41, 282 P.3d 595, 598-602
(2012) ("We have long held that access to an adjacent public way-even in the absence of an
expressly deeded right-is one of the incidents of land ownership, the taking of which may
require compensation."); Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 41-44, 855 P.2d 876, 87881 (1993) ("a right of access is a property right which can be the basis for an inverse
condemnation claim") Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266,
269 (2000) ("This Court has recognized the right of a property owner to access a public way is a
vested property right appurtenant to the land abutting the public way in question, and that an
unreasonable limitation upon such a right may constitute a taking requiring compensation.").
Access comes in various forms. Property can have access to the public roads through
frontage on a developed public road (with access to that road and the type of road having many
varieties as well). Property can have access to the public roads through frontage on an
undeveloped public right-of-way or easement. Property can have access to the public roads only
through a private easement over other properties. These are all different types of access and the
type of access greatly impacts how the property can be developed.
Until construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, the Property always had Direct
Access to the public roads, i.e. frontage access on and off a developed public road or an
undeveloped public road easement/right-of-way. From 1935, when the Day family bought the
first 160 acre parcel, till 1961, the Property had Direct Access to SH-30 that bisected the parcel.
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(See supra, Part II. A -C.) From 1961-1996, the Property had Direct Access to the public roads

through the place holder public right-of-way that was planned to bisect the Property. (Id.)
However, with the construction of the Isaac Canyon Interchange, the place holder public
right-of-way was replaced with an actual frontage road that did not bisect the Property. (See
supra, Part II.D-1.) The State not only failed to obtain an approach but also failed to obtain

workable public road easements from the frontage road that could be used to build a road
connecting directly to the Property. (Id.) Thus, the Property no longer has Direct Access to the
public road system. (Id.) Rather, it has some lesser form of access to the public roads through an
easement over two intervening parcels. (Id.) This lesser access has dramatically lessened the
value of the Property because this access is insufficient to be able to develop the Property for its
highest and best use. (Id.) This private easement access is wholly inadequate to serve a 300 acre
development. (Id.)
Certainly, this case involves a compensable taking of access. The Property had Direct
Access to the public roads and now the Property does not. The State took this Direct Access by
constructing the Interstate and Interchange in the area and failing to restore and/or maintain the
Direct Access. The Day Owners ask the Court to find that this is a compensable taking of access.
See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,291-96,328 P.2d 397, 399-402 (1958) (impairment of a right

of access constituted a "taking of property").
C.

The Taking Occurred In 1997, Though It Was Not Known to Be Permanent Until
2016.
The date of a taking is 1997-98, at the end of the construction of the Isaac Canyon

Interchange. See C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194
(2003) (project completion rule); Farber v. Slate, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981) (same).
As discussed above, at the end of the construction project, the Property no longer had a public
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right-of-way that directly connected to the Property and therefore provided Direct Access to the
public roads. (See supra, Part II.D-1.) At the end of the construction project, the location and
legal right-of-way for the (no longer future) frontage road had been established within 1 mile of
the Property, but the Property did not have Direct Access to that frontage road or any other
public road. (!d.) Thus, the end of the construction is the date of the taking (though it would be
two decades before the parties learned that this taking was permanent, rather than temporary).
D.

The State Has Waived Any Defense Related to Delay In Bringing This Lawsuit.
Parties aware of potential liability are able to contract to waive the statute of limitation, in

order to avoid potentially unnecessary litigation while they try to work out their issues. A waiver
of a legal right, like a statute of limitation, is enforceable like any contract. See, e.g., AgStar Fin.
Servs., ACA v. Nw. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 161 Idaho 801,391 P.3d 1271 (2017) ("This Court has
consistently held that freedom of contract is 'a fundamental concept underlying the law of
contracts and is an essential element of the free enterprise system.'"); Tipton v. Partner's Mgmt.
Co., 773 A.2d 488, 490 (Md. 2001) ("Any statute of limitations can be waived by agreement of
the parties."); Hughes v. Davidson-Hues, 330 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) ("By
comparison, the statute of limitations generally extinguishes contractual rights at a certain date,
but parties can agree to waive application of the statute."); see also Kugler v. Nw. Aviation, 108
Idaho 884, 886-87, 702 P .2d 922, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that a statute of limitation is an
affirmative defense that can even be waived if not timely raised);
Here, the communications from the State make clear that the State understood that, at a
minimum, it had potential liability to the Day family because the Property did not have public
road access to Eisenman frontage road after 1997. (See supra, Part II.E.) By written
communication in July 2000, the State indicates that it is working on resolving the issue by
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agreement with Day family and the State explains that it is waiving the statute of limitation
indefinitely while the parties try to reach that agreement:
lTD's District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way
Supervisor have gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and
how the easement can be relocated. I have not heard back from them at this point
in time. The District and the Headquarter's Right-of-Way Section are reviewing
funding sources in order to reach a solution to this problem. I would request that
you provide the Department an extension until September 5, 2000 or shortly
thereafter to be able to give you a firm proposal on a solution to this access issue.
I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some
type of proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent
to you that the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitation
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached.
(See supra, Part II.F.)

The statute of limitation waiver is clear and it was relied upon by the Day family, to the
detriment of the Day family and to the benefit of the State. For the next two decades, the Day
family relied upon that waiver. The Day family communicated with the State about the issue
repeatedly during that period and not once did the State indicate that it was terminating the
waiver. By providing this waiver, the State obtained two decades of opportunity to fix the legal
access issue without litigation and possibly without paying any damages. At any time, the State
could have withdrawn the waiver and started the clock on the statute of limitation; however, the
State preferred having the time and opportunity to avoid litigation. The Day family was
exceedingly patient.
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The State, as a matter of law, must be held to its waiver. Any taking or contract claim that
existed as of the date of the waiver, June 7, 2000, is not barred by any statute of limitation
defense because the State unequivocally waived its right to raise that defense. 5

V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the forego ing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue an order
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that ( l ) the Property has no Direct
Access to the public roads, (2) the State is liable for taking the Property's Direct Access to the
public roads, which must be justly compensated, (3) this taking occurred in 1997-98 at the
completion of the Isaac Canyon Interchange, and (4) the State has waived any defense related to
the delay in bringing this inverse condemnation action.
DATED this m a y of May, 2017.
KER 0BERRECHT P.A.

5

In addition, the State always portrayed the access issue as only temporary and something they
would soon fix. The Day Owners did not Jearn that the taking was permanent until 2016,
retroactive to 1997-98, and has brought a claim for that permanent taking well within the four
year statute of limitation.
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correct copy of the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt
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Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
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5/18/2017 11:13:39
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Loren K. Messerly, ISB #7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY
JACOBS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF
STATUTE OF LIMITATION
DEFENSE

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Donna Day Jacobs, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am a Plaintiff and a co-owner of the two parcels of real property, totaling

approximately 300 acres (the "Property"), at issue in this lawsuit.
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2.

The Day family members have been developers in the Treasure Valley for many

decades. In 1935, my grandfather and grandmother purchased the first parcel of approximately
160 acres. I am very familiar with this parcel, have been on it countless times and have reviewed
the title documents from the purchase. These 160 acres are located on a plateau southeast of
Boise that has views of the city and the foothills to the north and west.
3.

I have reviewed numerous maps ofthe area from the time period of 1935-1961.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of one such map that shows the location of the
property, and the location of the main highway heading in and out of the Treasure Valley, State
Highway 30 ("SH-30"). The map shows that the 160 acres were bisected by SH-30 and that the
160 acres had approximately 1000 feet of frontage with SH-30 on both sides ofthe highway.
4.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, my father would take me and my siblings to the

Property via SH-30. We were able to exit SH-30 and directly access the Property virtually
anywhere along the entire 1000 feet of frontage. There was no curb or barrier that impeded
accessing our Property at any place along the entire 1000 foot frontage with SH-30.
5.

After graduating from the University of Oregon and working for a local bank, I

became involved with the family business of property development beginning in approximately
1976 and began working full-time in the family business in 1993.
6.

I became well aware of the details of our ownership of the 160 acres and our

future plan to develop or sell it as soon as Boise expanded and development came to that area. I
also have reviewed the contracts and deed that were signed in the 1960s when the federal
Interstate was built and access to the Property was changed from access through SH-30 to access
through the future frontage road. Attached as Exhibits B, C, and D are those contracts and deed.
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7.

I was also involved in the discussions in 1979 regarding purchasing an adjoining

parcel of approximately 160 acres, abutting the first parcel that our family had purchased in 1935.
We purchased the second parcel so that we could develop the two parcels together, consisting of
approximately 300 acres, jointly, as one large development. Having the larger combined acreage
opened up significantly more options for developing the Property and maximizing the value of
the Property for development.
8.

I am aware of the 50 foot frontage road right-of-way that was planned for the

Property in approximately 1960, as part of the construction of the new Interstate highway. After
the Interstate was built, we used part of it occasionally to access the Property, though it was
basically impassible for the last 1.5 miles. For the last 1.5 miles, we had to cross our property via
Jeep trails or by foot, walking more than a mile.
9.

I was very involved in our family's development business in the 1990s when the

state of Idaho ("State") was developing the new Isaac's Canyon Interchange. I was a participant
in virtually all of the many communications with the State regarding the need to ensure that this
project would result in the Property being restored to its frontage or direct access to the public
roads, like it had been prior to 1961.

From 1997 forward, I was the Day Family member

primarily responsible for negotiating with the State and trying to sell or develop the Property.
10.

We reminded the State of its thirty-year old obligation to make sure the Property

was restored to its access to the public roads from the "future frontage road." We were assured
that this new frontage road was developed in a way to restore our Property's frontage access to
the public roads.
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11.

As part of the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, the State did not

actually build a public road restoring frontage access to our Property. The State also did not
locate the frontage road (Eisenman Road) such that it connected to the Property. At present the
closest public road, Eisenman Road, is approximately one-half mile away.
12.

Instead, in approximately 1996 the State obtained public road easements for both

the frontage road near our Property and for a secondary road leading from the frontage road to
our Property.

Thus, the State had ostensibly obtained easements to build a public road to

reconnect directly (i.e. with frontage) our Property with the public roads. Attached as Exhibits E
and F are true and correct copies of the public road easements that the State obtained.
13.

Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a document showing the

location of the new Interchange, the original place holder right-of-way that paralleled the
Interstate but was eliminated by the Interchange, the new easements for construction of the new
Eisenman frontage road extension, and the easements that the State obtained from Eisenman
Road to the Property. When we were shown these public road easements, we recognized that
they could never be used to build a public road because they were too narrow, had too severe of
slopes, and had too severe of turns. We communicated those concerns to the State and pointed
out that they had promised to provide frontage access to the public roads from our Property, not a
public road easement where no road was possible to be built. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and
correct copy of one of these communications, a letter dated December 12, 1997 from my brother,
Ben Day, to the State.
14.

Initially, the State responded that they owed us nothing more than the public road

easements that they had provided. However, shortly thereafter, in response to our continued
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efforts, the State admitted that it needed to fix the access so that the road easements were in
locations where a public road could actually be built that would meet current Ada County
Highway District ("ACHD") road standards.
15.

I was aware of the efforts by the State to change the route of the road easements

and widen them, so as to create a public road access that was actually usable, i.e. where a public
road could be built to connect the Property to the frontage road and allow development of the
Property. The State's recognition of this responsibility is evidenced by the State's letter to
ACHD of April 7, 2000 which it acknowledged that "some of the new right-of-way did not
provide the same level of access as was provided in the original right-of-way established in
1967." Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of that letter.
16.

I was aware of the new easement obtained in January, 1999, whereby the State

widened the public road easement over the neighboring Aldecoa parcel (which was acquired by
Nicholson and Yanke) located between the Day Property and Eisenman Road, from 50 ft. to 60
ft. I was aware of the new easement in April, 2000, whereby the State negotiated for a new 60 ft.
wide road easement across the neighboring BLM parcel in a new location over terrain that was
intended to satisfy ACHD's public road requirements. Attached as Exhibit J and K are true and
correct copies of these referenced easements. We told the State that these changes were not
sufficient, and it was still impossible to build a public road reconnecting the Property to the
public roads and restoring the Property's frontage on a public road.
17.

As a follow up on all of the efforts that the State was taking to try and fix the

public road access that it had promised, the State sent my attorney a letter dated July 19, 2000
that stated it was waiving the statute of limitation. The letter stated:
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I have had the opportunity to meet with lTD's District 3 management and
representatives from the Headquarter's Right-of-Way section on the access issues
involved with your clients.
To provide you with some historical perspective, when this issue first
arose and the Department attempted to resolve the problem it was the portion of
the easement over the BLM land that the engineer's perceived to be the problem.
The portion of the new right-of-way easement seems to be resolved with the new
easement from the BLM. During that process, the Department obtained an
additional ten feet of right-of-way from the Nicholson's to increase the width of
the easement over the property from fifty feet to sixty feet. The problem appears
to be the easement over the Nicholson property. The property is over terrain with
contours too great to construct a frontage road or effectively use the easement for
ingress and egress.
lTD's District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way
Supervisor have gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and
how the easement can be relocated. I have not heard back from them at this point
in time. The District and the Headquarter's Right-of-Way Section are reviewing
funding sources in order to reach a solution to this problem. I would request that
you provide the Department an extension until September 5, 2000 or shortly
thereafter to be able to give you a firm proposal on a solution to this access issue.

I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some
type of proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent
to you that the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitation defense
if an agreement on new access cannot be reached. (Emphasis added.)
Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of the referenced letter the State sent to
our attorney.
18.

We (myself and my family members named as co-Plaintiffs who also had

ownership in the Property) agreed to not file a lawsuit while the State continued to work on
fixing the public road access issue. I relied on the State's efforts because the State repeatedly
said that it had an obligation to restore the Property's direct/frontage access to the public roads
(i.e. to the Eisenman frontage road), the State had tried to fulfill that obligation, the State

AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY JACOBS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- 6
19807-001 I 943586_2.doc

000256

admitted that its first and second attempts to fulfill the obligation had not been sufficient, and the
State stated that it was still working on the issue.
19.

In 2000, the State did try to get ACHD to confirm that it was technically feasible

to build a public road on the existing 60 ft. wide public road easements that connected to the
Property. I was also aware of the response from ACHD in 2001 stating that it was not clear if
the proposed road would or could meet ACHD standards. Attached as Exhibits N and 0 are the
road designs and the response from ACHD. We knew the State was still working to fix the issue.
Without the danger of a statute of limitation defense and thinking that the lack of access was
only a temporary problem, we were willing to postpone any litigation regarding access.
20.

In late 2004 and early 2005, the real estate market in the Treasure Valley was very

active and strong.

Thus, despite the access issues, the Property drew a lot of interest. We

obtained three bids to purchase the Property. The winning bid was $10,010,000 from a local
developer, Craig Groves. He indicated that he was aware of the access problems but he also
believed the State was in the process of fixing the access issue and that it would shortly be
resolved. Groves finalized his purchase of the Property in May, 2006, but he still owed
$6,500,000 for the purchase, secured by a mortgage on the Property, to be paid in two equal
installments on April 1, 2007, and April 1, 2008.

The market crashed in 2008 and on

December 4, 2008, Groves executed a contract returning the Property to the Day family in
exchange for a release of his debt obligations and mortgage. Thus, during these approximately
five years from 2004-2008, we remained aware ofthe State's efforts, but were not as involved in
resolving the pending access issue with the State because the Property had been purchased by
Craig Groves.
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21.

Following Mr. Groves' default and after taking the Property back from him, we

attempted to obtain title insurance on the Property. We were unable to get title insurance to
insure access. Thus, not only did we not have legal access to the public road system and the
public road easements the State provided were inadequate to build a public road to the Property,
but Pioneer Title Insurance Company determined that the public road easements were not even
sufficient to provide insurable access to the Property. Pioneer Title pointed out seven different
issues with viable and marketable title as evidenced by Pioneer Title's report attached (in
relevant part) as Exhibit P to my Affidavit.
22.

The State kept us updated on its additional efforts to work on the access issue,

including its efforts to address the title company's concerns. The State did try to obtain access
over the lands owned by the two property owners who owned the real property separating
Eisenman Road from the Property. Attached as Exhibit Q is an email dated January 29, 2010
that describes some ofthe efforts that the State was taking to try and work out access issues with
these property owners. The State admits in the email that as of the construction of the Isaac's
Canyon Interchange, there was no legal access to the Property and no insurable title for access to
the Property.
23.

As a member of the Day Family and as one of the family members primarily

responsible for developing and managing our family's business and properties, I became well
acquainted with what is required to develop property in the Treasure Valley in terms of
governmental approvals from Boise City, Ada County and the ACHD. My experience included
development of our family's property in the foothills, commonly known as Northridge
Subdivisions, the Crest at Northridge 1-3, and the sale to third parties of other foothills property
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the family owned, commonly known as Terra Nativa Subdivision. We also sold the previously
acquired Gem Noble Building, redeveloped and completely remodeled the Vista Village
Shopping Center, and developed the final phase of the Boise Industrial Park. I am currently in
the process of developing seven acres adjoining the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way behind
Vista Village, commonly known as Station Village Apartments.

From these experiences, I

learned about and became familiar with the governmental requirements and impositions on
property as part of the development process. Among the governmental approvals required, most
important in Ada County, is the approval required to connect private property to a public street
or to add new or additional driveways, streets or connections to an existing public street,
commonly known as an "approach," as was the case with the approval needed by the State, on
behalfofthe Day Family, to obtain the ACHD's approval of public access to the Day Property.
24.

Based on my experience in development and management of the Day Family

properties and my experience with the subject property, in my opinion (a) the highest and best
use of the Property is now, and has been, at least since 1997, for development as a mixed use or
residential property, and (b) the Property cannot be developed to its highest and best use without
the direct public road access that was promised by the State.
25.

Pioneer Title told the State that Pioneer Title would reqmre a public road

successfully constructed connecting Eisenman Road to the Property before Pioneer Title would
agree to insure access to the Property. I was then aware of the efforts that the State was taking to
prepare to build that road and resolve the issue. For example, in February, 2014 the State
submitted an application for an "approach" at the location of where the public road easements
connected to Eisenman Road. The State's application acknowledged that there was no way to
AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY JACOBS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: ACCESS AND WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE- 9
19807-00I/943586_2.doc

000259

access these road easements without this approach. The State's application further admitted that
the Property could not be developed without this "approach." The State's application to ACHD
admitted that the State had given ACHD the full authority over where to place an approach.
Attached hereto as Exhibit R is a true copy of the State's application for an approach.
26.

One of the exhibits to the application for an approach was an agreement between

ACHD and the State from 1996. The agreement was about locations for "approaches" on the new
Eisenman frontage road. Inexplicably, although the State obtained public road easements
branching off Eisenman at the Green Gate and connecting to the Property, the State did not get
ACHD to approve an approach at the location of the Green Gate. This meant that no one could
build a public road at the location that the State had been trying to use as our access. The State
had never advised me that it lacked an approach for our public access road to the Property and
that ACHD had total control over whether to allow a new approach for our access road. Attached
as Exhibit S is a copy of the agreement from 1996.
27.

ACHD staff disapproved the lTD's application for an approach and the State filed

an appeal. The State withdrew the appeal.

A true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

T.

28.

While the State was still apparently negotiating with ACHD, the State offered me

and my fellow owners of the Property a lump sum of $560,000 in order to build a public road
over the public road easements to connect the Property and Eisenman Road. We declined the
offer for numerous reasons, including the fact that the approach to Eisenman Road did not exist,
the intervening land owners could potentially sue to stop construction based on the potentially
inadequate easements obtained by the State back in 2000, the width, terrain, and turning angles
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of the easement were insufficient to allow construction of an adequate public road to serve the
Property, and the $560,000 was too little for the actual construction. Attached as Exhibit U is a
copy of the letter from my attorney declining the offer. The State and the Day Family fully
explored the possibility for a "shared access" with neighboring property owners, but those
neighbors flatly refused to participate or grant us the right to access our Property via those
neighboring properties.
29.

The State continued to negotiate with ACHD through 2015 regarding solutions

for the public road access to the Property. Finally, however, on May 16, 2016, I received an
email that confirmed that ACHD was not going to help the State fix the problem that it created
back in 1997. ACHD stated that it would not be allowing an approach or a public road at the
location of the public road easements. Attached as Exhibit V to my Affidavit is a true and
correct copy of the email exchange.
30.

ACHD's email stated, "To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a

public street between the off ramp and the future Lake Hazel/Eisenman Road intersection which
is approximately 1800-feet from the [Green Gate]." (Ex. V.)
31.

Based on the State's failed effort before the ACHD and Mr. Inselman's email, we

understood that there was nothing more they could or would do to provide public road access for
the Property. The State did not suggest any new alternative for restoring public road access for
the Property.
32.

Thus, despite what were apparently the State's best efforts, the Property currently

has no public road access.
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33.

Since 2000, when we received the letter from the State saying that it would waive

the statute of limitation if a resolution was not found for the lack of access, we relied upon that
promise and did not bring a lawsuit. We also were reassured dozens of times over the years that
the taking of our access in 1997 was only temporary and thus we would get our access back. So,
on the basis of those promises, we did not file a lawsuit until those promises were shown to be
hollow or incorrect.
34.

In all of our conversations with the State since 2000, the State never indicated that

it was withdrawing its waiver of the statute of limitation defense, the State always discouraged us
from bringing litigation, and until 2016 we deferred filing suit and awaited the State's
performance.
FURTHER, your affiant saith naught.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

~~y of May, 2017, a true and correct copy ofthe

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
DATED this

0
0
0
0

C8J

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
EmailliCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

rtf1fay of May, 2017.
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AGREEMENT

i't-US AORTO:EMEl'l"'l', made and .ante red into this I 7
of

/V.1

v ¢- ·111 j c ,..

lk tlay

, 1961, by and between EMMA N. DAY,

a widow, and BRNES'l'

E:.

fJ.A Y, ROBERT L. DAY aar; DONALD M.

DAY, each of Boise, ldaho, hereinafter ,;ailed the

Own~-;;·s

and th("

ST.ATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, hereinafter called
the Dcrarunent,

Wl'fNh-:SSETH:

WHEREAS, the Owner8 hold title to th<> NE l/4 of
Se.::tion 19, Tow,1ship 2. North, Range 3 J::::ast, B. M., approximately
nine a.:rea of whieh, along with related ac.cess rights, are believad
by the Department to he required in connection with the construction

of lnter6tate Highway BON under the terma of Highway ':='reject No.
I~BON-2:(3)61;

and
WHEREAS, said Project terminates a 9hort

di,tan.~e

north of the Ow11ers 1 property and plana have not yet been formulated
for the construction of the next (northerly) section o£ Interstate
Highway BON; and

WHEREAS, the partiell are unable at present to nego.liate reasonably for the purcnaae of said nine acrel!l, together with
access righta by the Department because of uncertainty in the Depart•

ment as to tne character of future construction plans concerning the
next section of the h.ighway;-''·and further the effect theJ:'eof on the
Owr~ers'

property l'ighll>, such future construction will have a. direct

bearing on any !JUrchase price, and the vahle of the rights acquired
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irom :)vmerfl, :)arlicul.arly in :caga.rd to the po8sible construction of ar.
interchange, frontage roads, and so forth; and
WHEREAS, the Department is desi ron£- of entering into

higlw1ay •2LllJ!!tructior:

pro~ram

at•e willina to rH:rn•it pos!lession by the

Oepat·tmenl" in a;:;cor,tance with the following:

follow;,.
l'he Ovn!<Or'c' ;;ti;-'ulale that \:he ')e»artment may take
po~;session

of the following described property fot· highway constJ:uc-

tion i•ll1"[1Dses aE.

~Love set

forth:

!•. ,)iil'cel of land being O>l both siciec of th.~

east and west bound lanes survey center lines
of Interstato BON, Project No. I··BON-2(3)61
Highway Survey as shown on the plan11 thereof
now on file in the office of the Deparh"!Jer:.t
of Highways of the State of Idaho, and 1ying
over and acroos theE: 1/2 NZ 1/4 of Sedion
19, Townahip 2 North, Range 3 East, };,oise
Meridian, described ns follow~, to wit:

Beginning at a point in the north J.ine oi
Section 19, Township Z North, Range 3 East,
B. M. which point ia 1197.86 feet weB'.:erl.y
from the north.east corne1· of said Section 19,
thence Southeasterly along a line parallel
with and 100.0 feet Southwesterly from the East
Bound lane center line of said Interstate SON,
Pz·oject No. I·80N<l(3)61 Highway Survey, being
a:! 11559. 16 foot radius curve left, a distance
of 59. 0 feet, more or less, to a point that
bears South 51037'53" West 100. 0 feet f:tom
said east bound lane survey c:enter line Station
484+62. 14; thence Soutn 380ZZ'07" East along
said parallel line a distance of 1 B6l. 59 feet
to a point in the eaat line of said Secti011 19,
which point beal"e South 51°37'53" West 100.0
feet from eallt bound lane ~urvey .Station
503123. 73; thence Northerly along said eaat
line a distanc" of 685.0 feat, mo1·e or l.2se, to

-2-
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a ;)oint in the Nvri:iu,<t~terly right of v::2y
line of present U. S. Highway No. 30, 2.6 &
2.0 a2 .iea,~ribecl in that certain dght oi way
Jeed dated June 29, 1936, rr~.:orded July 2,
1';136, in the records of .Ada Gounty, 1~';-;,ho
iu Book 217 of Deeds at page 424; thence
Northwesterly along l'laid pretcent high'~'2Y
right of way line a distance of 1130. 0 feet,
more or less, to?. ~~oint in the north line of
said Section 19; thence we ate rl.y along aa.id
north linP. 425.0 feet, more. or let>f, tc· 01e
;-,oint of Beginning.
·8aE<t r1our!d Lar.e Survey Station Refe;:ance:
484+83. 03 to SOl i95. 69

The area abcve des,~ribed containo iln:;:':'oxi.mately 13. 4Z acres, 4, 43 acres of which is
acknowledged to be a nortlon of e p11blic ·eoail.
l~'urther,

both

side<~

Hll

a.cceS!l

rights from Owr..e?.·rc' property

of the oresent U. S. Highway 30 t.o U.

~.

t)ll

E:\ghway 30 and

to Inten1tate Highway llON an constructed and all easements of access

to, from and between Owners' rroperty as divided by c;,id

highway~

shall he waived and extinguished wiHll'e the rroneL·ty a·cu.ts Ltpo·,:
said highways.
It is further agreed that the

Departr.1cn·~

sh!Ll! determine

its final plane: with reaped to Ownerfl' property w!.th.in a reasonable
period of time consistent with the

com~lexity

of the pwject, ancl will,

upon such determination, nE\gotiate in good faith with O,,vne:.:s, to the
end that Owner!! will receive a fair and 1·easonable pri:e for the
e1·ty

BO

acquired, including severance damage.e if

an~··

prop~

Nothing herein

snall be so construed ae to deprive Owners of any rights which they
may have as provided by law, to fairly compensate them fen· eucl1
damage as they may suffer by reaoon of such taking and by reason of
these presents.

-3·
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:\ PPi-tOVE!.) AS
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F'DR.tvi:

Ri::COMMF~NDl~iJ:

i"·,
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i r
-,J!t-'::lvi 1 . '
\

~·nviaion·
. I

Head
OWNERS:
;:::.

:::.

h
""::--"'---or-l-

'--y'

- 7!4--=..-<.'
/

.

.

. '·

--LL-·- 1-·_...:.__:__:_:...t_ ______

~;·r·xr;~

.:);:

IDP.i:JfJ)
) IHL

·~:L,lll1t.~·

of /!.:·:a

)

thid,l'':l~~ay

J'~qfi.f.r!f ~.;j:c-;;

On
of
, 1961, he fore me,
tbe undersigned, a Notary Public in and for ,,aid State, •Jersonally appeared
G. BRYC:E BENt-lETT, l.;:nown to me tl> Le r,!,,~ SLat~ High''-'"'-Y Et.gineer of
the Idaho Department of Highways whose narrH~ is t<ubs·c:!'ibed to the within
i;.~>trumeut, and adtnowledg;ed tom~ that he ,,Jwc·r.rted ~:~;e 5ame ae euch
f-:'tate H tghway ~nginee r.

affb,ed llll'
written.

H·l WITNESS VIHI<.~REOf, 1 have ho::reurrt.t~ Get my hand an-:1
C<eal 1:he <iay c.w: vea:r in this certiiic~te first above

offi.::i~.l

~

.--~~-

/'

·/

_

..

~

(

1
\
k-;-;::~/
\ __ ':!--~t~~
~~ . . ~·-.o-·

!

r . . ;. . f· ·. . ~

~·· \4~-

N-ot<J.i"Y Public fo:.- Idaho
ae~idr-~n::r:.:
Boie0, Idaho

DAY00006
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C)n. thit:. ___,~·de::.y of

/ (~i

/

,,.

, 1~61, before

111e,

lhe under,.;:igu~dJ a ~L.Jtary L'.Jutli;:_ '"{fJ and ior oe!-id State, ~ereon.ally appeared
EMMA N. Dl~Y, ERN£81' E. DAY, ROBERT I.. Dl\Y <o.nd DON,lLD M. DAY
kth}Vh-, to ;:_":.e t.o be the ~~-~l·f;on~ -..vho:_e r1an1o~ a 1'.;: su~!J:.:i'ibed to the \vithin
instrLln:H~lii:,

2.l'ld ackrllY.;vledged to

11'--!
:~dii.x.st.i

11"!}

VVIT!\ll!~SS

Gfii~:ic.~J.

;5.::al

th~!

n:H~

that ·c.hey

~xel~ttt:ed

the sarne.

·vv·H}:;£tSOlt', I h.av(~ herEo·l1.ntc: set rny l1ari:J an<1
:.tay ~\nJ ys:z.1 irl tt·~~ll -~~rtiii~;_3.tS fi:i.:st abofra

\V.i"itte·u.

DAY00007
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EXHIBIT C
000273

.t'rOJ ect

Parcel No.

I-SON-2(3)61

2

THIS AGREEMENT~ Made this ~.day of
October
, 19_it, between
the STATE OF IDAHO, acting by its Board of Highway Directors, by its State
Highway Engineer or his authorized representative, herein called ''State",
and &nma N, Day, a widow, Ernest E. Dav, Robert L. Dav and Donald N. Day.
·herein called "Grantor(s)",
WHEREAS, Grantor(s) herewith deliver(s) to State a Warranty Deed
(Type of Instrument)
for highway purposes.
NOW,

THE~FORE,

the parties hereto agree as follows:

l. 'state shall pay Grantor(s) and the lienholder(s), if any, such sums of moneys as
are set out below. Grantor(s) agree(s) to pay all taxes and assessments due and owing, including those for the year 19~.

2. This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed by the State Highway
Engineer or~is authorized representative.
The parties have herein set out the whole of
their agreement, the ~erformante of which constitutes the e~tire consideration for the grant
of said right of way and shall relieve the State of all further claims or obligations on that
account or-on account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway.

.

3.

AMOUNT

Payment for 8.99 acres of land and full control of access to the

Interstate

Hi~hway

& rlamages to the re.maindE:r

;

. lump

:$,~QOO-. OQ ''"

sum ..

4

Grantors av.ree to nav a 11 tRxes and aasessrn~nts includiw 1967 taxes

s.

Access to Grantors
Hirrhwav wUl hP

re~~inin~

Av~i1nh1r>-

property southerly of t hP. Interstate

f,..r.m t:hr-> fHhlrP f'r...onVtrrP.

on the southwesterly side of I-BON.

rnA~

And

~tn~k

drive

(I-IG-SON-2(16)54)

'

;

..

~I
.....

Total Cash Settlement $---'.S'"""'O'""'O;...:O'-' '""O...;;:Oe-_ _ __

IN ·wiTNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
Recommended for
By
By

Approval~~

W.W. SACHT, P.E.
~ (!: _ptrict

Enrrinccr

~11;;-~ Turrt~

th·-~

day and year first above written.
.

c-\ '

~
'---y-j
~ -~-): ){)~
a-·
~
(

cc~---Fc::--__..,_,-~
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EXHIBIT D
000276

DH-35~(R/W)
Parc.e~

..

,.

(Rev. 7/25/66}

No. ___
2 _ _ __

WARRANI'Y DEED

~
·---=---

Access Rights

Negative Easements ____

'KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENI'S, TliAT_EMMA N .. DAY, a widow.
&"ti'IEST E. DAY,

liOBERT L· DAY &

DC~ALD

M. DAY

County of £d-e
, State o£ ~<2 , first part_, for and in
consi.derati.on of .z;::.e-z 4 ~ __..~P
, Dollars,
pa:i.d to t'h-rrz · , receipt whereof is acknowledged~ ha..t::~ granted, bargai..n.e.d, sold and conveyed, and ·oy these presents do_ grant, bargain,
eel~ and convey unto the State of Idaho, grantee, its suceessors and
assigns forever, in fee simple~ the following described parcel of land
s:Ltuat:ed in t:he County of
Ada
.. State of Idaho to-wit~
A parcel of land being on. both a~des of the ~ast and West Bound Lanea

Survey cente~lines of Intersta~e 80N, Project No. I-BON-2(J) 61 Highway
Survey as shown on the p1ans thereof now on £i1e in the office o£ the
Departm·ent of' Highways of the State o:f Idaho, and lying over and across
the E!N~ o£ Seet~on 19~ Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian,
descr~bed as fo1~ows, to-w1t!

Begil::tn:ing at a po:int in thei-North J.ine of: Secti.on 19. Township 2 North,
Range J East, Boiae Meridian, which point is 1197.66 reet Wes~erly
from, tb~ N~rtheast corner o£ said Section 19;-thence Southeaeterly
a2ong·a ~~~~.para1~e1 ~th and ~oo.o £eet Southwee~erJ.v £rom the East
Bound ...Lane··.'Benterline o:f' said Interstate 80N, Project f~o .. I-SON-2(3 )61
·Highwa:i S'urv.ey and be:i.ng an 1.1, 559.16 foot r~d:lu.s curve left,
a distance
0
~~

?9.0 r~etx more or leas~ ~o a point that bears South 5l )7'53" West
'fno·.·Q ·£eet :t:fom said Eastbound. Lane Survey centerline Station 4S4+62.14;
'·~,...~~;~.;;,....,~c_e· SC?-u:t.h..- ,38"'22 '07 71 East along said parallel l;Lne a distance of 1S6l. ~
· t·a·,··~1.':Po:i..nt i.n the East 1ine o:£ sa:i.d Section ~9 whi.ch point bears
So
• SJ.Py.]r 53" We~t 100.0 .f'E!et. f'rom East ~.OU.t;l,d .Lane Survey StatLm-:'.!iu,'.l· ~ .7.3
thence Norther~y a1on€; said Ease ~i.ne a'di.stailce' o£ 6$5.0 £eet, more or
1eSS 7 t o t point in tbe Northeaster1y right o£. way ~:i..ne of' present U. S.
Highway N • 30,26 and 20 as described ·i.n that certain right of' way
Deed-dated June ~9, ~936; recorded July 2, ~9J6 in ~he Records of Ada
County, Idaho in Book 2l7:c£ Deeds at page 424; thence Northwester~y
a~ong said present Highway right of' way l:Lne a distance o:f' l1)0.0 f'eet,
more or ~ess, to a point in the North 1ine
said Section 19; thence
Westerl.:v along said- North line· 425.0 raet 1 more or less, to the POINT
OF BEGINNING•
·

of'

East Bound Lane Survsy Station Rererence:

484+$3.03 to 501+95.69.
The area above described containa app~oX1mately 13.42 acres, 4.43 acres

of wbich :i..s acknow1edged to be a portion of· a public road.

The bearings as shown in the above land deacr~ption, un1ess otherw.ise
notad 7 are £rom the Idaho Plane Coordinate System, based ~n the transverse mercator projection £o~ the West Zone o£ Idaho. To convert to
geodetiC bearings, a COrrection O.f 0°15' 52 11 must be S\3.btracted from all
Northeast and Southwest bear:i..ngs and added to a1~ Northwest and Southeast beari.ogs.

..
Tba' area aba'\...e
~

.-l:

'

deee:riedtt ec'ftf!,ir:i'ine .app~xim~t.;'i:y.
..1.-i _...

:l

-··

_..

..3

·-.::.·

•

...

IDAY0001 0

II
000277

•

the

gati.on
'lri:eh:i::n

conducted
. t

way of
displays
advertising relating
rem.a
be per-

the Grantor

o

an 20 feet

~t only on land util z
Jl't'?. ~~#

therefrom~

.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances
unto the said Grantee and :lts successors and assigns forever.
.And th~
Grantor£ do_ hereby covenant to and wi~h the said Grantee~ that t_he~
Ia~ t::he awner.s in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from
1 a11 incumbrances and that t_he~ will warrant and defend the same from / al.~ lawful c1aims whatsoever •

•

i

m

WITNESS .JiHE_yEO..f.

4

seal;;:

! this iZE.•day of ..;a:;;;::::..,:;C.C.;;;~L~::::;::;.....:;;;==--------

....~.~~;.;:;.a..;;.;;._eo
___>
t2da_
) ss.
of

STATE OF

County

__________________

WHEREOF~

:t have

day ·and year.
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CORPORATlON EASEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY ·THESE PRESENTS, That J. D. Aldecoa and Son,
Inc., a corporation duly orga.ni2ed and existing under the laws of the State of

Idaho, and ba-ring its principal office in Idaho at 12 Mesa Vista Dr. Boise, in the
County of Ada, Grantor, for value received, does hereby grant unto the STATE

OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPAR'l"MENT, by and through

th~

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, Grantee, 3311 West State Street1 Boise,

Idaho 83703, and its successors and assigns, an

easem~nt

and right to go upon,

occupy, and use a po:rtion of NEll4SWll-t of Section 18, Township 02 North, Range

03 East, Boise, Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho,

d~scribed

as follows, to·wit;

A strip of Jand 50.0 feet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way
bour,dary of Interstate 84,Project No. NH-84-2(047)59 Highway
Sui"'icy, as shown on the plans thereof now on file in the office of the

Idaho Transportation Department, and as described in that certain
Warranty Deed to the Micron Technology Inc. executed by the
Grantor herein on the B!..Mtiay of May, 1996, and lying between
Eisenman Road Survey Station 86 + 38.88 as shown on said Highway
Su..rvey and Grantor's Southerly property line.
FOR THE PURPOSE

OF CONSTRUCTING- OR INSTALLING THEREON a

S-tock Drive and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its agents or
contractors.

The aforesaid facility once established shall remain in place

as constructed

ol" installed for its intended purpose and shall not be removed or relocated by the

Grantor, its sucr.essors and at~signs, without the prior approval of the Idaho
Transportation Department, or its assigns.
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2019000014
CORPORATION EASEMENT
The Idaho Transportation Department, its agents or transferees, shall have
tile right to perform any maintenance they may deem necessary or wish to
exercise in connection with the aforesaid facility (including but not restricted
thereto, the right to make necessary repairs, alterations, removals or replacements
thereof), together with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to and from
said prope:1;y for said purposes.
Grantor grants the Idaho Transportation Department an easement to use
the above-described real property for cattle and stock access purposes and for a
future public road. Such easement for cattle and stock access purposes shall be
held on behalf of those members of the public who reasonably require access by
their stock and cattle to property in the area of the above-described easement.
It is expressly intended that these burdens and restrictions shall run with

the land and shall forever bind the Grantor, its successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused its corporate name to be
hereunto subscribed bYi

affixed

President and its corporate seal to be

by..}._lu, If. Wi/!'!'1. its Secretory, the ~day of \'Y)f"r

, 19_Efb

::t::t~ni!:~LOOJ
Titl~EJ=

=
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CORPORATION EASEMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

County of Ada

)
) as.
)

11

On this 8' , day of
tn/Jy!
, in the year 199t:.., before
me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, personally appeared
~ ,..;: /1.'-0~tl
, known or identified to me to be the
;~;;;r,.
of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person who
executed the instrument on behalf of sait:! corporation, and acknowledged to me
that such corporation executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day B!ld year first above written.

Notary P lie for Idaho
Residing at: __.&:.::..:o:.:.'.:!..l.:...~ _ _ _......._..
My commission expires: 1 a ...z.~

J

9G039G93
.

. ~LLIANCE TITLe

ADJ. C;~. ~~C·)?.DER
j. -L!A'•,,,..
t-:..1 "~'/'~no
.,,,· )o\r.~ .
BOISE ID

3h
.
'96 fJRV 10 Prl '1

,,

:~
:

28
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EXHIBIT F
000283

96059985

(9 P'3"5)
Project No.
Key No.

HIGHWAY EASEMENT.

:.::: ·~:.. ··::_{:ORCEP.
.i. \;/:.! ':.'."i.'~r~RO
Vf, /l(i
BOiSE.~~! -(:; ~ ~~

NH-f'-84-2{047)59

6178

Parcel N'o. 7 IO.

No.

617BH07

THIS DE£0. cnade this

y/&-

between the UNITED STATES OF
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

~

DEEP~ ~ ~
0

day of

~

• 19fj, by and

·as nu 1A nr1111S
•
AMERICA)' '«e't._::CJ .:,~~ ~gh

tha

..

F£0EAAL ~{~~~l ~l?~.ltii?.:t~f\!O.N, herein-

arter referred to as the DEPARTMENT. and the STATE OF IDAHO, hereinafter

referred to

a~

the STATE;

W 1 TN E S S E T H.:

20·\ 7001451

WHEREAS, the STATE has filed application under the provisions oC
the Act of Congress of August 27, 1958 1 as amended (23

u.s.c.

Section

J17), for the right-of-way of a highway over certain land owned by thn
United States in the State of IDAHO, which is under the jurisdiction

of

the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management; and
WHEREAS, this transfer is further authorized under the provisions of the Act of congress approved October 15, 1966 (BO Stat. 9Jl,
9J7,

section 6[a]{l](A}); and
WHEREAS,

the

Federal

Hiqhway

Administrator,

purauant

delegations of authority from the secretary of Transportation,

to
haD

determined that an easement over the land covered by the application is
reasonably necessary for right-of-way for Interstate 84, Isaac's Canyon
Interchange, Project No.
WHE~EAS,

Bureau of

MH-f-84-2(047)59; and

the Department o! Interior, acting by and through the

Land Management, has agreed to the transEer

by the DEPARTMENT

of an easement over the land to the STATE;
NOW' THEREFORE, the DEPAR1'KENT I as authot"i il:ed by law I doc& hereby

grant to the STATE an easement for a

right-of-~ay

for the operation and

maintenance of a highway and use of the space above and below the

Page 1
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•

HIGHHA'i

Project No.
Key No.

FASEMf;HT ...DUQ

NH-F-84-2(047)59

2047fJ01~S2

6178

Parcel No. 7 ID.

He.

6178H07

established grade line of the highway pavement for highway

pu~poses

on,

over, across, in, and upon the following described land ot the United

States:
SE~SW~

and

SW~SE~

Section 18, Township 2 North, Ranqe

J

East,

Boise Meridian as shown on Exhibit A, attached hereto and mode a part
hereof,

subject,

however,

to the following terms,

conditions,

and

covenants:

1.

If outstandinq valid claims exist on the date of this use
authorization, the STATE shall obtain such pernission as
may be necessary on account of any such claims.

2.

The use right herein authorized shall terminate 10 years,

or sooner if agreed upon, from the date of execution of the

transfer docu=ent by the DEPARTMENT to the STATE in the
event construction of the highway has not been initiated
durinq such period.

J.

The use riqht herein authorized is limited to the described
right-of-way and the space above and below for highway

purposes and does not include ·any use r iCJhts for nonhighway purposes.
4.

Retention of rights by the Bureau o! Land Management to
use, or authorize use on, any portion
for

or

the right-of-way

non-highway purposes provided such usc would

not

interfere with the free flow of traffic, impair the full
use and safety of the

high~ay,

or be inconsistent vith the

provisions of Title 23 o! the United states Code and the
Page 2
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•

HIGHHAY £AS£HEHT PEED

Project No.
Key No.

6178

J

2047001..\!:;3

NH-F-84-2(047)59

Parcel No. 7 ID.

No.

6176K07

r~gulations

state

pursunnt thereto, and the DEPARTH£NT and

agency

concerned

shall

condulted

be

prior

th~

to

exercising such ri9hts.

s.

Location by the Bureau of Land

Hanage~ent

of any Surcau

information si9ns on the portions of the riqht-of-WolY
outside ot construction clearing

li~its

except that such

signs shall not be located on the right ...of-l.lay

oC

lin

Interstate SysteD.
6.

Consistent with highway sa!ety standards, the STATE agency
shall:
a.

Prott!ct and preserve soil and vegetative cover and

scenic and esthetic values on the

riqht-o!-~ay

outside

of construction limits.
b.

DUring construction activity, emexgeney erosion control
material

(straw bales,

cloth/sedi=ent

fences)

fiber

will

erosion JDats,

be available

filter

for

tho

installation o! sediment traps if such is needed from
a catastrophic rain.

If erosion control

~itiqation

is

not fully in place prior to completion of daily work.
all areas that have potential to erode and contribute
sediment to live waters 1.1ill have sedi=cnt trapa in
place (straw bale

tr~ps,

sediment fencea, mulch) to

prevent erosion/sediment reaching live waters.

c.

All disturbed soil/veqetatlon arens should bo seeded,
fertilized,' and mulched immediately after construction
Paqe l
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HIGHHAX £ASEHEHT QEEO

4

Z047001-154

Project No. tm-f-84-2 (047) 59
Key No.
6178
Parcel No. ? 10. No. ·6178~07

activity

is completed.

practical

It

seeding ltnd

mulching should take place the day of the disturbance,
and

if warranted re-seeded during more

conditions.

!avor~ble

The followinq seed QiX will be used tor

seeding disturbed areas associated with this project:
2
2

lbs.Jac.

4

lbs.fac.

2

lbs./ac.

1

lbs.Jac.

Lewis Flax

l

lb&.fac.
lbs.fac.
lbs.Jac.

Scarlet Globe-mallow

_l

1l

7.

lbs.fac

Nordan Crested Wheatqrass
Siberian Wheatqrass
Secar Snake River Wheatgrass
Russhn Wildrye
Firecracker Penstemon

No sites for highway operation and maintenance !acilJtJeo,
camps, supply depots, or disposal areas within the rightof-way may be established without obtaining approval of the

Bureau of Land Management authorized officer.
a.

Application of chemicals shall be pursuant to the tiational
Environment Policy Act

by

the

The provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act ot

1964

DEPARTMENT

9.

and shall

be

approved

prior to application by the STATE.

(78 Stat. 242} shall be co=plied with.
10.

The holder(sJ shall comply with all applicable federal lawn

and

regulations

promulgated.

existing

or

hereitfter

In any event, the holder(c) shall

onacted

or

co~ply

with

the Toxic Substances control Act of 1976, as amended {15

u.s.c.

260i, et.~)

With regard to any toxic subst5nces

that are used, generated by or stored on the right-of-way
or on facilities authorized under this right-of-way grant.
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•

HIGHWAY EASEMENT PEED
Project No.
Key No.

Z047001~5S

NH-F-94-2(047)59

6178

Parcel No. 7 ID.

No.

617BK07
Part 702-799 and especially, provisions

(See 40 CFR,

polychlorinated

etc.)

in

excess

established by 40 CFR,
required

the

by

40

CFR

7Gl.l-761.19:J)

any t"elease .at toxic &ubstances

Additionally,
spills,

biphenyls,

o!

the

r~portabla

(lcakll,
quanti~y

Part 117 shall be reported .'in

Environmental

Comprehensive

ResponsoJ,

and Liability Act of 1980, Section 102b.

Co~pensation

~~

A

copy of any report required or requested by any Federal
agency or State government as a resu1 t of a rcportabln
release

o~

spill ol any toxic substances shall be furnished

to the authorized officer concurrent with the flllng or
reports to the involved Federal agency or State
11.

h.older

The

of

Riqht-of-Way No.

th~

9~~er~ent.

IOI-31669 aqreeo to

indemnify the United States against any liability arising
froM the release of any hazardous substance or hazardous
~aste

(as these terms are defined in the Comprehensivr

Enviro~ental

1980, 42

Response, Compensation and Liability Act of

u.s.c.

9601 .e.t s..eG·

and Recovery Act of 1976, 42

.or

the Resource Conservation

u.s.c. 6901

at~.)

on th ·

riqht-o1-•ay (unless the release or threatened release is
wholly
the

un~elated

to the right-of-way holders activity on

right-of-w~y),

or resultinq from the activity of the

riqht-ot-way holder on the right-or-way.

This agreement

applies without regard to whether a release is cause by the
holder, its agent, or unrelated third parties.
Page 5
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IUGHHAX EASF.MENT QEEP

Project No.

2047001-156

NH-F-94-2(047)59

Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7 t~.
12.

6

~he

No.

6178M07

STATE, in consideration o! the qrant o! this easement,

does hereby covenant and agree as a covenant running with
the land for itself, its successors and assigns that:

a.

No person shall, on the grounds of race, color, nex,
age, or national origin, be excluded from participation

in,

denied

be

benefits

the

o!,

or

be

otherwise

subjected to discrimination with reqard to an)' facility

located wholly or in part on, over or under such

l~nds

hereby convi!yed;
b.

The STATE shall use said easement riqht-of-way so
conveyed, in compliance with all requirements imposed
by

or

pursuant

to

Title

49,

Code

of

Federal

Requlat"ions, Department of Transportation, Subtitle A,
Office of the Secretary, Part 21, Nondiscrimination in
federally

assisted

programs

of

the

Department

of

Transportation, effectuation of Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, and 'as said Regulations may

be

amended.
lJ.

When need for the easement herein granted shall no longer
exist, the STATE shall qive notice of that fact to the
Secretary of Transportation and the rights herein granted
shall terminate and the land shall immediately revert to
the full control of the Department of Interior,

Bu~eau

of

Land Management.
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PEED

H.tGHlfAX EASEHElfT

Project No.

Key No.

7

Z0-17001457

HH-f-64-2(047)59

6178

Parcel No. ? ln.

No.

6178H07

IN WITNESS WHEREOF 1 I, Robert B. ·RUtledge, Reqional Counoe l
pursuant to delegations ot authority from the Secretary ot Tnnsportation,

the

Federal

Administrator,

High..,..ay

Administration,

by

Hh:~hway

and

Adt1inistr-ator,

Chief

the Regional Federllt

Counsel,

virtue of authority

Federal

Hlqhvay

in JDe vested by law,

havo

hereunto subscribed my name as of the day and year first above vritten.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

STATE OF ORtGON

)
)ss:

COUNTY OF MUL'l'NO'MAH )

I

I

Me.· Ia"'

r

&<de.,sere

,a

Notary P\l9_pr:

in and for the Stat of oregon, do Jl.e}'eby certify that en the ..!::/..:__.
day of
:fUr.JE:
·
, 19~ befora me personally appoaretl
Robert B. Rutledge, R~gional counsel, Federal Highway Administ~ation,

and

acknowledged

that

t~;

foreqoinq

instrument

bearing dato of

,/
~

Lnu;

.Tur-tE
~
, l9_J.~pt vas executed by him, in his official
capacl ty an by authority ln him vested by law, for the purposeo ond
intents in said instrt1111ent described and set forth, and acknovledqed th<!
sum to be his !ree act and deed as Regional Counsel, federal Hi~hway

Administration.
qJ
Witness nay hand and seal this

day of

__ ,

19J.k>
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IUCHWAY EASEMENT DEED

Project No.

9

2047001458 .

NH-F-84-2(047)59

Xey No. 61-78
Parcel No. 7 ID.

No.

6178H07

In compliance with the conditions set forth in the foreqoinq
deed, STATE certifies, and by the acceptance of this deed, accepts the

right-of•way over certain land herein described and a9rees for itself,
its successors and assigns forever to abide by the conditions set forth
in said deed.
Acting by and thr'lugh

STATE OF IDAHO.

the Idaho

Transpc~ation

Board

By:~~
J~;

CiiefOt Hlgtlvay
Transportation

MONTE

Operations,

Idaho

Departatent
STATE OF

_J'-t'_4.....,.'v_ _ _ )
L1.J

county. of

~\

) ss.
)

. .,

.

on this / 1& day of J~
19!(, before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and tor said State, personally appeared
MONTE J. FIALA, known to me to be the Chief of Highway Operations for
the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department, by and throuqh the
Idaho Transportation Board, and acknowled9ed to me that he executed as
such Chief of Highway Operations for the State of Idaho.

d!J
o4t-

Notary Public 5,?r_
Residing in.
Hy commission

Page
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!Vt.r. Loren 0 Thomas. P.E.

7!0 VISTA

Dts(]icr Engineer

PHONE 342-352B

BOX B2B6

BOISE.

IDAHO

83707

Srale of ldaho
Transportation Department
P.O. Box 8028
Boi.se, Idaho 83707 - '2028

Dec.tmber 12, 19CJ7

Dear ;)ir,
This letter is addressed to you at Dan Cantrells suggestion.
A..s of rlWi writing, there seems to be no provision for the "Future Frontage Road" into

b;.wc':s Canyon as shown in your Right of Way Contract# I-80-2{3 }61, and
Warranty Deed inst. # 677552.{Attached} [n the t960's. the Day family
nc:go1iated a number of Right of Way properties to facilitate the occurrence of ;m Interstate:
Highway to enhance the Boise Valley. Tills was done with a certain amount of sacri:tice by
u.s for r.he good of the community.

a~;companying

Prior to 1967, our property in Section 19, 2E,3N B.M. fronted on Federal Way/ Highwnys
20,26 and 30 as they entered lsaE.c's Canyon. We had a number of roads leading south and
west from tllli; paine.
ln rerum for abandoning our frontage, the State agreed to provide a Right of Way for a
ti·onrage road along the west side of the Interstate. This right of way shows quite clearly
on the drawings provided to us in 1967, as well a<.; on the plans tor !he L'iaaC 1S Canyon
lnrachange. {Attached;highlighted}
In l\'1arch of 1996, your Department held an informational meeting for the public. After
seeing lhe proposal, I made an appointment with Dick Kridzcr for further discussion. A!
lha1 time> he assured me you were only in the plaruting stage and a final location for the
new in[erchange had not been deterrni..11ed and our concerns would be addressed.

Larcr char year, 1 stopped by to follow up on the progn:ss and

We\$

shown a drawing thnr

had a "Stock Drive" traversing 20% contours, changing elevations of 100+ teet three times
in ks.s than a hitlf of mile. At that time, I ~de a date with Mr. Kreitzer to further discuss t

rhis matter. When I went back, he told me that unless I could show evidence for access
other !han a stock drive, the S t.are had fulfilled its obligation.
DEVELOPERS OF

DAY00031

'VISYA VILLAC[ $HOP,.JNG C£ti1CR
O.A,'r \riST.l A.OCIITtON
CfitARY VISTA

1-tC::OA \IISTA.

000295

v..,: e then produced our copies of the Contract and accompanying Warranty Deed between
the Days and the State and was told that they brought "new tight" to the mattt:r. Mr.
Kreitzer said he'd discuss this with his superiors and get back with me, but he did not.
In the spring of this year1 I began an earnest effort to contact Mr. Kreitzer; I made a
nuraber of phone calls with no reply. His last answering machine message said he had
retired.

We inunediarety contacted lv1r. Cantrell and Jack Sparks. After discussing the matter with
them, they assured me lhey would have an answer for me by the middle to late July of this
year.

In

December~ we received a drawing of a Jeep Trail across steep BLM ground and an

offer

to discuss this matter with Mr. Cantrell, which we did. At that meeting, on Tuesday,
December 9~ 1997, Mr. Cantrell ftrst told us he wasn't sure you could provide access
across the BLM ground and suggested we hire an attorney. We said we would like lo
avoid hiring an attorney, so he suggested we write to you.

[n summary, after being able to drive directly to the property prior to 1967 via Federal Way
nnd exchanging that for a "Future Frontage Road Right of Way" on a gentle slope. we
wound up with a "Stock Drive" over impassable terrain. This, in our opinion, does not
satisfy the provisions in your· origin11l contract with us.
As you no doubt know, the property needed to comply with this Contract is about to
transfer from the BLM to private ownership. Therefore, )'0Uf prompt consideration of thi~
maner j:-; imperative.
On a related matter. we are also no longer able to drive to our parcel on the north side of
the freeway. It seems the new interchange has covered the road that the telephone
companies and the owners have always used to maintain this ParceL It also appean; that
the survey on our north border on the west side of the freeway doesn't follow the section
line. We would also appreciate an opportunity to discuss both of these issues \'.ith you at
your earlieRt convenience. As noted above 1 time is against 1}-S. Please advise.

rezy.~
e.nDay
Day Family

I
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.-\ccess Rlght:!J

!-..'NOW ALL MEN BY THESl;;
~;. D.'l.Y, ;cOill·:i<T r... ~AY

··---..

.

Pl~S£NTS,

ThAT

!<. 00'/AT,D g.

o,\J~

i(l
'II

Negr,.t;ivr:: c:useuwnts __ ~~!;
8-!i•li\ N.

)AV.,

l.t

\-li.do!!_. ______

,;i
. :i

1

1

!liCounLy oE---:-4~~.~--~-~-' s'-_.t--,-n_t:_e_o~f--_L,':;?,";._,.-;..p
, tirst: part __ , for ond t.n ·'·
1 lc.:onsi.derac:Lan of ~=-.....Y..c~· -'·~--;:..,...,:.• .. _
.,
________ Dollllr8-,
~~~ ~a.:id t:o /.-!.-~_,.....,
, receipt: whereof lt! acknowledged, ha~ granted, bar''

: ,gai.ned, sold and conveyed, and oy these presents tlo __ grmll.:, bargol.n,
/!sell o.nd convey unto the State of' ldaho, grantee. :Lts succcssor~1 and
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along :>aid preocnt Hi.e;hway righ-r. at' way line. a distance 01.- 11)0.0 fG~t,
, more or less, to a point in the Nort;h l:ine of sa:ld Scct.lon 19; t~hcmco
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EXHIBIT I
000302

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE AITORNEY GENERAL
ALAN G. LANCE

April 7, 2000

Terry Little
Traffic Engineer
Ada County Highway District

318 E. 37th
Boise, Idaho 83714
Re:

Day Family Access

Dear Terry:
I write to you concerrring some access issues the Department has been working on since
the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange East of Boise. In particular, it
concerns access to the Day Family property.
When the fnterstate was first constructed in 1967, the Day property was bisected. The
Right-of-Way Deed and Contract provided:
Access to the Future Frontage Road and Stock Drives on the
Southwesterly side of Interstate SON, Project No. I-IG-SON-2(16)54
Highway Survey.
This was accomplished with a fifty foot right-of-way bordering the [nterstate. The rightof-way probably pre-dates the Ada County Highway District.
When the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was built, the fifty foot right-of-way was moved so
that it adjoined the interchange. The connection to Eisrnarm Road occurs at
approximately Highway Station 86. The new right-of-way re-connects with the 1967
original right-of-way at approximately the boundary between Sections 18+ 19. The rightof-way continued to be fifty feet in width. A colored map is enclosed for reference.

Continued ...

Contracts & Administrative Law Division, Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129, Bo1se.10. 83707·1129: Telephone: (208) 334·8815. Fax: (208) 334·4498
Located at 3311 W State Street. 80158. Idaho. 83703·5881
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Terry Little
April 7, 2000
Page 2
After the interchange was constructed, the Department determined that some of the new
right-of-way did not provide the same level of access as was provided in the original
right-of-way that was established in 1967. The Department has taken two actions to
remedy the situation. First, ITD obtained an additional ten feet of right-of-way through
the NE 1.1 - SWY. of Section l 8. Tllis made the right-of-way sixty feet in width. The
connection to Eismann Road remains in the same location.
The Department also is in the process of negotiating an amended right-of-way easement
with the Bureau of Land Management through SE Y. - SW\4 of Section 18. Enclosed is a
drawing depicting the new easement. It was prepared by Porter's Land Surveying and is
dated May 19, 1998. It is also sixty foot in width.
Donna Jacobs (formerly Donna Day) indicates that she met with you and that there was
some indication that the new access would not be acceptable to ACHD. I'm not sure
whether it was the 1996 access to Eismann that is part of the interchange project or the
realigned and wider access that is presently under negotiation.
If you could give me a call at your earliest convenience, I would like to set up a meeting
to discuss this issue. Obviously with the construction of the new interchange, lTD can
not restore the former access.
Sincerely,

~
Deputy Attorney General

SMP:ss
enclosures
cc:

Pam Lowe-ADE-3
Terry Coffin- AGO

ITDDAY-000532

000304

• ~
~ ~ ~-;-~ .~~~~5--•A--~- "}- - • ®i
1------•t1-----------t------M._3.
·
~~tr]J~r---·
prf~

S)• kct

.p

,:.:J:.P.i

...

-

-

e

I
u

;!:

>
....

I~

~~~

~

~Ul

o.u

II I

£

~ ~
"'"'
T:;eg
.
z

11<1

//:..if.(

~-.1"~--

-r

-~

~ 1 ./':::..P'X'#~Y. /~ 1

1 / r=

~IY

~

II

I

:z:

~

v\~

~_./J>'t7

/

-

...\ -

~ //~~

I /

'>"

>-kf I

_..,o~ ~~'

..;r,.:.//.:,

I

•.:~

---=

_ _ coJ m

-----~

3:co

>

v>-

~ge
..,v>

V1

NOTE:
FOI" oddlilclnal ln.fcrm•

Rlgh.t-or-War ~~~
s.e R..eord af Sur..~
lnaburn..,1 li~ 9'1502!
Ada Cow!IJ,. Jdoho.. (

nu. 40, O.u:~~pt« 2.
ha-.. aleo b...-. fl..:l

~

"'"'

Q

"'~
a
b~G-i

_.,

_, V1

t;:i0
_,.;:

b-'Vl~e

1
~

- --•11.--- -

--.!

-;--;-:;--8~---

-

-

000305

TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 3 EAST,
BOISE MERIDIAN
SCALES SHOWN
ARE FOR 22" x 34"
PRINTS ONLY

CAOD FILE NO.
'i'"

~'

.-, oT.-.

'"'~'",...

IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION

DF.P!\RTMF.NT

.,.co

s ~e:i
-'Ul

>

.&.

..

I

"'

LOCATED IN SECTIONS

I
I
J,
I
I
I
I

~-

I

-

--•ll--- -

I
__j-

COWOl

~ ---P/l

---

-

-.J.-::.
N
--'T"..,.

:21

~~
~

FEDERAL AID PROJECT NO.

SITE PLAN

l-84 & ISAAC'S CANYON 1/C
NH-84-2(047)59

KEY Nl

ITDDA Y-000533

"<:t

(")

;
s:

z

~

"'>
"':l

.:::.

"'

::!"

:.J

/

'

1.0
0
0
0

.

I

><(

~~

0
0
f-

.

..i
"
- '
0

]---j ~i
r

~~

...... :.:

"l>.

!;='

/

(

·g
~

;.,
~

"

~

,:;

. o/

I
8
1 :;:

I
_____ _L ___, ___ _

0
0

JAt~

06 "35 10:07

PAGE. !l

000306

EXHIBIT J
000307

AD~.&=nii~J.t-

fEcoRDED . REOUENor:
~

Project No. STP-84-2(047)59
90!SE.IOAHO ·
~~FEE
DEPUTY
Key No. 6178
'+'.Pt3 g 9 QQ
Parcel No. 06 Parcel ID No.Jm~4:r~ PH 2:37
·
230 5
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,
DIANA R.

NICHOLSON,

That THOMAS T.

husband and wife,

NICHOLSON and

as to an undivided one-half

interest, AND RONALD C. YANKE and LINDA L. YANKE, husband and wife, as
to an undivided one-half interest, Grantors, for value received, do
hereby grant unto the STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
by and through the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
State Street, Boise, Idaho

Grantee,

3311 West

83703, and its successors and assigns, the

right to go upon, occupy, and use a portion of the

NE~SW~

18, Township 02 North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian, in

of Section
Ada County,

Idaho, described as follows, to-wit:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the South ~ Section
Corner of Section 18, Township 02 North, Range 03 East,
Boise, Meridian;
thence along the North-South center ~ section line of said
Section 18, North 00°10'46" East - 1319.16 feet to a point
marking the Center-South 1/16 Section Corner of said Section
18;

thence leaving said North-South center J:i section line, and
along the south 1/16 section line of said Section 18 - North
89°38'38" West - 643.56 feet to an Aluminum cap on the
Westerly Right-of-Way line of Isaac 1 s Canyon Interchange,
said cap being 1133.65 feet right of I-84 East bound lane
centerline station 462+68. 57, as shown on the plans of
Interstate 84, Federal Aid Project No. NH 84-2(047)59
Highway Survey;.
thence continuing along said South 1/16 Section line of said
Section 18, North 89°38'38" West - 50.69 feet to an Aluminum
Cap on the Westerly boundary line of an existing so.o foot
wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said cap being
1178.5J feet right of I-84 East bound lane centerline
Station 462+47.16, also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNINGj
thence leaving said South 1/16 Section line of said Section
Page

1
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FEE EXEMPT - I.e. 67-2301
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EASEMENT
Project No. STP-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 06 Parcel ID No. 0039340
and along said Westerly boundary line of an existing
foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement the
following courses and distances;

18,

50.0

North 09°50'10" East - 618.36 feet to a point, said point
being 150. o feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station
91+66.77

thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 678.00
feet, a central angle of 51°51'49", an arc length of 613.72
feet, and a chord which bears North 4Pl5'14" West - 592.98
feet to a point, said point being 150.00 feet right of
Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+88.83;
thence North 15°19'19 11 West - 50.00 feet to a point marking
the Northwest corner of said existing 50.00 foot wide
Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said point being
150.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline station
86+38.83;
thence leaving said Westerly boundary line of said existing

so.oo foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, South
West - 10.00 feet to a point, said point being
feet right of Eiseman Road centerline station

74°40'41 11

160.00

86+38.83;

thence South 15°19'19 11 East - 50.00 feet to a point, said
point beinq 160. oo feet riqht of Eiseman Road centerline
station 86+38.83;
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 688.00
feet, a central angle of 51°12'00 11 , an arc length of 614.80,
and a chord which bears South 40°55' 19 11 East - 594.55 feet
to a point, said point being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman
Road centerline Station 91+60.65;
thence South 09°50 1 10 11 West - 612.12 feet to a point on the
South 1/16 Section line of said Section 18;
thence along said south 1/16 Section line, South 89°38 1 38 11
East - 10,14 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING.
This easement contains approximately 0. 29 acres, more or
less and is subject to any easements of record or in use.
FOR

THE PURPOSE OF

CONSTRUCTING

OR INSTALLING

THEREON

a Stock

Page 2
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EASEMENT
Project No. STP-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 06 Parcel ID No. 0039340
Drive and Future Public Road by the state of Idaho or its aqents or
contractors.
The aforesaid facility shall remain in place as constructed or
installed for its intended purpose and shall not be removed or relocated by the Grantors, their successors and assigns, without the prior
approval of the Idaho Transportation Department, or its assigns.
The Idaho Transportation Department, its agents or transferees,
shall

have

necessary
facility

the
or

right

wish

to

to

perform

in

exercise

any

maintenance

connection

(including but not restricted thereto,

necessary repairs,

alterations,

with

they
the

may

deem

aforesaid

the right to make

removals or replacements thereof),

together with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to and
from said property for said purposes.
It is expressly

intended that these burdens and restrictions

shall run with the land and shall forever bind the Grantors, their
successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this

ts,'f1. day of Jta...-.uo..vj

,

1995._.

Page 3
RECORD AT THE REQUEST OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FEE EXEMPT - I.C. 67-2301
DAY00040

000310

.

,.

EASEMENT

Project No. STP-84-2(047)59
Key NO. 6178
Parcel No. 06

Parcel ID No. 0039340

STATE OF ::;Q;) f¥\.jo
ss.
County of ~~-~~et~--------

On this l.~ day of Jffi\le.v
, 1999.___, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and fo~ said state, personally appeared
THOMAS T. NICHOLSON and DIANA R. NICHOLSON, husband and wife, known or
identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
foregoing instrument, and acknowledqed to me that they executed the
same.

~A)~r
_z'D~

N(; ar;;ublic

(SEAL)

for

Residing at

STATE OF
ss.

County of
On this \p'"'Th day of jQ.n\)0...'<'1..:\
, 199:i_, before me, the under ...
signed, a Notary Public in and for iaid State, personally appeared
RONALD C. YANKE and LINDA L. YANKE, husband and wife, known or
identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the
same.

(SEAL)

&&

1M :1 £(\,),n i J:,. 4-., ' A'

N~Public
Residing
My

for

-:;Ib&W:o

at~\~

commission expires

U

'~

;:s;\::iT
~
\ 1
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13:09

2138-343-8B92

NATURE CONSERVANCY

HIGHWAY

PAGE

~& llc\~
A~1_~NTY.B£CORDER~.\(It RECORDED~ R£Q~U$
OF
EAS EI"H!!;r.rrii)IJ)~RRO
·-~( oJI'.
.jOIST:. IOM!O
\
-b·

Project No, NH~F-84~2(0q7)59
2DDOJN
Key No. 6178
Parcel »o. I
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339

~EE-----DEPUTY

-8 PH~: 33

~~

~lluh~v~ 1\.J~

THIS

DEED,

~

made this

after referred

to as

TRANSPORTATION

DEPARTMENT

West

3311

BOARD,

the

State

J

ARt; I

day of

and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

El2

'

-

00044826

2000'

by

acting by and through the

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, herein-

DI:!:PA.RTMENT,
by

and

Street,

and the STATE OF

through

t.he

Boise,

Idaho

IDAHO

IDAHO,

IDAHO

TRANSPORTATION

83703,

hereinafter

referred to as the STATE:

WI T

NE

S S E T H :

WHEREAS,
of

the

Act

the STATE has filed application under the provisions
Congress

of

Section 317),

for

the

of

August

right-of-way

27,
of

1958,
i!l

aa

amended

highway

over

(23

U.S.C.

certain land

owned by the United Staces in the State of IDAHO, which is under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management;

and

WHEREAS,

chis transfer is further authorized under the provi-

sions of the Act of Congress approved October 15,

1966 (80 Stat, 931.

937, section 6 [aJ [11 [AJ); and

WHEREAS,
delegations

of

the

Federal

authority

from

Highway
the

Administrator,

Secretary

of

pursuant

Transportation,

to
has

Page 1
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339

determined that an easement over the land covered by the application
is

reasonably

necessary

for

a

right-of-way

result

Interstate

property as

a

Project No.

NH-F-84-2(047)59; and

of

84,

for

Isaac's

access
Canyon

to

private

Interchange,

WHEREAS, the Department of Interior, acting by and through the
Bureau

of

Land

Management,

hae

agreed

to

the

transfer

by

the

DEPARTMENT of an easement over the land to the STATE;

NOW

TH~REFORE,

the

DEPARTMENT,

as

authorized by

law,

does

hereby grant to the STATE a GO. 0 foot wide floating easement for a
right -of -way

described

for access on,

land of

over, across,

the United States more

in,

and upon the following

particularly described as

follows to-wit;
A strip of land, 60. 0 feet in width, over and acrose
portions of the Southeast ;< of the Souchwest ;< and the

Southwest ~of the Southeast~ of Section 18, Township 02
North, Range 03 Eaet, Boise, Meridiani Ada County, Idaho;
the beginning and ending points of which are more
particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum cap marking the 1~ Section
Corner common to Section 18 and 19, Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Bo~se Meridian;
thence North 00°10 '46" East
1319.16 feet along the
North-South center S~ction line of said Section 18 to the
!?age 2
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project No, NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339
Northeast corner of the

SE~SW~

of said Section 19;

thence North 99°.38'38 11 West: - 673.97 feet along the North

line of said

SE~SW~

to the POINT OF BEGINNING of

said floating easement and being 1160.57 feet right of I84 eastbound lane centerline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the ~ Section
Corner common to Section 18 and 19, Township 02 N'orth,
Range 03 Bast, Boise Meridian;
thence along the section line common to said Sections 18
and 19, South 89°37'39 11 East - 24.9. feet to a point;
thence leaving said common Section line, North 00"22'10"
East - 30.00 feet to a poi~t. said point being the ENDING
POINT of said floating easement and being 1222.40 feet
right
of
I-84
eastbound
lane
centerline
Stdtion
·475~85.34.

IT

IS

UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that

the

specific location of

the 60. o foot wide easement granted from the DEPARTMENT to the

STATE shall be allowed to float within the southeast
Southwest

~

and the

Sout~west

~of

the Southeast

~

~

of the

of Section 18,

Township 02 North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that at
construction,

agreed
assigns,

upon
and

the
by

location

the

the

of

underlying

road .easement

landowner,

the

the time of road
will

be

DEPARTMENT

mutually
or

the STATE through its Transportation Department.

its
The

Page 3
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Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339
underlying landowner may give his final approval to the location of
the road easement in which event the floating easement shall become a
permanent easement.

In the event the adjoining property owner wishes

to develop its property and cannot come to a final or preliminary
agreement with the underlying property owner, .then the Department or
its assigns may use the alignment as shown crosshatched on Exhibit A
until such time the underlying property requests that the road be
moved as provided herein.

If the road is constructed on an alignment

other than that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit A, the alignment will
provide the same or equivalent accessibility. to the adjoining property
owner as that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit "A", and be approved by
the STATE through its Transportation Department.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD. AND AGREED that the party needing the
road constructed will be responsible for the cost of construction.

If

the road is constructed and should have to be moved in the future
because its location is detrimental to the underlying property owner,
the

STATE

will

construction.

be

responsible

for

the

cost

of

realignment and

The realigned road will provide the same or equivalent

access to the adjoining property owner as that shown crosshatched on
Exhibit A hereto.

The realigned road will be built to the same

standards as the original road and have the same point of beginning
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339
and ending point as described in this Highway Easement Deed.

If

utilities have been installed in the original road right-of-way, they
will

not

have

to

be

relocated and

each utility shall

retain an

easement to service its facility as i f the original road remained
public right-of-way.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that, if within five years of
execution of this Highway Easement Deed, the underlying property owner
does not elect to have the floating easement moved as provided for
herein then the easement as shown as crosshatched on Exhibit A shall
become a permanent easement.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD
this easement,

AND

AGREED that, as a result of securing

the STATE will relinquish the existing 50 foot wide

easement that is adjacent to the Interstate right-of-way located in
the above described quarter sections.

IT IS EXPRESSLY INTENDED That

these burdens and restrictions

shall run with the land and shall forever bind the DEPARTMENT, or its
assigns.
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel r.o. No. 0039339
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, Mary E. Gray, pursuant to delegations of

authority from the Secretary of Transportation,
Administrator,

the Federal Highway

by virtue of authority in me vested by law,

hereunto subscribed my name as of this

Jel_

have

day of June, 2000.

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDE
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

of

IN

WITNESS

WHEREOF,

I,

Steven

C.

Hutchinson,

Way

pursuant

to

delegations of authority from the Idaho Transportation Board, have
hereunto subscribed my name as of this ~

day of June, 2000.

IDAHO
STATE
By

BOARD

~~~~~~~~~~~~

even C. Hutchinson
Assistant Chief Engineer
(Devel opmen t)
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HIGHWAY EASEMENT DEED
Project No. NH-F-84-2(047)59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339
STATE OF IDAHO
ss:
COUNTY OF ADA

I,
L·,t--l~ft ~ecx.E:~
, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby. certify that on the ~ day of June, 2000,
before me personally appeared Mary E.
Gray,
Federal
Highway
Administrat~:nd acknowledged that the foregoing ins~rurnent be~r~ng
date of
.. ~ ~ 1Z@
. , was executed by her, ~n her ofhc~al
capacity and by authority in her vested by law, for the purposes and
intents in said instrument described and set forth, and acknowledged
the same to be her free act and deed as,
Federal Highway
Admin is tra tion.

Witness my hand and seal this ~ day of June, 2000.

/'\/~a.~
~
Pu?liWo~ ~c:k C:~~
Res1d~ng 1n -~~~6~~~~~~----~--+----My commission expires

oo 0

STATE OF IDAHO )
)

COUNTY OF ADA

)

<'\~IJ~~

o(f\.

YA\-1-~

a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2000,
before
me
personally
appeared
Steven
C.
Hutchinson,
Idaho
Transportation Department, t.. ;:md ackno~ed that
the
foregoing
instrument bearing date of -~tt'¥-lL... C..c 4
was executed by
him,
in
his
official
capacity
as
Assistant
Chief
Engineer
(Development),
for the purposes and intents in said instrument
described and set forth, and acknowledged the same to be his free act
and deed as, Idaho Transportat~on Board.
I,

...J ..

I

I

,

'

Witness my hand and seal this ~ day of June, 2000.

_:1:-

·

.{V'-

~
~

Notary Public for -c-uAE+O
Residing in ...Uc:>t$E:'
My cornmissio~n~e-xp~i_r_e_s-~~~~a---=2150~)
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EXHIBIT M
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFIGE OF THE' AnORNIOY GENERAL

AlAN G.I.J\.NCE

July !9, 2000

A.J. Bohner

Bolwer Chusan & W<Jlton, L.L.C.
1459 T)rrell Lane
P.O. Box 1069
Boise, Idaho 8370 I

Re:

Right of Way Contract, Project No. I-80N-2(3)6l Entered into by State ofldaho
Department of Highways and the Day Family on I0/23/67 (Isaac's Canyon)

Dear Tony:
Please excuse the delay in responding to your letter of June 27, 2000 concerning access

issues involving the Day family property around Isaac's Canyon. I have bad the
opportunity to meet with lTD's District 3 management and repi·esentative's from the
Headquarters Ri~t-of-Way section on the access issues involved with your clients.

To provide you with some historical perspective, when this issue first arose and the
Department attempted to reso1ve the problem it was the portion of the easement over the
BLM land that the engineer's perceived to be the problem. That portion of the new right·
of-way easement seems to be resolved with the now easement from the BLM. During
that process, the Department obtained an additional ten feet of right-of-way fi-om the
Nicholson's to incr~e the width of the easement over their property from t1fty teet to
sixty feet. The problem appears to be the easement over the Nicholson property. TI1e
property is over terrain with cont0t1r~ too great to <:oul>\rucl a fi:ontage road or effectively
use the easement for ingress and egress.
JTD District 'Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of.· Way Supervisor have
gone out to the site and viewed the property to determine if and how the easement can be
relocated. I have not heard back from them nt this point in time. The District and the
Headquarters Right-of-Way Section are reviewing funding sources in order to reach a
solution to this problem. I would request that you provide the Department an extension
until September 5, 2000 or shortly thereafter to be able to give you a finn proposal on a
solution to this ac.cess issue. Part of the reason for asking for this length of extension is
that r will be out of the office for the li.!St two weeks of August. r will make un attempt !0
provide you with a status update umund August 17, 2000.
Continued ..
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A.J. Bohner
July 19, 2000
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[ tl'\lly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously and will have some type of
proposal to provide substitute access to the property. I will also represent to you that the
Department will not assert any type of statute of limitations defense if an agreement on
new access cannot be reached.

lf an agreement can be reached on a new access easement, we will need to discuss
obtaining an easement from the Day family to recolUlect the new rigllt~of-way through
the BLM property to the existing frontage road stock driveway. The new casement
created a small gnp iu the right-of-way and there may be property owners to the east of
the Day property, which have historically llsed the stock driveway.
Thank you in advance for your patience with the Department in trying to resolve this
issue.
Sincereiy,

s-~9
-

STEVENM.~

Deputy Attomey General
SMP:ss
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Department Memorandum

DATE:

Wednesday, September 06, 2000

TO:

Lana Servatius
Dist. 3, Right of Way
Cliff Gaylin
Dist. 3, Design East

FROM:
RE:

ISAAC'S CANYON (DAY FAMILY PROPERTY ACC SS FROM EISMANN ROAD)
The design standards listed below were used to create an ccess road from Eismann
road through the 60' easement adjacent to our Ri9ht of Way.
1 ). I used the typical section of a 24' wide road (EAGLE CR EK WAY) that Ada county
accepted on project: NH-F-3271 (052), (JCT SH-44, N. T BEACON LIGHT RD.),
sheet 55 of 174 for copy of plan and sheet 8 of 174 for py of typical section.

0.2 1 PLANT MIX PAVE E:NT

EST~~

··

37 TONS/SfA.AVG.

0.5 AGGR. SASE (3/4 11 M.l~XJ
1

EST.~

98 TONS/STA

AV~

I designed the road for a speed of 15-20mph similar to u an subdivision access.
This will reduce the AASHTO standard requirements and design standards to
minimums.

2). The horizontal alignment provides a 50' staging tangent ff of Eismann road to the

DAY00056

000328

Ut;;I;IIIIIIIIIY Ul lilt: Ill ~l I,;UI Vt:

l vI J.

vUrVe UrJe na5 C:l H:ICJIU

OT OU

1

WI Vt1 lWU fJC:I~ C:l

radius of 658', and cun 'hree has a radius of 50'. The xisf 50' access opening
that the alignment pass~::~ through to the easement waul need to be 60' and the
existing Right of Way monument at station (86+88.83 1 0' Rt.) would need to be
relocated at station (86+88.83 160' Rt).
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Cur.~e tvvo is parallel to the alignment cur.~e of Eismann r ad and the Right of Way.

Curve three keeps the alignment in the center of the 60' asement and the catch
point lines within the easement.
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requirements. The diagr · ...., below represents the appr ach rf' ·tirements .
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I

20.00
2.

X-aeatfen

(SEE PROFILE PLOT FOR THE ENTIRE

LIGNMENT)

NOTE: This design is preliminary and uses minimum stand rds to represent a road can
be built through the existing 60' easement.
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Ada County Ho ghway District
Judy Peavey-Derr, President
Dave Bivens, 1st Vice President
Sherry R. Huber, 2nd Vice President
Susan S. Eastlake, Commissioner
David E. Wynkoop, Commissioner

318 East 37th Street
Garden City 10 83714-6499
Phone (208) 387-6100
FAX (208) 387-6391
E-mail: tellus@ACHD.ada.id.us

Febmary 21,2001
A. J. Bohner
Bohner Law Office
P.O. Box 16789
Boise, Idaho 8383715

RE:

Isaac's Canyon I Day Family Property

Dear Mr. Bohner:
The limited amount of information submitted with your letter of Janu
31, 200 I makes it difficult
to state definitively if the proposed road would meet Highway Distric standards. One deficiency did
stand out. The District standard minimum centerline radius for a loca street is 100-feet. The
drawings indicated at least two comers with a 50~ foot radius. More d tailed plans would be required
for review to detem1ine if the design meets all District standards.
The designation of the road would depend on the land use planned an the volumes of traffic
anticipated. These issues could affect the design standards. For exan le, a local residential street
has different standards than a local commercial street.
The District does require that all public street improvements be desi ed by a professional engineer
licensed in the state ofidaho. The plans would have to be submitted t the District for review and
accepted for public street construction prior to the issuance of a penni to work in the public right~of
way. The right-of-way would need to be dedicated prior to plans ace tance.

If you have any questions you may contact me at 387-6180.
Sincerely,

6~
Planning and Development

DAY00059
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18. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7272
Survey No.:
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106028400

19. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7855
SurveyNo.:
Recorded:
March 27, 2007
Instrument No.:
107043450
20. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7936
Survey No.:
Recorded:
June 7, 2007
Instrument No.:
107081394
21. Mortgage to secure an indebtedness of $6,500,000.00, and any other obligations secured thereby.
Dated:
May 15,2006
Mortgagor:
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho corporation
Mortgagee:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Mmjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as
his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David
R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Recorded:
May 23, 2006
106081744
Instrument No.:
22. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects that property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate.
NOTE A: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not state the subject property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrument No. 100044826 were to state the subject property is appurtenant, the
subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a dedicated roadway. It does connect to
Easement Parcels llA and IIB. We question access over those parcels at this time
NOTED: Ifthe State ofidaho extends the roadway to the North, across Parcel Easements IIA and liB,
access to Eisenman Road is restricted by Instrument No. 96040862, which states the point of access is Station
86+88.83 feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is given for the
access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to the West (Parcel No. 80618314950) is
owned by the Ada County Highway District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide
access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State ofidaho (Parcels IIA and liD) is sufficient for access to
Parcell.
NOTE F: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of the Quarter comer common to
Sections 18 and 19. We question ifthis creates adequate physical access. We have checked the West half of
Section 19 and do not find an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 is not excepted or reserved in Patent recorded as mstrument
No. 100097111, which conveys the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and
the East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. S1618438400)
23. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
24. INTENTIONALLY DELETED

25. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
ALTA Commitment Form 2006

Page 8 of~.f.Y00060

000333

EXHIBIT P
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EXHIBIT Q
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From: Steven Parry
ddjacobs@~indspring.cbm
To:
l/29/2010 5 51:54 PM
Date:
Subject: To49.doc

To:

Bill Smith
Andrew White
Dave Jones
Lana Servatius

From: Steven M Parry
Re:

lsaac Canyon I Day FamiJ Property I Access

The Day family owns a tra t of land east and south of the Isaac Canyon Interchange.
Historically the property had acces from US Highway 30. With the original construction of the
Interstate the property had access om the stock drive public right of way which bordered the interstate.
With the construction ofth Isaac Canyon Interchange the stock drive for this property was
obliterated. At the time the prope between the Day property and Eisman Road was BLM property.
The Department negotiated an easement withdrawal from the BLM for the Section 18 property.
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of e map showing the 2.83 acre easement. After the easement leaves
Section 18 it adjoins public right o way of the Ada County Highway District.
In April 2000 the Federal , ghway Administration granted to the Idaho Transportation
Department the easement that is de icted in Exhibit A. Exhibit B is a copy of the easement. Subsequent
to the grant of the easement the BLM disposed of the property and it is now owned by Dennis Baker.
The disposal was subject to the ealment.
The easement has become ermanent at the location shown on Exhibit A and the Department has
relinquished the old stock drive pu lie right of way.
Pioneer Title has raised qu tions and does not believe they can insure the property due to
defects they perceive in the easeme~t. The easement does not name the adjoining property owner(s) as
the beneficiaries of the easement. While this issue can be debated it is the Title Company that has the
final say on the issue where the De artment is transferring an undeveloped access road eac;ement.
Enclosed as Exhibit Cis a cbpy of a letter I wrote to the Day family attorney in September of
2000 which recounts the meetings ~th ACHD and the preliminary design work that the Department had
done to insure that the new easemebt was on a constructable alignment. The letter closes:

Andrew White and I met wi~ Pioneer Title Company this past week and came up with a solution
that was acceptable to all concerned. The Title Company would accept a recorded acknowledgement to
the Department as title holder ofthb easement from the underlying fee owner The acknowledgement
would need to provide that the pro erty owner acknowledges that the June 2000 easement was for the
purpose of an access road right of ay for the benefit of the Day family and other similarly situated
property o'Wllers.
I don't believe there are any other similarly situated property owners and once the road is
constructed it would be turned ave to the Ada County Highway District. I have prepares a proposed

file://C:\Documents and Settings\u r\Local Settings\Ternp\FD631 B75-C IFB-4E29-B 183-1..
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I

acknowledgement form which I believe would be sufficient. There are other solutions to the problem
but they all involve huge costs (e.gl construction of a local road and turning it over to ACI-ID).
The bottom line is that betl~d
e the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day property
had insurable title to its property a d had a legal right of access. With the construction of the
Interchange they will not be able t provide title insurance without going through litigation.
If the underlying property
er declines to agree to an acknowledgement then the Department
may want to consider a quiet title a tion on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed, executed
by Mary Gray in June of2000.

I
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EXHIBIT R
000338

February 6. 2014

Gary Inselman
AdJ. County Highway District
:~ 775 .\dams Street
G:m!en City, ID 3.3714 V~A E.MA1L
Application for a Temporary Approach- v\·'c•;t Eiscmnarl Hoad

Re:

l

The Idaho rransporti!tion Department .submit~ this application for ai temporary npprnach TO
Ciset_lmarr Road. \.vest ~:ftl:~ fntcrst<tte 84 interclwnge. Th_~ purpose! •J f the n~w appn~ach is to
provtde access to a 19o l ! l D easement that predates the 1I D road\1py transfer to AL.I-1 D.

if: street .:tccess is available

The requested easement will be temporary until an Jltcrnsttvc pub!

thrcugll the adj~Kcnt properties. lTD and ACHD previously agreed to the locations of thrurc
approaches on Eisenman Road. T"be existing cascnu::nl was not idc1hrifieci as one of the futur<:
approach locations. This temporary approach is therel()re needed ulni I a permanent location is
av:tibble a! one of the approved locations.
'
The permanent <lppro;-;ch 1-vill require access rlu·ough one of the adjicent private propt'rti.:s.

None ofthe ad_1acent properties is currently available.
Project I·Ii.~tor-y: This 1.emporar;: approach i.s needed to access an ltD-created easement lo lhc
Day Jlropeny. Figm·e 1 ~hows the location of the D(.ly propeny. The original SO-acre parcei
had direct access to old US 30. lTD purchased right-of-way for intbrsmtc 84 (I-80 North) <Jnd
prohibi t:d access t? the new in tcrstatc highw~y .. lTD_ provided an ·~f.sement (F'igurc 2) for site:
access. turure public street snd a srock road. !h1s onglllal cascmcJ1jt par~dlckd Intcrsmte 84.
I

The original casem<::nt <tnd stock road were relocJted with the constb.!ction of the !vficmn
In1crchange. TTD conLracled with the Day Family tor the revised citscment (Figure 3). Th"'
<tdpcent land owners also developed an informal :1cccss route ihat undocumented lmt still in

it

c~r.· '·'"' arH .Yh) ·
ng.1t-ot-way contracts
lL~sl·e.1cnowtion
thm the eascmcnr is for a
·,,I

the

.

.~<:'lgm·es

I

it,

d

"I I

.

, / .

ew1 t 1c ongmal

"Future public road."

3~1C!

. I
I
rev1sec agreements 8Lll.

!
I

Figure 5 illustrates the Eiscrumm Road location of the present easetncnt and the sctXm.Ilion
distance from adjacent intersections. :Figure 6 illustrates the spcciljic lTD mxi ACHD road,.vay
segments on Eisenman Road. The: handwriting lists the future applflilCh locations identified
during tbe tmnsfer of maintenance. The mccring minutes (Figure 70 show that a future public
road approaches will be determined by ACHD.
f
The existmg casement 3.IH.l the existing approach location ailov,; thcj Day family onh: iimiteJ
IJpportuni Ly lo clevdup tl:eir rural property lo t~1e south. A futme pjtbl ic road is ncedd 1:0
ztccommodme the poten1JaJ s!tc-gcncratcd tralflc volumes
·
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Tllc ioecll<Ut~ u! 1hc: e;J:;cutcnj':; "P!lt\l<tclt du~~:, 1101 meet ACH.D policy (llOS.-'.3) Cu: inter~cc:Liuli
,ep.Jt<ltwn {;)r ;( puL1lic roctcl !nkrse,:tion. Curren! .\CHD policy requires loc~1i slre~Jt spacing on d
prim~ip<ll arrerialul·l ,JlO fe~l from lhe r•illll' t<:rmmnl inrcrscclion. ACl-fD;s corridor plnn
rcquiJ\:;.s OJJ<.>ll<i]finjl.; S[XKiJ~g on this sc:gnicnl (JfEiscnnwn Ro::Id. Th·;~ Day Family cannot
,>Jnstruc l a public >lret::t ar a !location that meet~: 1\CI-ID policies bt~C<lU:>c lJf inil.~rv:::ning property
,J\Vl1ers.

The Dn:<' Fm1l!!_;

doq~5

110\

contrG! <illY

or the p<~rcds '.Vil'h <l pt)l8nti<tl JCCCSS to Eiseunwn

I

Spl:dfic Request: fTD

rcqtlcsl~: <i temporary <tpJxoach to Eisemnnn R.xtd

illti·,e lucarion ol'ihe
:he app!Jca11t tc>r I his upproach. The r~quest~'d approach
1
.
··1
...tor Clf-Ve
' I opmenl cmc I ensure~ t llilt tne
' nunj nccHJ()J1
prov!cc;:;
t !1e D;lys ~. '!1 I1 an opponumly
~;tanciard approach can be eli 11inated ·with the ,·egionat deve!opmenr. The temporary arprc.nch
vvi!! be eliminated with lhc development Ofilll iiltermlliVt~ nublic Slr::et :CiCCcSS.

~xisting east:tlwnL lTD \V(ndc!

.

bi;

1

I

lTD requcsrs

.

slemclard 40-ih approach. Th!s is lTD's stm1clard width to illloi.N one inbound and
t_wu_:luLbow~d travel. lanes. ·b1~ ~onslr_uction wil! requi.rc maintaining lhe cw-rent d:·~inagc . .
l'<!Clllty. addmg :;ub-nase matert<:!l, addmg base lllateJ'iai, and rlanr nm; pC!vement. I be stancldl'C!
-iW. by .:!8'' STOP siun will tle inst:llled t()r the east:mt:n!'s approach ro EisetuJ;;>n Ro<1d.
<1

l'he n.:ces;:;ar:;' J\mns art: att'*hed. Several :naps and mrphotos ure aHachecl. A 1rMfic l'Ontrol

'ohm is attached.

1\n

!TD src:!lndard
clrawin£.>·-· i'or the l -vuical
aoproach
is abo artar.:hed.
!
.
.

]-t'you lu:vc any questions, y~nt may conwc! nh~ d1recLly <11 334.8377.
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l. fulax 20' driveway lilroat wicitfi at lot line per ACHD policy.
2. Max 2% cross-slope in

sidcw~lk@ driveway, per Stanclard Drawing SD-7·tOB

or similar.

:l. Driveway siloulci be caved thbir full width at least 30-feet into !he site beyond tlw 8clge of P8'temerl\ per

.

'

stanr.iarrJ drawing SD-809.
Please alia ch corn mcnts and! a uela iled dr,nvi;JCJ of proposted project for this subm i ti·a I.
,J-\oplicafions 'Nit.houf· ;.1 cfetaiibcl

.

I

dr~:n~;ing

vJill be dei<1yed

U~Of'i J~PPROI!PL i~Ei111E~JiBER! !\ PERPJliT IS STILL REO UIRED BEFORE COI\IS-!"RUCTIOf\J :3EGII\JS!
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Inc .. a ..:orpor2.tior:. dub o:rgauiz,;d and Gx:i.sdng und.er the law& afth'~ Si:atc of
Idaho, und having its1J:incipa1 n.ffice in ldilho at 12 Mesa Vist~ Dr. BoistJ, in i:hc:
Couut;y of .Acia, Ch·ant.of·, for value :;·eceivecl, does herehy gran~ tJIYi:o thr;- S0.'A'.I'E

OE' IDAHO, mAHO

I

'I~j?.AJ'IfSPOJVlWJ'10N DJ.l1P.A~11rl;J\IfEN'l',
..

I

IDAJIO rrJ.iA.1'1SPO:R.T.:).TI03:-I'BOA:R.D, G1·antea,

!~311

by <Jml througJ.1

i;h·~

'YVeat Stnte ;::;tl·eet, Boise,

I
Idaho 83'703, and its .succe::sors unci JWsigns, an easement and l'ighi: to go upon,
or:CL\py,

and

l1S0

a po:rU~n of NE:U4SW:i.M uf Se~;lion 181 Township 02 North, R.::ragG
!

IJS East, Boise, lvieridi~n, in Ada Count'}, Idaho, (hscribed us follows, to-wit:

i

.A s~rip of iand 5~}.0 feet wide on ~he Westerly side of the right of way
bour,dnry of Interstate 84,Project No. N"'-I-84-2(047)59 Highway
Survey, .at~ 8.ho>.v~ on the pla.ns thereof now on file in the o£.-'ico of the
fcialw T:ransport~tion Department, and :as described in that c8l""tain
V:larrauty Deed tp the Micron 'reclmology Inc. executed by the
Grantor h~rein op. the .6!-!'\:lay ofi!tiay, 19961 and lyi:ng between
Eiser..m2n Hoad $u.l·...,tey Station 86 + 38.83 as shown on said Hi:;dnvay
Survey and GJ'a9tor's Southerly p:cope1:ty line.
I

THE PtJRPpsB OF CO'NS'I:'R.UCTING OR IN'S'f:lJ..LTNG TEEEEON n

I?OR

:?.t1jck Drive <we Fu\;ur, Public Hoacl by the state Gf Idaho or lts

<1gen~s

m·

cvntractvr.s.
The aforesaid

fachi~;; once established ::;hall remaiu.

cr installed for its i.Gte.nded
:

PtU"Pusc;

....

-

and shaH not bre :rc;moved
or reJ.oee.ted by th•:o
.

.
'
Gran to!·, ii:.'.'i suer:esso:-s .;r.ncl .a;;::dgn."l, without the p1·.ior
Tra.nspor~~d:iou Dep:J.rtn~'":c.i;,

ju place as consl;rur:.ted

~pprovaJ

of the Idaho

ot' .it:; <\s.sir:,rns.

i

i

H.ECORD AT 'rfiE.D IU!iQUTilS~r Oft' 'L'H.B ST.!L'TE OF illLI1Ci
VEE BXB;MP':P- J.C. a7-230:L
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r~u·;r

:Lictlc, A.CHD ~c:ailio Engim;~.,·

S/.;Ve Spio!d:!.ru.ier, ACFfl:i Finn.1 & Eu.!w;yc St:(.•:i·•i:Jc;;

l.arcy Sc.lc, ACHD D:!'tdopmc.:l( kktvk::;;
.l. Brem Smilli, J}fFOTEK W'f.i cu:::.sulfa1~t.
.~ D. Crii~Jc•j F:;ujr.ic;r Coorc:liJ.w.tor
T!ii~ WJ~~ti!Jff_'A'!JS ;e:r;.~;:.Jt~5 ~c l1IC~LJ.ppro,~r: tht~ Jo,.~jjca:: u:~i1tmn; app~·c.llchr;:~ f:.1J.~~-r :1~:'-\~'

~a·'vtol;ectl!:;!) being ~t'.'/C~:.;d. Tht:i.H; rva4w:ty:;·."'vViil. :!G~~ und~l· AGI'"1_Tf
3uri:;di.::ticu wi:~n r;o{.l!Hi"t:ctt;i.and :dl ;;v'ociJat;h.;:; wiU IJ~ ,;o::J.:itnJcwd ':c A.G-ID :;randfl:do.
;'<J8d..,.lf(tys
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me:::;ting 1?-.Jml helci
Augusr 26, l996 :u; Ada County Higb.we..y DL<:trip: (ACI-ID),
ra prederamliz!e ~ armroa.cll.1ocm:iotul.
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T'er.l"l; Littl€, fo.iQID TliZ.f& ~7
Stt-ve Sp~a~J.#a>., A.CHO J?J~ & ,Slli'VeJIE Supe!:'ViSJr
La.-zy Sale, AG&-ID LJ.evel.opmem .S~~
I. B!;&aiL

R. D.

~mi~ ~~OTEK fi!W ~t!SUltiu:tt

Cn·§~ .!;''t01@ct CoQ-zclingt;;)b'
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.
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T'nis rneetfu.g ~-~ rc;:q_ti!l:s'red Co pga=approve thlill.or;;:,uions cf .fu.."?'!..t\·Ol ay;Jproache_!l from ne~r
road.v."2.ys ta pro~~ !being severed. T'nGSe roadw":ys v.rill c:omr:J Im.da- -~-CI:ID
juri~diGtiCJn 'Wfum codtruc"lGcl and all a-gproooh.t;;;; will be c.on..c:u-u~ci'ta ACHJJ smnda.."'Cis.
D1re to poasfrlk: t:o:a.:ili#; '\'lri.th trnffic ~v~ero: it is p_eces.say t£1 limit new ..pproach:;s.
Tnas~

!.

!imiwz:icn:ta m:e ~ foilo'.:.ts:
Ft=:der;ll Way (e~.isri.:ng) AC:E-ID s-L.Eiidard a.pproach policy.
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.~-·

S m:don !1:6+0(}.:;;: Ri!?,hT. - public road cofl.D.ecrion w
be constju:r::tcd
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t;;;-i sri:ng

FerlB?3l Y./r:.y r,rill
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EXHIBIT T
000358

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

P. 0. Box 8028
Boise, ID 83707-2028

(208) 334-8300

itd.idaho. gov

March 21,2014
Ada County Highway District Commission
Ada County Highway District
3775 Adams Street
Garden City, ID 83 714 VIA EMAIL

Re:

April2, 2014 AppeaJ to the ACHD Commission- Appeal of a Staff Level Decision
for a Temporary Approach to West Eisenman Road
\

The Idaho Transportation Department requests a temporary deferral of our April 2, 2014
Commission agenda item. lTD staff will contact the Commission to reschedule at a later date.
We thank the Commission for your understanding and continued support of our interagency
relationships. If you have any questions, you may contact me directly at 334.8377.
Sincerely,

Dave Szplett
Development Services Manager
dave.szplett@itd.idaho.gov
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EXHIBIT U
000360

BO NER LAW OFFICE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
A.J. Bohner, Attorney at Law
Karen L. Weybright, Administrative As istant

7280 Ustick Road
Post Office Box 16789
Boise, Idaho 83715
Telephone: (208) 376-5595
Facsimile: (208) 376-0998
E-Mail: bohnerlaw@gmail.com

August 28, 2015

J. Timothy Thomas
Idaho Attorney General's Offic
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83 707

Re:

Day Fa ily Property Located at Isaac's Canyon

Dear Tim:

Following our m eting, my clients discussed the question as to whether or not
they prefer ITD to give them th money to build the road or whether ITD should build the road.
My clients would respectfully r quest that lTD take on the responsibility to build the road since it
has the expertise and knowledg in what needs to be done. Our clients would have to hire
independent contractors to do e same. I trust this will work with ITD and I request a time table
when this would be undertaken d completed, and what input you would request of my clients
with reference to the same.
Thank you for y ur attention to this matter and in working with us in getting this
endeavor completed. It is great appreciated by myself and my clients.
Sincere~y y~~rs,

,.

/
_,..

•' ./~-

...,.,.....·

<--'./

·' A.J. Bohner
AJB:kw
cc: client
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EXHIBIT V
000362

Gmall -Day Prop

511612016

Work (208) 332-7191

Fax (208) 334-8917

jim.morrison@itd.idaho.gov

"'"CONF!DENTiAUTf NClTI.CE This &-mail message rnay contain legally privileged and coJlfidential
mformation exempt or prohibited frorn disclosure under applicable law. If vou am not the 1ntended rec1pient of
this e-mail, please notify this sender lmtnedlaiely and do not deliver. distribute or copy this e.. mc1il. or disclose its
coni Hnts or tah: any e~ction in rel1ance on !·he information il conlainf>

From: Donna Jacobs [mailto:donnadjacobs@gmail.com]

Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 10:33 AM
To: Amy Revis; Jim Morrison (Property Manager); Ben Day; andrewjacobsiv; nm Thomas
Subject: Fwd: Day Prop
[Quoted text hidden)

Gary lnselman <ginselman@achdidaho.org>
Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:19 AM
To: "Jim Morrison (Property Manager)" <Jim. Morrison@itd.idaho.gov>, Oonna Jacobs <donnadjacobs@gmaii.Mm>,
Amy Revis <Amy.Revfs@itd.idaho.gov>, Ben Day <benday@spro.net>, andrewjacobsiv
<andrewjacobsiv@gmail.com>, Tim Thomas <Tim.Thomas@itd.idaho.gov>

Jim,
To clarify, what I said is that ACHD will not accept a public street between the off ramp and the future
Lake Hazei/Eisenman intersection wllich is approximately 1800-feet from the current gate. There are
existing accesses in this area today. ACHD is not commenting on these accesses nor stating that
ACHD will restrict or alter them in any way.

Thanks,
Gary.

Gary lnseiman
Development Services Manager
Ada County Highway District
3775 N. Adams Street
Garden City, ID 83714

Office: ( 208) 387-6170
Fax:

(208) 387-6393
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Electronically Filed
5/26/2017 4:22:09 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB # 1687
Loren K. Messerly, ISB /17434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 013ERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

CaseNo.: CV01-16-20313

NOTICE OF ERRATA

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs in Support o{

Plaint?ffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation
Defense, dated and filed May 17, 2017, included 22 exhibits consisting of 82 pages. All exhibits
were attached to the affidavit, but one of those exhibits, Exhibit P (as referenced in paragraph 21
of Ms. Jacobs' Affidavit and consisting of one page of a title insurance policy from Pioneer Title
Insurance Company) and the face sheet for Exhibit P, were reversed. To clarify and avoid any
NOTICE OF ERRATA- 1
19807-001 I 948559

000364

potential confusion , the face sheet for Exhibit P and Exhibit P itself are attached to this Notice of
Errata in the correct sequence.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2017.

Fredric V.
oemaker I Loren K. Messerly
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of May, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D

D
D
l:8J

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: chri s.kronberg@ itd.idaho. gov

DATED this 26th day ofMay, 2017.

NOTICE OF ERRATA - 2
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EXHIBIT P
000366

18. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
l06028400
Instrument No.:
19. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7855
Recorded:
March 27, 2007
Instrument No.:
107043450
20. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7936
June 7, 2007
Recorded:
Instrument No.:
107081394
21. Mortgage to secure an indebtedness of $6,500,000.00, and any other obi igations secured thereby.
Dated:
May 15, 2006
Mortgagor:
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho corporation
Mortgagee:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Mmjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as
his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David
R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Recorded:
May 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106081744
22. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ics) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.

Affects that property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate.
NOTE A: Easement Instnunent No. 100044826 does not state the subject property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrumt-"11t No. I 00044826 were to state the subject property is appurtenant, the
subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a dedicated roadway. It docs connect to
Easement Parcels IIA and IIB. We question access over those parcels at this time
NOTED: If the State of Idaho extends the roadway to the North, across Parcel Easements IIA and IIB,
access to Eisenman Road is restricted by Instrument No. 9604D862, which states the point of access is Station
86+88.83 feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is given for the
access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to the West (Parcel No. S061 83 I4950) is
owned by the Ada County Highway District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide
access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State ofidaho (Parcels IIA and IIB) is sufficient for access to
ParcelL
NOTE F: Easement Instrumt:nt No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of the Quarter comer common to
Sections I 8 and 19. We question if this creates adequate physical access. Wc have checked the West half of
Section 19 and do not find an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Tnstrummt No. I 00044826 is not excepted or reserved in Patent recorded as Instrument
No. 100097 I 11, which conveys the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and
the East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section I 8,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. SI 618438400)
23. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
24. INTENTIONALLY DELETED

25. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
ALTA Commitment form 2006
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Electronically Filed
5/31/2017 2:57:46 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Loren K. Messerly, ISB #7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOl-IN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT FACTS
This case involves inverse condemnation and contract claims that have their roots

111

contracts dating back to 1961. The Plaintiffs own approximately 300 acres of prime development
property, but the property cannot be developed because the State took the property's unfettered,
direct, frontage access to a main highway of the public road system and the State failed to
comply with its promise to restore similar access.
The Day family has been patiently waiting for the State to do the right thing and comply
with its promises. From 1935-1961, the Day family owned the Property that was bisected by the
main highway in and out of the Treasure Valley, State Highway 30. (Affidavit of Donna Day
Jacobs, filed on May 17, 2017 ("1st Jacobs Aff."), ~2.) The Property had unfettered, direct access
to State Highway 30, along 1000 feet of frontage, the type of access it needed for future
development. (!d.,

~~

2-3.) In 1961, the State built the federal interstate over the top of State

Highway 30 and took all access rights from the bisected Prope1iy. (!d.,

~,[6,

Exs. B-D.) The Day

family cooperated with that taking, turning over those access rights in exchange for future good
faith negotiations with the State regarding compensation. (!d.) In 1967, the State and Day family
finalized those negotiations with a Right-of-Way Contract ("ROW Contract") that said access
rights to the Property would be through a "future frontage road." (!d.)
Thus, after the State's taking, direct, frontage access to State Highway 30 was replaced
by a promise of direct, frontage access on the future frontage road. To be developable to its
highest and best use and thereby retain its value before access was taken, the Property had to
have its direct public road access restored. To that end, the State obtained a public right-of-way
that paralleled the interstate and showed the general, anticipated location of the "future frontage
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2
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road." (Jd.,

~

8 & Ex. G.) This right-of-way for the future frontage road bisected the Property,

showing how access would be restored through the future construction of the frontage road. (Id.)
The frontage road, Eisenman Road, finally came near the Property in approximately
1997, with the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange less than a mile from the Property.
(!d., ~~ 9-13 & Ex. G.) However, thirty years had passed since the State made its 1967 promise,

and perhaps the State's institutional memory waned. The State built over the existing public
right-of-way that had bisected the Property for thirty years and had been a placeholder for the
future frontage road that would restore the Property's direct public road access. (Jd.) The State
obtained public road easements for the frontage road, Eisenman Road, but moved the location of
Eisenman Road so that it did not bisect the Property (reneging on the promise of the frontage
road bisecting the Property). (Id.)
The State instead obtained additional public road easements in an effort to connect
Eisenman Road with the Property (crossing two other parcels). (!d.) The road easements the
State obtained were deficient in numerous ways and could not actually be used for restoration of
access similar to what had been taken from the Property in 1961-1967. For example, these new
road easements were too narrow and located through terrain where no public road could be built
to the Property that was comparable to either the historic pre-1961 frontage along State
Highway 30, or comparable to the promised direct frontage road access, or that would comply
with known ACHD road building requirements. (Id.,

,1~

13-19 & Exs. H-0.) Even more

remarkably, the State failed to negotiate an agreement with ACHD that a public road could be

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3
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connected to the existing public road system at the location of the road easements, 1.e. no
"approach."' (Jd., ~~ 23, 25-26 & Exs. R-S.)
The Day family informed the State that the public road easements from Eisenman Road
to their Property could never be used to build a public road to the Property and restore the
Property's direct access. (Jd.,

~,[13-19

& Exs. H-0.) The State recognized its failing regarding

the location of easements and told the Day family that this access issue would be fixed. (Id.) The
State waived the statute of limitation in exchange for the Day family not filing suit while the
State worked to fix the access issue. (Id.) The Day family believed the State's assurance that this
was only a temporary taking of access that would be restored. (Id.)
The State tried numerous approaches to fix the access so that an acceptable public road
providing similar access could be built to the Property from Eisenman Road. (Id.) The Day
family continued to monitor the State's efforts for two decades (1998-2016) while the State tried
to find a solution. In the meantime, Eisenman Road was built over its new easements to connect
with the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, coming within less than a mile of the Property. The State
unsuccessfully attempted to also have a road constructed from the finished Eisenman Road to the
Property. (Id., ,[,[25-28 & Exs. R-U.)

1

A public right-of-way has two universal requirements, neither of which were obtained by the State here. Any
connection to the existing public road system must have an approved "approach." Secondly, the public right-of-way
must be "dedicated" to and "accepted" by the ACHD. See I.C. Section 40-202; ACHD Policy Manual, Section
7212.3.6, states:
Acceptance. After Commission approval of the request to accept the road into the public system the
applicant shall dedicate the right-of-way for the road by donation to the District free of all liens and
encumbrances. The applicant shall provide a legal description for the road right-of-way prepared by a
professional land surveyor licensed in the State of Idaho. The District will prepare the deed and obtain a
title report. The applicant shall be responsible to remove all encumbrances not acceptable to the District
prior to recordation of the deed. The official date of final acceptance of the road by the District for public
maintenance shall be the date the deed is recorded by the District. (Emphasis added.)

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT- 4
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In 2016, the Plaintiffs learned that the State was permanently prohibited from having a
public road at the location of the terminus ofthe road easements. (Jd.,

,]~

29-31 & Ex. V.) Thus,

the Property's only access to the public roads is over approximately one mile of easements where
no public road can be built. (Jd.) This greatly diminished access is not comparable to what was
taken in 1961-67; not comparable to what was promised in 1967 as future substitute access; not
comparable even to what existed from 1967-1996 as placeholder access; not what the State
intended to be the access after 1997-98; and not the access necessary to develop the Property. 2
Having lost its direct access to the public roads (and therefore its ability to be developed
for its highest and best use\ the Property lost its value as prime development property and is
now valued only as grazing property. The Plaintiffs, as the owners of the Property, brought this
suit to recover that lost value.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs filed suit on November 1, 2016. The State filed for partial summary
judgment on April 28, 2017 ("State's Motion"). The Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial

2

The State also failed to provide marketable and insurable access, which from a title insurance company
perspective, was absolutely necessary to bonow on or develop the Property. (Aff. of Donna Day Jacobs, ,]21, Ex. P)
This deficiency is not addressed in this Memorandum. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs regarding the State's failure to
provide access does not require consideration of this insurable title deficiency.
3
The compensation which must be paid for property taken by eminent domain does not necessarily depend upon
the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking; rather, all the uses for which the prope11y is suitable should
be considered in determining market value.

Ada County Highway Dist. v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656,658,662 P.2d 237,239 (1983).
The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in
the reasonably near future is to be considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the full
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the property. It must be
shown that the use for which the property is claimed to be adaptable is reasonably probable.

Eag)e Sewer Dis/. v. 1/ormaechea, I 09 Idaho 418, 707 P.2d I 057 (Ct. App. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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summary judgment on May 17, 2017 ("Plaintiffs' Motion"), which addresses several topics
related to the State's Motion. The State's Motion addresses five issues.
Regarding Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims arising out of the ROW Contract, the
State is taking the position that it immediately fulfilled all of its contractual obligations in 1967
and had no further obligations in 1997 or otherwise. The State claims that the agreement to
provide access to the "future frontage road" was not actually tied to any "future" road; rather, the
State claims that it contemporaneously complied with the ROW Contract by providing an
undeveloped public right-of-way that ran alongside Interstate 80N for many miles and that
passed through the Property. Alternatively, the State argues that any breach of the ROW Contract
is limited to damages to the approximately 160 acre parcel owned by the Day family in 1967 (as
opposed to the entire 300 acres for two adjoining parcels that the Day family owned as of 1979).
Regarding the Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, the State argues that certain of the
Plaintiffs are not the proper parties because they were not owners of the Property at the time of
any taking in 1997-1998.
Regarding both the contract and inverse condemnation claims, the State argues that any
alleged breach of the ROW Contract or taking of access occurred in 1997 or 1998 (Plaintiffs
agree that an initial taking and breach occurred at that time). The State makes that argument
undoubtedly as a precursor to arguing that the statute of limitation ran on those claims, despite
the State having expressly told the Day family in writing that it would not raise the statute of
limitation defense. The State further argues that any damages from any of the Plaintiffs' claims
must be reduced by the approximately $4.85 million that a third-party paid towards the purchase
of the Property in 2005. As discussed below, all of the State's arguments are incorrect (save its

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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assertion that a taking and breach of contract actually occurred in 1997 -98). The State's Motion
should be denied and the Plaintiffs' Motion should be granted.
III. ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract and inverse condemnation arise out of a similar set
of facts but have several significant legal differences. Therefore, the inverse condemnation and
breach of contract claims are discussed separately below.
A.

Plaintiffs' Inverse Condemnation Claims
1.

The Taking in 1997-98 Is Not Barred By the Statute of Limitation.

The State asks the Court to find that any inverse condemnation claims arose in 1997-98.
The State indubitably intends to bring a subsequent motion claiming that a taking in 1997-98 is
barred by the four year statute of limitation for inverse condemnation actions. As discussed
below, a taking of access did occur in 1997-98, but it is not barred by the statute of limitation
that was explicitly waived.
a.

The Taking of Direct Public Road Access in 1997-98.

The parties disagree about the meaning of the 1967 ROW Contract about access.
However, this difference of opinion is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim: under
any scenano, an initial taking of access rights without just compensation occurred in
approximately 1997-98. See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 291-96, 328 P.2d 397, 399-402
(1958) (impairment of a right of access constituted a "taking of property"); see also State v. Hi
Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 337-41, 282 P.3d 595, 598-602 (2012) ("We have long held that

access to an adjacent public way-even in the absence of an expressly deeded right-is one of
the incidents ofland ownership, the taking of which may require compensation.").

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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Plaintiffs believe that the intent of the ROW Contract was for the State to take actions in
the future: when a frontage road was extended to the Property in the future then the State would
ensure that the frontage road was located (and then built) to bisect the Property and restore the
Property's direct access to the public roads. In contrast, the State argues that the intent of the
ROW Contract was for the State to take contemporaneous action to wholly fulfill the contract:
providing the unimproved, public right-of-way running from the existing public roads, parallel to
I-SON, over several miles of undeveloped land, and eventually bisecting the Property. (See
State's Motion at p. 4.) The State claims this public right-of-way was the "future frontage road"
referred to in the ROW Contract and nothing more was required to restore the Property's access.
(!d.)''

Under both interpretations of the ROW Contract, the State is liable for taking the
Property's direct public road access without just compensation. For example, the State admits
that it complied with the ROW Contract by establishing the public right-of-way as the "future
fi·ontage road" to provide access to the Property by bisecting the Property. (See State's Motion.)
Yet, by 1997-98, it is indisputable that the State built over and moved the location of that
frontage road right-of-way so that it no longer bisected the Property and no longer could provide
the contractually agreed upon access. (See supra pp. 2-3.) It is indisputable that the State has not
provided a new comparable access to Eisenman Road. (See supra pp. 4-5.) Thus, even under the

4

That the permanent location of the "future frontage road" was not known in 1961-1967 is evident from the 1961
Agreement. It references the future construction of another "interchange" (I ' 1 Jacobs Aff., Ex. A.) that could only be
what became the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, not built until thirty years later. The State did not know where it
would build this future interchange, so it also did not know exactly where it would eventually route the frontage
road.
The State also urges that the plans attached to James Morrison's Affidavit memorialize the extent of the State's
promise made in the 1967 ROW Contract. However, it is unlikely that these plans, showing revision dates from" 118-68" to "2-23-68" could be "plans referenced in [the 1967] ROW Contract" as the State contends. (State's
Motion, p. 4.)
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State's interpretation of the 1967 ROW Contract, it gave the promised access but then took it all
back thirty years later, leaving the Property with no direct access to the frontage road.
Under all scenarios, in 1961-196i the State took the Property's direct access to the
public roads; in 1967 the State promised to restore that direct access through a frontage road;
from 1967-1997 the undeveloped frontage road right-of-way promised direct access by bisecting
the Property; but in 1997 the State moved the original frontage road right-of-way, eliminating the
Property's direct access to the public roads, and replaced that access with "access" through
easements that cannot be used for a public right-of-way. (See supra Part I.) This is a clear taking
of access rights without just compensation, and the Plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary
judgment asking the Court to recognize that taking. (See Plaintiffs' Motion, Part IV.A-C.)

b.

1997-98 Taking Not Barred by Statute of Limitation That Was Expressly
Waived and State Is Estopped From Reneging On Its Waiver.

Plaintitis' Motion also addressed the statute of limitation issue. (See Plaintiffs' Motion,
Part IV.D.) Plaintiffs will not repeat their arguments in full here. The important point is that the
State explicitly agreed, in writing, that it would not raise the statute of limitation defense if the
Plaintiffs deferred litigation and allowed the State to work on fixing the access issue. (1st Jacobs
Aff.,

~~

17-18, 33-34 & Ex. M.) The Plaintiffs relied upon that agreement and the State cannot

now change course and claim that its express waiver was something different and limited in
some undisclosed way. See, e.g., Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457-58,259 P.3d
595, 603-04 (2011) ("A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or

5

Under the 1961 Agreement, the Day family gave up "all access rights ... in exchange for the State's promise to
"negotiate in good faith" and to eventually pay "a fair and reasonable price"; in 1967 by a separate ROW Contract,
the State paid $6,000 and promised access from "the future frontage road and stock drive" on the SW side of I-80N.
The property and access rights surrendered were formally transferred by warranty deed recorded on
November 10, 1967. Thus, the timeframe referred to is 1961-1967.
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advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance
upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment."); Tipton v. Partner's Mgmt.

Co., 773 A.2d 488, 490 (Md. 2001) ("Any statute of limitations can be waived by agreement of
the parties."); Hughes v. Davidson-Hues, 330 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) ("By
comparison, the statute of limitations generally extinguishes contractual rights at a certain date,
but parties can agree to waive application of the statute.").
The State has a constitutional obligation to provide just compensation for a taking of
access rights (Idaho Constitution, Article I, § 14) and it is morally and contractually obligated to
stand by its promise to not use the statute of limitation defense to avoid that constitutional
obligation. See, e.g., AgStar Fin. Servs., ACA v. Nw. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 161 Idaho 801, 391
P.3d 1271 (2017) ("This Court has consistently held that freedom of contract is 'a fundamental
concept underlying the law of contracts and is an essential element of the free enterprise
system."'). The Day family members, including the Plaintiffs, have collectively remained true to
their word for sixty years since the State's initial taking, and they expect the State to do the same.
If the State is going to renege on its express promise regarding the statute of limitation,
effectively attempting to double cross the Day family, then this Court should find that the State is
equitably estopped from now denying its written waiver. See, e.g., Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho
50, 54,480 P.2d 896,900 (1971) ("All the elements of equitable estoppel are shown in this case
and we hold respondent is estopped to deny the existence of a valid contract. . . . Even if
respondent had a legal right to question the validity of the contract ... he waived his right to
challenge it on that basis."); see also Twin Falls Clinic & Hasp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho
19, 22, 644 P .2d 341, 344 (1982) ("Although this Court has never passed upon the question of
whether a party can be estopped from pleading a statute of limitations, such has been well
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established in other jurisdictions .. .. ");Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 464, 210 P.3d 563,
572 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent assertion of a statute of
limitation defense if the defendant's statements or conduct caused the plaintiff to refrain from
prosecuting an action during the limitation period.").
Plaintiffs ask this Court to grant summary judgment preventing the State from gomg
back on its word both as to access and as to the statute of limitation defense. (See also Plaintiffs'
Motion, Part IV.A-D.)
2.

The Failed Sale of the Property Has No Relevance to Damages or Mitigation.

The State claims that any damages must be reduced by the approximately $4.85 million

6

that Craig Groves paid towards the purchase ofthe Property from 2005 to 2008. The State claims
that this money was paid to mitigate Plaintiffs damages from the taking of access. As explained
below, the funds from Groves are completely unrelated to Plaintiffs damages from the State's
taking of access and have not mitigated any ofthe Plaintiffs' damages.
Plaintiffs are required to "take such steps as would reasonably tend to mimmize
damages." Casey v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 299, 305, 379 P.2d 409, 412 (1963).
Here, the damages from the taking of direct access to the public roads are the loss in value of the
Property owned by the Plaintiffs since it can no longer be used for its highest and best use. To
mitigate those damages from loss of access, the Plaintiffs must take "reasonable" steps to minimize
the lost prope11y value. Plaintiffs have done that. They waited two decades hoping that the State
could fix the access issue as promised. (1 51 Jacobs Aff., ,],]13-30.) The Plaintiffs cooperated with all
of the State's efforts to fix the access. (!d.) Plaintiffs are not required to do anything more to resolve

6

Groves sought to purchase the 300 acres and actually paid this amount toward those 300 acres. These amounts
were paid over time from 2005 to 2008.
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an issue that the State created. See, e.g., State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. P 'ship, 148
Idaho 718, 728, 228 P.3d 985, 995 (2010) (quoting trial couti's jury instruction: "[N]either the City
of Twin Falls nor the State of Idaho can require a land owner to join with adjacent property owners
for the purpose of providing access to the subject propetiy in an attempt to cure the access taken by
the condemnation of Canyon Vista [sic] access rights to Pole Line Road.").
The sale to Craig Groves had nothing to do with mitigation. It was an attempted sale of the
Property, despite its lack of access that at the time was understood to be in the process of being
corrected by the State. (1 51 Jacobs Aff., ~,[20-21.) The money that the Plaintiffs obtained through the
temporary sale to Groves has not in any way mitigated or decreased the damages that they have
suffered from the decrease of the value of the Property. Rather, the Plaintiffs still own the Property
and the Property has lost most of its value.
There is no unjust windfall, as claimed by the State. A property owner is always entitled to
the value of his property plus any amounts that he/she can gross from ownership of the property.

7

Here, the Plaintiffs received some money from ownership of the Property and their agreement with
Groves. They are entitled to those funds. Plaintiffs remain entitled to the full value of the Propetiy
and any just compensation for the taking of the Property's full value. The only potential windfall
would be to the State if it is allowed to apply a third-party payment to the Plaintiffs to reduce the
State's obligation to pay just compensation for the taking of access.
That the damages from the taking have not been mitigated/reduced by the patiial sale
proceeds paid by Craig Groves is best demonstrated by comparing what the Plaintiffs would own
(a) with the taking and (b) without the taking. With the taking, the Plaintiffs have the $4.85 million
from Groves plus a Property with no direct public road access that is not valued for its highest and
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best use and is instead valued as grazing land. If no taking had occurred, then the Plaintiffs would
still have the $4.85 million from Groves plus they would have a Property valued higher based on its
8

highest and best use as mixed use or residential development property. Thus, damages from the
State's taking have not been reduced by the Groves payment and mitigation or offset against
damages has no application. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on this issue. See Farmers

Nat'! Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 855, 318 P.3d 622, 624 (20 14) ("A district
court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own
motion with the court.").
3.

The Plaintiffs Have Standing to Claim Inverse Condemnation Damages.

The State argues that four of the six Plaintiffs lack standing to bring inverse condemnation
claims because they did not own the Property at the time of the initial taking in 1997-98. As
discussed below, the Plaintiffs are the rightful beneficiaries of intra-family transfers of all takings
claims against the State and are therefore the proper Plaintiffs in this action.

9

The State cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that only a property owner at
the time of the alleged taking can have standing to sue for damages for the alleged taking. The State

7

The failed sale to Groves is no different than if the Day family had rented the Property for three years from
2005-2008 and was paid $100,000 total. The State would have no more right to claim that the $100,000 should be
considered as mitigating Plaintiffs' damages than it would for the $4.85M Groves paid.
8
By example, although neither party has submitted expeti reports or placed any value for just
compensation on the record, a comparison based on hypothetical values is as follows:

WITI-IOUT TAKING
Property Value
Groves Payment
Net Result

$15,000,000
$ 4,850,000
$19,850,000

WITH TAKING
Property Value
Groves Payment
Just Compensation Sought
Net Result

$ 2,000,000
$ 4,850,000
$13,000,000
$19,850,000

9

Similarly, though not addressed by the State, Plaintiffs are the proper holders of all breach of contract claims.
All ROW Contract rights were transferred jointly with the Property intra-family since 1967. All ROW Contract
breach claims have been transferred jointly with the Propetiy intra-family since 1997-98. The State does not appear
to contest that issue.
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argues that this rule is logical because the subsequent grantee of the property has likely acquired the
property for a lesser value based on the taking and the alleged condemnor should not be subject to
suit by each subsequent grantee of the prope1ty. This rule, of course, is not meant to protect the
condemnor from liability for the taking; rather, it is a rule for determining (where there are
subsequent transfers of the prope1ty) which owner in the chain of title is entitled to recover the
damages from the taking.
Here, the Prope1ty is currently owned differently than it was owned when the initial taking
occurred in 1997-98. In 1997, the Property was owned by: three siblings (Ben Day 119, Donna
Day Jacobs 1/9, David R. Day 119), their uncle Bob Day 113, and the living trust of their other
uncle (Ernest and Lois Day Living Trust 113). (See Second Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs, filed
11

concurrently ("2 ct Day Aff. "), ,] 21.) By 2016, at the time of the permanent taking and filing of
this lawsuit, the Property was still owned by two siblings (Donna Day Jacobs 1/9, David Day

1/9) but the rest of the ownership had changed based on three transfers: in 1998, Bob Day
transferred his ownership

to

each of the living trusts for his brothers (Plaintiff Donald M. Day

and Mmjorie Day Family Trust tracks its 119 ownership to that transfer); later in 1998, the Ernest
and Lois Day Living Trust transferred half of its ownership to each of Ernest and Lois' two boys
(Plaintiffs Dan E. Day 114 and John F. Day 1/4); and in 2013 Ben Day transferred his ownership
interest to his own separate business entity (Plaintiff Holcomb Rd LLC 116). (!d.,

~,]22-24.)

Note

that all of these transfers occurred during the period that the State was indicating that direct
access would be restored and the taking would not be permanent.
The State is apparently arguing that the law requires a defunct Living Trust (the Ernest
and Lois Day Living Trust) to file the lawsuit rather than the two sons of the Grantors of the trust
who inherited all the assets from that trust; that Ben Day is apparently required to file the lawsuit
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rather than the entity to which he transferred all of his rights in the Property; and that the estate
of Donna Day Jacobs' deceased uncle, Bob Day, is required to file the lawsuit rather than the
functioning living trust that received his assets. The State appears to be hoping that it can escape
condemnation liability by forcing defunct entities or deceased persons to raise the claim. The
State is misapplying a narrow legal rule that has relevance to arm's length transfers of the
Property rather than intra-family gift transfers.
The narrow rule cited by the State is solely applicable to situations where there are
competing owners claiming the right to sue for a single taking. The purpose of this rule is to
avoid the condemnor having to pay a condemnation claim twice if the "wrong" party is paid.
Only in that situation does the law in some jurisdictions create a standing rule that allocates the
claim to the party who owned the property at the time of the taking.
Here, however, there is no debate about who owns the rights to recover from the taking,
and there is no one waiting in the wings to sue the State again for the same damages the
Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs do not dispute that it was the "owner of the property at the time of the
taking who [was] entitled to compensation" and who could have raised a personal claim. 2-5
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.01 [5][d][i] (2017). Those owners, however, then gifted their

ownership of the Property and any related claims to their relatives. (2nd Day Aff., ,],]22-24.) The
Property changed ownership between family members, or their succession planning entities, and
with gift transfers. (!d.)
None of the Property's pnor owners (from 1997-98) transferred their interest in the
Property for value in an arm's length sale such that they might claim damages from the taking.
(!d.) In addition, two of the three transfers happened in 1998, when the owners had no idea that

the taking of access was going to be permanent or would permanently decrease the value of the
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Property. (!d.) See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Ricards, 515 P.2d 585, 586-88 (Cal. 1973) (discussing
temporary taking of access and limited type of damages and finding no damages because access
restored a couple years later). Thus, these transferors certainly did not receive less in the transfer
based on the yet unknown taking.
In sum, the current Plaintiffs are the parties that own the taking rights that arose in 199798 and have been passed down within the Day family. There is no evidence that any prior owners
might actually claim a competing right to damages from the taking. Even if there were evidence
of other parties with a claim to those original taking rights, then the proper response is not to
dismiss some of the Plaintiffs or prevent them from recovering damages for their portion of the
Property. Rather, the proper approach is to proceed and recover all damages to the Property and
then the Court can hold those funds and resolve any competing ownership claims.
B.

Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claims

1.

Breach of Contract Issues, Different From Inverse Condemnation Issues, Are
Resolved By Jury Fact-Finders.

As an initial issue, a breach of contract claim is different from an inverse condemnation
claim because Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on the breach of contract claim as to all issues
(whereas this Court decides all issues for an inverse condemnation claim other than valuation).
Compare Farmer v. Loojbourrow, 75 Idaho 88, 92-93, 267 P.2d 113, 115 (1954) (breach of
contract is purely a legal right that attaches the constitutional right to a jury trial), and Rueth v.
State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1979). This creates a bit of a conundrum in this case, as the
taking issue is for the Court to decide while the breach of contract claim (which is based on
many of the same facts as the taking) is an issue for a jury to decide. See, e.g., David Steed &
Assocs. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 250, 766 P.2d 717, 720 (1988) ("The Bank has made no
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showing of' imperative circumstances' in its case which would deprive it of equitable relief if the
legal issues [like breach of contract] were tried to a jury. We can thus find no reason to deny
Petitioner Steed his most precious constitutional right to trial by jury.").
This "conundrum" has relevance on summary judgment because only where the Court is
the ultimate decider of fact is the Court able to draw probable inferences from conflicting
inferences at summary judgment. See Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325,
17 P .3d 266, 269 (2000) ("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict
between those inferences."); see also Banner L(fe Ins. Co. v. 1vfark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Tr., 147 Idaho 117, 124,206 P.3d 481,488 (2009) (When ... the action will be tried before the

court without a jury, however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment,
draw probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts.").
Thus, regarding the inverse condemnation issues in Plaintiffs' Motion and the State's
Motion, the Court can decide those issues on summary judgment despite conflicting inferences
from the undisputed facts. Regarding the breach of contract issues in the State's Motion,
however, it appears that the Court must resolve all conflicting inferences in favor of the nonmoving party at summary judgment, i.e. in favor of the Plaintiffs.
2.

The ROW Contract Unambiguously Required the State to Build a Frontage Road
Giving Direct Access to the Property.

The State argues that the 1967 ROW Contract only required the State to provide a legal
right-of-way to the Property, which it did. However, the State's interpretation of the 1967 ROW
Contract is contradicted by the plain language of the contract and by the surrounding context.
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The State contracted to do much more than just obtain an undeveloped legal right-of-way that
was mostly impassable by vehicle. The State contracted to provide the Property with access
similar to what was taken, i.e. direct access to the frontage road.
The persons who could have testified about the intent of the 1967 ROW Contract
apparently are no longer living. Thus, the Court and the parties must rely upon the plain language
of the contract and the surrounding circumstances in order to determine the intent of the
agreement. See, e.g., Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464, 583 P.2d 997, 999
(1978) ("The ascertainment of the contracting parties' intent requires a careful review of the
contract documents and the circumstances surrounding the contract's formation.").
The 1967 ROW Contract is short: "Access to Grantors remaining property southerly of
the Interstate Highway will be available from the future frontage road and stock drive on the
southwesterly side ofi-80N." (1 51 Jacobs Aff., Ex. C, emphasis added.) The language appears to
be forward looking and recognizes that actions are being promised in the "future." The language
also appears to be general, undoubtedly by necessity: the access was going to be restored in the
future and through a frontage road that had not yet been built and could not yet be permanently
located. (See supra footnote 4.) Importantly, the State's promise was not limited to an
"easement" or a "right-of-way", but a "road" that still has not happened.
The surrounding circumstances give the additional context that make the contractual
intent clear. In 1961-1967, the State took the Property's direct, frontage access to the main, fully
developed highway. This was the best access the Property could have hoped to have. The law
required the State to provide similar replacement access or else it would be liable for damages.
See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,291-96,328 P.2d 397,399-402 (1958) (impairment of a
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right of access constituted a "taking of property"); (see also

1st

Jacobs Aff., Ex. B: "Owners will

receive a fair and reasonable price for the property so acquired, including severance damages if
any."). The 1967 ROW Contract was the State's promise to provide that similar replacement
access to the Property. The State's provision of access over several miles of an undeveloped and
mostly impassable public right-of-way was not the provision of "similar" replacement access.
(1 51 Jacobs Aff., ~ 8 & Ex. G.) Ifthat was all the State was going to provide, then the Day family

certainly would have sued and recovered inverse condemnation damages.
However, the State promised that it was going to provide more. This was the purpose of
the 1967 ROW Contract: a promise to restore access similar to what had been taken. What had
been taken in 1961 was direct access to the main, developed highway into the Treasure Valley.
(Jd.,

,[~

3--4.) Similar access would be direct access to a developed frontage road that would then

provide C\)Jmection to the rest of the public roads in the Treasure Valley. However, the Day
family understood that such similar access was impractical for the State to provide based on an
exact timetable. The parties all knew that similar access would not be possible for potentially
many years because developed public roads had not yet reached the area and an additional
interchange would someday be built that would fundamentally alter any just compensation. (Id.,
Ex. B: noting, in 1961, the possibility of construction of an interchange near the Property).
Therefore, the best the parties could do was to acknowledge that when the next major public road
reache'd the Property, i.e. the future frontage road, then the State would ensure that this frontage
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road restored the Property to direct, frontage access to a fully developed and major public road.

10

In the meantime, the State showed its commitment to that promise by obtaining a
placeholder, undeveloped public right-of-way that connected to the Property and showed the
general location of where the future frontage road would be built and restore full, direct public
road access to the Property. This was a necessary pre-cursor to the future frontage road. This is
the true meaning of the 1967 ROW Contract, when considered in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.
The ROW Contract states that the State will provide the Property with access from the
"future frontage road." The ROW Contract makes no reference to the existing public right-ofway that the State claims was promised.
Therefore, the Court should find that the State promised, through the 1967 ROW
Contract, to restore the Property to its direct access with major, built public roads, specifically
the frontage road. The State breached that promise initially in 1997-98 when it moved the
frontage road and never reconnected it to the Property. The State further breached that promise

10

In support of its argument that it only promised to provide a 50 foot, undeveloped and mostly impassable
legal right-of-way to the Prope1ty, the State points to the 1967 ROW Contracts' reference to "(l-IG-SON-2(16)54 )"
and how the Plan Sheets for that project refer to the public right-of-way to the Property as a "Future Access Rd."
The State argues that this means the 1967 ROW Contract was incorporating those plans for the public right-of-way
as fully fulfilling the terms of the 1967 ROW Contract.
However, the State's argument begs the obvious question: if the State was already providing the access that fully
fulfilled its obligation under the 1967 ROW Contract, then why did the State not include a specific reference to what
was being provided. The State could have said that it was replacing the Property's access by giving it access to the
50 foot legal right-of-way running parallel to the new Interstate 80N. The 1967 ROW Contract could have easily
been written to say what the State wants it to say: "Access to Grantors remaining property southerly of the Interstate
Highway is available fi·om the 50 toot wide legal right-of-way, as shown on the attached map, highlighted in red,
and referred to as the Future Access Rd." But the State did not say any of that. The 1967 ROW Contract never
mentioned the 50 foot legal right-of-way, it never tried to incorporate plan sheets, and it never referenced any
existing access roads. The parties instead used a much more general term of access from the "future frontage road"
because that was as exact as they could be considering the frontage road was likely many years away from being
finally located, engineered, and constructed.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 20
19807-001 I 948536

000387

when it built out the frontage road but again failed to connect it to the Property. The State has
breached its promise to restore the access that was initially taken in 1961-67. See Farmers, 155
Idaho at 855, 318 P.3d at 624 ("A district cowt may grant summary judgment to a non-moving
party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the cowt."). Like the inverse condemnation

claims, the State expressly waived its statute of limitation defense for these contract claims.
3. The Breach of Contract Damages Cannot Be Limited to Just the Initial160 Acres.
The State argues that any breach of contract damages are limited to just the impact the
breach had on the parcel of approximately 160 acres that the Day family owned at the time of the
ROW Contract. 11 The State argues that additional damages to the second parcel purchased in
1979 are not reasonably foreseeable damages for a breach of the ROW Contract. However, the
issue of foreseeability is a question of fact and there are disputed material facts that should
preclude summary judgment on this issue. See, e.g., Davis v. McDougall, 94 Idaho 61, 63, 480
P .2d 907, 909 (1971) ("Questions of negligence, proximate cause, intervening cause, and
foreseeability constitute questions of fact for determination by the jury unless the proof is so
clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds
would construe the facts and circumstances in only one way."); Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho
1021, 1026-27, 772 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Ct. App. 1988) ("The inquiry whether damages allegedly

11

The State does not argue that Plaintiffs' takings claim must be limited to the original 160 acre parcel. The
State apparently recognizes that because the takings claim arose initially in 1997-98, after the Plaintiffs had
purchased the second adjoining parcel in 1979, then the State's taking of access denied access to both parcels of a
combined 300 acres that were intended to be jointly developed as mixed use or residential property. A taking of an
access property right is a taking that results in severance damage to the "larger parcel affected." See State v. Grathol,
158 Idaho 39, 44-47, 343 P.3d 480, 486-89 (2015) ("A com1 determines what prope1iy is included in the larger
parcel by assessing three elements: (I) unity of title, (2) contiguity, and (3) unity of use."); State ex rel. Symms v.
Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 531-32, 493 P.2d 387, 390-91 (1972); State ex ref Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel,
93 Idaho 574, 579-83, 468 P.2d 306, 311-15 ( 1970).
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resulting from a breach of contract were reasonably foreseeable or within the contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract was formed is a question of fact.").
The State promised to provide direct public road access to the original parcel through the
"future frontage road." (1st Jacobs Aff., ~ 6 & Exs. B-D.) The State knew the Day family were
developers and were holding and wanted the property for future development. (Jd.,

~

2.) The

State knew, or should have known, that developers regularly acquire adjoining property in order
to enhance economies of scale for development and to control other adjoining lands that would
enhance the value of the original parcel and preclude other developers from enjoying the benefits
rightly attributable to the Day family's efforts, here the ROW Contract. Thus, the State knew, or
should have known, that its promise of access would be relied upon by the Day family in
purchasing other adjoining parcels that would also rely upon that same access. (ld., ,[ 7.)
In addition, the State was legally obligated to restore the access that it had taken in 1961,
so that the Propetiy would not be landlocked and/or unusable. The State knew that the Day
family would potentially be taking many actions based on an expectation of public road access.
The State should be accountable for all damages it caused by breaching its contract to provide
basic public road access. Without access to the first parcel of 160 acres, then certainly the State
foresaw how that would similarly damage adjoining parcels that the Day family might also
purchase. When the State chose to breach the contract in 1997-98, it clearly knew the full
ramifications of how that would harm all 300 acres then owned by the Day family. Therefore, a
jury should determine the full extent of the foreseeable damages from the State's breach of the
ROW Contract, including whether damage to adjoining parcels that also lost their access was
reasonably foreseeable.
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4. The Breach of Contract Damages Are Not Reduced By the Money Paid by Groves.
Plaintiffs have already addressed the State's flawed argument that the payment by Groves
was a mitigation of damages payment that reduced inverse condemnation damages. (See supra
Part III.A.2.) For the same reasons, Groves' payment also did not mitigate any of the damages
that PlaintifTs suffered from the State's breach of contract.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny the
State's motion for partial summary judgment as to all of its arguments and enter summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on those same claims as follows:
1.

That the State breached its contract(s) and the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing embodied in the 1961 Agreement, ROW Contract and Deed by failing
to provide the access promised;

2.

That the initial breach of contract and inverse condemnation claims both arose in
1997-98 upon substantial completion ofthe Isaac's Canyon Interchange;

3.

That the named plaintiffs are the proper party plaintiffs and collectively have
standing to bring a claim for inverse condemnation and, as would appear
uncontested by the State, the named plaintiffs are the proper party plaintiffs and
collectively have standing to bring their breach of contract claims;

4.

That contract damages, as well as inverse condemnation damages (as would
appear to be uncontested by the State), are recoverable for both parcels and the
entire 300 acres; and

5.

That neither the partial sale proceeds from Mr. Groves nor any rental or other
income received by the Plaintiffs for their property before or since the taking are
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properly considered as mitigation of damages or reduce the just compensation that
Plaintiffs are entitled to receive.
DATED this 31 st clay ofMay, 2017.

AKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

oren K. Messerly
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Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg({~itd.idaho.gov

DATED this 31 st clay ofMay, 2017.
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Electronically Filed
5/31/2017 2:57:46 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Loren K. Messerly, ISB #7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA
DAY JACOBS

Plaintiffs,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
)
County of Ada
1.

I, Donna Day Jacobs, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state:

2.

I am over the

years. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this matter, and as

such, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth and the documents identified in this
Affidavit.
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3.

I currently reside at 2470 Sunshine Drive, Boise, ID 83712.

4.

I make this Affidavit in response to the State of Idaho, Idaho Department of

Transportation's ("lTD") motion for partial summary judgment.
5.

I am the person primarily in charge of the business affairs and assets, under

different entities and forms of ownership, that are owned by members of the Day Family, the
named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, and am also the treasurer and primarily responsible for the
operations of Day Realty Company, which, among other things, operates the Vista Avenue
Shopping Center in Boise, Idaho, where our business office is located.
6.

I was the person primarily responsible for and remain primarily responsible for

researching the history ofthe Day Family's ownership of the three hundred (300) acres near the
Isaac's Canyon interchange southeast of Boise and I am also familiar with each of the persons
and entities who own, or did own, an interest in what is described in the Complaint as the Day
Property and the Initial Day Property.
7.

I am also familiar with the estate and succession planning that was undertaken by

members of the Day Family and that estate and succession planning remains an ongoing function
for the Day Property and other assets owned by myself and other members of the Day Family.
8.

Pertinent family history, dates of death, estate planning documents and deeds

pertinent to the ownership of the Isaac's Canyon Property, a/k/a, the Day Property, are as
follows:
9.

Ernest George Day and Emma N. Day acquired the Initial Day Property on

March 25, 1935. Ernest George Day, my grandfather, was
was married to Emma N. Day, who was

. He
. Ernest George Day and

Emma N. Day had three children- Don Day, my father, Bob Day, my uncle, and Ernest E. Day,
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another uncle. Don Day and my mother, Maijorie Day, had three children- Ben Day, Dave Day
and myself. Bob Day was

. While he had children, as explained

below, they never acquired an interest in the Day Property, and Bob Day's interest in the Day
Property was concluded on July 15, 1998, as described in paragraph 22 below. Ernest E. Day
. Ernest E. Day was married to Lois Day. Lois Day was

was

Ernest Day and Lois Day had two children- Dan Day and John Day,
both of whom are still living.
10.

On November 17, 1961, at which time the original agreement with lTD was

signed, the owners of the Initial Day Property were my grandmother, Emma Day, my father, Don
Day, and my two uncles Bob Day and Ernest Day. That ownership continued and was the same
on October 23, 1967 when lTD provided a warranty deed to them and signed the right-of-way
contract with Emma Day, Don Day, Bob Day and Ernest Day.
11.

On April 30, 1975, approximately 160 acres ofproperty adjoining the Initial Day

Property was purchased in the name of "Donald M. Day", Don Day herein, although the Day
Family regarded this parcel as acquired for and owned by Emma N. Day. This property and the
Initial Day Property are collectively referred to herein as the "Day Property".
12.

On March 24, 1977, my father and mother created the Donald M. Day and

Marjorie Day Family Trust ("MDFT") but no title to the Day Property was transferred to this
trust.
13.

On June 1, 1979, my mother, Marjorie Day, died and my two brothers and I

became the sole remaindermen and Don Day remained as the primary beneficiary of the MDFT.
14.

On June 15, 1980, my father remarried and married Sue Day.

15.

On December 23, 1984, my grandmother, Emma N. Day, died.
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16.

On May 17, 1989, Emma N. Day's estate, which included all of the Day Property,

was passed in equal shares, 1/3 each, to Don Day, Bob Day and Ernest Day. The adjoining 160
acres was also quitclaimed by Don Day to Emma N. Day's Estate and passed in equal shares to
Don Day, Bob Day and Ernest Day.
17.

On October 5, 1989, the Donald M. Day Family and Marital Trust ("DMDFT")

was created, but no title to the Day Property was acquired by this trust at this time.
18.

On February 21, 1992, my uncle, Ernest E. Day, created the Ernest and Lois Day

Living Trust ("EEDL T") and Ernest Day conveyed all of his interest to the trust, with the result
that, at this time, Don Day, Bob Day and the EEDLT each held an equal 1/3 interest.
19.

On December 30, 1994, as part of my father's estate planning, Don Day and his

second wife, Sue Day, transferred, by gift deed, all of Don Day's interest, any interest Sue Day
had, in the Day Property, being 1/3 interest, to the DMDFT and, immediately thereafter, the
DMDFT transferred by gift deed an equal 1/9 interest to Ben Day, David Day, and myself, such
that we each held a 1/9th interest in the Day Property.
20.

On August 27, 1997, my father, Don Day, died.

21.

During the time period from December 5, 1997 to April 6, 1998, the range of

dates that lTD has urged is the range of dates for valuation of damages for our inverse
condemnation claim, the ownership of the Day Property was as follows: Ben Day 1/9, Donna
Day Jacobs 1/9, David R. Day 1/9, Bob Day 1/3, and EEDLT 1/3.
22.

On July 15, 1998, Bob Day disposed of his 1/3 interest in the Day Property by

conveying half of that, or a 1/6 interest, to EEDLT and the other half, being a 1/6 interest, to
MDFT. Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of said Deed dated July 15,
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1998. As of July 15, 1998, the interest in the Day Property was held as follows: Ben Day 119,
Donna Day Jacobs 119, David R. Day 1/9, MDFT 1/6, and EEDLT 112.
23.

On December 29, 1998, EEDL T gift deeded all of its interest in the Day Property

to the two children of Ernest and Lois Day, being Dan E. Day and John F. Day, in equal
amounts, or 114 each. That gift deed is attached hereto as Exhibit X and provides that the
Grantors" ... grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm ... all of the Grantor's undivided one-half
interest ... together with all ... hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto ... "
24.

As of December 29, 1998, the ownership of the Day Property was as follows:

MDFT 1/9, John F. Day 1/4, Dan E. Day 1/4, Ben Day 119, Donna Day Jacobs 1/9, David R.
Day 1/9, and MDFT 1/6.
25.

On July 13, 2005, Lois Day died, which death had no impact on the ownership of

the Day Property.
26.

On February 20, 2008, Ernest E. Day died, which death had no impact on the

ownership ofthe Day Property.
27.

On August 13, 2013, Ben Day, for estate planning purposes, caused to be

transferred his interest in the Day Property by transferring a 1118 interest in the MDFT (reserved
for him) and the 1/9 interest he individually owned, to Holcomb Rd LLC, a limited liability
company wholly owned by Ben Day, which then owned a 116 interest. Those two deeds, true
and correct copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits Y and Z, both included the language
" ... all of its rights, title and interest ... together with any undiscovered interest therein, together
with all of the appurtenances pertaining thereto."
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28.

On November 1, 2016, when this Complaint was filed, the owners of the Day

Property and their respective interests were: Holcomb Rd LLC 1/6, Donna Day Jacobs 119,
David Day 119, MDFT 1/9, Dan E. Day 114, and John F. Day 114.
29.

Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit AA is a pictorial representation of the

transfers involving the Isaac's Canyon Property described in this Affidavit.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY JACOBS- 6
19807-00 l I 944038_5

000397

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

sk-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2017, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0 . Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D
D
D
1Zl

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
EmailliCourt: chris.kro nbcrg({i),itd.idaho.gov

Fredric V. ShoemakeI '/ Loren K. Messerly
I
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DEED (Issac's Canyon)

THIS INDENTURE is made this

IS day of July,

1998, in order to convey the

property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto from the following GRANTORS to the
following GRANTEES:
GRANTORS
•

ROBERT L. DAY and CHARLOTTE L. DAY, husband and
wife, as to an undivided one-third interest in the property.

GRANTEES
•

The ERNEST E. DAY and LOIS H. DAY LIVING TRUST,
created by instrument dated February 1, 1991, as to an undivided
one-sixth interest as tenant in common, and

•

Trust B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY
FAMILY TRUST, created by instrument dated March 24, 1977,
as to an undivided one-sixth interest as tenant in common .

WITNESSETH
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the GRANTORS have granted, conveyed, bargained
and sold, and do hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to the GRANTEES, and to
their successors and assigns, all of the GRANTORS' undivided one-third interest, as a tenant
in common, in that certain real property situated in the COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF

1

G: ICLIENT\04118\DEED. 23

DAY00257
000400

(

IDAHO, more particularly described in Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference (the "Property").
TOGETHER with all and singular the buildings, structures, improvements,
tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,
the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof;
SUBJECT TO the exceptions to GRANTORS' title which are of record in the
office of the Ada County Recorder on the date of this Deed, and all easements and rights-ofway that are open and obvious on inspection of this Property.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Property, with its appurtenances, unto the
GRANTEES and their successors and assigns forever.
The current address of the GRANTEES is: P.O. Box 8286, Boise, Idaho
83707.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTORS have executed this Deed the day
and year therein first above written.

I

/

'·t.-

'....... -

J

- -:

-· i

,

/

Robert L. Day

Charlotte L.

2

Day(!
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(

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Jt.lj!:J_ , 1998, before me,
--~..csr.z..w.~....L...::l;;__L..:l--=-...l.....,..c:L!.LL~4--' a Notary Public m and for saxd State, personally
appeared Robert L. Day and Chari e L. Day, known or identified to me to be the persons
whose names are subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

3
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EXIDBIT "A" (Isaac's Canyon)

THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 19, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH,
RANGE 3 EAST, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO.
EXCEPT THEREFROM THAT PORTION DEEDED TO ADA COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT BY DEED RECORDED FEBRUARY 4, 1980 AS
INSTRUMENT NO. 8005941, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO.

4
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EXHIBIT "B" ( Isaac's Canyon-Merrigan)

The Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise,
Meridian, as shown in the records of Ada County, Idaho,
together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

5
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EXHIBIT X

000405

. : .~.....-

''..

-·

DEED Qssac!s. Canyon)

THlS lN!>ENttJRE is' made this

""k' day ofDecember, 1998, in order to.

convey the· property described in E#Ubits· 'iA'' and "B'r attached h~eto from the following
GRANtORS to the folltlwing

GRANTEES~.

GRANTORS
•

The ERNEST E. D.AY an~: LOIS H. DA:¥ LIVlNG TRUS.T,
cteatedby iti:sttunlent dated_F~bruacy l, .1991, a.s,to an ~diY;ided
one.;half interest" 'as tenant itt coilitiion
.

•

JOIJ:N: F.

.

DA,Y~

'

as. to an undivid..e(l one-fourth interest -as tena,nt

in common, .as Ins .sol~· and. separate property and
•

DAN E. DAY; as to an undivide~ one~f.outth interest as tenant in

cottimon, as· his sole an,d sepa.rate property·

FOR 'VALUB RECEIVED; the GRANT.<t)RS have w;ant.e~ conveye'd1 bargained
'·

and ~old, and do· hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey an<i co~u.rn to the GRANTEES', and to

their successors and asslgns,. all of ·the GRANTORS' undiVided one-half interes.t' as a ten.I!P.t
in col'Illlion,. in· that oertain.rea.l property $it;Uated mthe CO.tJN:rY OF ADA, STA~ OF.
IDAHO, mor.e p~culiltly described in Exhib.its '1A'i tmd "B" attached hereto andi incorporated
h~rein.

by reference (the ''Property").
1
DAY00309

000406

TOGETHER with. all and singulat :the bmtdlngs~
.structures.,
.

~provetnents,
~

tenements; hereditaments ~~ ~purtenances there\lllto belonpg orin L,W.ywise ~ppertai.ning,

the reversion and reversions, te~der and remainders? r®fS; issues at.ld. proJlts thereof;

StJ:aJEC't TO the exceptions to: GRANTORS·' 1it.,le which ate of record in the
oftlq.e of the Ada CoutitY Reco~:der on the date of this _Deed,..and aU el:1$~ments all.d rights-of.
way that are open and obVious on iA$pect.ion of this Property.

TO ijAVE AND TO -HOLD tb.e ·PJ,-oper:ty, With it$ a.ppl.lrtenance$, uqto the
GRANTEES' ·and theit succesSQrs and assigns fon;tve~.

The ctln'ent. addtess of the GRANTBES is~ lt():. Box 82&6~ Boise, t®ho
83707.

IN WitNESS WHEREOF, the GRA.N'TORS have. ex:eo-uted this Deed: ~e dA,y ·
and year therein fttst above Written.

THE. ERNEST E. DAY and t.OIS H.. DAY
twJN(il TRUST

2

.

'

Gi \C.I£HJ\0417810Etil. 32
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STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
County of Ada

)

· n thi$ ~ day of 7J~~~¢6 ,.1998, before. me,
. . . .· . .
·
. . . . . ... a. Notary Public ih and for said State,. personally
4ppeared .L(t lL Day, known or identified to me to· be the person. whose llal;l.1.e is su:bscrlbed
the f(n~~going inst:i11Inen4 as Co.-trustee of the Er.nest E~ Day and Lois H. Day Living TruS.t,

to

and acknowledg~d to me that she executed the same.

IN WI'I'.NESS WHEREOF, r .have b.er~:unto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day and year in this ·eertifi~ate first ·above Writtcm.
., ....

'•
......

3
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.

.

.

tire NORTHEAST QUARTER Oli' SECtiON 19, TOWNSIDP 2 NORTH;
RANGE 3 EAS'rj OFFICIAL :RECOROS OF ADA COUNTY, lOAHO. .
BXCEtr THEREFROM THAT PORTION DMDED TO ADA COUNTY
BlQHWAY DISTruCt :aY. DEED RECORDED 'FEl13R.UARY 4, 1980 AS
INSTRUMENT NO. 8005941, OFFlClAL RECO:Rl)S OF ADA CQ~TY,
IDAHO!

4
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EXBIBlT "B'' ( Isaac's

Cany<»n~Merrigan)

The Southeast qU1irter of Section 19, Township 2 Nol't'l4 Range 3 East, Boise,
Meridian, as ,shown in th~ records· of Ada County, Idaho,

together with all1\D.cl singular the tenements, herl'ditarnents and appurtenances
·

thete1ir1to belonging o.r 'in anywise appertaining.

5
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EXHIBITY

000411

ADA COUNTY RECORDER Christopher D. Rich
BOISE IDAHO
Pgs=3 VICTORIA BAILEY
BENNETT G. DAY

2016-067560
07127/201611:32 AM
AMOUNT:$16.00

1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
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CORRECTED QUITCLAIM DEED
(Correcting Grantee Under Instrument No. 113093237)

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DA.Y FAMILY
TRUST created by instrument dated March 24,1977, does hereby convey, release, remise and

forever quit claim unto HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
whose address is 1015 Robert Street, Boise, Idaho 83705, all of its right, title and interest in and
to an undivided one-third (1/3rd) of its one-sixth (116th) interest as shown on Instrument No.
108138051, records of Ada County, Idaho, which one-third equals an undivided one-eighteenth
(l/18th) interest in and to the following described premises located in Ada County, Idaho, all as
shown on Instrument No. 108138051, records of Ada County, Idaho, to-wit:

All that real property set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto, which Exhibit
"A" is incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth herein in
full
together with any undiscovered interest therein, together with all of the appurtenances pertaining
thereto.
DATED this .JL:_ day of JU.AA- ( , 2016.
DONAW M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY

FAMILY TRUST created by instrument dated

March 24, 1977

By~~>~
gennett G. Day, Trustee

STATE OF IDAHO )
)
County of Ada
)

ss:

On this~ day of ]UA.)--i , 2016, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
Public in and for said State, personally appeare BENNETT G. DAY, known or identified to me to

CORRECTED QUITCLAIM DEED- 1
DAY00249

000412

me to be the Trustee of DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY FA.MaY TRUST created by
instrument dated March 24, 1977, the Trust that executed the instrument or the person who
executed the instrument on behalf of said Trust, and acknowledged to me that such Trust
executed the same.

Residing at Boise, Idaho
My Comm. Expires:

j ,

}

1 11
OY r'-1
J.O;t-c
I

I
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EXHIBIT A
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY

PARCELl

Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: NE ~
Except those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967 as
Instrument No. sn552. records of said County.
And Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded February
4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II

Township 2 North. Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: SE ~
Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded February 4,
1980 as Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

EXHIBIT A

DAY00251
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EXHIBIT Z

000415

1\UA c.;uuN I Y l'<t:.I,;UIWER Christopher D. Rich

BOISE IDAHO

Pgs=2 VICTORIA BAILEY

2016-067559
07/27/201611:32 AM

BENNETI G. DAY

AMOUNT:$13.00

1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
.
00253049201600675590020022
CORRECTED QUITCLAIM DEED
(Correcting Grantee Under Instrument No. 113093236)

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, BENNEIT G. DAY, a single person, as his sole and
separate property does hereby convey, release, remise and forever quit claim unto HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, whose address is 1015 Robert Street,

Boise, Idaho 83705, all of his right, title and interest in and to his one-ninth interest (119th) in the
following described premises located in Ada County, Idaho, all as shown on Instrument No.
108138051, records of Ada County, Idaho, to-wit:

All that real property set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto, which Exhibit
"A" is incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth herein in

full
together with any undiscovered interest therein, together with all of the appurtenances pertaining
thereto.
DATED this

4£e

STATE OF IDAHO )
)
County of Ada
)

day of

I

'j1U..) . . .

ss:

a

On this lJ day of )Lt.{)_,[ , 2016, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
Public in and for said State, personally ap~ BENNEIT G. DAY, known or identified to me to
me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DAY00252
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EXHIBIT A
I..EGAL DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY

PARCEL I

Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: NE 14
Except those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967 a$
Instrument No. 6n5S2, records of said County.

And Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded Febfuary
4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II

Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: SE 1!1
Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded February 4,
1980 as Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

EXHIBIT A

DAY00253
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EXHIBIT AA
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Electronically Filed
5/31/2017 3:41:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katie Holden, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho. gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
State of Idaho
County of Ada

)
)
)
)

Case No. CVO 1-16-20313

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF AMY REVIS

)
: ss.
)

Amy Revis, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:

AFFIDAVIT OF AMY REVIS - I

000420

1. I am employed by the Idaho Transpotiation Depa11ment (lTD) as District Engineer at
the District 3 Office located in Boise, Idaho. I have held that position since July
2014. As District Engineer, my duties include, among others, access management
decisions

in coordination with local

highway jurisdictions, planning and

implementation of highway improvement projects and maintenance of the State
highway system within District 3.
2. In my capacity as District Engineer, I became involved in the access issue related to
the Day Family property, and therefore have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein.
3. In order to address the Day Family propetiy access issue, I was personally involved in
discussions with representatives of the owners of the property ("the Days") and the
Ada County Highway District ("ACHD").
4. lTD had previously acquired a public access easement that ran from Eisenman Road
to the Day property. Where the lTD public access easement approached the Day
property, it was adjacent to an ACHD easement that in tum was adjacent to the Day
pro petty.
5. ACHD and lTD reached an agreement whereby the public access easement lTD
acquired to provide access to the Day property would be allowed to have an approach
onto the pmtion of Eisenman Road controlled by ACHD. The tme and cmTect copy
of an email dated April 18, 2016 attached hereto reflects that I infmmed Donna
Jacobs of this fact.
6. ACHD was willing to allow a connection to Eisenman Road from the lTD public
easement at least until altemative access became available as the area developed. The
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location ofthe ACHD approach connection would be close to the tetminus of the lTD
public access easement adjacent to Eisenman Road, near the cul1"ent approach located
at the so-called "green gate" on Dave Leader's property.
7. The discussion in the attached email regarding crossing ACHD property relates to the
ACHD easement adjacent to the Day propetty and has nothing to do with access to
Eisenman Road. The Days could have resolved any issue with crossing that ACHD
easement by dealing directly with ACHD.

As the attached email indicates, lTD

offered to help the Days deal with ACHD on that issue.
8. The Days could have built a road on the lTD public easement. Whether the road
would have been public or private would have depended on whether either lTD or
ACHD would have taken jurisdiction over the completed road.
9.

The Days were to build the road, the requirements for which would depend on the
type of development proposed by the Days. In an effort to resolve the issue, the State
offered to pay for construction of the road. The Days were to check with Ada County
to see what type of development the county would have petmitted on their propetty
and report back, but to my knowledge the Days never did. Therefore, there was no
further communication regarding construction of the road.

10. As a fallback, if ACHD for some reason refused to permit the Days to have an
encroachment for access onto Eisenman Road from the lTD public access easement,
lTD would allow such an encroachment on the portion of the Eisenman Road right of
way owned by lTD that is adjacent to the access easement. This approach would also
be very close to the "green gate" existing approach.
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11. Because the Days can connect the lTD public access easement to Eiserunan Road,

their property is not landlocked. At minimum, the Days could use the lTD public
access easement to build a road that the public could use, although the Days may need
to maintain it as a private road.
12. During my communications with the Days, mainly through Donna Day Jacobs, I was

never told that the Days wanted to change the location of the cunent easement. The
Days were concerned about the grade or slope of the public access easement, but the
State demonstrated that a road could be built on the easement that would meet
relevant standards.
Fmther your Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this 31 51 day of May 2017.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of May 2017.

SHONA TONKIN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 9-16-21

AFFIDAVIT OF AMY REVIS - 4

000423

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31 51 day of May 2017, I caused to be served a tme and coiTect
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker ObeiTecht P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
D iComt Service
D Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transpmtation Department
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From:

To:
Subject:
Date:

Amy Rey!s
Donna Jacobs; Jim Morrison Cproperty Manager); Tim Thomas; andrewlacobs!y; .BeD...Jlay
RE: Day Property
Monday, Aprll18, 2016 1:11:41 PM

Donna,
The access we are proposing connects from Eisenman Road at the current access point adjacent to
the easement, following the 60' easement to your property where we must cross the current ACHD
property to get onto your property. This is the property that needs to be vacated by ACHD, or as an
alternative, ACHD could grant you an easement to cross this property. We met with ACHD's
representative responsible for this type of property management, he indicated a willingness to work
with you to accomplish either action. If you would like, Jim or I would be happy to arrange a meeting
between you, us and ACHD so you can hear first hand what would be required for each option and
confirm that they are willing to work with you to accomplish one of the necessary property actions.
Regarding the connection to your property, the 24.9' that the easement crosses past your property
line will provide an adequate width to construct a passable approach onto your property.
Let me know if you would like us to move forward to set up a meeting with ACHD and if you would
like any other clarifications.
Amy
From: Donna Jacobs [mailto:donnadjacobs@gmail.com]

Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Amy Revis; Jim Morrison (Development Services); Tim Thomas; andrewjacobsiv; Ben Day
Subject: Day Property

Thank you Amy,
We would be happy to participate, as we have been in attempts to reestablish our access. It is
unlikely that ACHD will grant our request and we would require assurance before more time
and money is expended.
All of the deeds concerning the extensions of Eisemann road and access to the east and south
of sections 19,20,29,and 30 were made at the request and the acceptance of ACHD to avoid
landlocking those sections These 1977 deeds were also a matter of public record when the
Isaacs Canyon Interchange was built. Our 1967 deed restriction was also of record. In
addition the 10 extra feet added to the 50 ft.stock drive/ right of way by your office suggests a
road to the southeast.
You have said we can connect to Eisemann on a 40 Ft approach, proceed up the 60 ft. stock
drive/ right of way ,on to 60 ft. wide Highway Easement Deed to our property But how do we
connect to our property on the 24.9 tail end of the "Highway Easement Deed" especially if
ACHD vacates the 25ft 1977 Quitclaim Deed in Section 19.
Please clarify our obvious misunderstandings on these title issues.
Respectfully.

lTD DAY-001044

000425

Donna Jacobs
Day Family
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5/31/2017 3:41:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
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STEVEN L. OLSEN
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Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
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)
)
)
)
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AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID SZPLETT

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
: ss.
)

David Szplett, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:
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1. I was employed by the Idaho Transportation Department {lTD) as Manager of its
Right of Way Department at the headquarters office in Boise, Idaho from May 2014
to June 2016 when I retired from lTD. Part of my duties as Manager of the Right of
Way Department included state-wide responsibility for right of way acquisition,
disposition and access management.
2. Prior to being Manager of the headquarters Right of Way Department, I was
employed by lTD as Manager of the Development Services Division at the District 3
office from September 2011 to May 2014 when I was transferred to lTD
Headquarters.

Part of my responsibilities at District 3 included review of

development applications, encroachment permit applications, as well as access and
right of way management.
3. I have also been employed by the Ada County Highway District (September 1992
through to October 2000, where my principal duties included, among other things,
review of development applications, encroachment permit applications and
conducting corridor studies.
4. As part of my duties working at lTD and ACHD, I reviewed hundreds of staff reports
from local land use planning agencies regarding applications for land use changes and
development.

I reviewed those applications for the purpose of signing off on

transportation infrastructure associated with proposed developments or land use
changes. I have also performed the same duties while employed as a transportation
and/or land use consultant over more than twenty years.
5. While employed at the District 3 office and at lTD headquarters, I was involved with
the Day property access issue. My involvement included discussions with ACHD,
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Ada County, the Federal Highways Administrations, lTD staff and contact with Day
representatives and adjacent land owners.
6. As part of the effort to obtain access for the Day property, I had discussions with
ACHD that resulted in obtaining a staff-level agreement for an approach from the
lTD owned easement onto the section of Eisenman Road controlled by ACHD that
would not require using any land other than the lTD easement.
7. I summarized the results of my efforts in an email, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto. The email included an attachment, also attached hereto, that showed
the location of the new approach that would not use any private land. At about the
time of the attached email I had a conversation with Donna Day Jacobs regarding the
encroachment onto Eisenman Road.

Ms. Jacobs expressed no concern about the

location of the lTD easement and did not request a change in its location.
8. If ACHD had not agreed to allow an approach onto its portion of Eisenman Road,
lTD could allow an approach onto the portion of Eisenman Road it controlled. Such
an approach would be located just south of the one proposed on the attachment to my
email of March 5, 2014 and attached hereto.
9. Any road built on the ITO easement at the time of the attached email would likely
have been a private road, as ACHD would not take jurisdiction over a public road
built between the end of the I-84 ramps and the future intersection of the Lake Hazel
Road and Eisenman Road, about 1800 feet to the west of the end of the ramps.
10. Because of the availability of the lTD easement, the Days' property was not
landlocked and had access to the system of public roads. At minimum, the Day
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Property could use the public lTD easement to build a private road which the Days
would have had to maintain.
11. Based on my many years of reviewing development applications for available
transportation infrastructure, in my opinion the Days could use a private road on the
lTD easement to develop their property within the limits set by the local land use
planning agency, which in this case would be Ada County.
12. Construction of private roads on publicly owned easements is not unusual when the
relevant public entity does not want to take jurisdiction over the road for some reason.
Three local examples include Flying Hawk Lane on South Cole Road at Hollilynn
Road, Hubbard Lane on Hubbard Road east of Five Mile Road, and Longmont
Avenue off of Broadway Avenue near the Broadway Bridge.
Further your Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this ?J2 day ofMay 2017.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

eo_~ay of May 2017.

~~b.~V
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 12-18-22
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of May 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702

Du.s. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601

~ iCourt Service
D Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:

Daye Szplett
Jim Caroenter; Larrv Allen ; Daye Jones
The Day Access Issue Is solved ... •
Thursday, March 06, 2014 6:30:00 AM
Access Location. pdf
!mage003.1pg

.. ... pending your acceptance of my negotiated settlement. The terms are :
•

ACHD will give Day's an approach permit for a 40-ft approach aligned with their existing
easement

•

lTD will build the 40-ft pave approach from the edge of the Eisenman Road pavement to the
edge of right-of-way (see attached)

•

lTD will remove the existing 24-ft approach on the adjacent property

•

lTD and ACHD do all the remaining paperwork

•

No money changes hands

The Day family is ecstatic.
I can't write work orders to build the new approach so I need someone to say "OK" to the concept.
We would need a small CMP, base material, and plant mix pavement.
We would have one year to actually build the approach .
I will finish the paperwork if directed to do so .
Now that we solved this, I volunteer to take on more of these challenges.
You can make me Assistant COO for Impossible Projects!
The credit goes to my entire Development Services Division.
Dave

(])ave Szpfett
Development Services Manager - lTD District III
Email: daye szplett@itd idaho goy
208.334.8377 office or 208.949.5683 cell

***CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message may contain legally privileged and confidential
information exempt or prohibited from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient of this
e-mail, please notify this sender immediately and do not deliver, distribute or copy this e-mail. or disclose its
contents or take any action in reliance on the information it contains.
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from the
unimproved fifty
wide frontage
Id.
the property.
miles from
frontage road
foot Wide
to within
unimproved
improved to
1.8 miles
road improved
property. Id.
fifty foot
“had just
line 1.8
that with
with such
He
property “had
just as
the property
miles
He indicated
well lay
on aa section
indicated that
section line
1.8 miles
such access,
as well
access, the
lay on

road.” Id.
from aa road
that the
limited access
from
Id. He
the limited
the full
replacing the
is replacing
full access
He opined
opined
now that
road now
road is
access road
access road.”
that “[d]ue
time of
further
possible time
“[d]ue to
the loss
the possible
further that
residential development
to the
of direct
direct access,
of residential
is
development is
loss of
access, the
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considerably
postponed and
between the
the development
the subject
on the
of lands
development of
lands between
dependent on
and now
now dependent
and
subject and
considerably postponed
North.” Id.
Id.
the
the Interstate
the North.”
Interstate connector,
miles to
to the
two miles
connector, two
In calculating
In
Original Day
Mr. Onweiler
the property
the Original
Onweiler valued
calculating damages
to the
at
valued the
damages to
property at
Propeny, Mr.
Day Property,
D to
$75
per acre
before the
page of
Affidavit of
Exhibit D
the highway
the twelfth
the Aﬂidavit
twelfth page
of Exhibit
to the
project. See
acre before
See the
$75 per
highway project.
of
State’s acquisition
James Morrison.
Morrison. Onweiler
that the
the State’s
for highway
acquisition of
of 8.99
Onweiler calculated
calculated that
acres for
8.99 acres
James
highway
right-of—way should
X 75).
right-of-way
by payment
payment of
The rest
therefore be
rest of
of
of $674.25
should therefore
compensated by
$674.25 (8.99
be compensated
(8.99 X
75). The

in property
the
value from
from the
from $75
the damages
the reduction
an acre
to $50
an acre
to
reduction in
acre to
acre due
arose from
damages arose
due to
$75 an
$50 an
property value

loss
Id. Applied
remaining 146.58
the remaining
the interstate,
the $25
Applied over
of direct
direct access.
of the
south of
146.58 acres
over the
loss of
acres south
access. Id.
interstate, the
$25
in value
in damages
decrease
value per
per acre
Id. Based
the Onweiler
of $3664.50.
on the
Onweiler
resulted in
acre resulted
Based on
damages of
decrease in
$3664.50. Id.

appraisal,
paid to
their property
the Days
for damages
the total
total compensation
to their
to the
to be
compensation to
damages to
was
be paid
appraisal, the
property was
Days for
$4,350,
which about
for loss
of which
of damages
of direct
direct access.
82% consisted
consisted of
loss of
about 82%
damages for
access.
$4,350, of
The
public system
The Days
the issue
the public
of loss
of access
to the
of roads
understood the
loss of
issue of
roads
access to
clearly understood
system of
Days clearly
in 1967.
when they
with the
the State
the
when
As reflected
compensation with
negotiated compensation
State in
reﬂected by
1967. As
they negotiated
by the
State’s right-of-way
right-of-Way negotiator
contemporaneous
the State’s
the time,
Don Day
the
negotiator at
of the
at the
notes of
contemporaneous notes
expressed the
time, Don
Day expressed

following
property:
his property:
the impact
following regarding
impact of
regarding the
of loss
of access
to his
loss of
access to

if there
still
He
purchased this
were still
this land
for speculation
there were
feel if
He stated
land for
speculation and
and feel
stated they
had purchased
they had
10-20
it would
good
within 10-20
that it
unit within
to aa housing
housing unit
would be
developed to
good access
access remaining,
remaining, that
be developed
years. He
just aa legal
that the
that with
with just
the
He also
no physical
legal access
stated that
and no
also stated
access and
physical access,
access, that
years.
land
been damaged
where no
value is
point Where
left.
land has
to aa point
no value
is left.
has been
damaged to
…
doesn’t feel
like to
Don
would like
but doesn’t
property
bén says
the State
the property
he would
to settle
settle but
feel the
State has
has viewed
Viewed the
says he
in its
if
in
proper respect.
if
there
had
been
physical
access
provided
for
what is
its proper
for
there
What
is
had
respect. Says,
provided
been
access
physical
Says,
right of
that they
being taken,
way.
the right
being
of way.
donate the
would donate
taken, that
they would
1-2, Exhibit
E to
Exhibit E
See
Affidavit of
James Morrison.
Morrison. The
the Aﬂidavit
The ROW
negotiator offered
to the
offered
ROW negotiator
See p.
p. 1-2,
of James

Onweiler’s appraisal.
in the
that came
from Onweiler’s
Don
Don Day
the amount
amount of
of $4350,
compensation in
appraisal.
came from
value that
$4350, aa value
Day compensation
(“damage to
remainder”),
That amount
That
for access
to remainder”),
amount included
compensation for
included compensation
and severance
severance damages
damages (“damage
access and

right of
E to
Exhibit E
as
well as
way. See
p. 2,
Affidavit of
James Morrison.
Morrison.
for property
for right
the Aﬂidavit
of way.
to the
as well
as for
See p.
property for
2, Exhibit
ofJames
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“didn’t feel
Don
were enough
that he
Don Day
the State
there were
told the
he “didn’t
feel there
to loss
of
State that
enough damages
loss of
damages due
due to
Day told
“he doesn’t
doesn’t feel
access” and
in its
access”
because of
that “he
the State
its appraisal
the loss
realistic in
feel the
is being
being realistic
of the
of
appraisal because
State is
and that
loss of
access.” See
E to
Affidavit of
James Morrison.
Morrison. The
access.”
p. 3,
Exhibit E
that State
that
The Days
the Aﬂidavit
to the
told that
State that
See p.
Days told
3, Exhibit
ofJames

“feel they
$6000.” Id.
they
Id. The
than $6000.”
with
The State
the $6000
cannot accept
to settle
settle with
State paid
paid the
less than
accept any
$6000 to
they “feel
they cannot
any less

the
purchase of
the Days
for loss
for loss
for the
the purchase
the
of access,
of access,
of the
and for
loss of
loss of
severance damages
damages for
access, severance
access, and
Days for
right-of—way needed
right-of-way
Id.
for the
the new
interstate. Id.
new interstate.
needed for

In addition
In
payment for
property for
their property
for loss
the
for the
the damage
of access,
to their
addition to
to accepting
accepting payment
loss of
damage to
access, the

Days
their Original
from aa future
that access
Original Day
frontage road
at
to their
future frontage
road at
agreed that
would be
be from
access to
Propeny would
Days agreed
Day Property
the
plans. Ms.
that the
the fifty
the highway
the location
the easement
foot wide
on the
location of
of the
easement on
Ms. Jacobs
states that
Wide
Jacobs states
fifty foot
highway plans.
miles” and
“basically impassable
easement
was “basically
that to
for aa future
for the
the last
frontage road
last 1.5
to
easement for
impassable for
1.5 miles”
and that
road was
future frontage

access
property, the
their property,
mile or
that easement.
the Days
the last
to walk
walk or
or use
last mile
or so
of that
had to
easement.
access their
use aa Jeep
Jeep the
so of
Days had
in agreeing
Day
that easement
the location
for aa future
agreeing to
to the
location of
of that
at 3.
Para. 8
easement for
future
Affidavit, Para.
8 at
3. Further,
Further, in
Day Affidavit,

frontage
points that
point
that they
multiple access
for aa one
the Days
the multiple
frontage road,
exchanged the
one access
had for
access point
access points
road, the
they had
Days exchanged
their property
easement.
point to
would be
be
that the
the Days
Having only
meant that
to their
easement. Having
one access
access point
likely meant
property likely
only one
Days would
in the
their property.
severely
the development
restricted in
of their
development of
property.
severely restricted
in 1997,
Thus,
prior to
the construction
the Isaacs
the
Interchange in
to the
of the
construction of
Isaacs Canyon
immediately prior
Thus, immediately
Canyon Interchange
1997, the

their property.
Days
provided one
that provided
point of
an apparently
of access
to their
easement that
had an
impassable easement
one point
access to
apparently impassable
property.
Days had

They
paid thirty
years previously
previously for
public system
for loss
the public
of access
to the
of roads
had been
been paid
loss of
roads
access to
thirty years
system of
They had
that easement
created
by that
not entitled
entitled to
to any
more such
easement and
and are
are not
created by
such damages
damages payments.
payments. They
They
any more

from the
received
part of
the State
the new
the construction
of the
of the
construction of
substitute easement
State as
easement from
new interchange,
received aa substitute
as part
interchange,

essentially
by the
undeveloped, impassable
attempt by
the State
the loss
the undeveloped,
the
an attempt
to cure
of the
State to
easement the
impassable easement
cure the
loss of
essentially an
in 1967.
Days
to in
agreed to
1967.
Days agreed
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There
that they
that
for Day
the same
entitled to
There is
is absolutely
no basis
to assert
to the
assert that
are entitled
same access
basis for
access that
absolutely no
they are
Day to
1-84. The
they
prior to
The issue
the 1967
the construction
Whether
to the
construction of
of I-84.
is whether
contract and
had prior
now is
ROW contract
and the
1967 ROW
issue now
they had

in fair
value of
the
their property
fair market
the Days
for any
market value
entitled to
to compensation
difference in
of their
compensation for
are entitled
property
Days are
any difference
in comparison
caused
by access
by the
public
the current
the public
current public
to the
comparison to
public access
easement in
provided by
caused by
access provided
access easement
in 1997.
access
that existed
the construction
the new
interchange in
construction of
of the
existed immediately
easement that
before the
new interchange
1997.
access easement
immediately before

III.
III.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

A.
has access
the system
The Day
to the
of public
A. The
public roads.
roads.
access to
property has
system of
Day property
Contrary
public roads
their property
the assertion
the Days,
the system
to the
of the
to the
of public
assertion of
has access
roads
access to
Contrary to
system of
property has
Days, their
State’s public
Days’ memorandum.
via the
public access
the State’s
the Days’
on page
of the
memorandum.
easement described
Via
described on
page 8
8 of
access easement

As
As

made
by the
Szplett submitted
the affidavits
the Days
of Amy
submitted herewith,
afﬁdavits of
clear by
ReVis and
and Dave
Dave Szplett
made clear
could
herewith, the
Days could
Amy Revis
State’s public
have
from the
the State’s
Eisenman Road
an approach
onto Eisenman
public access
approach onto
have an
Road from
access easement,
easement, thereby
thereby

establishing
public roads
property. That
their property.
from their
That approach
the system
establishing aa connection
connection to
to the
of public
approach
roads from
system of
would either
by the
portion
from the
the portion
portion of
either be
the State
the portion
Eisenman Road
of Eisenman
controlled by
or the
State or
Road controlled
would
be from
controlled
by ACHD.
para. 6-8,
Affidavit of
David Szplett;
para. 5-6,
Affidavit of
Amy
ACHD. See
5-6, 10,
controlled by
6-8, Afﬁdavit
See para.
Szplett; para.
ofDavid
10, Afﬁdavit
ofAmy
Revis.
Revis.

April 18,
By
that aa connection
informed Donna
email dated
Donna Day
connection
ReVis informed
Ms. Revis
dated April
Jacobs that
2016, Ms.
18, 2016,
Day Jacobs
By email

State’s public
to
was available
public access
for the
the State’s
the Revis
Eisenman Road
to Eisenman
of the
ReVis
available for
easement. See
Road was
para. 5
access easement.
See para.
5 of

Affidavit.
Afﬁdavit.
minimum aa question
Summary
judgment should
because there
there is
is at
at minimum
of fact
fact
question of
should clearly
denied because
be denied
Summary judgment
clearly be
Days’
from the
as
whether the
public roads
the State
all access
the system
the Days’
taken all
to Whether
to the
of public
State has
has taken
roads from
as to
access to
system of

property.
property.
In aa condemnation
In
whether direct
the
comparing the
condemnation case,
direct or
or inverse,
are calculated
calculated by
damages are
inverse, damages
case, Whether
by comparing

“after” conditions
“before” with
in Lobdell
from the
“before”
with the
project. As
Lobdell v.
the “after”
the project.
resulting from
As explained
explained in
conditions resulting
v. State,
State,

89
P.2d 135,
Idaho 559,
407 P.2d
137 (1965):
89 Idaho
564, 407
135, 137
559, 564,
(1965):
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in agreement
The
that the
the measure
The authorities
for the
the
authorities are
almost universally
agreement that
of damages
are almost
measure of
damages for
universally in
right of
destruction
upon which
property of
impairment of
the property
which the
of an
an
or impairment
of aa right
of access
to aa highway
destruction or
access to
highway upon
owner
fair market
property immediately
the difference
is the
market value
owner abuts
the fair
the property
abuts is
between the
value of
immediately
difference between
of the
before
fair market
property immediately
market value
the taking,
and fair
the
the same
same property
value of
taking, and
immediately after
before the
after the
of the
destruction
basis of
The basis
the damages
not the
the
or impairment
of the
is not
impairment of
the access.
destruction or
damages awarded
awarded is
access. The
of the
right
in
value
of
the
right
of
access
to
the
highway,
but
rather
the
difference
in
the
value
of
the
the
the
rather
the
the
the
of
of
to
difference
of
but
value
value
access
highway,
in turn
property before
before and
impairment of
this in
the destruction
the access,
after the
or impairment
of the
turn is
is
destruction or
and after
and this
property
access, and
based upon
best use
use to
the highest
highest and
the land
which the
to which
land involved
is suitable
involved is
suitable before
upon the
and best
before and
and
based
after
the taking.
taking.
after the

Emphasis
judgment, the
the question
the access
For purposes
Whether the
Emphasis added.
is whether
of summary
question is
access
added. For
purposes of
summary judgment,
easement
that the
the Days
the 1997
the Isaacs
after the
of the
construction of
easement that
had immediately
1997 construction
Isaacs Canyon
immediately after
Canyon
Days had
Interchange
value of
fair market
the fair
market value
the property
the access
Interchange diminished
diminished the
of the
when compared
to the
compared to
access
property when
easement
that existed
the interchange
interchange construction.
existed immediately
construction.
easement that
before the
immediately before
That
been built
built on
preThat analysis
the predetermination of
on the
of what
What road
requires aa determination
road could
have been
could have
analysis requires
jurisdiction over
interchange
whether any
interchange access
taken jurisdiction
public entity
have taken
over it,
would have
access easement,
easement, Whether
entity would
it,
any public
and
property by
by that
that access.
the Day
on the
What type
of development
development could
and what
supported on
have been
been supported
could have
access.
Day property
type of
in regard
The
that exists
The same
the access
the
after the
is necessary
exists after
to the
regard to
easement that
same analysis
access easement
analysis is
necessary in
in access
If there
interchange
was constructed.
fair market
the fair
market value
interchange was
there is
is no
no change
or effect
effect on
on the
change in
constructed. If
value
access or
in access,
taking of
from
from any
then no
no compensable
of access
change in
has occurred.
compensable taking
occurred.
access has
access, then
any change

The
just claim,
this exercise.
through this
The Days
not bothered
without
to go
bothered to
exercise. Rather,
have not
go through
Rather, they
claim, without
they just
Days have
“bisect” their
“placeholder” for
their property.
evidence,
public road
would “bisect”
that they
that would
for aa public
had aa “placeholder”
road that
See
evidence, that
property. See
they had
Days’ Memorandum
that the
Days’
provided no
wide easement
the fifty
Memorandum at
at 16.
no evidence
foot Wide
easement
16. They
have provided
evidence that
They have
ﬁfty foot

“bisected” their
in 1967
their property
Original Day
provided by
by the
the State
The State
is
State in
State is
provided
1967 “bisected”
property (the
Property). The
(the Original
Day Property).
than reaching
Original Day
not
not aware
the easement
the boundary
the Original
other than
reaching the
of the
doing anything
of the
easement doing
aware of
anything other
boundary of
Day

Property.
Property.
in 1967
in
the Days
Rather,
up the
the access
to give
on SH
SH 30
had on
give up
1967 the
agreed to
30 in
access they
Rather, in
knowingly agreed
they had
Days knowingly

point of
exchange
payment of
for payment
the end
single point
of severance
of access
at the
of an
an
exchange for
and aa single
end of
severance damages
damages and
access at
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easement
per the
that the
for aa future
the Days
the
the Day
admit that
frontage road.
easement for
road. Significantly,
future frontage
afﬁdavit, the
Significantly, per
Days admit
Day affidavit,
“impassable” the
it approached
fifty
was “impassable”
their Original
Original Day
the last
miles or
or so
last 1.5
easement was
1.5 miles
approached their
so as
as it
ﬁfty easement
Day

Property.
Property.
The
that they
The Days
the type
the
no analysis
of the
of access
on the
had on
provided no
have provided
have had
could have
access that
analysis of
they could
Days have
type of
pre-interchange
post-interchange access
in comparison
pre-interchange access
that
the post-interchange
to the
comparison to
easement in
easement that
access easement
access easement

“frontage on
currently
was built,
built, they
not have
the interchange
interchange was
on aa public
Before the
exists. Before
public
did not
have “frontage
currently exists.
clearly did
they clearly
road” as
“Direct Access”.
Access”.
road”
define “Direct
as they
they define

“Direct
“buildable right
right of
Nor have
proven that
part of
their “Direct
way”, the
that they
the other
Nor
other part
of their
of way”,
had “buildable
have they
they had
they proven
Access” definition,
way”
“buildable right
right of
Access”
prior to
the interchange.
Demonstration of
interchange. Demonstration
of way”
to the
of aa “buildable
definition, prior

requires
answering such
requires answering
questions as:
such questions
as:
—> What
the requirements
for construction

requirements for
What entity
controlled the
of aa road?
construction of
have controlled
would have
road?
entity would
—> Could
pre-interchange easement?

been met
met on
the pre-interchange
requirements have
on the
those requirements
easement?
have been
Could those
—> Would

be private
public?
the road
to be
private instead
of public?
instead of
had to
road have
have had
Would the
—> What

would the
limitations would
the access
the potential
the
potential development
What limitations
on the
of the
development of
imposed on
have imposed
access have

property?
Day
Day propeny?
that the
the Days
the State
the Court
claim that
Without such
Without
cannot claim
took access
State took
Court does
such analysis,
access because
because the
does
analysis, the
Days cannot

in 1997.
not know
the interchange
interchange in
not
what access
prior to
know What
to construction
of the
existed prior
construction of
1997.
access existed
State’s public
Ultimately,
that they
the Days
the State’s
no access
public access
assert that
have no
access because
because the
access
Ultimately, the
they have
Days assert

easement
be connected
untrue, as
That simply
the
Eisenman Road.
cannot be
to Eisenman
is untrue,
indicated by
easement cannot
connected to
Road. That
as indicated
simply is
by the
State’s public
affidavits
public access
Szplett and
The State’s
of David
an
afﬁdavits of
David Szplett
easement can
and Amy
Revis. The
can have
have an
access easement
Amy Revis.

approach
whether aa road
A question
the easement
Eisenman Road.
exist as
built on
onto Eisenman
to Whether
on the
question may
easement
approach onto
road built
Road. A
as to
may exist
would be
be public
would take
that the
ACHD would
the State
for the
the road)
or ACHD
take responsibility
or
public (meaning
State or
would
responsibility for
(meaning that
road) or
private, requiring
build and
their
maintain it.
requiring the
the Days
it. But
But as
the Days
admit at
to build
at page
15 of
of their
and maintain
as the
page 15
private,
Days to
Days admit
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memorandum,
private easement
the public
through aa private
to the
public roads
easement
can have
have access
roads only
access to
memorandum, “[p]roperty
“[p]r0perty can
only through
In this
be
over
properties.” In
this case,
the access
the road
itself would
other properties.”
is public,
easement is
over other
road itself
would be
access easement
public, only
case, the
only the

private.
private.
Days’ motion
Based
the Days’
motion of
the existence
material factual
of summary
on the
of several
existence of
factual issues,
several material
Based on
issues, the
summary

judgment as
the loss
judgment
to the
of access
should be
denied.
loss of
as to
access should
be denied.
B.
whether the
At minimum,
fact exists
the parties
parties agreed
the
B. At
of fact
exists as
as to
to whether
on the
question of
agreed on
minimum, aa question
State’s waiver
location
waiver of
the current
the State’s
the
location of
current access
of the
of the
access easement,
nullifying the
easement, thereby
thereby nullifying
statute
limitations defense.
statute of
of limitations
defense.
in their
In their
In
partial summary
judgment, as
well as
their supporting
their motion
motion for
for partial
supporting memorandum,
as well
as in
memorandum,
summary judgment,

the
this Court
that the
limitations
the State
its statute
the Days
for an
of limitations
an order
State has
Court for
order that
has waived
statute of
have asked
asked this
waived its
Days have
Days’ inverse
in relation
but not
defense
their contract
the Days’
not in
relation to
to the
condemnation claim,
to their
contract claims.
inverse condemnation
claims.
defense as
as to
claim, but
Days’ Memorandum
See
Motion fbr
for Partial
Judgment at
The language
the Motion
Memorandum at
at 13.
at 2;
13. The
Partial Summary
language
See the
Summary Judgment
2; Days’
in support
relied
their motion
limitations comes
relating to
the Days
motion relating
the statute
relied upon
of their
to the
of limitations
statute of
support of
upon by
comes
Days in
by the

M to
from
from aa July
from Steve
letter (Exhibit
the Day
to the
an attorney
2000 letter
Steve Parry,
Affidavit) from
(Exhibit M
attorney
19, 2000
July 19,
Parry, an
Day Affidavit)

representing
the State,
the Days.
The letter
letter discusses
representing the
representing the
to A.J.
an attorney
discusses
A]. Bohner,
Bohner, an
attorney representing
State, to
Days. The

“new” (post-interchange)
relocating
portion of
by the
the
the portion
the “new”
relocating the
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of May 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

Ou.s. Mail
D Hand Delivered
0 Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
0 Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTON FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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Electronically Filed
5/31/2017 3:39:09 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3 311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Depa1tment
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
State ofldaho
County of Ada

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOl -16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON

)
: ss.
)

James Morrison, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON - l
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1. I am employed by the District 3 office of the Idaho Transportation Department as a
Property Manager.
2. Part of my duties and responsibilities include maintaining files containing documents
relating to various Idaho Transportation Depatiment highway projects, and I am
therefore making the following statements regru·ding such documents based on my
own personal knowledge.
3. I bad several email communications with Donna Jacobs, some of which involved her
brothers, regarding access to the Day property. I also attended meetings to discuss
the access issue which meetings were attended by Ms. Jacobs and on occasion by one
or more of her brothers. On at least one occasion their attomey was present. These
communications occurred mainly in 2016. In all of my communications with the
Days, they never indicated that they wanted to move the location of the current lTD
access easement.
4. Attached hereto are hue and con·ect copies of the following documents that are public
records made at or near the relevant time, and created and maintained in the regularly
conducted course and practice of business activity:
a. Exhibit A: Letter dated November 21, 1961 from Mr. Bennett, State Highway
Engineer, to Jess Hawley, attorney representing the Day family.
b. Exhibit B: Letter dated November 21, 1961 from Mr. Bennett, State Highway
Engineer, to the Day Realty Company, with a copy to Jess Hawley, attorney
representing the Day family.
c. Exhibit C: 1967 Appraisal of Original Day Property by Robe11 Stout.
d. Exhibit D: 1967 Appraisal of Original Day Property by William Onweiler.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON - 2
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e. Exhibit E: Right of Way Agent's Diary from 1967, setting forth notes made
by Right of Way Agent's communications with the Day family.
f.

Exhibit F: Letter dated February 10, 2000 from Steve Pany to Donna Jacobs
Re: Agreement on new easement.

Further your Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this 3C~ay of May 2017.

Property Manager, District 3
Idaho Transportation Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this3o day ofMay 2017.

SHONA TONKIN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

SHONA TONKIN
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 9-16-21

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON- 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on this 31 51 day of May 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Obenecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

OU.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax to (208) 319-2601
~ iCowi Service
Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

0
0

0

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transpmiation Department
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I-80N-2{J )61

November 21, 1961

Isaac's Canyon - Regina
Ada County
Parcel No. 2

Jess B. Hawley, Attorney-At-Law
McCarty Building
Boise, Idaho
Dear Mr. Hawley:
Enclosed ia a fully executed copy of an agreement
between your clients Emma ·I . Day, et al and the State of Idaho,
Department of Hifhways, stipulating that the State of Idaho
may take possess on of the property desc~lbed as the above
captioned parcel pending co pletion by the State of its final
plans £or the next (Northerly) section of Interstate Highway aoN.
Three additional copieo are being furnished your clients
through the offices of the Day Realty Company.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,

o. BRYCE BENNET1'
State Highway Engineer

John P. l4ix
Chief Right of Way Agent

JPM:cso:1m

Enclosure
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EXHIBIT B
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•

•
November 21, 1961

I-BON-2(3)61
Iaaac•s Canyon - hegina
Ada County
Parcel ffo. 2

Day Realty Company
710 Vista Avenue
B\>ise, Idaho

rl~~

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are three fully executed copies of an agreement
I jl entered into by Emma N. Day et al and the State of Idaho,
~) Department of Highways, 6tipulating that the State of Idaho may
take possession of the property described as the above captioned
pa-vcel pending completion by the State of its final plans for
the next (Northerly) section of I nte r state I{jghway SON.
lfll]
~~l- I
An additional copy is being furnished your attorney,
Mr. Hawley.

II_/
u

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
G. BRYCE BENNETT

State dighway Engineer

John P. l\iix

Chief Right of Way Agent

JPMICSOiim
Inclosure a
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·PRINCIPAL R/W AGBNT-APPRAISAL

9 June 1967

Conaideratiorl ot Free Appraiaal
on aboYe parcel

I-goN-2() )91

Ieaaca Cauyon
Parcel No. 2
Wilma .t. Day, et al
Ada CoLlr.t y

legotiationa on thia parcel have developed to a poaition
where purchaM on our present appraisal is lot possible.
It would appear that the only poeaible aolution would

be a fee appraiaal.

Will JOLl pleaae adviae it• the eervicae of a fee
will be aonelderecl at t.bia time.

cc:

apprais~r

Chief d/W Ageqt
/
Aeat.. Chief R/"1.' Agent..._.../'
PrinciR&l R/W Age; t - Apprai w
Area If/W A&ent
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e

Intra· Department
Correspondence

HIGHWAYS
'

'

CHIEF RmHl' OF W4Y ACDT

Date a

January 6, 1966

~RtLJ:d,J~~J

G. J. VOORHEES

Principal R/W Agent
(Appraisal)
'l'RANSMITTAL OF APPRAISAL REPORT

Projeet'

1-SON-2(3)61 Parcel 2
Emma Day

property

Transmitted herewith is an appraisal report by Jay Stout, above captioned
parcel and project. This report has been reviewed and approved tv the
Review Appraiser.
A copy of the report has been i'urniEihed the Area R/W Agent and the BPR.
This copy is for the project file.
!"g

attachment
co L. I. Passmore, w/attach.

I

~i
•

1

~

•

:

_ '.
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~

.•

·a;

-r

4·'65

'

•

•

Intra· Department
Correspondence

Date:
~,
~

.•
!!'•

Byt

- i'roaa .

Project&

I-SON-2(3)61 Parcel 2
Emma Dq property

'lhie propert7 COI181st.a ot 146.58 aores of land located about 5 m:Ues
1101ltheut ot Boille on Hw;r 30. ·

:. . ·
' ..

•..

..•

The laDd lqa in t.he mDUth ot Isaacs Car110n with the highwq crossing
it on 811 iqle baa DOI'theast to southwest and going through the valley
with the belanq of the land l.qing on a steep slope on the north and
the major ,.rt. on a steep slope to the south.

The parcel on the north consists ot 7 ac. which has about 50 to 100 tt.
back trom the rigbt of way line which b flat and the remai1lder rtses
vp a steep slope 60 to 70 tt. above the highwa71 tor a dista.....,,.-: of 300
to 400 tt. !be land on the south consists of 139.58 ao. which slopes
up tram the tirhg ot way Une 40 to 50 ft. high and then levels ott to
more or lese rolling dry graze land.
The land along the highwq has sane value for signs but this is ma.:inly
on t.he DOrth tor the in-cOlling trattio tu Boise.
It appears the hi-ghest and best use for about 2 ao. on the north side
along the right ot WQ" is tor signs.
This laDd bas been used tor signs over the years with a good return from
the land on this use.
Approaches to Value
To arrive at a value on this land as of July, 1961, the sales are used
as of that time and they are utilized as to the reason of purc!.lase and
highest and best use.

.
~

. ·..
'

< •

There a.re a number of sales in this area with the major part of thelr.
being purchased by stockmen i'Dr grazing purposes. These sales vary in
value .trom $16 to $75 per ac. with the highest and best use for grazing.
There is a sale of 4.0 ac. farther west near the highway which sold tor
. 76 per ac.
It appears subject property has some value above grazing but not the value
has a number
of uses dtte to the fact it is level •

ot t ho sale farther west at $75 per ac. The 40 ac. sale at $75

000459
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Project I-SON-2(3)61
Parcel 2
page 2

The salee used va:ey in size from 40 ac. to 640 ac. and the price ranges
in value troa $7.50 per ac. to $75 per ac. The purchases are .ID)st all
e by stoaJaleD with the major use being for grazing.
With the •301' port.ion ot the sales being 1 to 6 miles awq from the
h:i.gl'1nJ', ~· appraiser is putting the major portion of support tar the
'Yal.ue on eal.e Bo. 1 vbioh is the 40 ao. halt a mlle west of subject land.
Subj ot laad. 1UQ' have some value as view lots but it appears this "!!uld

be so 1118;1 Jeal'l

a

the future, it could not be considered at this time.

Tbe before nJ.ne and. the a!tervalu.e are figured nmch on the same basis
with the Cllllq difference being the tull control highwa;y in the after
c..,ared to the old hig)'Dnq w1 thou.t control.

'l'he DeW bi.stofa.7 was
l.and needed tor the
in the befCl'e vbiah
l eas 2 a.o. ot th 7

built on the old r:tght of way with c...
extra width. The owner had 7 ac. 01.
was used for signs. The income frou1
ao. shows a land valu·' of about $50C'

little more
the northwest
this l!lln!!e or
per a.c.

Thera is a oontraot with the owner on the land to the north consisting
~r 7 ac. t or a:i.gn rental for two eigne which brint; in $15 per month.
'!'hie is a 5 year lease vi th a renewal option.

to the fact this is a short term lease with a high risk, this appraiser
thinks $500 par ac. or $1000 for the site would be fair market value.

Due

If this was figured on the income of $15 per month for 12 mcmths, the

following figures are the result:

15 x 12

=

$180 per year

$180 income/yr. 0

1~

~

$1.800

Dne to the high risk, it appears 15% would be more nearly in the range
with $1000 to $1200 for the land used for signs.

Befol"e Value

2 ao. 8 $500/ao - H & B Uee signs
11
5 ao. ~ $15/ao
"
dry graze

7 ac. Total Est • .Mkt. Value RT
148.57 ao.

$50/ac

Total Est. Mkt. Value &fore

$1000
75

$1075
5943
$7018

000460

Project I-80N-2(3)6l
Parcel 2
page 3

Dell0l."1pt4.on Gt Propgtz - Alter
Parcel 2 in the attezo remains much in the same c:Cildition with 7 ac.
rema.i.ni.D.g northwest aDd 339.58 ao. r-aining southeast. 'Dle major
cl:U'teraDOe em \bia lAad is the taking ot 8.99 ac. tram the land e11 the
eotltheast ot the h1ghwa;y and autting oft the access !rom both parcels
an the ~orth auci the land to the south .from the main higbwq.
After

Va.J.ue

Highest aDd best use - resale

2. a.c. reduced to ciry graze 0 $10/ac
11
5 ac.
"
"
"
@ $10/ac
7

$20

20

c. After Value

$

1.39. 58 ac. 8 $30/e.c

70

4187

Total Est. Mkt. Value After

$4257

Canclltsion
Before Value

$701.8

After Value

4257

Est. Just Compensation

$2761

t

8.99 ae. i $40/ao

$360
$J60

Dauase

Due to the loss of access !rom the hwy, there will
be no legal access to the land on the north consisting of 7 ac. This v1l1 cause the loss of income tram the signs aDd reduce the land to dry
grasse ldth t.h6 higt.eet & best use being for reeale to adjoining owners.

The land on the south consisting of 139.58 a c.
will lose the access to the hwy. There will be
rh prouded for the land a.long the interstate
r/w but there will be no road and the cost of the
road lf'Ould. be more than the land wuld be worth.
Due to the poo"" access in the alter it would be
reduced in value for dry grazeo Poor access to
this land c!ue to t.he !act you could not get in
b;r ~ in the after.

000461

ProJect I-SON-2(3)61

Parcel 2
Total Damagee
Total '!'ake

$2401

36o

'total Just. Oolfpensat.ion
'the dall&gee

1ft

page 4

$2761

based em t.be as811111ption there will be no access to the

7 ao. rnJ1n1ng on the north r.nd the sifPl& will have to be abandoned.
I't ~t 'be possible 'ttt pvobase an easement into this land !rom the
adji!iitDg on.ers aDCl it thie is possible the damages would. be reduced
to the amollllt. ot the. ea.s-.mt.

It wald. take a right ot - . of 30 tt.. by about 1 mlle or
laad.
It. iG possible t.1d.
about $.350

could be purchased

31

acres c;t

tar $100 per ac. at the roost or

total.

'D1ie wculd. cleareue just. compensation to $1.815.

Land WJjd in right of wa:;

000462

Project I-SQN-2(3)61
Parcel 2
page 5

Land on south c. f IniiVs t&te

Land remaining north of Interstate
area with sigrts

000463

• I

Sale No. 1
Information of Sale:
Seller:
Buyer:
County:
Date of Sale:
Description:
Total Con~ideration:
Land Classification:
Date Recorded:

Ed Case and Ada County Records 7/28/61
Edward Case and Thelma I. ease
).lerle F. & Annabel H. Fellers
Ada
Jan. 13, 1961 Case
Jan. 25, 1961
S~ Ni·l~ Sec. 18 T. 2 N, R. 3 E~

$3000

40 acres $75 per acre
1/16/61 Book 475 page 228 Rev. Stamps $2.75
InstrQ~ent 495265
Case - Uright
1/25/61 Book 475 Page 410 Rev. Stamps $3.30
Instr~~ent 49592
Cash

Terms of Sale:
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EXHIBIT D

000466

•
.JUlf 19, 19Ej7

l80N 1(1)82
Pal'oel 2 • D&J
'f otal 0111181' ship 1 166.67 Aores
P.rojeots

'fuea
bmainclers

8.99

•

148.68 •

Mr. G• .J. Voarbeee

Cblet Appraiser
Dept. ot Bighft)'11
BoiH, Idaho

DIN' Sirs
. , ••ti•t• ot the •rket ftlue ot the lan4 ilaken ror
tbe Interstate ancl the lo .. in ftlue 'to 'the r.-incler is
f'.li0e00 1 &8 Of .JUlJ 196le
lespeottull)' .ubmittecl,

~4tt~

Fee Apprailer
WOajg

000467
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CONrmS

!1t1•

at lubjeot

1

~h

2

Pioture• of Subjeot

a

Bletor7 6 Description at Subjeot • Before July 1961

'
.'

Purpo•• ot Appraiaal • Before JulJ 1961
......ed valuation

6

.Area

6

Highest

6

Pioture

T

Ad3u1tment of Comparable& • Before July 1961

9

Purpose ot Appraisal • After July 1961

9

Deaoriptian ot Subject • Atter July 1961

9

Highest 6 Best Use • After July 1961

Deeaription
&

Best Use • Bei'ore Jul7 1961

10

A4jutment of

10

Conoluaion

12

llap

lS

Comparable

#1

14

if.

#3

16

•
•
•

17

•

/16

18

•

It

16

Cca~p&~"ables

• After July 1961

14

19

Underlying Aeaumptions and Limiting Conditions

2~

~alifioations

ot

~he

Appraiser
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HISTORY ARD DESORIPUOH OF SUBJECT BEFORE JULY 1961

-8

!he eub~eot pl"oper\y
purchased Yaroh 26, 1936 by Ernest a. Day tr•
ilhe lata'H of Blloob Hanlon Wiokerabam tor teoo.oo. the pl'oper1;y is the
111 i ot S..idon 19, ! bl, a 11. It bas been held tor tuWJ-e u•e sino•
an4, aooorting to O..ld Day, the son, • • to be held until ripe for
nb-cl1ri.cl1JIIe

tu
\AM

pw Do-.14 Day, bas been leaaed. tor dry grazing, a1; whiob
it will Uca&t p&J ~e 1;aaa.

pi"O~y 11

'fhe ownera haft a long hiatory ot purohasins land nll ahead of tho demam
tor IUb...Si:rision luul. They- antioipate the ..,.ket by ~are, thus buy at
a fraotion ot the ~bsequont ~lue. In the ease or the aubjeot parcel,
the land 11 aelt ~Raining, aa it 11 &4jaoent to dry graloing and suitable
tor thia illtel'ia uae.
'fhe aubjeot is seven (7) miles Southeast or Boise, Idaho on u.s. Higoway
jeo. 'file l\ll"rouwHng l&JJd on all aides b \Ulderdevelaped and. used tor
4ry- gr&dJII• Aaoel'l to u.s. JU.sbway if,O 11 approxiaately 1•700 teet
41&goD&lly- aero.. the Horth•st oorner. There b no lbdtation to the
aooess.
!he land b then bbeoted 1Dto a ••llor paroel on the Northeast that ia
neop and roekf• 'fbe large parool on the Southwest ia rolling up trc the
high•y- to lenl plateau on top. There is little rook in the larger
paroel, and the 1011 appears very good.
!he large paroel hu an oxoellent view or Boioe and. the mountains to the
North.

Water, and dhtanoe to the city present two deterrents to sub-dividing.
Water 11 about 600' down by well, just North and also North and West of
tho eubjeot. South and West of the aubjoot, the wells are in exceu ot
800'. 'rhis probl8111 will require a oolllllUnity water BJ&tem, or a high-oolt
per lot, ~ua a lower lot prioe When it is sub-divided.
'lbe cU.atanoe i'rc Boise will beoome less a deterrent as the plateau to tne
North develops. 81noe lV6l this development is beooming evident with

many aales tor parposes or industrial use, proposed ranohettos, and horse
farms. SeTOral or these are inoluded after the oomparables to help
eupport the abne argument.

3

000471

LBGAL DBSCBIPriON:

!he lonb.ean f ot Seotion 19• 'l 2H, R 3E exoept -the u.s. Highway ~o
1/W ot about 4.43 aor••• !be paroel oontains ~pproximat.ely 155.67 aores.
fUIIPOSE OF THE APPBAISAL • BEFOBE dULY la&l
!hls apprailal b a supportable estimate of market value tor the above

clesoribed. real property when all taotors ei'feoting value are taken into
aooount.
ASSESSED VALUAUO!h
l96lt AasesiiJUent

_:.-..;,......;...;._~-

{1)
(2)

Itt
si

ot

oi'

ol Seation 19 •
NBi Seotion 19 •

• 170.00
170.00

T 2H, R 3E
T 21f, R 3E

1961 Tax
(1)
(2)

t170 X Be0462
t170 X 7.4416

Code 10
Code 40

• 13.68
12.66
TOfAL

• 26.33

000472

liiEA DESCRIPfiOlf a
South of Boise City and the Municipal airport is a large plateau

I"UJlDing East UlCl Welt a DUmber of miles and about 2-~ miles wide from

Jortb to South. 'fhe large • undulating plateau is bordered on the
South by a ridge of amall hills. The Subject property ex.te1.is into
these hill•, as do Comparables #4 and #f,.
The soil 11 fertile, with scattered areas or lava rook. \'i'ater is
from wells. The normal depth on the plateau is rrom 500' to 600'.
Above the hills, the depth is from BOO' to 900 1 •
The area is serviced by Highway #30 on the Eas~, and Pleasant Valley
Road in the center.
Sinoe 1960, industry baa been looating in the East end of this strip
or land •

•

5

000473

BIGOS! AliD BES! USI • BBFOBE JULY 1961
~~

·..

moat profitable uao to wbioh the subject property may be put now
11 dry P'&aiDC• !M aost profitable 1\lture use for the subjeot property
ia for residential uao.

This tuture uae may be supported by the following example, of whioh there
are several around Boise in Yarious stages ot development.

A oomparable property in the later stages of development is as foll01n1 t

July 21, 196'7

Per s W. 11. Wood a

It'. Woods purahaaod 2to aorea in 1938 tar $' 1 800.00 for the pvpose ot
'building an airport. DeYelopment oosta were found to be prohibitive.
Sage Aares laDohettea• Subclivhion, in the
of Sootion 11, T 4:B,
ll lE wt.a started i:n 1969. The lots nre sold for t&oo.oo eaoh. To
elate, Mr. Woods aaicl thirty (30} of the fiftJ' one~re lots have been
aold for oash. Be said three had been sold in the last 1;wo years.

wl

Water supply is the Cllllly deterrent, Mr. Woods thought. The souroe is
from 300 1 to 400' deep.
The area is about seven miles North and West of Boise on the Highway
to McCall, and about two miles North of the Valley Road junotion.
The land i l rolling, unsuitable for farming, but attractive for
ranobette u... The land extends to the Bighwt.y.
It 1a ..., opinion tbat a oOIIIIlWlity well would have encouraged the de•
velopme.a.t.
There are aeTen ba.es built and occupied, and one under construction.
The area is improved with eleotrioity and a paved road.
Tillotson Agenoy is now selling the lotsJ reports oo:nai4erable interest.
They sold a lot in March or 1966 for 11,600.00; sold a lot in February or 1967 for t2,2oo.oo, oash •

•

v'

.j 1,\.)

fL\T

~"'' ~
}}.t. i"t\

(( 1/.1.

~

J

'
t)
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•
ADJUS'fllll'f OF OOMPARABLES • BEFOBE JULY 1961
CCID(IU'able fl. si~oa a goocl iJI.dioe.tiaa of wbat a 'bu,er will pay tar arid
&Dd. UDdeTeloped truiq lad South of Boise. Comparable 1/6 further auppcrta the ~UOJ hOWYer, it h after the time ot the appraisal. Oompa•
rable f1 •• purobaaed tor a apeoifio use 1 i.e. stables, farming and a
raoe tl'aok. Cm~p~U"a'ble :lfi
purohased for speculation. Comparable /16
ia ~ery like the aubjeot in oontour. The Subject has aooeaa from a paved
u.s. Bigbway 1 while these two oomparables are on a gravel road, departing
trom Gowen Road aD4 going South to aervioe arrid land.

•s

AcljuatMJrta for Comparable #1 is a plus 30% for poorer road. Adjustments
tor Comparable :f/6 ia leas 10% for time and plus 3()% for aooess.
!ho roaulta vo COIIpU'&ble #l ia io6.88 adjuated 1 and Compara.'ble
t7Sel2, adjusted.

:1/6

ia

:1/t, II and #f, are sales one-halt mile North of the subject
Highway 110. Co-.parable :f/1. is a level paroel fronting on
ft,o, or 23.2 aorea in 1966. OD~~p&rable ~ ia the portion or
11he 40 aores on the Woat side of the hi&}lwa.y, ot wbioh Comparable /if.
i.e the East part.
CGilparable ~ waa puroha.aed in 1966 and contains
12.6 aorea. (Both the above acreages exclude old Highway jSo B/W).
'lhe per acre prioes are • Comparable 1/!l at $120.00 aDd Comparable #3
at ll?&.oo. 'rheae per acre "f&luea mat be a.djusted down (1) for level
land (2) tor closer to oity and {S) more trontage per acre. the tv1o
oomparables will haye more immediRte use for industrial as e"fidenoed
by paroell to the Borth. they are adjusted to 50% or sa.le price, or
COJDp&ra.ble II to teo.oo and Comparable /13 to $87.60.

CG~~pVablea
Gil

u. s.

H1sn•r

Comparable :/fi is the moat like tbe subject in oontour and size. It
is oloaer to Boise, however aooess is 196' from the highway. The sale
in 1961 shows t?&.OO per aore.
CORRELATION OF VALUEs
Comparable

"
"

II

•

t·f!3

1/4
:J/6

adjusted to

"
"

"
"

"
"

"

II

I 56.88

so.oo
8'1.50
'16.00
'13.12

It is m::J opinion that $76.00 per aore for both parcels of the subject is
a fair market ftlue, allowing a vo.riation of 10% error. The value is
then between ts2.60 and $67.60.

•

To further support this value, mathen~tioally, the value of the $800.00
purchase price may be approximated in 1960 dollars by dividing by 40%.
It follows tbat if the dollar were stable in 1960 values, the buyer would
ha.ve given approximately $2,000.00 for the parcel. The future worth
of 1 for 26 years at 6% is 4.29, thus 4.29 X 2,000 • $8,680.00. When
a profit !e allo~ed for risk, ~1e $11 1 000.00 plus v~lue is very realiatio.
(Cont•d. on following

7

p~ge}

000475

•

(COAt'4•) Correlation of Value 1
'fhe tame prooe11 oarried forward tor 26 years may be applied by dividing
the t76.00 per aore by .233, resulting in about 1320.00 per aore. This is
in the range ot probability for a ftlue if aubdivided on toda:ya market,

ooneid.ering the ooat or obtaining water.
!he present ~lue ot the parcel, July 1961. ia 166.67 acres times f75,
or 111 1 667.76 - say 111,100.00 •

•

~f~
,,

....,.

r
I
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fUBfOSK OF APilWSAL • AF'Ual JULY 1961

'fhil apprailal b a supportable estillate or the market ~alue for the
aeaoribed real propert, when all factors arteoting ~lue are taken into
aocount.
'fbia appraiaal ia to fUrther show the loss in value due to the taking
ot land tor Interstate 80N and the loas in ~lue, it any, to the remain•.
1D.g proper-ty.
Per inatruotiona and maps, the Bight of Way for the existing u.s. Highway
flo 11 4.43 aares. !he "take" tor Interstat~& BON is 8.99 aorea. The
paroel to the Northeast will have left • 1 aores. The paroel to the
Southwest will have left • 139.58 aorea.
DBSCBIPriON OF SUBJECT • AFrER JULY 1961

The before deaorit..,d property ia bisected on the Northeast corner by
Bigpway BON tor approximately 1 1 700 teet. No aooess is allowed from
approximately li miles to the Southeast to approximately 2 miles to the
Southwest.
Aocess ia now anly by a 50' frontage road along the West side of the
Inter state. This road vdll be improved to within about 1.8 miles to the
North.
the Northeast parcel will have no aooesa.
the paroel bad just as well lay on a aeotion line 1.6 miles from a road
now that the limited aooess road is replacing the full aoceu road.

All elae about the property remains the same, with the exception that the
Northeast paroel will now oontain approximately 1 &ores and the Southwest
parcel will contain approximately 139.58 aorea.

The take is 8.99 aores in addition to the old

u.s.

Highway ~0 ~Y.

'HIGHEST AND BEST USE - AFI'ER JUI..Y 1961

the moat profitable use of the subject JrOperty may be in dry gradng just
now. The most proti table use in the tuture is residential. Due to the
loss or direct access, the possible time or residential development is
oonaiderably postponed and now dependent on the de~elopment of lands
between the subject and the Interstate connector, two miles to the North.
paroel to the Northeast is now land-looked, and not feasible for use.
It was the least T&luable or the two parcels before the buildin~ of the
Interstate. It haa now lost all speculative vnlue for residential •

~he

•

000477

AJ)dUST'ME!n OF COIIPAWLES • A.FrER JULY l9Gl
Aooess to the remaining property is now by a 50' right-or-way that is
Wldeveloped. 'rhia ia the same as putt.ing the subject l} miles from a
paved road on & aeotion line sinoo aocess is from ~ frontage road
1• lei't for the puoele l!he road oo.wes £rom Govten Road on the West
side of the Inter:..ta.te. It; is improved &pproxiJIU\tely o:ue-halt milo
and unimprGYed approximately 1! miles.
Adjusting Comparable 11 down 10,! for tho quality of the road. and Compe..r•
able :/}5 down 2~ for quality or road and time, the following results 1

CQIIIDarable
1t

#1
#6

j43.75
62.50

to
to

i39.75

so.oo

Comparable :1/fj 11 the most like the subject in terrain and reasons for
purchase. It is my opinion tho a.ftor vn.lu~ of t.hd sl.<bj-:tct is $50.00 per
aore.

COliCLUSION I

Tho pa.roel to be appraised before July 1361 is 155,57 acres. The vn1ue
aupported by this appraisal is $75.00 per acre. Tho before vnlue or the
paroel ia f?ti i 155.~7 a.oros or ill,667.76.
The value of the subject property a£ter July l9ol and the •take" by the
Interstate is $50.00 por aoro for 146.58 acres, or $7,329.00.
The loss in V&lY~ is oomposed of a
per acre or $674.25.

takin~

of 8.99 acres valued at $75.00

the remaining aores have a. loss i n vnl-te due to lo:1s of direct access of
about t25.00 per aore. $25 times 1146.58 is i3,664.50.
The 8 taken or land for Interstate
The Loss in value to 146.58 aoros

i

4,338.16

Rounded to
This vulue is supJ?orto.ble within a 10:' uargin
llote:

674.25
3,664.50

~.3~0.00

or

errore

Tha pvoel on the 1~ol."thonst side of the road is len valuable e.s
re31de~1&1 or ro.nohette th~ the lar~er parcel; however, a value

10

(Cont'd• on next000478
page)

(Cont•d. • ~onoluaion)
apprwawly the aame aa the large paroel may be supported tor
ra&4 'billbou'd use. It thia uae ia to.ken the ri&ht will be pur•
obaaed.

If, ia included in this appraisal, even though the sale is
f'iTe yee.rs atter the date ot the appraiaal, to give an example of possible
uses in the general area South and East or Gowen Field. This property.
ia oloser to Bois•J howeyer, aooeas 11 arounJ the airport.
·
CG~~p~&'&ble

It should be noted, also, this paroel is a mile from a gravel road.
The mile DUst be i~roYed as yet. ~fi th only this a.ooeaa, the parcel ia
being developed.. I think the proposed subdividing ia ahead of the
market, but the poaa1ble use ia there in the futuro,

•
11
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COMPARABLE

fl

Le~l Deaoriptiona
Intonu.tion tromt

Seller a
-*iuyera
Date ot S&lea
Total oonaiderationa
Land olaaslfioations
Impr ovementa 1
Interviewed a
Bemarkaa

r

r
t

•

•
Hi ot NEt Section 8• 't 2.N, ll 2E
Ada County reoordss
Book 486, Page 486. No stamps.
Probate oourt tor Maggie Ann Howard
Jorry D. & Leta J. Sohooley
February 27, 1962
t3.600e00 Canh, or $43.75 per aore
Dry grazing - 80 aores level.
None
Leta 5ohooley, on Jul:· 19, 1967.
at property.
I was told the prioe was 90% or the
appraised value, as required by the probate court. The land was purchased to
develop a horse ta~ and rnoe traok.
·rhe stables have been built• the track
is built, and a well drilled. The well
ia 636' deep, oased 12 •. The oost is
just over $14,000.00 for the well •

13

000481

COMPARABLE

f!

Le&&l 4esor1ptiona
r.

f:

l

r

A por·liion of Swt NEt Seotion 18, f 2N, R 3E
From the NE oorner of above
\V along N line 979' to E R/11 U.s. /f30
s " E rvfw u.s. iao to s line SWt ~
E " S line 8~~ NEt 543' to SE corner
of'

•'

N •
E boundary of
About 23.2 acres.

t.
Intonaatic-n !'roms

Swf NEt

swf NEt

1,326.6 1 •

Ada County recordu

Book 402

Pa~e

428

Sellers

Charles E. SilLaugh

Buyer a

Thomas Barnes

Date or Sales

May 17, 1956

fot&l oona1derations

Mrs. Barnes reports $2,600.

Stamps indioate

$600.

•

Land olassif1oat1ons

Dry grazing with h1r)'lway frontage.

ImproTementss

Uone

Interviewed a

.Mrs. Barnes on July 17, 1967,
at property.

Remarks:

The property was purchased to build a home
on; the home was built in 1966. A well
has been drilled 430'. It is found to be
inadequate a..wi ~m.t:;t be lowered to some
depth over soo•. Mrs. ~arnes told me they
were planning to put in a trailer oo~rt
in the future.

000482

-

COMPABABLE

f!

tesal desoription:

A portion of SYfi NE~ Section 18 1 T 2N, R :SE
From NW corner Seo. 18 E 195' to West
Edge of u.s. /f-1>0J thence SW along R/N
to insect1on or R)W &Seo. 18; thence
W along Southerly boundary or Sec. 18 629 1 ;
thence Northerly 1,32B't About 12.6 acres.

l.ni'or.lll&t;ion trom.a

Ada County records:
Book S26, Page 534.

*2.7S in stamps.

Seller•

c.

BuJers

Harold

Date or Sales

September l, 1966

'fota.l considerations

t2,200. or $176 per aore

Land olassitioationa

Dry gadng with frontage.

Improvement a 1

None

Interview a

None available.

.B.enarka a

The parcel is the bala.noe of a. 40 acres,
Comparable #2 being the East portion,
the old Highway #30 bisecting and this
bein~ the West part.
It is vary similar
to theo purchase of Mr. Barnes •

E. Silbaugh

o.

Nelso1~ &::

Rudolph

o.

Nelso!l

..

-----""'-·-.------
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COMPARABLE

•

f/!
,

J:

'Legal Desoriptiona

Sit NW4 Seo. 16, T 2N R 3E

Information froms

Ada County records,
Book 475, Fage 410.

r.

$3.30 in stamps.

case

Seller a

Edward &: thelma

Buyer a

Merle F. &Annabel H. Fottora

Date of Sale 1

Jan. 25, 1961

total considerations

j3,000. or

Land olassifioationa

Dry grazing without frontaGe•

lmpr ovement s a

None

lntorviews

None available

:Remarks a

'fhis ptU·ool is 4.) n.ores, laying West and
adjacent to Comparable if-3. It is le,•al
on the East nide and runs up on the
hills on the West. It is vary simi)ar
to the subject in terrain •

~·--···--- - -

$7~

por nora

.
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·.

OONPABABLB

ft

.Les-1 Deaoriptions

Nt SEJt .& slJ Z.I.Ei-, Seo. 8 1 T 2rl 1 R 2E 1
or 160 Aorea.

Information fraaa

Ada County reoorde,
Book of A~eements 24, Page 154.

Sellers

Zardee Cox & William U.Wstrwn, et ux

Bu;yera

J.

Date

or

Sale I

a.

Simp lot

June 2, 1964

Total oonsiderationa

flO,ooo. i2,000 down and $1 1 000 per year
with ~/o int., or ts2.50 per acre.

L&Diolaa sifioationa

Dry grazing.
to subjeot.

M~ch

is on slopes similar

Improvements s
Inl:~rviend a

J. :.!i. Si.:aplot office in Boiso.

•

The property is South and adjacent to
Comparable i/=1. Approxima~ely halt is
level and halt is very alopiug.
The land ?J&.I purohnsed tor speoulation.

...........~ ..·--·

,

.

-- ----

----......-~·--=--
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•
COMPA&ABLE

f!
NWt Seo.

10 'f 2U, R 2lil and Eastlt

9, 'f 2N, R 2E.

Boa.d 7 miles and 1 mile East

Valley Road.

IDtormation l'roms

NP>i

Seo.

240 Aores SotAth ot Gowen

ot Pleasant

Keith Gil.Jnore, salesman tor deal, and

Jess Doty, a well driller.
Sellers

Brauey

Buyer a

Glen Guillo

Date

•

or

Sale I

CoDtraot, Oct. 1966.

'fotal oonaidera.tion:

t24,ooo.oo

Land ola.ssifioa.tion:

Dry grazing at time or ftale.

Improvements a

!lone

I nterviewed s

J e s3 Doty o.ru:l Kei"t.'l :iilmore.

Jlemarkas

A well is being drilled in order to irrigate
the 240 acres. It 1o a 14" oa.sed 12"
~~d vdll have a probable depth or 500'
to 600 1 • I was told the buyor is consider•
i nu subdividing into 5 to 10 acre tracts.
Aooesa it via an unimproved road on a.
section line.

18

·f

000486

•
•

UHDBKLYING ASSUMPriONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS

Id.entltioation of the Prrer'a The legal description given to
lie .a pprat.er l• presul!'.e to e correct, but it has not 'been
ooDtiJ"'IH b)' a 8\ll've;y.
'!he appraber renders no opinion ot a legal nature, suoh aa to
oWDarahip to the proper'¥ or oondition ot title.
The appraiser aaau..a the title to the property to be marketable
and ~t the property does not exist in violation of any appli•
oable oodea, oricblanoes, statutes, or other govermnental re~
le.tion.
~areJLt

CoD.d.itiona The appraiser assumes that there are no
bid en • waapparent oOilditions of the property, subsoil •
atruoturea wbloh would render it more or lees V&luable than other•
wise OOIIIp&r&ble propertJ. The appraiser assumes no reapcm.aibilitJ for auoh oondi tiODe or tor engineering whioh might be
required to 41aoOTer suoh things.

•

Intol"'D&tion and Data a 'rhe information and data supplied to the
appraiser by others, aDd whioh ha~e been oonsidered in the valu•
a.ticm, are troa awroea believed to be reliable, wt no further
re~onsibilit.y is aeaumed tor its aoouraoy.
Use of the Aplr&iaala Poaaeaaion of the appraisal report or a
OGRJ &reQt oea not oarey with it the ri,Pt at publioation.
tu appraiaal report JILl.)' not be used tor any purpose exoept
~betantiation at the ~uations in the report without written
permiar,ion or the appraiser.
Sketohea ancl !lt.paa The lketohes included in the repozot are only
for the purpose ot aiding the reader in ~iauali&ing the property
and are not ba1ed on survey. Sbes and dimensions not shown
mould DOt be aoaled from the altetoheae
Aooeaa 1 It 1a uaumed the property has adequate and legal aooeas
from a publio street and/or highway.

000487

•

'

•

•

CIJWFICAt IONS OF 'r BE APPIAISU

EllJCATIOia Graduat. of Sohool of Bllliness troa the Un1Teraity ot
IdAho, in 1948, with a B. s. degree.
TIADillli a Suooeasfully oompletod Appre.bal I 1ponsored
in 1964• and Appraisal II sponsored by the
Iutitute in 1987. I am a oanclidate in the Allerioan Institute
or Jleal Bata.te Apprahors.

'l~HNICAL

b7 the IDi'tltute

!XPERIDCEs I have been a full-time Fee Appraiser tor one )'ftl'•
Pi'lor to that, for three years I aold and brokered real
estate.
~·

I haTe been oalled aa an expert w1Q1ess several times.

.'l IPE <»' ASSIG :miENT S 1

•

I have had experienoe appraising the following:

Jleaidenoea
llllti•l1v1ng Uni ta
Aoree.gea
Small Farms
Inoame Propertiea

William Onvzeiler

•

000488

•
_ ....f1~/.w.IJ.....,.c+

•

11~"~wl..al..:.;.o.:{t....c__

...----....
1110

J,

being duly

awom,

depoaee and 8&78:

That I have peraaaal.1J inepectecl the property herein appraised on

t1 ~ 7

(date) (e).

flat to the belt of
knolfledge and belief the statements contained in the appraieal
blreiDabow eet forth are true, and the information upon vhi.ch the opinions apreeeed
~ are baaed ie correct; subject to the limiting conditione therein eet forth.
'lllat I UDderetand that euch appraieal ie to be used in connection with the acquieiUca of right ot w,. tor a highwa;y to be constructed b;y the State ot Idaho vi th the
uaiatance of PedeNJ.-aid hisbW&f tlmde, and that such apprai.aal hu been made in
caatond.t7 with the appropriate State lave, regulations, and policies and procedures
appl1cable to appraieal of right ot W&J tor euch purposes, and that no portion ot
the Yal.ue auipecl to eucb property coneiete of iteme which are non-compensable
1Dler the establiehed lav of said State.

•

!bat neither .. tlllpl.o,_nt nor fliT compeneation tor making this appraiaal. and report
are in arw WJ contillleDt upon the values reported herein•
That I have DO direct or illdirect present or contemplated tuture personal interest
ill Rch propert7 or in &D7 benefit trom the acquisition of such property appraised.
!bat I v1ll not reveal the findiDgs and results ot eucb appNieal to ~ne other
thaD the proper officials of the State Highway Department of eaid 5tate or otticiale
ot tbe aareau ot PUblic Roads until authorised by State ottici&le to do eo, or until
I • required to do so by due process of law, or until I am released from this obUption b7 having public~ testified ae to such findings.

SI(JlATURE

IR WI'l'RESS WHEREOF, the said
b1a band and seal •

Jf) f/L;.,.

... Subecribecl and swom to before me this

£h,.M ft.n

)_ 7 day ot

has hereunto set

--)-+-.. . . .1.~7..._
. _ ___.191.2·

r ....
\

... .

~~7 ~~

... .,.

-.

JCr

CIOIIII1eei~ expires _ __../_4. . .J""""""'t;-'- - - - - - ·

.'

' .. ,.-

• ~ARY PUBLIC

-
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EXHIBIT E
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DH-14)9 R~l Rev. )-6~
R/'rl Agent's Diary
RIGHT OF V'A Y AGF.N'l' 'S DIAP..Y
OF ACTION ON PARCELS ASSIGNED BY AREA AGEN'l'
Parc~l

llo.

Project t!o.

2

I-BON- 2 ( 3) 61

I

I -I G- 80N -2 ( 14) 50 11./W

Owners ~arne ----------~E~~~~~A~N~i·~D~A~Y~,~e~t~a~l~---------------------------------Date Assi~ned by Area Agent -----------------------------------------------Document Heceived ----------------------------------------------------------

Date

Time

5-16-67

9:)0-10:45
A.M.

Action Taken (rlarrative)
I met with Don and Bob Day at their office on Vista.
We discussed the right of way needed and I gave
them a set of maps showing the 8.99 acres of land
needed and the access that is available to their
remainder property. Don was absent for about )0
minutes at the time of offer of $2760 was made for
the land and damages. Bob indicated he was not
pleased with this offer. Don returned and upon
hearing the offer from Bob he also was very unhappy
with the offer. He stated th e State has what it
wants and now that the highway is built it doesn't
want to pay what is fair. I tried to explain to
Don how the appraisal was made. Pe stated "with
su~h a ridiculous offer, I am not i r. terested in how
it was made". Don later did ask what the breakdown
was. I told him $40 per acre for the land south of
the highway and ·~50C per acre for two acres and 1Pl5
per acre for five acres north side. Don asked who
would be willing to buy this land now that it has
no access. I told him I was sure the larger sheep
operators would be willing to buy it at $)0 per acre,
the States after value. At this point Dor. said to
Bob "the State has appraised this as sheep land".
I asked them what they felt the State should pay.
Bob indicated he would have to talk with Ernie and
their mother before anything could be de ided. They
did indicate that it appears if this is the States
offer, they are not ve ry likely to settle. Bob
asked if the State didn 't pay interest on the money
from the date of taki ng. I told him un co ~ demnations
this is normally the ~ ase. They are going to dis.uss with t he r est of family and I told th~m would
see in a week or so.

6-6-67

9:) 0-12:00
A.~. Noon

I

I met with Don Day and agai u discussed the purchase
of the right of way with him. He does not ac vept
the States method of appraisiny for the right of
way, stating the premise of using camp sales is in
r~ality not satisfa ~ tory because there are no sales
applicable to their land. He feels due to the land
beinr on a bluff it is much more desirable for future
development than the flat desert.land. He also
points out that the sales that are being us ed as
camp sales are not located with highway fro ntage.
I asked him what he felt the land was worth. He said
he feels it is worth at least ·~ 200 per acre, t his
bein~ based on ~is estimate that it will be worth at
least ~750 per acre 20 years in the future. I told
him this is a speculative figure which the 3tate
cannot legally reco~nize. He stated they had pur~hased this land for speculation and feel if there
were still good access re~aining, that it would be
developed to a housinr.: unit within 10-20 years. He

000491

DH-14)9 R/tl Rev. )-6~
R/tl Agent's Diary
RIGHT OF \''A Y AGF.N'l'' S DIARY
OF ACTION ON PARCELS ASSIGNED BY AREA AGEN'l'

Parcel No.

2

Project rro.

I-BON-2(1 )61

I

I-IG-80~1 -2(14)50

R/W

Owners Name --~E~M~MA~~N~·~D~A~Y~,~e~t~a~l~-------------------------------------Date Assigned by Area Agent -----------------------------------------------Document Heceived

Date

Time

Action Taken (rlarrative)
also stated that with just a legal access and no
physical access, that the land has been damaged to
a point where no value is left.
In our talk, he made the observation that this land
·with a rim view should be as desirable 10 to 15 years
from now as the rim view lots, 10 miles west of
Boise are now. I again injected the thought that
we have to work with present day values not future
speculated values. It came out in the discussion
although it wasn't a statement as such, that they
are figuring the State should pay around ~16,000
for the right of way, being $ 200 per acre for the
9 acres and $ 100 per acre damage to 145 acres remaining.
Don says he would like to settle but doesn't feel
the State has viewed the property in its proper respect. Says, if there had been physical access
provided for what is being taken, th ~ t they would
donate the right of way. Our discussion basically
centered on the fact he wants payment for what they
speculate can be ac~omplished in the future, not on
present worth.
I told Don the only thing I could do was report our
conversation to administration and see if it warrants
any future consideration. I also told him I personally f e lt there would be very ltttle chance of any
different offe r being made, but possibly there might
be a new apprC:~.isal made. I also told him in any
event I would i nform him of the answer.
During the first part of the meeting Don pointed out
the paragraph in the stipulation that provides only
that the department may have possession of the land
for hi~hway construction purposes. His point being
the r e are no provisions to allow for traffi~. I made
the obs e rvatio n I didn't f~el this paragraph inte nded to mea n what his interpretation was and in
any event it would be hard to cut the traffic off at
this date. Don i s quite amused at this paragraph.

9-11-67

10:30 A.M.

I called Don Day and told him we had the results of
the new appraisal. He asked if I would give him the
new figure as Bob was leaving town for the week and
he wanted him to have some time to think on it. I
told him we had a fi gure of ·~43 50 for the right of
way, ac cess and damage to remainder. Don wanted to
know if this ircluded the interest from 1961. Told
him this was the whole ball of wax.
He asked me to get in tou c h with him again next week.
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DH-1439 R/Vl Rev. 3-6~

R/tl Agent's Diary

RIGHT OF \''A Y AGENT'S DIARY
OF ACTION ON PARCELS ASSIGNED BY AREA AGEN1'

2

Parcel No.

Project r.Jo.

I-80~ -2 ( 3 )61

I

I-IG-80l~ -2 ( 14) 50 R/W

Owners Name ______________E_~_~_A_l_~_._o_A_Y~,__e_t__
a_l_____________________________
Date Assigned by Area Agent
Document Received

Date

---------------------------------------------------------

Time

Action Taken {iJarrative)

9-14-67

Called main office and asked if the State could pay
interest from 1961. Chief R/W Agent approved payment up to $1500 for interest if this comes to an
issue.

9-20-67

I called Don Day, he hasn't had a chance to discuss
with Bob Day as he returned just this morning. Don
said he didn't feel there were enough damages due to
loss of access, however, he will talk over with Bob
and ~ t me know the answer · in a few days. Says if
I don't hear from him to give him a call.

9-25-67

10:)0-11:)
A .1-1.

I went to Day Realty office and met with Don Day.
I gave him a copy of the right of way contract in
the amount of $4350. Don said they have not been
in a position to discuss the right of way and
promised to do this within a week. He also stated
he doesn't feel the State is being realistic in
its appraisal because of the loss of access. Told
him I thought the State very fair as indicated by
the action ofmtaining three appraisals. Also told
him would be interested in a settlement figure from
them.

10-18-67

Called Don, he says he hasn't the answer yet, will
s ee his attorney this morning and wants me to call
Friday if he hasn't been in touch by then.

10-20-67

Called Don Day, he says they have had a meeting and
feel they cannot accept any less than $6000. I told
him I would ~ onv e y this to main office and let him
know the out come.

10-21-67

Received approval from Chief R/W Agent to settle for

$6000.

10-23-67
10-25-67

Took WarranGy Deed, Right of Way Contract and Voucher
to Day Realty for signatures.

10:00

A.l\1.

Pir.ked up executed documents from Day Realty.
The written arreement secured embodies all of the
considerations agreed upon between myself and the
property owner; the arreement was r~ ched without
coercion, promises other than those shown in the
afree~ent, or thr_ats of any kind whatsoever by
or to either party; I understand that the parcels are
to b ~ se . ured for use in connectior. with a Federalaid highway project; and I have no direct or indirect
present or ~ ontemplated future personal interest
in the parcels or in any benefit from the a quisition
of such property.

EARL E. TO

.tt

ACTING ArtEA rt/W AGENT

10-26-67
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 10, 2000

ALAN G. LANCE

Donna Jacobs
Day Realty Co.
710 S. Vista A venue
Boise, Idaho 83705
Re:

Isaac's Canyon

Dear Donna:
I believe we may have reached an agreement on the new right-of-way easement on the Isaac's
Canyon property. Enclosed is a proposed Highway Easement Deed that is acceptable to the
federal government and the nature conservancy.
The Right-of-Way Easement is sixty feet in width. The easement is still a floating easement, but
with several restrictions which are contained on pages 4 and 4a of the enclosed Easement Deed.
The presumptive alignment is what is shown as cross-hatched on Exhibit A to the Deed. The
Deed assures you, "the same or equivalent accessibility'' to your property as that shown on
Exhibit A.
If an access road is constructed on the Exhibit A alignment and the underlying property owner
wants it moved, the relocation of the road will be at the Department's expense. The realigned
road will still have the same point ofbeginning and ending and provide the same or equivalent
access. Utilities will not have to be relocated.
If nothing happens within five years then the easement as shown on Exhibit A will become
permanent.
Also, the Department relinquishes the old fifty-foot easement.
Please let me know your thoughts on the easement at your earliest convenience. I will be out of
the office February 14-18,2000. You can call me on February 22, ifthat is convenient.

Sincere~

~VEN~c;:;?
Deputy Attorney General
SMP:ss
enclosure
Contracts & Administrative Law Division, Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129, Boise, 10, 83707 -1129; Telephone: (208) 334-8815; FAX (208) 334-4498
Located at 3311 W. State Street, Boise, Idaho, 83703-5881
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Electronically Filed

6/7/2017 4:00:01 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho. gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

---------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO
"PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARITAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT"

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO "PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT" -1
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(“the State”)
State”) and
COMES
the State
Department (“the
Transportation Department
of Idaho,
COMES NOW
State of
Idaho Transportation
and
NOW the
Idaho, Idaho

Defendant’s’5 Motion
Motion fbr
for Partial
replies
Memorandum in
replies to
to Plaintiffs’
in Opposition
Partial Summary
Opposition of
Summary
ofDeféndant
Plaintifﬁ ’Memorandum
Judgment as
follows:
Judgment
as follows:
I.
I.

Introduction
Introduction
The
partial summary
judgement, seeking
The State
for partial
the
regarding the
seeking an
an order
State has
order regarding
has moved
moved for
summary judgement,

following
following issues:
issues:
Plaintiffs’ breach
a.
their concomitant
for breach
the
claim for
concomitant claim
of contract
contract claim,
of the
breach of
and their
breach of
a. Plaintiffs’
claim, and
implied
faith and
fair dealing.
implied covenant
of good
dealing.
covenant of
and fair
good faith
in 1997
b. That
when
That any
claim or
claim arose
of contract
contract claim
or inverse
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
breach of
1997 when
arose in
b.
any breach
the
was constructed.
the Isaacs
Interchange was
constructed.
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon Interchange
c.
time any
That only
the time
the Day
at the
condemnation
of the
inverse condemnation
alleged inverse
owners of
0. That
Property at
only owners
Day Property
any alleged
occurred
bring aa claim
for inverse
claim for
standing to
to bring
condemnation.
inverse condemnation.
occurred have
have standing
in relation
alleged
contract
damages
can
only
be
recovered
in
d.
That any
the property
relation to
contract
to the
alleged
can
recovered
damages
d. That
be
property
only
any
in the
Right of
identified
the 1967
identified in
of Way
Contract or
or Deed.
1967 Right
Deed.
Way Contract
e.
Plaintiffs have
their damages.
That Plaintiffs
mitigated their
have mitigated
damages.
e. That
Days”)11 responded
(“the Days”)
in part
The
part by
by arguing
Plaintiffs (“the
limitations issue,
the statute
The Plaintiffs
of limitations
statute of
responded in
arguing about
about the
issue,

in its
in their
their partial
which was
by the
not raised
the State
its motion,
the Days
partial summary
which
State in
raised by
but by
was not
motion, but
summary
Days in
by the
in this
judgment motion.
that issue
this memorandum.
the State
not going
going to
motion. Therefore,
judgment
is not
to address
memorandum.
State is
issue in
address that
Therefore, the

their
The
valuation for
that the
With the
the date
for damages
The Days
the State
of valuation
on their
to agree
State that
date of
appear to
agree with
damages based
based on
Days appear

April 1998.
claims
that
The Days
either December
incorrect factual
or April
claims that
claims is
is either
December 1997
factual claims
1997 or
have made
made incorrect
1998. The
Days have
the
Will address.
the State
State will
address.
II.
II.

Facts
Facts

> The
in 1967

frontage road
The easement
the State
for the
the future
not
State in
easement provided
future frontage
road did
did not
provided by
1967 for
by the
Days’ Property.
bisect
the Days’
bisect the
Property.
In their
right of
their response,
that the
the Days
the right
for the
the future
In
claim that
frontage
of way
future frontage
response, the
repeatedly claim
Days repeatedly
way for

“bisected” What
Right of
the State
the 1967
the
road
part of
what was
was at
of the
of Way
Contract “bisected”
at the
State as
provided by
road provided
1967 Right
as part
Way Contract
by the

“the Days”
Days” to
Initial Day
The
will use
The State
the owners
the Initial
the Day
refer to
to refer
to the
of the
State will
owners of
and the
use “the
Property and
Day Property
Day
the
the
Property,
regardless
of
the
actual
identity
of
the
owners
at
various
times.
of
of
at
times.
regardless
owners
various
actual
identity
Property,
“PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM
DEFENDANT’S REPLY
REPLY TO
IN OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM IN
DEFENDANT’S
OPPOSITION OF
TO “PLAINTIFF’S
OF
JUDGMENT” -- 22
DEFENDANT’S MOTION
PARTIAL SUMMARY
DEFENDANT’S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT”
MOTION FOR
FOR PARTIAL
11
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2
3
Response3 at
(“This right-of-way
Days’ Response
Property.2 For
right-of-Way for
time
Initial Day
time the
for
For example,
the Initial
at 3
see Days’
3 (“This
example, see
Day Property.

“reneging on
the
promise of
the future
the Property…”;
the promise
the frontage
frontage road
frontage road
on the
of the
road bisected
road
future frontage
bisected the
Property. .”; “reneging
.

(“. .then the
bisecting
would ensure
was
that the
the Property”);
the State
the frontage
frontage road
at 8
State would
and at
ensure that
road was
bisecting the
Property”); and
8 (“…then
.

located…to
Property”). Emphasis
the Property”).
Emphasis added.
located. .to bisect
bisect the
added.
.

“bisect” means
In other
The
word “bisect”
words, the
into two
claiming
the Days
The word
other words,
to cut
means to
cut into
are claiming
pieces. In
two pieces.
Days are
right of
that
part of
that the
the 1967
the right
for the
the future
the Days
frontage road
of the
of way
to as
ROW
1967 ROW
road the
agreed to
future frontage
as part
Days agreed
way for

Contract
their
their Original
from two
Original Day
Contract would
of their
to their
two sides
provided access
have provided
would have
sides of
access to
Property from
Day Property
property. The
their incorrect
The Days
the 1996
for the
the Isaacs
official ROW
claim on
incorrect claim
on the
diagram for
ROW diagram
1996 official
Isaacs
base their
property.
Days base
Exhibit G
Canyon
ﬁrst affidavit
the first
Donna Day
affidavit of
IC found
at Exhibit
to the
of Donna
found at
G to
Jacobs.
Canyon IC
Day Jacobs.
Exhibit G
First,
was not
the location
the future
not created
the obvious,
to show
location of
of the
to state
state the
created to
show the
future
G was
First, to
obvious, Exhibit

it only
right of
frontage
part of
the 1967
frontage road
of way
of the
established as
project. Rather,
1967 highway
road right
shows
as part
Rather, it
highway project.
only shows
way established
right of
right
was acquired
from the
for the
the Isaacs
the Days.
which was
of way
acquisition for
none of
of which
acquired from
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon IC,
Days.
1C, none
way acquisition
in 1967
Second,
boundaries of
the diagram
not show
the boundaries
the Day
of the
or
existed in
diagram does
show the
1967 or
does not
as they
Property as
Second, the
they existed
Day Property

“50’ Access/Stock
Drive” extended
it cannot
1996.
used to
that the
the “50’
all the
the
cannot be
to state
state that
extended all
1996. Therefore,
Access/ Stock Drive”
be used
Therefore, it

way through
through the
the Day
Property.
Day Property.
way
I-80N plans
right of
Third,
that the
for the
the
the 1967
the right
of way
more importantly,
plans show
and more
1967 I-80N
show that
Third, and
importantly, the
way for

A
Exhibit A
future
bisect even
Original Day
not bisect
the Original
frontage road
stock drive
drive does
future frontage
and stock
road and
even the
does not
Property. Exhibit
Day Property.
I-80N highway
ﬁrst affidavit
the 1967
the first
to
Morrison is
is a
of the
to the
afﬁdavit of
of James
correct copy
and correct
true and
1967 I-80N
James Morrison
a true
highway
copy of
in red)
right of
in the
the right
for the
the future
the
plans, and
frontage road
of way
referenced in
and shows
road referenced
shows (outlined
future frontage
(outlined in
plans,
red) the
way for
that exhibit
that the
exhibit shows
the five
the State
1967
purchased aa 100
Each of
of the
to that
Contract. Each
State purchased
ROW Contract.
ﬁve pages
100
1967 ROW
shows that
pages to

in their
their Complaint
The State
the references
the Days
The
will continue
use the
by the
continue to
to use
when
State Will
references adopted
adopted by
Complaint when
Days in
identifying
Initial Day
original 160
The Initial
the original
the two
of property
is the
ownership. The
160
stages of
two stages
identifying the
property ownership.
Propeny is
Day Property
acres
by the
while the
in 1935,
Initial Day
the Days
the Day
the Initial
of the
consists of
purchased by
acres purchased
Property consists
Property
1935, While
Days in
Day Property
Day Property
plus the
purchased in
in 1979.
the additional
the Days
additional 160
or so
plus
160 acres
acres or
1979.
so the
Days purchased
3
“Days’ Response”
Response” to
The
will use
Plaintiffs’’ Memorandum
Memorandum in
The State
refer to
in Opposition
to refer
to Plaintiffs
State Will
Opposition of
use “Days’
[sic]
0f [sic]
’5
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment.
Motion
Partial
Judgment.
Defendant
Summary
for
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right of
foot
the old
for
of the
SH 30
of way,
an additional
additional 50
feet of
of ROW
foot wide
south of
easement south
01d SH
and an
ROW for
Wide easement
30 right
50 feet
way, and

drive” as
“future access
it is
the
plans.
the “future
the plans.
is labeled
on the
stock drive”
labeled on
road &
access road
& stock
as it
State’s
A to
in relation
Exhibit
Affidavit of
James Morrison
Morrison filed
Exhibit A
the Second
the State’s
relation to
filed in
to the
to the
Second Aﬂidavit
ofJames

I-80N extending
motion
partial summary
judgment contains
motion for
for partial
for I-80N
extending east
contains 1967
plans for
1967 highway
east
highway plans
summary judgment

A to
from
plans found
pages of
Exhibit
Exhibit A
first two
from the
ﬁrst Morrison
The first
the plans
the first
Morrison affidavit.
of Exhibit
at Exhibit
to the
afﬁdavit. The
found at
two pages
A to
A
that the
Original Day
the second
the Original
the
Morrison affidavit
to the
afﬁdavit show
demonstrate that
and demonstrate
show the
second Morrison
Property and
Day Property
State
purchase aa 50
wide piece
piece of
not purchase
the location
location of
of aa future
foot Wide
of ROW
to be
State did
did not
ROW to
future
50 foot
be used
used as
as the
I-80N ROW
frontage
purchased aa 100
wide piece
piece of
just for
The State
for the
the I-80N
frontage road.
foot Wide
of ROW
State purchased
100 foot
ROW just
ROW
road. The

it purchase
Initial Day
rather
purchase to
west of
Nor do
than the
rather than
the 150
the west
the Initial
feet of
of ROW
to the
of the
those
150 feet
ROW it
do those
Property. Nor
Day Property.
Initial Day
sheets
the Initial
for aa future
indication of
frontage road
on the
of aa 50
foot easement
easement for
future frontage
sheets show
road on
show any
50 foot
Day
any indication

Property.
Property.

A to
Exhibit A
The
beginning
the second
the beginning
The second
Morrison affidavit
to the
afﬁdavit also
of Exhibit
also shows
shows the
second Morrison
second page
page of
of
which the
from which
that ROW
the Dibble
the State
But that
not
of the
Dibble property,
feet of
of ROW.
is not
State purchased
160 feet
ROW is
purchased 160
ROW. But
property, from
in any
in
way identified
the location
for aa future
the 160
identified as
frontage road.
location for
feet of
of ROW
160 feet
ROW was
road. Rather,
future frontage
as the
was
Rather, the
any way
in the
purchased to
the cut
the hillside
for construction
the wider
hillside necessary
interstate
to protect
protect the
of the
construction of
wider interstate
cut slope
purchased
slope in
necessary for

limitation of
highway.
page shows
line on
the cut
the second
the limitation
The dashed
Afﬁdavit of
of
of the
on the
cut slope.
shows the
slope. Affidavit
second page
dashed line
highway. The
5-6 at
James
at p.
2.
para. 5-6
James Morrison,
p. 2.
Morrison, para.

That fact
from the
that
limited distance
the limited
the 160
That
further evident
fact is
is further
of the
foot wide
evident from
distance of
160 foot
ROW that
Wide ROW
2 or
shrinks back
shrinks
width. Again,
there is
indication on
to 100
feet of
of Width.
is no
no indication
on page
or any
100 feet
back down
down to
page 2
Again, there
any

A that
Exhibit A
that ROW
the location
subsequent
purchased to
of Exhibit
being purchased
to serve
location of
of aa future
ROW was
future
subsequent page
page of
was being
serve as
as the
Initial Day
through the
the Initial
the other
the plans
frontage
plans extend
other side
frontage road
of it,
extend
and out
out the
and the
road through
side of
Property and
it, and
Day Property
Black’s Creek
all the
the way
eastward
to Black’s
Creek Road.
Road.
eastward all
way to
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in 1967
Thus,
purchased by
by the
purposes of
providing the
the ROW
the State
for purposes
the location
of providing
location of
of
State in
ROW purchased
1967 for
Thus, the

aa future
Initial Day
from the
the Initial
the west
frontage road
at or
or even
and stopped
road approached
approached the
west and
even
stopped at
future frontage
Property from
Day Property
before the
Initial Day
The easement
not extend
through or
pick up
the Initial
the
extend through
or pick
again on
on the
easement did
did not
before
up again
Property. The
Day Property.
other
Initial Day
the Initial
other side
of the
side of
Property.
Day Property.
in 1967
Plainly,
the ROW
for the
the future
the Days
frontage road
location for
ROW location
upon by
road agreed
1967
agreed upon
future frontage
Plainly, the
Days in
by the

did
bisect their
their property,
for such
not bisect
the State
to provide
State certainly
never agreed
provide ROW
ROW for
did not
and the
such aa
agreed to
certainly never
property, and
Initial Day
future
with aa single
point of
left With
the Initial
single point
frontage road.
As aa result,
of access,
future frontage
road. As
was left
result, the
Property was
access,
Day Property
in 1967.
and
were otherwise
their property
the Days
for the
the loss
of access
to their
otherwise compensated
and the
compensated for
loss of
1967.
access to
property in
Days were


waived any
> The
claim to
the type
The Days
had to
restoration of
to restoration
of the
of access
to SH
SH 30.
access they
30.
Days waived
they had
any claim
type of
The
value of
that they
fair market
The Days
the fair
market value
the
arguing that
claim based
on the
of the
are now
now arguing
have aa claim
based on
they have
Days are
“before” condition
if in
in the
it had
in quality
Initial
Day
the “before”
the access
the Initial
condition it
to the
had access
equal in
as if
access equal
access the
Property as
quality to
Day Property
1-84. This
Day
prior to
This is
from statements
the construction
to the
construction of
of I-84.
is evident
statements
to SH
SH 30
evident from
had to
30 prior
Property had
Day Property

in their
their response.
made
For example:
example:
made in
response. For
Property’s direct,
In 1961-1967,
In
the main,
the State
the Property’s
frontage access
to the
1961-1967, the
took the
State took
access to
direct, frontage
main, fully
fully
developed
was the
This was
the best
the Property
The
to have.
best access
have hoped
hoped to
could have
have. The
developed highway.
access the
Property could
highway. This
it would
law
provide similar
be liable
similar replacement
the State
for
to provide
replacement access
or else
liable for
required the
State to
law required
else it
would be
access or
State’s provision
damages…The
undeveloped and
miles of
of an
an undeveloped
provision of
of access
and
several miles
over several
damages. .The State’s
access over
“similar” replacement
right-of-Way was
mostly
public right-of-way
provision of
not the
the provision
of “similar”
replacement
impassable public
was not
mostly impassable
It that
access.
was all
was going
that was
then the
all the
the State
going to
the Day
to provide,
State was
access. It
certainly
provide, then
family certainly
Day family
would have
condemnation damages.
inverse condemnation
and recovered
have sued
recovered inverse
would
damages.
sued and
.

State’s taking,
Days’ Response
Days’ Response
18-19. See
2 (“Thus,
(“Thus, after
Days’
the State’s
after the
at 18-19.
at 2
Response at
Response at
See also,
taking, direct,
direct,
also, Days’

frontage
promise of
the
frontage access
frontage access
to State
of direct,
on the
State Highway
replaced by
access to
30 was
was replaced
access on
direct, frontage
Highway 30
by aa promise
right-0f(“The State
Days’ Response
road”); Days’
existing public
future
the existing
built over
frontage road.”);
at 3
public right-ofState built
future frontage
Response at
over the
3 (“The
that had
way that
bisected the
for the
the future
the Property
for thirty
placeholder for
future
had bisected
and had
had been
been aa placeholder
thirty years
Property for
years and
Way

Property’s direct
access”).
that would
frontage
public road
the Property’s
frontage road
direct public
restore the
road that
road access.”).
would restore
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I-80N
However,
the Days
the construction
the I-80N
claims based
on the
of the
construction of
waived any
based on
speciﬁcally waived
However, the
Days specifically
any claims

“future frontage
highway
project as
plans, which
plans include
the highway
the “future
which plans
frontage road
include the
reﬂected by
road
as reflected
highway project
highway plans,
by the

drive” location.
(“ROW
in the
Right of
and
waiver is
That waiver
the 1967
is found
of Way
Contract (“ROW
location. That
stock drive”
found in
and stock
1967 Right
Way Contract
Contract”):
Contract”):

2.
binding unless
unless and
until executed
This contract
not be
the State
shall not
2. This
contract shall
State Highway
and until
executed by
be binding
Highway
by the
Engineer
parties have
whole of
Engineer or
The parties
herein set
the Whole
his authorized
or his
authorized representative.
of
representative. The
set out
out the
have herein
their
performance of
their agreement,
the performance
the entire
entire consideration
for the
the
which constitutes
of which
consideration for
constitutes the
agreement, the
right of
grant
way and
all further claims
grant of
of said
of way
or obligations
and shall
the State
said right
shall relieve
relieve the
obligations
State of
claims or
ofallﬁtrther
of‘the
of‘the
on
the location,
grade and
the proposed
proposed
on that
or on
on account
and construction
that account
construction of
account or
account of
location, grade
highway.
highway.
Emphasis
prosecute an
the Days
Emphasis added.
cannot now
an inverse
condemnation or
or contract
contract
inverse condemnation
now prosecute
added. Clearly,
Clearly, the
Days cannot
Initial Day
claim
by the
that was
the Initial
the State
through the
the 1967
claim based
on access
to the
State through
acquired by
1967
based on
access to
was acquired
Property that
Day Property

ROW
based on
provided by
by the
that
the future
the State
part of
frontage road
Contract or
or based
on the
of that
State as
ROW Contract
ROW provided
road ROW
future frontage
as part
ROW
Contract.
ROW Contract.
III.
III.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

Right of
A.
not breach
the 1967
The State
State did
Contract.
of Way
breach the
A. The
did not
1967 Right
Way Contract.
Days’
The
jury to
that breach
The Days
matter of
for aa jury
to decide.
of contract
contract is
is aa matter
of fact
fact for
breach of
decide. Days’
argue that
Days argue
Days’ assertion,
Response
That is
the Days’
incorrect statement
statement of
at 16.
is an
an incorrect
of law.
to the
contracts
16. That
Response at
law. Contrary
assertion, contracts
Contrary to

Days’
“surrounding circumstances”.
circumstances”. Days’
are
not interpreted
the Court
through review
interpreted by
of “surrounding
Court through
are not
review of
by the
Intent of
Response
by the
the parties
the language
the contract
at 18.
of the
parties to
to aa contract
contract is
is determined
determined by
of the
contract
18. Intent
language of
Response at
nothing more.
148
Potlatch Education
Association v.
Potlatch School
District No.
No. 285,
and
more. Potlatch
and nothing
Education Association
School District
v. Potlatch
285, 148
1281 (2010).
226 P.3d
its
Idaho
be ambiguous,
contract is
is found
to be
Idaho 630,
found to
Unless aa contract
P.3d 1277,
ambiguous, its
1277, 1281
630, 633,
633, 226
(2010). Unless

determining Whether
matter of
interpretation
whether itit has
been breached.
interpretation is
is aa matter
of law,
is determining
has been
Potlatch
breached. Potlatch
as is
law, as
148 Idaho
226 P.3d
Education Association
Association v.
District No.
No. 285,
at 633,
at 1280.
Idaho at
1280.
Potlatch School
P.3d at
Education
School District
v. Potlatch
285, 148
633, 226

“Only when
intention of
from
the language
the intention
the parties
“Only
When the
is ambiguous,
is the
of the
parties determined
determined from
language is
ambiguous, is
circumstances.” Clear
141
surrounding
Lakes Trout
Foods, Inc,
Inc., 141
surrounding facts
facts and
Trout Co.
Springs Foods,
and circumstances.”
Clear Lakes
Clear Springs
Co. v.
v. Clear
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Idaho
Fliegel, 92
443 (2005)
P.2d 443
92 Idaho
P.2d 990,
Gardner v.
Idaho 117,
Idaho 767,
106 P.2d
450 P.2d
994
v. Fliegel,
(citing Gardner
117, 106
771, 450
767, 771,
990, 994
(2005) (citing
“To determine
(1969)).
the face
the
Whether aa contract
determine whether
contract is
is patently
at the
of the
court looks
looks at
face of
ambiguous, aa court
patently ambiguous,
(1969)). “To
in common
document
their established
the words
deﬁnitions in
common use
or
or phrases
document and
established definitions
phrases used
and gives
gives the
words or
use or
used their
meanings.” Swanson
settled
Beco Construction
Inc., 145
145 Idaho
legal meanings.”
settled legal
Swanson v.
Idaho 59,
175
Construction Company,
v. Beco
Company, Inc,
62, 175
59, 62,

“two different
In order
P.3d
different reasonable
to be
contract must
must have
order to
751 (2007).
reasonable
P.3d 748,
have “two
be ambiguous,
ambiguous, aa contract
748, 751
(2007). In
“nonsensical”. C
interpretations” or
interpretations”
be “nonsensical”.
Ind. v.
Rule, 135
the language
or the
must be
at 765,
Idaho at
language must
135 Idaho
C&
& G,
v. Rule,
765,
G, Ind.

25
25 P.3d
at 78.
P.3d at
78.
The
this analysis
The Days
not gone
through this
the language
the 1967
Whether the
to argue
of the
gone through
have not
argue whether
1967
language of
analysis to
Days have
ROW
requiring analysis
of surrounding
surrounding circumstances
to
Contract is
is ambiguous,
circumstances to
ROW Contract
ambiguous, thereby
analysis of
thereby requiring
“appears to
determine
be forward
that the
intent. Rather,
the Days
the language
the contract
determine intent.
of the
contract “appears
to be
assert that
language of
forward
Rather, the
Days assert

future”. Days’
Days’ Memorandum
in the
promised in
looking
that actions
looking and
the future”.
being promised
Memorandum at
at
actions are
and recognizes
recognizes that
are being
“surrounding circumstances”
circumstances” including
18.
that the
the Days
the
the access
including the
refer to
to “surrounding
18. Additionally,
access that
Additionally, the
Days refer

Original
prior to
that the
into the
entering into
Original Day
the
the 1961
for possession,
1961 agreement
agreement for
to entering
and that
had prior
possession, and
Property had
Day Property
law
Id. None
None of
that access
the State
to replace
or pay
of these
required the
State to
these assertions
assertions
law required
replace that
damages. Id.
access or
pay damages.
State’s motion.
Days’ opposition
provide valid
valid support
for the
the Days’
the State’s
motion.
opposition to
to the
support for
provide

unambiguously states
paid $6000
The
that the
The 1967
the Days
for
Contract unambiguously
ROW Contract
states that
1967 ROW
would be
be paid
$6000 for
Days would
their property
damages
property (loss
the remainder
for 8.99
control and
remainder of
to the
of their
of access),
and for
damages to
acres.
access control
8.99 acres.
(loss of
access), access
1-84 would
Days’ remaining
that the
remaining property
from
The parties
the Days’
the new
The
parties also
property south
of the
south of
new I-84
also agreed
would be
agreed that
be from

“the future
I-80N”. The
then
the southwesterly
The contract
“the
frontage road
on the
of I-80N”.
contract then
stock drive
drive on
and stock
side of
road and
future frontage
southwesterly side
“the future
I-IG-80N-2(16)54. Those
the project:
the location
references
plans show
location of
of “the
references the
Those highway
project: I-IG-80N-2(16)54.
future
show the
highway plans

drive” on
I-80N as
in the
the southwesterly
the contract.
frontage
frontage road
on the
of I-80N
indicated in
contract.
stock drive”
and stock
road and
side of
as indicated
southwesterly side
the plain
the contract,
the State
Based
plain language
what was
on the
of the
to provide
State was
provide What
Based on
language of
was only
was
contract, the
only to

7 right
right of
the highway
for aa future
The
shown
frontage road
on the
plans –
of way
shown on
stock drive.
future frontage
and stock
drive. The
road and
highway plans
way for
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contract
will build
when the
will
that the
the State
the frontage
the frontage
not indicate
frontage road,
frontage road
indicate that
contract does
State will
build the
road will
does not
road, when
prebe built
who Will
will build
not require
the State
the preit. The
The contract
built or
require the
contract certainly
to replace
or WhO
State to
build it.
replace the
does not
be
certainly does

If that
in the
1967
were true,
put the
waiver in
that were
the State
not have
the waiver
the contract
to SH
SH 30.
contract
State would
1967 access
have put
would not
access to
30. If
true, the
and
paid severance
not have
for loss
of access.
and would
have paid
loss of
severance damages
would not
damages for
access.
in footnote
The
their memorandum
The argument
the Days
argument made
footnote 10
10 of
of their
memorandum on
on page
20 is
is
made by
page 20
Days in
by the

“future frontage
without merit.
merit. The
The 1967
the “future
without
frontage road
identiﬁes the
Contract specifically
ROW Contract
and
1967 ROW
road and
speciﬁcally identifies

I-80N” and
I-80N highway
by
stock
the I-80N
the southwesterly
on the
of I-80N”
plans by
stock drive
drive on
references the
and references
side of
southwesterly side
highway plans
I-80N” is
“future frontage
number.
The “future
the southwesterly
frontage road
on the
of I-80N”
is
number. The
stock drive
drive on
and stock
road and
side of
southwesterly side
drive” and
“future frontage
identified
the “future
the
identified on
frontage road
on those
plans as
is located
on the
those plans
stock drive”
and stock
and is
located on
road and
as the
I-80N. Those
southwesterly
what
than adequate
more than
to identify
of I-80N.
Those references
references are
are more
side of
adequate to
southwesterly side
identify precisely
precisely What

the
the parties
parties intended.
intended.
7
The
provided the
with everything
by the
The State
the Days
the 1967
Contract –
required by
State provided
ROW Contract
1967 ROW
everything required
Days With

right of
severance
payment for
way for
for loss
for 8.99
for aa
of access,
to right
of way
and access
loss of
severance damages
acres and
damages for
8.99 acres
access to
access, payment

future
plain language
the plain
the contract,
frontage road.
on the
of the
no breach
future frontage
breach has
has occurred,
and
road. Based
Based on
language of
contract, no
occurred, and
Days’ contract
the
judgment to
grant summary
the Court
the State
the Days’
to the
on the
contract claims.
claims.
Court should
State on
should grant
summary judgment

B.
Original Day
The 1967
the 160
Contract only
relates to
B. The
to the
acre Original
ROW Contract
160 acre
1967 ROW
Property
only relates
Day Property
nothing more
Based
than aa tenuous
that the
the Days
the State
on nothing
more than
thread of
of speculation,
State
assert that
tenuous thread
Based on
speculation, the
Days assert
that the
should
were developers,
bought more
property,
the Days
more property,
known that
should somehow
somehow have
have known
have bought
would have
developers, would
Days were

drive” for
“future frontage
that property
and
the “future
for access.
frontage road
on the
stock drive”
and that
and stock
have depended
road and
would have
depended on
access.
property would

Such
part of
the part
the State
the Days,
on the
of the
to the
rise to
to
State therefore,
knowledge on
according to
alleged knowledge
Such alleged
gives rise
therefore, according
Days, gives
in relation
until several
that the
liability
would not
purchase until
for contract
the Days
not purchase
relation to
contract damages
to parcels
parcels that
several
damages in
liability for
Days would
in their
their response,
ﬁrst affidavit
years later.
the statements
the first
Donna Day
affidavit of
later. Contrary
to the
statements made
of Donna
made in
Contrary to
response, the
years
Day

their argument
Jacobs
the State
not support
regarding what
What the
knew or
or should
known.
argument regarding
State knew
support their
should have
have known.
Jacobs does
does not
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At best,
At
best, damages
for lack
the rest
the Day
after 1967
lack of
of access
to the
rest of
of the
purchased after
1967
damages for
access to
Property purchased
Day Property
been
could
indirect or
must have
or consequential
characterized by
consequential damages.
Such damages
have been
could be
damages must
damages. Such
be characterized
by indirect
contemplated
by the
parties at
Inc. v.
time of
the parties
the time
contracting. Silver
at the
of contracting.
contemplated by
Creek Computers,
Silver Creek
v. Petra,
Computers, Inc.
Petra,
42 P.3d
in the
in the
Inc., 136
Nothing in
the 1967
the
Contract or
or in
Idaho 879,
136 Idaho
ROW Contract
P.3d 672,
1967 ROW
677 (2002).
Inc,
884, 42
672, 677
879, 884,
(2002). Nothing

record
that the
the concept
the parties
other
parties contemplated
to any
contemplated damages
record remotely
supports the
concept that
damages to
remotely supports
any other
property than
was the
judgment on
that contract.
than the
that was
this issue
the property
the subject
of that
on this
contract. Summary
issue
subject of
property
property that
Summary judgment
is
therefore appropriate.
is therefore
appropriate.
7 Davis
The
Davis v.
McDougall, 94
The Days
cite aa negligence
negligence case
94 Idaho
P.2d 907
Idaho 61,
480 P.2d
case –
v. McDougall,
907
61, 480
Days cite

(19710
– to
their argument.
no relevance
to contract
contract
negligence case
to support
support their
argument. Obviously,
had no
relevance to
case had
(19710 7
Obviously, aa negligence
Jensen v.
damages.
The other
the Days,
115 Idaho
228
other case
P.2d 228
cited by
Idaho 1021,
772 P.2d
damages. The
case cited
v. Westberg,
Westberg, 115
1021, 772
Days, Jensen
by the
(Ct.App.
is also
inapposite.
also inapposite.
(Ct.App. 1988),
1988), is
Jensen involved
which damages
be calculated
determining the
the date
for failure
failure
at which
involved determining
Jensen
should be
calculated for
date at
damages should
of
by the
partnership. The
partner to
the sale
the partnership.
The factual
of one
to agree
to the
of aa housing
housing project
project owned
one partner
factual
agree to
sale of
owned by
it was
determination
that question
that the
the value
determination necessary
Whether it
to answer
of
question was
answer that
foreseeable that
value of
was whether
was foreseeable
necessary to
in the
the
project would
would drastically
time between
the housing
the time
the refusal
trial. No
housing project
No
decline in
refusal and
and trial.
between the
drastically decline

factual
partnership
whether the
the partnership
the housing
of the
to Whether
housing project
factual question
question existed
existed as
project was
subject of
as to
was aa subject
agreement.
agreement.
In contrast,
that was
In
property that
for property
not the
the subject
the
the Days
seeking damages
of the
are seeking
damages for
subject of
was not
contrast, the
Days are
that was
1967
parties could
was not
The parties
not have
not
to property
contemplated damages
Contract. The
ROW Contract.
1967 ROW
have contemplated
could not
damages to
property that

that the
part of
until years
years later.
part
the contract
the Days
not own
of the
contract and
later. Simply
no basis
and that
own until
would not
basis
stated, no
Simply stated,
Days would

exists
whether contract
be
which to
exists upon
to establish
contract damages
establish aa factual
upon which
dispute over
should be
factual dispute
over Whether
damages should
that was
available
property that
by the
not covered
the 1967
The Court
to property
Contract. The
Court should
available to
ROW Contract.
should
1967 ROW
covered by
was not
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therefore
judgment to
property
grant summary
the State
therefore grant
to the
to contract
contract damages
on any
State as
damages based
as to
based on
summary judgment
any property
other
Initial Day
than the
the Initial
other than
Property.
Day Property.
C.
their damages
mitigated their
The Days
the extent
extent of
the proceeds
the sale
damages to
to the
of the
of the
sale of
of
proceeds of
C. The
Days mitigated
their
in 2006.
their property
2006.
property in
in their
The
their lawsuit
their lawsuit
that in
The Days
ﬁled their
on November
lawsuit they
lawsuit on
2016. Assume
November 1,
Assume that
they
Days filed
1, 2016.

“after” value
“before” value
claimed
value of
value of
their property
that their
of $15
an “after”
of $5
claimed that
had aa “before”
and an
million, and
$15 million,
property had
$5
in aa condemnation
million.
whether direct
million. As
the Court
As the
condemnation case,
direct or
or inverse,
Court knows,
are
damages in
inverse, are
knows, damages
case, Whether

calculated
would be
be asking
fair market
the before
market value,
the Days
for
after fair
asking for
on the
before versus
calculated based
versus after
based on
so the
value, so
Days would
in damages.
million in
$10
damages.
$10 million

Let’s further
Let’s
property for
their property
that on
the Days
for $15
further assume
on November
November 2,
sold their
assume that
$15
2016, the
Days sold
2, 2016,

million.
would have
would have
their alleged
million. Obviously,
the Days
all of
of their
alleged damages
and would
have recovered
have
recovered all
damages and
Obviously, the
Days would
no
basis to
would have
that they
mitigated
entitled to
claim that
no basis
to claim
to any
more compensation.
compensation. They
are entitled
have mitigated
They would
they are
any more
their alleged
all
all of
of their
alleged damages.
damages.
let’s assume
their property
Now let’s
property on
but
the Days
for $15
on November
2016 for
November 2,
Now
sold their
assume the
million, but
$15 million,
Days sold
2, 2016

their property
the
property and
the default,
the Days
the purchaser
As aa result
result of
of the
got to
to keep
purchaser defaulted.
keep their
and $10
defaulted. As
$10
default, the
Days got
In that
in payments
million in
million
payments that
been made.
that situation
that had
all of
the
mitigated all
of the
situation as
had been
have mitigated
made. In
as well,
well, they
they have
in their
in just
their complaint.
damages
just as
position had
the State
ﬁnancial position
complaint. They
State
alleged in
are in
had the
damages alleged
as good
good aa financial
They are

their property.
not
not taken
taken any
of their
property.
any of

In the
that the
the case
the Days
not alleged
In
amount of
of
alleged aa specific
speciﬁc amount
have not
case that
actually filed,
ﬁled, they
they have
Days actually
in 2006
their property
the Days
for 10,010,000.
The
compensation
property in
compensation as
sold their
2006 for
damages. However,
as damages.
However, the
10,010,000. The
Days sold
in payments.
million in
their property
the Days
buyer defaulted
property and
payments. So
got to
to keep
almost $5
defaulted and
and the
keep their
and almost
So
$5 million
buyer
Days got

,

still have
their property
million. That
That total
the Days
its value
the
value is,
total amount
at whatever
amount –
Whatever its
plus $4.85
have their
$4.85 million.
property at
is, plus
Days still

million should
the property
the $4.85
the
value and
be weighed
whatever damages
against Whatever
are
and the
should be
weighed against
damages they
$4.85 million
property value
they are
awarded.
would give
the Days
To do
otherwise would
give the
double recovery.
awarded. To
do otherwise
recovery.
Days double
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in
As
part of
their response,
forth aa hypothetical
the Days
As part
of their
calculation in
set forth
damages calculation
hypothetical damages
response, the
Days set

“without
footnote
page 13
their memorandum.
the hypothetical
the “without
footnote 8
on page
13 of
of their
memorandum. If,
8 on
as the
hypothetical indicates,
indicates, the
If, as
taking” (before)
in payment
taking”
property value
million and
million in
the Days
and the
received $4.85
value was
was $15
$4.85 million
$15 million
payment
(before) property
Days received

and
property, they
property worth
worth $15
pocketed
million and
still have
the propeny,
got to
to keep
and got
keep the
and pocketed
have property
would still
$15 million
they would
$4.85
value. That
million on
than the
fair market
fair market
That gives
them $4.85
the fair
market
the fair
market value.
on top
top of
of the
more than
gives them
$4.85 million
$4.85 more
value of
their property.
of their
value
property.

“with taking”
taking” (after)
If the
If
value of
would be
the “with
the property
the Days
of the
seeking
is $2
be seeking
million, the
$2 million,
property is
(after) value
Days would
in payments
in damages.
million in
million in
$13
pocketed $4.85
Assuming they
got to
to keep
and got
keep
damages. Assuming
$4.85 million
$13 million
payments and
they pocketed
in this
in property
million in
their
property as
pocketed
still have
their property
this case,
and pocketed
have $2
occurred in
would still
as occurred
$2 million
property and
case, they
they would
in damages.
million should
million in
the
million. The
from the
The $4.85
the $4.85
the $13
should be
damages.
deducted from
be deducted
$4.85 million
$4.85 million.
$13 million

if the
in damages
million in
Otherwise,
would be
be better
better
from the
the State,
the Days
the $13
received the
damages from
Otherwise, if
$13 million
State, they
they would
Days received
“before” ($19,850,000
in the
in the
off
property in
vs.
their property
than the
fair market
the fair
market value
off in
the after
the “before”
after than
of their
value of
($19,850,000 VS.

$15,000,000).
$15,000,000).
In other
In
words, the
be able
the Days
not be
through aa combination
other words,
combination
to collect
an amount,
collect an
should not
able to
amount, through
Days should
in aa better
mitigation and
of
better financial
position
that puts
them in
from the
the State,
financial position
of mitigation
obtained from
and damages
puts them
damages obtained
State, that

if no
than
than they
the
entitled to
to the
no inverse
condemnation occurred.
inverse condemnation
are only
have been
been if
occurred. They
would have
they would
They are
only entitled
“take”, nothing
“[T]he owner
in fair
nothing more.
difference
value arising
be put
put
fair market
from any
market value
arising from
difference in
must be
more. “[T]he
owner must
any “take”,
taken.” Fowler
in as
Tmst
the propeny
not been
in
position pecuniarily
pecuniarily as
property had
Irrevocable Trust
Fowler Irrevocable
had not
been taken.”
as good
good position
as if the

1992-] v.
1992-1
Boulder, 17
17 P.3d
802 (Colo.
General
P.3d 797,
United States
v. City
States v.
v. General
(quoting United
(Colo. 2001)
2001) (quoting
ofBoulder,
797, 802
City of
“The guiding
Motors Corp.,
L.Ed. 311,
guiding
Motors
323 U.S.
319 (1945)).
S.Ct. 357,
US. 373,
65 S.Ct.
89 L.Ed.
311, 319
Corp, 323
373, 379,
379, 65
357, 360,
360, 89
(1945)). “The
principle
the owner
for the
the property
principle of
just compensation
taken and
reimbursement to
of just
is reimbursement
to the
he is
is
compensation is
owner for
and he
property taken
in as
if his
his property
not been
entitled
be put
pecuniarily as
property had
been taken....
entitled to
position pecuniarily
He
to be
put in
had not
taken.... He
as good
good aa position
as if

more.” W.
Transp., Div.
not entitled
must
be made
whole but
Dep't't of
Div. of
Highways
entitled to
must be
is not
to more.”
but is
Virginia Dep
made Whole
W. Virginia
of Transp.,
ofHighways
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v.
L.P., 236
cert. denied
236 W.
S.E.2d 619,
631 (2015),
denied
Pocahontas Properties,
v. W.
W. Pocahontas
W. Va.
Va. 50,
777 S.E.2d
Properties, L.P.,
619, 631
62, 777
50, 62,
(2015), cert.
Transp., Div.
sub
Res., Inc.
Inc. v.
Dep't of
Div. of
Highways, 136
nom. Beacon
136 S.
Ct. 1453,
Beacon Res.,
Virginia Dep’t
v. W.
W. Virginia
S. Ct.
sub nom.
1453,
of Transp.,
ofHighways,

194
194 L.
L. Ed.
2d 551
Ed. 2d
551 (2016).
(2016).
in 2006
proceeds from
This
This Court
that proceeds
from the
the sale
the Day
of the
Court should
order that
should order
sale of
2006 go
go
Property in
Day Property

towards
mitigation of
that the
the Days
the State,
of any
against the
given that
towards mitigation
recovered against
damages recovered
especially given
State, especially
Days
any damages
have
the property.
retained ownership
ownership of
of the
have retained
property.
D.
an inverse
Plaintiffs have
Certain of
standing to
the Plaintiffs
condemnation
D. Certain
of the
have no
no standing
to pursue
inverse condemnation
pursue an
claim.
claim.
State’s argument
Without
brush off
citing any
the Days
off the
the State’s
Without citing
legal authority,
on
argument on
authority, the
simply brush
Days simply
any legal

“are the
standing
by asserting
plaintiffs “are
beneficiaries of
that the
rightful beneﬁciaries
the current
the rightful
intra-family
current plaintiffs
standing by
asserting that
of intra-family

in this
transfers
Plaintiffs in
this
the proper
all takings
takings claims
the State
therefore the
transfers of
proper Plaintiffs
of all
claims against
against the
State and
and are
are therefore

action.” Days’
Days’ Memorandum
action.”
That argument
not respond
the
without merit,
Memorandum at
at 13.
is without
to the
argument is
13. That
and does
respond to
does not
merit, and

legal
the State.
legal authority
cited by
State.
authority cited
by the

“[t]his rule,
The
wrongfully assert
that “[t]his
The Days
the
not meant
meant to
to protect
protect the
of course,
is not
assert that
also wrongfully
course, is
rule, of
Days also
it is
condemnor
from liability
determining (where
for determining
for the
the taking;
there are
is aa rule
condemnor from
are
rule for
liability for
rather, it
taking; rather,
(Where there
in the
subsequent
which owner
the property)
the chain
the damages
entitled to
chain is
transfers of
is entitled
to recover
of the
owner in
recover the
subsequent transfers
damages
property) which

taking.” Days’
Days’ Memorandum
from
from the
the taking.”
14. Here
the Days
for
Memorandum at
at 14.
Here again,
cite no
no legal
legal authority
authority for
again, the
Days cite
Days’ argument,
their argument.
their
that the
the relevant
the Days’
the
argument. Significantly,
relevant concept,
to the
is that
argument, is
Significantly, the
concept, contrary
contrary to

time of
sellers
– at
the time
the alleged
at the
of the
at least
sellers and
least constructive
alleged damages
had at
constructive
and buyers
have had
could have
damages -- could
buyers 7
that the
notice
purchase price,
the damage
the purchase
not that
the parties
notice of
of the
parties actually
to have
and adjusted
had to
have
damage and
adjusted the
actually had
price, not

done
Blue Springs
Nixon, 250
Springs v.
250 S.W.3d
done so.
rel. City
so. See,
State ex
ex rel.
v. Nixon,
S.W.3d 365,
370 (Mo.
2008).
ofBlue
See, State
365, 370
(M0. 2008).
City of
that the
The
The Days
the current
the Day
not the
the same
the
admit that
current owners
of the
owners of
are not
same as
as the
Property are
Days admit
Day Property

in 1998.
that the
time of
owners
the owners
the property
the time
the take
the
admit that
of the
at the
of the
take are
owners in
owners of
are the
also admit
1998. They
property at
They also
Days’ Response
that have
parties that
standing to
parties
to prosecute
an inverse
condemnation claim.
claim. Days’
at 15.
inverse condemnation
15.
Response at
have standing
prosecute an
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The
then try
that any
that the
The Days
the 1998
claim that
claim that
to claim
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
owners had
had
1998 owners
Days then
try to
any inverse
Days’ Response
was transferred
that the
the deeds
the State
transferred to
to subsequent
at 15.
State
15. However,
Response at
subsequent owners.
owners. Days’
was
deeds that
However, the

in the
has
placed in
that assertion.
The statements
the fallacy
the record
statements of
of
of that
demonstrate the
assertion. The
has placed
record clearly
fallacy of
clearly demonstrate
in her
Donna
not support
the assignment
her second
Donna Day
of any
of action
action
afﬁdavit do
assignment of
support the
second affidavit
causes of
Jacobs in
do not
any causes
Day Jacobs

to
to subsequent
owners.
subsequent owners.
in fact.
Standing
The Days
Standing requires
failed to
to
to demonstrate
an injury
demonstrate an
requires aa party
fact. The
have failed
injury in
party to
Days have
in 1998,
demonstrate
who owned
property in
than perhaps
the property
other than
demonstrate how
perhaps those
those who
how any
have
owned the
owner, other
1998, have
any owner,

been injured.
from inverse
not pass
condemnation do
on to
to subsequent
injured. Moreover,
inverse condemnation
been
subsequent
damages from
do not
pass on
Moreover, damages
in its
owners,
the State
The Court
its opening
opening memorandum.
an order
memorandum. The
State established
Court should
order
established in
should issue
issue an
as the
owners, as

April 1998.
plaintiff that
was not
dismissing
that was
than April
not an
the Day
later than
dismissing any
no later
an owner
of the
owner of
1998.
Property no
any plaintiff
Day Property
IV.
IV.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

The
partial summary
judgment,
grant its
that the
its motion
motion for
for partial
the Court
The State
Court grant
State respectfully
requests that
respectfully requests
summary judgment,

April
in December
dismissing
plaintiff that
was not
that was
not an
the Day
dismissing any
or April
an owner
of the
owner of
December 1997
1997 or
Property in
Day Property
any plaintiff
their damages
their
1998.
find that
that the
the Days
The Court
the sale
mitigated their
of their
Court should
should also
also find
sale of
1998. The
damages by
Days mitigated
by the
in 2006
property in
the extent
extent of
the exact
to the
of $4.85
or whatever
amount of
of those
exact amount
those proceeds
whatever the
2006 to
proceeds
million, or
$4.85 million,
property

turns
be.
to be.
turns out
out to
Days’ contract
Additionally,
the Days’
the State
dismissing the
contract claims
claims is
is appropriate
appropriate because
an order
State
order dismissing
because the
Additionally, an
State’s
the State’s
met its
its obligations
the 1967
met
claim survives
obligations under
contract claim
Contract. If any
under the
ROW Contract.
1967 ROW
survives the
any contract

limit any
Initial Day
that was
the Court
the Initial
motion,
was
contract damages
to the
Court should
should limit
damages to
because that
motion, the
Propeny because
any contract
Day Property
the only
the 1967
the
other property
to the
to other
Contract. Any
ROW Contract.
alleged damages
1967 ROW
subject to
damages to
property subject
property
only property
Any alleged

that contract.
not contemplated
the parties
was not
by the
parties to
to that
contemplated by
contract.
was

7
“take” –7 either
April 1998
the parties
the date
the “take”
either December
Finally,
parties agree
on the
of the
or April
December 1997
agree on
date of
1997 or
1998 –
as the
Finally, as
the Court
the date
for valuation.
the
valuation.
establishing one
an order
of those
Court should
order establishing
those dates
should issue
one of
date for
issue an
dates as
as the
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DATED this

ih day of June 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

ih day of June 2017,

I caused to be served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

Ou.s. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
0Email:
fshoemaker@ greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Electronically Filed
6/7/2017 3:58:08 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVE OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.k.ronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transpmiation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOl-IN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
--------------------------State of Idaho
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES
MORRISON

)
: ss.
)

James Morrison, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:
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1. I am employed by the District 3 office of the Idaho Transpmiation Department as a
Prope1ty Manager.
2. Part of my duties and responsibilities include maintaining files containing documents
relating to various Idaho Transpmiation Department highway projects, and I am
therefore making the following statements regarding such documents based on my
own personallmowledge.
3. Attached hereto are true and cmTect copies of the following documents that are public
records made at or near the relevant time, and created and maintained in the regularly
conducted course and practice of business activity:
a. Exhibit A: Plan sheets 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, and 27 fi·om the 1967
Project I-IG-SON-2(16)54.
4. Prior to filling the position of Property Manager at the ITD District 3 office, I was
employed in ITD's construction division where my duties and responsibilities
included inspecting the construction of roadways according to contract plans and
specifications. In order to fulfill those duties, I had to be familiar with the symbols
used on highway construction plans.
5. The second page of Exhibit A indicates the limits of the purchase of right of way by
the State in 1967. Symbols used on such plans have changed little if at all since that
time. The boundary of the right of way is indicated by the three ball marking (-• ..-)
on the right of way boundary.
6. The dashed line north of and within the 160 feet of right of way being pui·chased
indicates the boundaries of a cut slope that was necessary to create because of the
width of the interstate being constructed.
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7. As the dash line indicating the cut slope heads east and the right of way purchase
shrinks back to I 00 feet wide, a dotted line indicating a fill slope can be seen within
the right of way purchase.
8. The first page of Exhibit A shows the Day property at the time. The Day property
begins at the line identified as "Begin Proj. I-SON-2(3)62" and continues to the east
on sheet 13. The Day property is also shown on the second sheet of Exhibit A
(marked sheet 15), continuing eastward nntil the property line for the Dibble property
which is indicated by the section line marked 19> <20 and labeled 501+95.69.
9. Nothing on the plans in Exhibit A indicates that the State purchased any right of way
from the Days or landowners to their east for a futnre frontage road and stock drive.
The location of the right of way for the future frontage road and stock drive is only
shown to the west of the Day property on the first sheet of Exhibit A (marked sheet
13), and on the plans attached to my first affidavit as Exhibit A.
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Further your Affiant sayeth not.
_...--

DATEDthis _b_~'dayof ~e

2017.

Property Manager, District 3
Idaho Transpmiation Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

SHONA TONKIN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

iL_ day of J't.ut ..e

2017.

SHONA TONKIN
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 9-16-21

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES MORRISON- 4

000513

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

i

11

day of June 2017, I caused to be served a true and conect

copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
0 Email: fshoemaker@ greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Depmiment
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EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT A
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Electronically Filed
6/7/2017 3:47:15 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Loren K. Messerly, ISB #7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day
Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs, and
David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke
Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby submit their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Re Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation Defense.

Ill

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT- Page 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment and opposition
and reply briefs filed by both parties. The State filed for partial summary judgment on April 28,
2017 ("State's Motion"). The Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 17,
2017 ("Plaintiffs' Motion").
Plaintiffs' Motion focuses on the central issue of access and the State' s affirmative defense
of the statute of limitation. Access is central to both the inverse condemnation and breach of
contract claims. The access issue has several possible variations on what was taken by the State.
Plaintiffs believe that the State contractually promised in 1967 to construct a frontage road to the
Property in the future, when the frontage road was developed by the State near the Prope1iy.
However, Plaintiffs Motion did not address that larger taking claim.
Rather, Plaintiffs Motion sought to prove a "lesser included" taking that should be
indisputable and resolvable at summary judgment: the Property had access to the public roads via a
right-of-way for a public frontage road but that access was taken and replaced with access to a
public road 1 only for a private road that the Plaintiffs must build and maintain in perpetuity. That
dramatic change in only this one element of access is a taking of property rights that must be justly
compensated, and it is the Court that makes this legal and factual determination. See, e.g. , Killinger
v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322, 327, 17 P.3d 266, 271 (2000). ("The Access Road is
no longer usable for the same purposes as promised to the Killingers, but now is pmi of the state
highway system. Such a change in the type of use from which the property had originally been set
aside amounts to a taking requiring compensation."). What damages this taking (and other takings)

1

To be clear, access to a public road, here Eisenman Road , must have an approved "approach," whether it
be a " public" road or a " private" road. The State 's position is that it can, even though it never has, obtain
ACHD's formal approval for either kind of an approach.
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caused will be decided at trial by a jury.
In opposition, the State argues that this forced reduction in access - from a public frontage
2

road right-of-way to a private road easement - is not a taking that requires just compensation. The
State further argues that its written waiver of the statute of limitation defense may have expired
because the parties may have reached an agreement regarding access sometime in the past
(interestingly, the State does not explain what terms were reached regarding access). As discussed
below, the State's incorrect arguments should not prevent summary judgment on the limited issues
that Plaintiffs have raised regarding access and the statute of limitation waiver.
II. THE RELEVANT FACTS AND REASONABLE INFERENCES
The State admits that the Property historically had unfettered direct access to SH-30 with
multiple access points and extensive frontage. (See Affidavit of James Morrison, filed on May 31,
2017 ("2nd Morrison Aff."), Ex. D, p. 3 (History and Description of Subject Before July 1961):
"Access to U.S. Highway #30 is approximately 1,700 feet ... [and] [t]here is no limitation to the
access.") 3 The State admits that it knew the Property was being held for future development as view
lots, and it knew that taking away the Property's direct access to a built public road was going to
make that development basically impossible in the shmi run. (!d., Exs. C & D.) The State's own
agents state, "due to the loss of direct access, the possible time of residential development is
considerably postponed and now dependent on the development of lands between the subject and

2

Though not raised on summary judgment, the State's reduction of the Propetty's access to the public roads
is much more than just from a public frontage road right-of-way bisecting the Propetty to a private road
right-of-way. The evidence will show that this undeveloped, private road right-of-way proposed by the State
is unusable for any reasonable road for public access, cannot serve a 300 acre development, and does not
provide the marketable and insurable access that is needed to develop the Propetty.

3

The State submits notes of conversations during negotiations with the Day family in the 1960s. Those
notes are valuable for showing the State's knowledge and intent. However, those notes obviously do not
contain the full story as they do not contain the actual thoughts of the Day family.
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the Interstate connector, two miles to the North," i.e. the State knew that development of the
Property as view lots was still the plan but it would have to wait until the frontage road was built
out to the Property. (Jd., Ex. D, p. 9.)
The State admits that it paid a pittance ($3,664.50) for what was supposed to be the
temporary taking of that direct, frontage access for Property that would not be subdivided for many
years. (See Defendant's Opposition Memorandum filed May 31, 2017, p. 5.) Much more important
than paying that trifle, the State expressly promised "Access to [the Property] from the future
frontage road" (importantly, the State's contractual promise was not "access from the existing rightof-way"). (Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs, filed on May 17, 2017 ("1st Day Aff."), Ex. C.) The
State admits that there was an existing public road right-of-way that it intended to use for the
extension of the frontage road, and this right-of-way connected the developed frontage road all the
way to the Property and beyond. 4 (See Defendant's Opposition Memorandum filed May 31, 2017,
p. 6.) If the frontage road initially planned had been built over that right-of-way, then it would have
restored an access very similar to what was taken: more than 1000 feet of frontage on a major road
built for significant traffic and the ability to have multiple access points into and out of any eventual
residential or mixed use development on the Property. 5
So, those undisputed facts should lead to only one reasonable inference: the State took away

4

The State excitedly points out that Donna Day Jacobs stated that the right-of-way was mostly impassable
by normal vehicle as it approached the Prope1ty. This is no surprise, since the right-of-way was not yet
developed. The right-of-way was created so that it could eventually be developed for a frontage road that
would allow vehicular travel. At least this was the State' s representation to the Day family.
5

For unexplained reasons, the State challenges the Plaintiffs' assertion that the frontage road right-of-way
bisected the Prope1ty. Plaintiffs believed this was undeniable. For example, the State said in a letter dated
January 27, 1998: "During the right of way acquisition and construction of the Interstate Highway between
Boise and Mountain Home there is a fifty foot (50') Right of Way, some deeded and some permanent
easement on one side or the other almost all the way."Plaintiffs' Motion does not depend on establishing this
fact.
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT- Page 4
19807-001 /95 0814

000527

essential access, paid a small amount for the loss of access during the period when the Property was
not yet ready to be developed for view lots anyway, and explicitly promised that it would ensure
that the future frontage road (future because it was not yet developed) was built to the Property so it
could still be developed for view lots.6 The State made this promise and the Day family relied upon
it because the State had control over public roads and control over where the frontage road would be
built to reconnect with the Property.
The next set of undisputed facts is that the frontage road was slowly built on or near the
original frontage road right-of-way, moving closer and closer to the Property. The State eventually
built an interchange near the Property, and the State chose where the frontage road would be
located. (See 1st Day Aff., Ex. G.) The State built over the old 50 foot wide frontage road right-ofway and obtained new 100-180 foot wide frontage road rights-of-way and easements to connect to
the new interchange. (!d.) The Day family Property was less than a mile away and additional
frontage road easements could have and should have been obtained by the State in order to extend
the frontage road to the Day Property as part of the Isaac' s Canyon construction. (!d.) But the State,
for unexplained reasons, chose not to do that.

6

The State utilized a commonly recognized method of reducing its damages by promising, by way of the
1967 ROW Contract, to build the future frontage road. In doing so, it substantially limited its damages to a
pmtial and time-limited reduction in access to the Day family's Propetty. As the negotiations neared a
conclusion later in 1967, Don Day recognized that obtaining a future frontage road would be the best way to
preserve development of the Propetty and specifically would still permit the mixed use or residential
development that was the highest and best use of the Pro petty, especially if he could get the State to agree to
a frontage road bisecting the SW remainder. That would still enable the potential for multiple points of
access along the frontage of that access road. Thus, he accepted far less than he thought was due in 1967
because he was able to obtain the State's promise to build this frontage road. See 26 Am Jur 2d § 312, p.723:
The condemning authority may act to reduce the damages to be paid by limiting, through
agreement or stipulation at the time of condemnation, the mode of use or the extent of the right that
is to be acquired. Thus, stipulations, and matters deemed to be binding stipulations or agreements
or reservations of rights, have been held to reduce or mitigate damages, and a pmty condemning
lands may bind itself to a specified plan of construction or specified use of pro petty, and have the
damages assessed on that basis. Later changes made, or diversions from the originally projected
use may call for additional damages.
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This is the moment that the State first broke its promise to the Day family. The Day family
had given up amazing public road access for a pittance based on everyone's agreement that the
taking of direct access was temporary, i.e. the frontage road would be built to the Day Property in
the future, timed to development' s approach and thus timed to when development of the Property as
view lots would be primed and ready. Yet, when the frontage road finally came to the doorstep of
the Property, the State chose not to connect it to the Property as promised. The frontage road needed
only a small extension to get to the Property but the State failed or refused to build that extension.
Instead, the State chose to offer lesser access options: narrow road easements, with extreme turns, a
bizarre 90 degree angle connection to the frontage road, and with remarkably steep changes in
elevation. (See 1st Day Aff., ~~13-28 . ) Even more remarkable, the State obtained the road easements
to the Property but then negotiated with ACHD that no public road would be built on those
easements (and did not tell the Day family about this decision). (See

!d.,~

26, Exs. R-S.)

The Day family told the State that these road easements were not what were promised in
1967. (See 1st Day Aff., ~~13-28.) These road easements could not be used by the State or anyone to

build a frontage road extension to the Property. (Id.) The Property no longer had the promise of
direct access to the public roads via the frontage road. The Day family did not immediately sue.
Instead, in good faith and with the protection of a written waiver of the statute of limitation defense,
the Day family tried to see if the State could improve the access to something reasonably equivalent
to a frontage road running to the Property. (Id.)
Repeatedly, the State admitted in both word and action that it needed to provide the Property
with better access than what it had provided. The list of written admissions by the State is
remarkably long. The State's sustained, varied, and tremendous (offering over $500,000 to the
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Plaintiffs to build a road) efforts to try to fix the access speaks volumes in contradicting the State's
current position that no significant access rights were taken:
1.

The State widened the entire road easement that would connect to Eisenman Road from 50
feet to 60 feet wide. The State obtained two new easements from third parties in order to
widen the road easements. (See 151 Day Aff, ~~ 14-16, Exs. I, J & K.)

11.

The State negotiated extensively with third parties the BLM, the Nature Conservancy, and
then Baker Investment in order to obtain a new route for half of the road easement,
acknowledging that the prior route had been unbuildable. (Id., Ex. M: "when this issue first
arose ... it was the portion of the easement over the BLM land that the engineers perceived
to be the problem".) The State even agreed that if a road was built over this new easement,
but then the underlying property owner wanted it moved, the State would pay for relocating
the road. (Jd. , Ex. K.)

111.

The State admitted in writing, "After the interchange was constructed, the Department
determined that some of the new right-of-way did not provide the same level of access as
was provided in the original right-of-way that was established in 1967." (Id., Ex. I, emphasis
added.)

1v.

The State admitted that the other part of the road easement, closest to the frontage road, was
still unbuildable: "The problem being the terrain is so steep and sloping that ACHD will
not approve any public road access using the easement. I have met with ACHD's Traffic
Engineer and he confirms that the easement does not meet ACHD standards. Also, the
approach to Eismann Road is at a right angle and does not meet ACHD standards."
(Complaint, filed November 1, 2016, Ex. 14, emphasis added.) The State further admitted
that "When the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was constructed, the [frontage road] easement
was moved to adjoin the interchange" even though the State had promised "Access to the
Future Frontage Road." (Jd.) The State finally concluded, "the Day Family has two probable
courses of action. They could take the matter to the Transportation Board, at which time the
District and Headquarters need to be in a position to respond. The second alternative
would be to file suit based upon a taking of access (inverse condemnation) and lTD's
breach of its covenant in the original deed." (Id., emphasis added.)

v.

The State worked on relocating the road easement: "The problem appears to be the easement
over the Nicholson property. The property is over terrain with contours too great to
construct a frontage road or effectively use the easement for ingress or egress. lTD
District Three's Project Development Engineer and Right-of-Way Supervisor have gone out
to the site and viewed the property to determine if and how the easement can be relocated .
. . . The District and the Headquarters Right-of-Way Section are reviewing funding sources
in order to reach a solution to this problem." (Id., Ex. M.)

v1.

The State admitted, "[T]he Department will not assert any type of statute of limitations
defense if an agreement on new access cannot be reached." (Jd.)

v11.

The State tried to engineer a buildable road through the road easements and had to design a
road for a "speed of 15-20 mph." (Jd. , Ex. N.) ACHD reviewed the plans and said that the 90
degree turns on only 50 or 60 feet easements was not workable: "One deficiency did stand
out. The District standard minimum centerline radius for a local street is 100-feet. The
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drawings indicated at least two corners with a SO-foot radius." (ld., Ex. 0, emphasis
added.) ACHD also said that the State's plans were not sufficiently detailed: "More detailed
plans would be required for review to determine if the design meets all District standards."
(!d.) ACHD also pointed out that "the land use planned and the volumes of traffic ... could
affect the design standards." (/d.) In other words, a development of 300 acres of mixed use
would need to be served by a substantial access road much bigger than what the State had
designed.
vn1.

The State admitted that it had an obligation to resolve all issues with insurable access:
"Pioneer Title has raised questions and does not believe they can insure the property due to
defects they perceive in the easement. ... [I]t is the Title Company that has the final say
on the issue where the Department is transferring an undeveloped access road
easement." (/d., Ex. Q., emphasis added) The State met with Pioneer Title and tried to come
up with solutions for providing insurable access. The State admitted, "The bottom line is
that before the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day property had
insurable title to its property and had a legal right of access. With the construction of
the interchange they will not be able to provide title insurance without going through
litigation." (!d., emphasis added)

IX.

To resolve some of the Title Company' s concerns, the State agreed to get an
acknowledgement from the third party whose property was burdened by the road easement.
(!d.) The acknowledgements would state that the road easement was "for the purpose of an
access road right-of-way for the benefit of the Day family and other similarly situated
property owners." (/d.) The State further stated that "If the underlying property owner
declines to agree to an acknowledgement then the Department may want to consider a
quiet title action on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed .... " (ld.) The State
indicated that it did not want to solve the access issue by actually building a road on the road
easements because that would "involve huge costs." (/d.)

x.

The State made application to ACHD for an approach to serve its road easements. (Day Aff.,
Ex. R.) In the application, the State admitted that its negotiations with ACHD in 1996
resulted in an agreement that did not account for a road to be built at the location of the road
easements. (!d.) The State also admitted that the "existing approach location allow the
Day Family only limited opportunity to develop their rural property to the south." (!d.,
emphasis added.) The State explained, "A future public road is needed to accommodate
the potential site-generated traffic volumes. . . . The Day Family cannot construct a
public street at a location that meets ACHD policies because of intervening property
owners." (!d., emphasis added.) The State requested a 40-ft approach despite its prior
engineering plans that required at least a 60-foot approach to try and make the immediate 90
degree turn workable. (!d.) The State provided ACHD with a copy of the contract where the
State had promised access to the Property from the frontage road, hence the urgency and
underlying basis for an approach for a public road to the Property. (/d.)

x1.

In 2015, the State offered $560,000 to the Plaintiffs so that they could try to build a road
over the road easements. (ld., Ex. U.) The State was still hoping that ACHD would allow a
road to be built from Eisenman over the road easements to the Property.

xn.

The State negotiated extensively with ACHD for several years, through 2016, in an attempt
to get ACHD approval of a public road built over the road easements. (!d. , Exs. R & V.)
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Through all of this, the Day family was patient in waiting for an adequate resolution and
noting all the State's admissions about needing to restore public road access, if not frontage road
access. Ultimately, however, the State failed. The State could not get authorization from the
governing authority, ACHD, to use its road easements to build a public road (frontage road
extension or otherwise) to the Property. (!d. , Ex. V.)
Now, in this litigation, the State is forced to try and rewrite history and claim numerous
things that contradict what it has already admitted in writing.
•

The State claims that there is nothing wrong with the road easements and the Day family has
in some way concurred on the location of the road easements. However, the State long ago
admitted that the road easements can at best only handle a 15-20 mph road, that the 90
degree turns are unworkable and too narrow for a public street meeting current standards,
and that the terrain is too steep. The State made one attempt at designing a road on those
easements and it had major design flaws and could only fit a street that would not be
adequate for the needs of a 300 acre development and was never accepted by ACHD. (See
supra list i-vii.)

•

The State claims that it already paid all value for what it took in access in 1967. Yet, the
State has long acknowledged that it still has not met the promises it made in 1967. The
State's communications internally, to the Day family and to ACHD make reference to the
obligations from 1967 to provide access from the "Future Frontage Road." The State, in an
internal memo, admits that the Day family would be able to file suit for both "taking of
access (inverse condemnation) and lTD's breach of its covenant in the original [1967]
deed." (See supra list iv, x.)

•

The State claims that building the new interchange over and moving the initial frontage road
right-of-way planned in 1967 is insignificant. Yet, the State has spent twenty years trying to
find an acceptable replacement access for what it took. The State has even offered to pay
$560,000 for the Day family to build a road to replace that access. The State obtained new
easements, engineered roads, negotiated with ACHD, land owners, and the Day family,
performed studies of all access options and costs of building various roads, offered to build
approaches from Eisenman, offered to pay the cost of moving built roads if required by
underlying property owners, met with title insurers and created potential agreements to meet
their requests, considered a quiet title action, and petitioned ACHD to allow for a new
approach. After two decades of admissions that it owed the Day family a solution, now lTD
is trying to reverse course and claim that it took nothing of value and has no obligation to
the Day family. (See supra list i-xii.)

•

The State (Amy Revis) claims that ACHD was willing to provide an approach and approve a
public road over the road easements, and it was the Plaintiffs who failed to follow up with
ACHD. However, the record shows several times that ACHD rejected a public road over the
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road easements. The State admitted, in its application papers for a temporary approach, that
ACHD policy and ACHD's corridor plan would not allow the approach. ACHD sent an
email confirming that it would not accept the approach or public road that Ms. Revis is
claiming she could have obtained: "ACHD will not accept a public street between the off
ramp and the future Lake Hazel/Eisenman intersection." (See supra list iv, vii, x, xii.)
•

Lastly, the State claims (Amy Revis and David Szplett) that even if ACHD will not allow
the approach or public street (and ACHD has unequivocally said it will not), lTD has
offered an approach from the portion of Eisenman that it controls and then the road
easements could be used to build a private road for public access to the Property. The State
ignores the fact that this "privately maintained public road" is limited to 60 feet width that
would hold a road much smaller than the frontage road (which has easements well over 100
feet wide), has a 90 degree turn immediately after any approach off Eisenman Road that is
unworkable, has a second turn that is too sharp to be workable, and traverses rises and falls
that are too steep to be workable. (See supra list iii-v, vii-viii, x.)
After twenty years of failed efforts, the State is now offering a "private road" connection to

the frontage road and saying that the Day family should just accept it. Instead of access directly
from a built public frontage road that bisects their property and is maintained by the government,
which is what was promised in 1967, the State is telling the Day family to just build a road on
easements over property owned by hostile property owners who want to block the road, build a road
that is narrow and much smaller than a frontage road, with turns too sharp and a travel way too
steep to be useable or to satisfy minimum ACHD standards, and then pay the expense into
perpetuity to maintain the road for the public and be responsible for its liability (to the public and to
the underlying property owners), knowing that ACHD has no obligation to ever approve the road
and likely never will because of its location, dangerous curves, dangerous rises and falls, and
dangerous narrowness. The State further asks the Plaintiffs to just accept the difference that this
change in access has on the value of the Property.

Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
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III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

A Taking of Direct Access to a Public Frontage Road, Replaced With Access Only Via
a Private Road that Plaintiffs Would Have to Build and Maintain, Is a Constitutional
Taking.
The State argues that there is a "question of fact as to whether the State has taken all access

to the system of public roads from the Days' property." The State admits that it built the Issac's
Canyon Interchange over the right-of-way for the frontage road connecting the public roads to the
Property. However, the State appears to claim that (1) this right-of-way was not going to be
buildable for a frontage road to restore the Property's direct access or (2) connection to the frontage
road via a private road is sufficient substitute access to avoid a taking of access. These arguments
are incorrect and cannot prevent summary judgment on this limited issue.
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in reversing summary judgment for the State and
granting it for the property owner:
The Access Road is no longer usable for the same purposes as promised to the
Killingers, but now is part of the state highway system. Such a change in the type of use
from which the property had originally been set aside amounts to a taking requiring
compensation.
Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322, 327, 17 P.3d 266, 271 (2000).
There should be no dispute that the Property had a right to have access through the frontage
road bisecting the Property, with frontage all along the frontage road and with multiple access
points to the frontage road. The State has repeatedly admitted that the 50 foot right-of-way was for
the construction of the frontage road. The State's argument is that this earlier 50 foot right-of-way
was the "future frontage road" referred to in the 1967 ROW Contract. The State owned that frontage
road right-of-way and controlled where the frontage road would be constructed. As the frontage
road was constructed, it would eventually reach the Property and restore direct access to the public
roads.
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The State, however, then took actions that ensured the frontage road would not be built to
the Property. The State built the Isaac's Canyon Interchange over the right-of-way and did not
replace it with a new right-of-way that could be used for an extension of the frontage road to the
Property. Instead, the State replaced the frontage road right-of-way with road easements that cannot
be used for a public road. The State's agents, Amy Revis and Dave Szplett, admit that the State's
road easements from Eisenman Road to the Property cannot be used for an extension of the frontage
road or any public road because the State did not negotiate with ACHD for a public road at that
location in 1996 and ACHD refuses to amend that agreement. The record contains ACHD's
unequivocal statement that it will not accept any public road at that location. 7 (See

1st

Day Aff., Ex.

V.)
Thus, the Property's future direct access to the public roads was through the right-of-way for
the frontage road that ran through the Prope1iy. That direct access was eliminated and replaced with
an option to have access to the frontage road but only if the Prope1iy owners would construct a
private road and maintain it into perpetuity. 8 This, as a matter of law, is a taking that merits just

7

The affidavit testimony from Amy Revis and David Szplett is perhaps purposely vague and confusing
regarding the State's negotiations with ACHD. Both Revis and Szplett at times mention that they had an
agreement with ACHD for the building of an approach to Eisenman at the location of the State road
easements. However, both Revis and Szplett also mention that this agreed upon approach would only be for a
private road and not for a public road to be managed by ACHD.
Thus, no agreement was ever reached with ACHD to allow a public road over the State's public road
easements. At best, ACHD may have agreed to allow construction of an approach at the location of Green
Gate for a private road over the State's road easements. The Day family has no interest in building and
maintaining a private road into perpetuity in order to access its Propetty, so this supposed "agreement" with
ACHD was wotthless.
8

The State claims there is a question whether this access would be a public road or private road: "A question
may exist as to whether a road built on the easement would be public (meaning that the State or ACHD
would take responsibility for the road) or private, requiring the Days to build and maintain it." (Defendant's
Memorandum, filed May 31, 2017, p. 9.) There is no "question." ACHD said clearly that it would not take
responsibility for any road at the location where the State's road easements are located, and the State has
never stated that it would build and maintain a road.
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compensation. The State's failure to get an "approach" for a public road approved by the ACHD
absolutely shuts the door on developing the property for its highest and best use. There are other
failures that also foreclose development of the property, and would independently satisfy the
threshold requirements for a compensable taking: (1) easements that are too steep, too narrow and
too sharp-cornered to enable safe transit or that would satisfy ACHD; (2) incomplete easements or
rights-of-way transitioning the length of the interstate west of where it bisects the Property; and (3)
lack of marketable and insurable risk for those accounts, but resolving those are not necessary to
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment narrowed to that described. If any of these
other takings are eventually resolved by the Court, Plaintiffs' damages may be increased but
Plaintiffs' are entitled to summary judgment on the taking they have established.

B.

The State Raises No Relevant Dispute of Fact Regarding Its Written Waiver of the
Statute of Limitation Defense.
The State argues that "a question of fact exists as to whether the State's contingent offer to

waive the statute of limitations defenses is still in effect." However, the evidence that the State
presents is insufficient to create any question of fact on this issue. Summary judgment should be
entered that the State waived its statute of limitations defense.
Donna Day Jacobs explicitly stated that the access issue has never been resolved and she
relied upon the State' s express statement that the statute of limitation defense was waived while the
State tried to resolve the access issue. (See 151 Day Aff., ~~ 9-34, Exs. E-V.) In support of her
affidavit, Donna Day Jacobs provided numerous documents showing how the State was working on
the access issue for many years, from 1998 through 2016. (!d.)
In opposition to that testimony, the State provided only the testimony of Amy Revis (who
states she worked on the issue since 2014) and James Morrison (who states he has worked on the
issue since 20 16). Revis and Morrison both state that they never heard the Plaintiffs take issue with
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the location of the State's road easements. The State then extrapolates from this testimony that there
is a question of fact about whether an agreement had been reached about the location of the State's
road easements.
This testimony, however, is irrelevant for several reasons. First, Revis and Morrison admit
that they were involved in discussions with the Plaintiffs regarding "access issues," effectively
admitting that the access issue was not agreed upon, hence the need for these meetings . Revis
discusses her many attempts to resolve this access issue with the Plaintiffs and with ACHD. Second,
if Revis and Morrison were involved in resolving access, then clearly no agreement had been
reached prior to at least 2014 (when Revis admits she first became and involved and before
Morrison was involved), so the four year statute of limitation could not have run. Third, if locations
of the road easements or new access had actually been resolved, then there would be written
communications between the parties confirming that agreement. Revis, Morrison, and Szplett fail to
provide any evidence of any agreement.
Fourth, the State is trying to parse words and claim that its waiver was only related to the
location of the road easements. The waiver language, however, is broad: "I will also represent to
you that the Depatiment will not assert any type of statute of limitation defense if an agreement on
new access cannot be reached." (!d., Ex. M.) Neither Revis nor Morrison attempts to claim that
an agreement was reached "on new access." The State's offer of $560,000 to the Plaintiffs in 2015
to build a road should be evidence enough that no agreement had been reached prior to 2015. If not
that, certainly this lawsuit unequivocally establishes that no agreement was reached.
Fifth, even if Revis and Morrison are accurate in their recollection that they never heard any
discussion of moving the location of the State's road easements, that is merely evidence that the
parties were focused on other issues like: the lack of insurable title, attempts to get agreements with
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underlying property owners, feasibility and costs of any road, and ACHD's refusal to allow an
approach or the construction of a public road at the location of the State's road easements. (See
supra list vii-xii.)

In sum, the State may be able to dispute whether the Day family, in meetings with Revis and
Morrison from 2014 to today, ever discussed the need to move the location of the road easements.
However, those facts are not material and cannot preclude summary judgment. The material facts
are whether the parties had an agreement about "new access" that then caused the State' s waiver of
its statute of limitation defense to expire. The undisputed facts are that access has been an ongoing
problem and dispute since the written waiver was given. (See supra list i-xii.) The State has no facts
to challenge that conclusion. Summary judgment should be granted preventing the State from
raising the statute of limitation defense that it waived in writing.

C.

The State Has Already Admitted That a Contract Claim Existed As of the State's
Waiver of the Statute of Limitation.
The State argues that it has not breached the 1967 ROW Contract and if it did then that

breach is precluded by the five year statute of limitation for written contracts. However, the State
misunderstands Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. That claim arose in 1997-98 and the State also
waived its statute of limitation defense as to that claim.
The Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is simple. The State promised to ensure that access
to the Property was restored via the "Future Frontage Road. " This promise was not to just provide
an undeveloped right-of-way for legal access. The State did that. This promise was much more. The
State promised to restore real access to the Property, i.e. the right-of-way would be turned into an
actual frontage road that would restore the Property' s direct access to a major road that was
essential to developing the Property for its highest and best use.
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When the State built the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, that was the moment for the State to
make good on its promise to develop the frontage road so that it restored real access. Instead, the
State cut off the Property from the frontage road. That is the moment that a breach of contract
occurred. In fact, the State recognized that the Day family had a potential breach of contract claim:
"The second alternative would be to file suit based upon a taking of access (inverse condemnation)
and lTD's breach of its covenant in the original [1967] deed." That covenant in the original deed
was an extension of the 1967 ROW Contract and had the same language: "Access to the Future
Frontage Road."
Thus, this breach in 1997-98 was still alive in 2000 when the State agreed to waive the
statute of limitation. As a matter of law, the State should not be allowed to raise the statute of
limitation defense for any ofthe Plaintiffs' claims in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their
partial motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 7111 day of June, 2017.

AKER 0BERRECHT P.A .
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DATED this 22nd day of June 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of June 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
D Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Electronically Filed
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Department
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
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Case No. CV01-16-20313

MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF
MOTION TO BIFURCATE

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, (hereinafter
"the State"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and submits this memorandum in
support of its Motion to Bifurcate:
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Additionally, the parties need to have these issues resolved in order to have viable
estimates of just compensation from their respective experts.

Otherwise, those experts simply

cannot come up with reliable numbers.

CONCLUSION

III.

The State respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion to bifurcate these proceedings
in order to hold a bench trial on all issues other than the amount of any just compensation due to
the Days.

Doing so will allow the parties to more efficiently litigate this matter and streamline

the jury trial, mitigating expert expenses and reducing the time spent at trial.

DATED this 22nd day of June 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
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PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby submit this Memorandum in Response to Defendant
State ofldaho, Idaho Department of Transportation's ("State's") Motion to Bifurcate.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, the Plaintiffs concur with the State's goal in its Motion to

Bifurcate, which Plaintiffs understand to be assuring that the Court resolves all of the factual and
legal issues well in advance of the jury trial, except for the determination of just compensation.
This is a principle laid down in numerous cases by our Idaho Supreme Court regarding
condemnation cases, including inverse condemnation cases, like this one. The Plaintiffs and the
State rely upon the same authorities for this proposition, e.g., all elements of the inverse
condemnation claim are to be decided by the trial court rather than a jury. Covington v. Jefferson
County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596

P.2d 75 (1978)).
The seminal case is generally regarded to be Rueth v. State, supra, and the Idaho
Supreme Court cited the Rueth decision for this proposition in several cases, including Tibbs v.
City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979), where it stated: "In Rueth,

the Court clearly states that the determination of whether or not there was a taking is a matter of
law to be resolved by the trial court. The trial court should also determine the nature of the
property interest so taken. Rueth points out that all issues except the sole issue relating to
compensation are to be tried by the court as in the ordinary condemnation case."
The practical reason for this proposition serves both the condemnor and condemnee,
especially their attorneys, who, without this principle in place, would be faced with the
challenging proposition of starting a jury trial and asking the jury to determine just
compensation, without having clarity on the several background issues regarding the nature and
scope of the take, or if in fact there was a take at all; and thus not knowing the underlying facts
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upon which the damage experts could take into account in offering opinions as to just
compensation based upon the classic "before and after" analysis.
So, by seeking bifurcation, both parties can more efficiently prepare their cases, reduce
the length of a jury trial, and avoid confusion that might result in having the jury sit through
testimony as to the nature of the take, or whether there was a take at all. Such testimony would
be unnecessary for the sole jury role in determining just compensation.
Thus, in this very general and limited sense, the Plaintiffs here join, as condemnees often
do, the State as the condemning party in seeking to bifurcate this trial so as to assure that the
court, not the jury, makes the necessary factual and legal determinations prior to a jury trial, and
the jury trial is limited to the determination of just compensation, at least with respect to the
condemnation case.
II.

BIFURCATION SHOULD NOT CAUSE A DELAY IN RESOLUTION OF THE
CASE
The Court has already been presented with cross motions for partial summary judgment

on many of the issues that the Court must determine in the inverse condemnation case before
presentation to the jury on the issue of just compensation.
The State has presented five issues in its motion for partial summary judgment:
"a. Plaintiffs [do not have a] breach of contract claim, and [in] the concomitant claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
b. That any breach of contract claim or inverse condemnation claim arose in 1997
when the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was constructed.
c. That only owners of the Day Property at the time any alleged inverse condemnation
occurred have standing to bring a claim for inverse condemnation.
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d. That any alleged contract damages can only be recovered in relation to the property
identified in the 1967 Right of Way Contract or Deed.
e. That Plaintiffs have mitigated their damages."
(Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2.)
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the following issues:
•

the Day Property was promised access to the public road system via a right-ofway for a dedicated public frontage road but that access was taken and replaced
with only a temporary and private access to the public road system, and a road
that Plaintiffs must build and maintain in perpetuity,

•

this taking occurred in 1997-98 at the completion of the Isaac Canyon
Interchange, and

•

the State has waived any defense related to the delay in bringing this inverse
condemnation action.

(See Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of

Limitation Defense, pp. 1-2.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs will soon be filing an additional motion for partial summary
judgment on at least one, and possibly two, issues that can be resolved by the Court in advance
of a jury trial determining just compensation. These additional motions for partial summary
judgment, if filed, will be filed in the immediate future, if not prior to the time the hearing on the
State's Motion to Bifurcate is scheduled to be heard on July 12, 2017. Although the parties do
not agree on all of the pre-just compensation issues that need to be resolved by the Court, they
agree on most of them and, again, many of them have already been, or soon will be, presented by
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way of motions for partial summary judgment, and can and should be resolved by the Court in
the reasonably near future.
Plaintiffs' position, which we believe to be in agreement with the State's, is that those
few remaining issues that cannot be resolved or have not been resolved by way of a motion for
summary judgment, can be resolved at a bench trial to be scheduled at a time prior to the jury
trial scheduled for ten days commencing November 13, 2017.
The dispute in this case, as the Court now well understands, has to do with access that
was taken, and if so how much, what access existed at the time of the take (being December 5,
1997, as stipulated during the June 14, 2017 hearing), and what access exists after the take and
today. All that will be left for resolution at the jury trial, is the amount of just compensation, and
that resolution will be driven largely by the testimony of the Plaintiffs' and State's expert
witnesses. Although it has not finally been determined, it is likely each party will have two
expert witnesses on damages and one or more of the Plaintiffs' will also offer testimony as to
their opinion as to value, as is also typical.
As long as the Court determines the issues other than just compensation 2 or 3 weeks
prior to the jury trial, there is more than sufficient time for the valuation witnesses to adjust their
testimony based upon those determinations.
Thus, Plaintiffs believe that even with bifurcation, there is ample time to have all of the
elemental issues determined in advance of the jury trial setting so that the jury trial may still go
forward as scheduled.
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III.

HAVING AN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING COMBINED WITH A
BREACH OF CONTRACT CASE COMPLICATES THE COURT'S AND JURY'S
TASKS.
Although the Court must determine all issues in an eminent domain case other than the

amount of just compensation, for the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and breach of an
implied covenant, as the State outlined in its opening memorandum, the contract issues are just
as often as not reserved for determination by the jury.
So, by example, for the companion breach of contract claim, if the Court were to
determine that there was an ambiguity in the contract, then the jury would listen to testimony
about facts that might bear upon the meaning and intent of the parties in the 1967 Right of Way
Contract and Warranty Deed, but which would have no bearing upon eminent domain case as
those components would have been previously determined by the Court. This incongruous result
could occur unless the Court determines all of the issues other than just compensation/damages
in the contract side of the case, as it must in the eminent domain side of the case.
For this reason, were the Court inclined not to resolve all issues in the contract case, as it
must in the eminent domain case, save just compensation, the Plaintiffs would likely file a
motion for bifurcation asking the Court to defer presentation of evidence pertinent to resolving
the breach of contract case. Such a motion would be appropriate since the amount of damages
under either claim - eminent domain or breach of contract - would be the same. Thus, if the
Plaintiffs prevail in an initially bifurcated jury trial for just compensation in the inverse
condemnation case, there would be no reason to proceed with the breach of contract case as this
would portend a double recovery by the Plaintiffs.
For these practical reasons, the Plaintiffs are hopeful that the Court will entertain some
discussion of this issue at the hearing scheduled on the Motion to Bifurcate - "bifurcate" in this
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sense simply meaning that the Court resolve all of the non-just compensation issues that are not
resolved by the parties' motions for summary judgment at a bench trial, prior to the eminent
domain jury trial.
IV.

MOST REMAINING
JUDGMENT.

ISSUES

CAN

BE

RESOLVED

BY

SUMMARY

The State suggests that there are six (6) "sub-issues" that need to be resolved to
determine the nature and scope of any alleged take as of December 5, 1997. (Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 2.) While Plaintiffs agree to bifurcation in theory, they
have a fundamental disagreement as to the State's characterization of some of the issues that
must be resolved. Therefore, Plaintiffs set out below a more accurate and appropriate description
of these mischaracterized issues. First, however, Plaintiffs are mindful that it may be helpful to
determine what issues are likely to be resolved by summary judgment and what issues, if any,
remain for evidentiary resolution before the Court.
Fundamentally, several of the issues, even as characterized by the State, should be
resolved on a summary judgment basis. These issues, as stated and as numbered in the State's
Motion, are as follows:
"2. What is the scope of the statute of limitation waiver set forth in the July 19, 2000
letter from Steve Parry, Deputy Attorney General representing the Idaho
Transportation Department, to A.J. Bohner, who represented some or all of the
Plaintiffs ("the Days")?
3. Can the Days make a claim based on breach ofthe 1967 Right of Way Contract given
the statute of limitations issue and the waiver language in the contract? If so, did the
State perform its obligations under that contract? Is that contract ambiguous, and if
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so, what was the intent of the parties in entering into the contract? Is the contract is
missing material terms to such an extent it was not a valid contract?
4. Did the Days mitigate their damages by the sale of the Day Property in 2006, and if
so, to what extent?
5. Do all of the Days have standing to bring a contract and/or inverse condemnation

(State's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate, p. 3.)
The two issues remaining that likely cannot be resolved at summary judgment are, at
least as the State defines them, issue numbered 1, which is the nature and scope of the access
before and after the take, and perhaps issue numbered 6, an inquiry and clarification as to
"applicable development standards" as ofDecember 5, 1997.
Plaintiffs believe that the appropriate characterization of the State's first listed issue
would be more appropriately framed as follows:
1. In general, the nature and scope of any alleged take as of December 5, 1997. This
includes a number of sub-issues, including the following:
a. Using December 5, 1997 as the valuation date, what access was the Day Property

promised prior to construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange Project?
b. Using December 5, 1997 as the valuation date, what access did the Day Property
have after construction of the Isaac Canyon Interchange Project?

1

While Plaintiffs agree this is an issue that can be determined by summary judgment, they
disagree with the State's characterization of this 5th issue as one of "standing" and believe instead it is
properly characterized as an issue requiring resolution of transferability of a claim for just compensation,
as contained in the deeds here involved, from the owners at the time of the taking (December 1997) to
those owners today.
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c. Was the State obligated to provide the Day Property with right of public access so
as to enable obtaining marketable and insurable title for the Day Property prior to
December 5, 1997 and before the construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange,
and did that construction result in the State taking this marketable and insurable
title and, if so, is that taking compensable in an inverse condemnation lawsuit?
The full extent of nature and scope of the take is the only issue that clearly cannot be
completely resolved by way of summary judgment and will likely require a bench trial prior to
the jury trial; Plaintiffs say "completely resolved" because the Court should rule on a summary
judgment basis that the change from a permanent publicly dedicated road to a temporary
approach providing for only a privately-maintained easement constitutes such a substantial
change in the type of use that it warrants the payment of just compensation at some level.
Plaintiffs believe that a bench trial can be completed in a day or perhaps two days at the
most. Written discovery is for the most part completed and depositions of important witnesses is
in the process of being scheduled and should be completed in July and August so as to permit a
bench trial during the last week of August 2017.
V.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs concur in Defendant's Motion to Bifurcate, at least bifurcate in the sense that

this condemnation case, as do most, is best structured so that the Court makes all the factual and
legal determinations in advance of the jury trial and the jury is left to address the sole issue of
compensation. However, Plaintiffs would submit that the bifurcation motion requires the Court
to consider a separate aspect of bifurcation presented in this particular case arising because the
Plaintiffs have also brought a separate claim for breach of contract (and the breach of the implied
covenant). To avoid the jury having to consider and resolve issues raised by those claims and
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being instructed how those same issues were to be considered in the condemnation case would
be confusing. The solution to that potential conundrum is for the Court to decide all the issues
but for compensation in the breach of contract case, as well as the condemnation case - except
for compensation. Alternatively, Plaintiffs would want the breach of contract case deferred until
after the jury hears and decides the condemnation case to avoid that potential confusion.
Additionally, the jury's resolution of the condemnation case would render the breach of contract
claims moot.
Most importantly, the Plaintiffs want to preserve the jury trial setting in November and
that seems realistic as most of the issues the Court must resolve can be resolved by motions for
summary judgment that have already been filed, or will soon be filed, and the issue of the date of
the take-which is often contested-has been resolved by stipulation .

.rT)1

DATED this ~ day of July, 2017.

Fredric . Shoemaker I Jason R. Mau I
Slade D. Sokol
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and inverse condemnation claims in this matter are
Plaintiffs’
based on
are based

the issues surrounding the promise of public access
access to the two adjoining parcels of real property
in the East Half of Section 19,
2 North, Range 3
3 East,
East, Boise Meridian (collectively the
19, Township 2
Plaintiffs’ previous motion for partial
“Property”), owned by
by the Day family. As detailed in the Plaintiffs’

summary judgment, the State of Idaho, through its agencies and agents (collectively,
(collectively, the
“State”), had promised to provide access
access in the form of a
a public frontage road, but left the

Property with far less and fundamentally inadequate access
access to the Property in 1997,
1997, when it
attempted to relocate aa frontage road after construction of the Isaac’s Canyon Interchange to I84. The frontage road was
was relocated to within
Within one mile of the Property, but the State failed to
reestablish the required public road connection from that frontage road to the Property and failed
to fulfill
fulﬁll its promise.
promise. Since that time, the State has
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to correct
the access
access problems it had created.
The State has
fulﬁll the promise
has introduced multiple theories to deny its obligations to fulfill
Plaintiffs’ claims, including, recently, an unnecessary
and in defense to the Plaintiffs’
unnecessary and misleading

argument characterized as
as one of “standing,” claiming that the entire simple fee interest in the
Property is not fully represented in this litigation. Regardless of the State’s introduction of aa true
red herring, the fee simple is fully represented in this litigation as
as a
a matter of law. Further, under
the undivided fee rule, the State has
has no right to introduce any
any arguments related to this “in rem”
issue. Therefore, Plaintiffs request this Court to enter an
an Order declaring as
as a
a matter of law that
the fee simple is adequately represented in this litigation and that the State is prohibited from
questioning the issue.
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II. FACTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Title to the Property.
The Property in this matter basically consists of the NE1/4 and the SE1/4 of Section 19,
19,

right-of-Way. The Day Family has
Township 22 North, 33 East,
has
less the highway right-of-way.
East, Boise Meridian, less

owned portions of the Property since approximately 1935
1935 when Ernest George Day and Emma
2 North, Range 3
N. Day purchased the NE1/4 of Section 19,
3 East of the Boise
19, Township 2

right-of-Way for State Highway 30. (See
Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, less aa right-of-way
Afﬁdavit
(See Second Affidavit

of Donna Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant’s
nd
(“2nd
Donna Aff.”), 1]¶ 9.)
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“2
9.)

The fee simple in the Property was
was held in 1967
1967 by
Day, Ernest G. Day’s
by Emma N. Day,
widow, and his three children, Ernest E. Day,
see
10; see
(Id, ¶ 10;
Day, Robert L. Day,
Day, and Donald M. Day. (Id.,
11

also Compl., Exs. 2,
4.) The Property is now currently vested in Trust B of the Donald M.
2, 3,
3, 4.)
Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, created by
1977 (an
24, 1977
(an
by Instrument dated March 24,
F. Day (1/4);
undivided 1/9
1/9 interest); John F.
(1/4); Dan E. Day (1/4);
(1/4); Donna Day Jacobs (1/9);
(1/9); David R.

Day (1/9);
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs in
(1/6). (Third Affidavit
(1/9); and Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC (1/6).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to
Support of Plaintiffs’
rd
(“3rd
Donna Aff.”), Ex.
Condemnation Award (“3
EX. A.) The current fee simple is different than when

the initial taking occurred at the end of 1997.
was owned by:
1997. In 1997,
1997, the Property was
by: three siblings
(Ben Day 1/9,
1/9, Donna Day Jacobs 1/9,
1/9, and David R. Day 1/9),
1/3, and
1/9), their uncle Robert Day 1/3,
nd
2nd
the living trust of their other uncle (Ernest and Lois Day Living Trust 1/3).
Donna Aff.,
Afﬁ,
1/3). (See
(See 2

¶1] 21.)
Four deeds
1997 and today.
deeds document the differences to the vesting of the fee between 1997
First, on July 15,
1998, Robert L. Day and Charlotte L. Day transferred their one-third interest in
15, 1998,
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the Property to The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust, created by
by instrument dated
February 1,
an undivided one-sixth interest and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and
as to an
1991, as
1, 1991,
Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, created by
by instrument dated March 24,
an undivided
as to an
1997, as
24, 1997,
nd
(2nd
Deed”). (2
one-sixth interest (hereinafter, the “Trust B Deed”).
Donna Aff.,
EX. W.) The Trust B Deed
Aff, Ex.

was recorded July 23,
ofﬁcial records of Ada County, Idaho, at
at Instrument No.
1998, in the official
23, 1998,
98070520.
98070520. (Id.)
Next, on December 29,
1998, The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust, created
29, 1998,
by
an undivided one-half interest in the Property
1991, transferred an
1, 1991,
by instrument dated February 1,
to John F.
F. Day and Dan E. Day (each
an undivided one-fourth interest) (hereinafter, the “John
(each an
nd
(2nd
Donna Aff.,
was filed
and Dan Deed”). (2
EX. X.) The John and Dan Deed was
ﬁled on the same date in
Afﬁ, Ex.

the official records of Ada County, Idaho, at Instrument No.
No. 98125242.
98125242. (Id.) Finally, the
interests of Bennett (Ben)
ﬁled
deeds filed
(Ben) Day were recently cleared up and transferred by
by corrective deeds
on July 27,
at Instrument Nos. 2016-067559
27, 2016, in the official records of Ada County, Idaho, at
nd
(2nd
and 2016-067560 (collectively hereinafter, the “LLC Deeds”). (2
Donna Aff.,
Afﬁ, Exs. Y, Z.) The

corrective deeds
clariﬁed Ben’s interest and transferred it to Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, the
deeds clarified
Plaintiffs’ Motion
sole member of which is Ben Day.
(Afﬁdavit of Bennett G. Day in Support of Plaintiffs’
Day. (Affidavit

for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award (“Ben Aff.”),
Plaintiffs’ previous motion for partial summary judgment, all of these
¶1] 3.)
3.) As explained in Plaintiffs’

transfers occurred during the period that the State was
was indicating that direct access
be
access would be
restored and the taking would not be permanent.
The Trust B Deed specifically
speciﬁcally transferred the Property with “all and singular the
buildings, structures, improvements, tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto
belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders,
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rents, issues and profits thereof.” The John and Dan Deed contained the same specific language.
The LLC Deeds transferred the Property “together with any
any undiscovered interest therein,
together with all of the appurtenances pertaining thereto.”
In the Trust B Deed, Robert and Charlotte Day transferred all interests that they held in
the Property to their family (in this case,
case, to the trusts of Robert’s two brothers), and did not
rd
(3rd
intend to reserve any
Donna Aff.,
Afﬁdavit of
Aff, ¶1] 6;
any interest in the Property for themselves. (3
6; Affidavit

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Richard G. Smith in Support of Plaintiffs’
nd
2‘“
Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award (“Smith Aff.”), ¶ 2;
Donna Aff.,
see also 2
Afﬁ, ¶
2; see
11

11

22.) Similarly, the John and Dan Deed was
was made to pass
pass along all Ernest and Lois Day’s
rd
(3rd
interests in the Property to their two sons,
Donna Aff.,
see also
sons, John Day and Don Day. (3
Afﬁ, ¶ 8;
8; see
11

nd
22nd
Donna Aff.,
19 years
Afﬁ, 1]¶ 23.) In the intervening 19
years since execution, no family member or third

party
has challenged the circumstances surrounding the Trust B Deed, questioning any
patty has
any motive of
Robert and Charlotte Day’s intentions to transfer all interest in the Property, nor suggesting that
they had intended or attempted to reserve, transfer or assign separately from the Trust B Deed an
rd
(3rd
interest to any
Donna Aff.,
Aff, ¶1] 6;
Aff, ¶¶
any rights to aa future condemnation award. (3
6; Smith Aff.,
111] 4-5.)

No
been made to the transfer by
N0 similar challenge has
has been
by The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living
Trust, the John and Dan Deed, nor were there any
any assignments prepared or contemplated prior to
the transfer for the purpose of dividing any
any rights to aa future condemnation award from the
rd
(3rd
Property.
Donna Aff.,
Property. (3
Aff, ¶1] 8;
Aff, ¶¶
8; Smith Aff.,
111] 3-5.) Finally, the intention of the LLC Deeds was

to have the limited liability entity hold all of Ben Day’s interest in the Property, including any
any
rd
3rd
interest in aa condemnation award.
Donna Aff.,
award. (Ben Aff.,
Afﬁ, ¶¶
Afﬁ, ¶¶
111] 3-5; 3
111] 9-10.)

Thus, the intention of all deeds
1997 were to
deeds transferring interests in the Property since 1997
keep the Property, and all interests related to the Property, including any
any rights to aa future
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condemnation award, in the Day Family as
been since 1935;
has been
as it has
1935; in addition, no separate
assignments of the rights to the future condemnation award were prepared, nor were any
any
contemplated.
contemplated.

STANDARD;1
III. LEGAL STANDARD

“if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
Summary judgment is proper “if
file,
as to
afﬁdavits, if any,
ﬁle, together with the affidavits,
any, show that there is no genuine issue as
any
as a
a matter of
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to aa judgment as
pany.”
law.” “The facts are
be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.”
are to be
“may
However, the party opposing summary judgment
not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
by
in
affidavits
this rule, must set
afﬁdavits or as
set forth specific facts
as otherwise provided
showing that there is aa genuine issue for trial.”
1224 (2016)
Path to Health,
Health, LLP v.
161 Idaho 50,
v. Long, 161
1220, 1224
(2016) (internal citations
50, 383 P.3d 1220,

omitted). Additionally, the “moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails
to make aa showing sufficient
sufﬁcient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case....” Silicon Int’l
Int'l Ore,
155 Idaho 538,
v. Monsanto Co.,
Ore, LLC v.
544, 314 P.3d 593,
538, 544,
593, 599 (2013)
Ca, 155

(internal citation omitted).
In inverse condemnation cases,
are resolved by the
cases, all issues other than just compensation are
Court as
Jefferson Cty.,
137 Idaho 777,
Cavington v.
v. Jeﬂerson
as the trier of fact. See,
53 P.3d 828,
See, e.g.,
828,
e.g., Covington
777, 780,
780, 53
Cty., 137
831
831 (2002) (citing Rueth v.
100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75
v. State,
75 (1979),
State, 100
(1979), for the legal holding that
“all issues regarding inverse condemnation are
be resolved by
by the trial court, except the issue
are to be
of what
Boise, LLC, 153
What is just compensation”); see
153 Idaho 334,
see also State v.
v. Hi Boise,
334, 337,
337, 282 P.3d
595,
been taken and
595, 598 (2012) (“The issues of the nature of the property interest alleged to have been

law”); City of
whether
Lewiston v.
Lindsey, 123
123 Idaho
Whether aa taking has
has occurred are
are questions of law.”);
v. Lindsey,
ofLewiston

1

Plaintiffs incorporate the identical legal standard as
as presented in their memorandum supporting their
previous Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
1
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851,
whether legal or factual, other than just
issues, Whether
1993) (“all issues,
851, 853 P.2d 596,
596, 602 (Ct. App. 1993)
compensation, are
by the trial court”).
are for resolution by
Where the Court will be the trier of fact, “summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
because the court alone will
Will be responsible for resolving the
conﬂicting inferences because
possibility of conflicting
conflict
Dist., 135
conﬂict between those inferences.” Killinger v.
135 Idaho 322,
v. Twin Falls Highway Dist,
322, 325,
325,
17
Ins. Co.
Tr.,
17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000);
Co. v.
v. Mark Wallace
Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr.,
see also Banner Life Ins.
(2000); see
147
will be tried before the court
147 Idaho 117,
124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009)
117, 124,
(2009) (“When … the action Will
without aa jury, however, the court may,
Without
may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts.”).

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
The Day Owners bring this motion to address the issue related to the fee simple of the
Property.
Property. They ask the Court to rule that (1)
(2)
(1) the Plaintiffs represent the complete fee simple; (2)
there are
are no other individuals or entities, dead or alive, claiming an interest in the Property or any
any
rights to aa condemnation award for the Property;
has no right to introduce
Propeny; and (3)
(3) the State has
arguments relative to the fee simple issues.
issues.
A.

Current Title Owners to this Property Own All Rights to aa Condemnation Award
1.
1. Fee simple title to property
propertv includes all interests.
Of primary importance to this issue is the undisputable hornbook statement of law that

declares ownership in real property includes many interests, the proverbial bundle of rights.
rights. City
’Alene v.
of
D’Alene
142 Idaho 839,
136 P.3d 310,
v. Simpson, 142
310, 328 (2006)
839, 857,
857, 136
J.,
(2006) (Eismann, J.,
of Coeur D

dissenting in part);
part); Hughes v.
v. State,
State, 80 Idaho 286, 293, 328 P.2d 397,
397, 400 (1958)
(1958) (“Real property
55-101 (“Real
includes . . . every interest in lands.”) This bundle is contemplated in I.C.
LG §§ 55-101
.

.

.

property . . . consists of: (1)
(1) Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining
.

.

.
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claims, both lode and placer.
afﬁxed to land. (3)
placer. (2)
(2) That which is affixed
(3) That which is appurtenant to
land.”) and I.C.
LC. §§ 73-114 (“‘Real property’” is coextensive with lands, tenements and
hereditaments, possessory
possessory rights and claims.”).
2.
property interests owned and not reserved.
2. Conveyances
Convevances include all propertv
Conveyances of title in land, typically by aa deed,
property interests in
deed, include all real propeny
Joyce Livestock Co.
United States (In re
reserved. Joyce
Co. v.
v. United
property owned by the grantor, unless reserved.
SRBA Case No.
No. 39576), 144
144 Idaho 1,
156 P.3d 502,
v. Goss,
Goss, 30 Idaho
502, 515 (2007);
14, 156
1, 14,
(2007); Crandall v.
661,
P. 1025,
1029 (1917)
167 P.
v. Clark, 22
1025, 1029
661, 674,
674, 167
(1917) (title in reserved interest did not pass);
pass); Paddock v.
Idaho 498, 512,
126 P.
P. 1053,
1058 (1912) (Ailshie, J.,
512, 126
1053, 1058
J., concurring) (“[A] grant of appurtenances
carries all appurtenances not specifically
reserved”); I.C. §§ 55-101; I.C. §§ 55-604; I.C. §§ 73-114.
speciﬁcally reserved.”);
These transferred real property interests can be water rights, mining claims, and all
appurtenances.
appurtenances. Id.
3.
3. Conveyances
Convevances can include condemnation award rights without reference or
reservation.
A conveyance can,
can, under certain circumstances, transfer the rights to an award for aa
condemnation. Specifically,
Speciﬁcally, courts have found that when aa conveyance is executed during
ongoing condemnation proceedings during such aa time that the condemning party could still
abandon the proceeding, the right to the condemnation award passes
passes if not reserved, even if no
reference to the award is made in the deed. Bank of
1037
v. Glendale, 50 P.2d 1035,
1035, 1037
of America v.
(Cal. 1935)
see also Clay County v.
v. Howard, 95
95
1935) (citing other jurisdictions supporting same rule); see
Neb. 389,
145 N.W.
NW. 982 (1914) (finding appropriation was not complete at time land was sold,
389, 145
and that, therefore, aa subsequent purchaser was entitled to the compensation).
compensation). The reasoning
behind the rule appears in aa Supreme Court of Washington case:
case:
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Where the conveyance of the land pending condemnation is by deed without
Without
reservation, the only certain and just rule is that the money to be
be paid for the right
to take or damage the propeny
property shall be
be paid to the person or persons owning the
has
property or having an interest therein at the time when the condemnation has
reached that point of completion where
Where it is not subject to abandonment, and
when the right to the compensation becomes an
an enforceable demand against the
condemner.
condemner.
Ave. S.,
In re Twelfth Ave.
132 P.
P. 868,
132, 133,
133, 132
868, 869 (1913).
(1913).
S., 74 Wash. 132,
The rule is applicable to the current inverse condemnation action as
as it is manifest that, if
the State had actually fulfilled
fulﬁlled its promise to the Days,
Days, all parties taking the property since the
140-41
undamaged. See
Ryan, 74 Wash. 138,
promise would have taken the property undamaged.
See Damon v.
v. Ryan,
138, 140-41

(1913).
(1913). Here, once it became clear that ACHD would not approve aa public approach for the
benefit of the Property, the construction of the Isaac’s Canyon exchange became aa take that
beneﬁt
requires an award of just compensation. At this point, the compensation became an
an enforceable
demand against the State. Thus, the right to that compensation passed
passed with each conveyance of
the Property until it became enforceable.
enforceable. In aa sense,
sense, it was not until this time that the right
became certain, Whereas
whereas before it was always contingent on the State’s fulfillment
fulﬁllment of its
Plaintiffs’ right to damages and
obligations; or as
as expressed from the opposite perspective, the Plaintiffs’

the State’s obligation to pay
at the time the promise could no
pay became fixed and irrevocable at
longer be fulfilled.
fulﬁlled.
Further, courts have even declared in inverse condemnation cases
Where it is
cases that where
determined that the taking predated the current ownership of the land, aa subsequent owner’s right
to seek redress through an inverse condemnation action is not impeded. Rahaly
Rohaly v.
Dep’t’t of
v. State,
State, Dep
of
Envtl. Prat.
Prot. & Energy, 323 NJ.
N.J. Super. 111,
DiV. 1999)
Envtl.
111, 116,
116, 732 A.2d 524,
524, 526 (Super.
(Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999)
(citing to quote in Nollan v.
H2 (1987)
v. California Coastal Comm’n,
Comm ’n, 483 U.S.
US. 825,
825, 833 n.2
(1987) (“[T]he
be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
prior owners must be
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lot.”)). Similarly here,
here, all prior title holders understand that all interests and property rights were
transferred to the current owners.
4.
4. The conveyances
Propertv included rights to aa condemnation award.
convevances of the Property
No patty
party questions that aa portion of the interest (2/9)
by
N0
(2/9) to the Property is still held by
owners holding title to the Property in December 1997.
has been made that
1997. Further, no challenge has
those interests still include the right to aa condemnation award for which the Property is rightfully
owed and the State is obligated to pay.
pay. Unfortunately, the State has
has introduced aa red herring to
parties’ and the Court’s time in unnecessary
unnecessary focus on remaining interests in the
waste the parties’

Property.
Property. Regardless, the remaining 7/9 interest currently held by Trust B of the Donald M. Day
and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day and Dan E. Day,
Day, and Holcomb Road Holdings,
LLC, respectively transferred by the Trust B Deed, the John and Dan Deed, and the LLC Deed,
also includes as
as a
a matter of law, the rights to the condemnation award the State is obligated to
pay to the Property.
Propeny.
pay

The right to the condemnation award became enforceable after the

stipulated date of take, and thus passed
passed as
as a
a matter of law to the subsequent owners in the chain
of title up until the point it was determined that the Property could not be
be accommodated with
the promised public access.
access.
In addition, none of the individuals involved with any
any interest, or transfer of any
any interest,
in the Property are
are aware that any
any member of the Day Family holding or transferring rights in the

Property intended, or intend, to separate any
party, including aa
any rights in the Property to aa third palty,
right to aa condemnation award.
award. The parties directly familiar with the circumstances surrounding
the Trust B Deed are
are unaware of any
any other conveyances prepared or contemplated to divide any
any
interest in the Property, for the purpose of
of aa reservation or for aa separate conveyance to aa nonrd
(3rd
Day Family member. (3
Donna Aff.,
Afﬁ, ¶ 6;
Afﬁ, ¶¶
6; Smith Aff.,
111] 4-5.) Nor was it ever considered that
11
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such efforts would have been made since those rights were transferred pursuant to aa partnership
settlement between the three brothers.
brothers. (Smith Aff.,
Afﬁ, ¶ 2.)
2.)
11

The same can be said for the circumstances surrounding the John and Dan Deed, as
as the
conveyance was
was specifically
speciﬁcally intended to transfer any
any and all rights in the Property, and any
any
rd
(3rd
planning.22 (3
related to the Property, to family as
Donna
as part of Ernest and Lois Day’s estate planning.

Aff.,
¶¶ 3-5.) As for the final post-1997 conveyances, Ben Day transferred all
Afﬁ, ¶ 8;
Afﬁ, 111]
8; Smith Aff.,
11

his interest, and all related rights to the Property to Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, his solelyheld entity, with the intent and purpose that it would hold all such interest.
interest. (Ben Aff.,
Afﬁ, ¶¶
111] 9-10.)
Ben Day did not intend to reserve any
Propeny when the LLC Deeds were
any rights related to the Property
contemplated and executed.
executed. (Id.)
([5].) Accordingly, the Property, and all related interests and rights,
is still held in the Day Family, as
has been since 1935.
1935. Therefore, this Court should rule as
as a
a
as it has
matter of law that all interests in the Property are
lawsuit.
are directly represented in this lawsuit.
B.

The Undivided Fee Rule Prohibits the State From Questioning any Interest in the
Property.
Finally, regardless of whether this Court rules as
as a
a matter of law that all applicable

interests and rights to the Property, and related to the Property, are
are represented in the current
lawsuit, the undivided fee rule (or unit rule) prevents the State from presenting arguments related
to these applicable interests. U.
Land, 352 F.3d 1259,
1269 (9th Cir. 2003);
U. S.
S. v.
v. 1.377 Acres of
1259, 1269
ofLand,
2003);
N.J.
v. E. Rutherford, 137
N.J. Super. 271, 279, 348 A.2d 825,
NJ. Sports & Exposition Auth. V.
137 NJ.
825, 829
(Super.
Whole of just compensation being
as a
a whole
(Super. Ct. 1975)
1975) (stating rule contemplates one award as
“a summation of all of the values of all of the separate interests in the property”). At the
made as
as “a

22

Of note here from the estate succession planning perspective, is that aa right to aa condemnation award
a right becoming enforceable against the
would pass
pass to an heir or devisee if the owner of the land passes
passes prior to a
condemnor. Lafonlaine’s
Lafontaine’s Heirs at Law v.
Lafonlaine’s Heirs at Law, 107
v. Lafontaine’s
107 A.2d 653,
653, 657-8 (Md. Ct. App. 1954);
1954);
U.S.
Land, 800 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir. 1986).
v. 198.73
198.73 Acres of
US. v.
1986).
ofLand,
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most basic level, condemnation awards are
are really entered for the benefit of the Property
as a
a
Propeny as
Property. Id. (“A lump sum verdict encompasses all
whole, not separately to each interest in the Property.

land.”). As such,
interests in the land.”).
has no right to question any
State) has
such, the condemnor (here,
(here, the State)
any of

the interests in the Property once it has
an award is owed, nor does it have
has been determined that an
any
152 Colo.
Vivian v.
v. Board of
any such award. Vivian
any obligation to correctly apportion any
of Trustees, 152
556,
1963) (“Once the reasonable market value of property subject to
801, 803 (Colo. 1963)
556, 383 P.2d 801,
eminent domain proceedings has
has been established, the apportionment of that amount among
persons claiming an interest therein is aa matter of no concern to the condemnor.”). Any question
persons
as
Whether the correct interests have applied for, or received, proper apportionment of such an
as to whether
award is left to those claiming any
any interest related to the Property.
The undivided fee rule stands for the proposition that once the government has
has been held
to provide just compensation for aa condemnation, the respective interest holders are then
required to apportion the award themselves, either by
by contract or by
by judicial determination.
determination.
1.377
[.377 Acres of
1269 (stating apportionment is left to court or contract). The
of Land, 352 F.3d at 1269
rule contemplates that rights, like those protected in Art. I ,, §§ 14,
14, of the Idaho Constitution to just
compensation for takings of private property,
property, are
are being made directly to the property
as a
a
propeny as

Wholeithe undivided fee simple. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
whole—the
purposes, aa condemnation action is
really one in rem as
as it is the just compensation for the res that is being contemplated, not the
various interests that different parties may
property: the award is for the land itself, not
may have in aa property:

the interests. This principle has
has been adopted in Idaho, though not by
rel.
ex rel.
name, in State ex
by name,
Moore v.
v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 448, 546 P.2d 399,
issues, before
399, 402-03 (1976).
(1976). Among other issues,

the Supreme Court was the issue of whether
Whether it was appropriate for the State to seek aa jury
instruction stating compensation for the value of condemned land should be first
ﬁrst assessed
assessed in total
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and then only thereafter apportioned between those holding interests in the property.
property. Id. The
Supreme Court agreed with the State,
by denying the jury
ﬁnding that the trial court had erred by
State, finding
instruction, citing to Nichol
Nichol’s’s on Eminent Domain for support to its reasoning that aa division of
property into various interests did not affect the valuation questions. Id. The same issues are
are
present here and require aa similar separation between any
any division of the award and the
preeminent valuation question.
an issue for
question. Therefore, the State has
has improperly interfered with an
which it has
has no right to question, and the Plaintiffs seek to restrict the State to its sole obligation
of just compensation, and ask the Court to consider any
any questions of interest in the Property

W

outside of the proceedings surrounding valuation.

V.
V- CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue an
an order
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding
ﬁnding that the Plaintiffs represent the
complete fee simple, and that no other parties claim an interest in the Property, or any
any reserved
or assigned rights to the condemnation award; and that regardless of the extent of Property rights
represented by
has no right to introduce arguments relative to fee simple
by the Plaintiffs, the State has
issues.
DATED this 7th day
July, 2017.
day of July,
G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Slade D. Sokol / Jason
R. Mau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day
of July,
July, 2017, aa true and correct copy of the
day of
foregoing document was
was filed
Eﬁle System which
ﬁled with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile
sent aa Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311
3311 W. State Street
P.
BOX 7129
P. O. Box
83707-1 129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
for Idaho Transportation Department
Attorney for

II
I:
I:I
I:

U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IE Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker / Slade D. Sokol /
Jason R. Mau
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Electronically Filed
7/7/2017 2:15:00 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY
JACOBS, IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: CONVEYANCE OF RIGHT TO
CONDEMNATION AWARD

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Donna Day Jacobs, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the

years and am competent to testify regarding the matters

stated herein.
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2.

I am one of the Plaintiffs in this matter, and as such, I have personal knowledge of

the facts set forth and the documents identified in this Affidavit based upon my experience in
development and management of the Day Family properties, and as the person primarily in
charge of the Day Family business affairs and assets, especially those related to the different
entities and forms of ownership of the interests related to the property near the Isaac's Canyon
Interchange southeast of Boise at issue in this litigation (hereinafter, "Property") that are owned,
or have been owned, by the members of the Day Family since 1935.
3.

I make this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary

judgment related to the issue of the conveyances ofthe rights to the condemnation award at issue
in this litigation.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Schedule A and

Exhibit A of the title commitment from Pioneer Title reflecting the recent vesting of the
Property. I am aware of no conveyances subsequent to the title commitment date which would
affect the vesting.
5.

I am personally familiar with the circumstances surrounding the July 15, 1998

disposition by Robert L. Day and Charlotte L. Day (hereinafter, the "Bob Transfer") of their
interest in the Day Property, conveyed to The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust and
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust by Deed, a copy of which
conveyance was attached as Exhibit W to the Second Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs ("2nd Day
Aff.") previously filed in this matter.
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6.

Regarding the Bob Transfer, I am aware of no other assignment, conveyance, or

reservation of the Property, or rights related to the Property, made prior to the Bob Transfer, or
intended or contemplated by Robert L. Day or Charlotte L. Day to be made prior to the Bob
Transfer, or any intentions or efforts to divide or reserve any rights to a condemnation award
separate and apart from the interests transferred in the conveyance. The Bob Transfer was part
of the partnership settlement between Robert L. Day and his siblings to transfer any and all rights
to the Property, or related to the Property, that were held by, or vested in, Robert L. Day and/or
Charlotte L. Day.
7.

I am also personally familiar with the circumstances surrounding the December

29, 1998 disposition by The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust (hereinafter, the
"Ernest Transfer") gifting all of its interest in, or related to, the Property to the two children of
Ernest Day and Lois Day, being Dan E. Day and John F. Day. The Ernest Transfer interests
were conveyed by Deed, a copy of which conveyance was attached as Exhibit X to the 2nd Day
Aff. previously filed in this matter.
8.

Regarding the Ernest Transfer, I am aware of no other assignment, conveyance, or

reservation of the Property, or rights related to the Property, made prior to the Ernest Transfer, or
intended or contemplated by The Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust or by Ernest E.
Day or Lois H. Day to be made prior to the Ernest Transfer, or any intentions or efforts to divide
or reserve any rights to a condemnation award separate and apart from the interests transferred in
the Ernest Transfer deed conveyance. The Ernest Transfer was a gift of any and all rights to the
Property, or related to the Property, that were held by, or vested in, The Ernest E. Day and Lois
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H. Day Living Trust or Ernest E. Day or Lois H. Day for the benefit of Ernest E. Day' s and Lois

H. Day' s children.
9.

I am also personally familiar with the circumstances surrounding the August 13,

2013 conveyances made to clear up and correct the previous dispositions made by Bennett
("Ben") G. Day , individually, and as Trustee of the Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie
D. Day Family Trust, to effect a transfer of any and all of his interests in the Property held
individually or as reserved for him as a beneficiary in the Trust B of the Donald M. Day and
Marjorie D. Day Family Trust (hereinafter, collectively the "Ben Transfers"), to Holcomb Road
Holdings, LLC, a limited liability company wholly owned by Ben Day.

The Corrected

Quitclaim Deeds were attached as Exhibits Y and Z to the 2nd Day Aff. previously filed in this
matter.
10.

Regarding the Ben Transfers, I am aware of no other assignment, conveyance, or

reservation of the Property, or rights related to the Property, made prior to the Ben Transfers, or
intended or contemplated by Ben Day, individually, or as Trustee of the Trust B of the Donald
M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust to be made prior to the Ben Transfers, or any
intentions or efforts to divide or reserve any rights to a condemnation award separate and apart
from the interests transferred by the Ben Transfers. The Ben Transfers were made to transfer
any and all rights of Ben Day to the Property, or related to the Property.
FURTHER, your affiant saith nau~ --
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me

this30~ay of June, 2017.

Notary Public for Idaho
My commission Expires:

_s- ~ ( 0

-

.20,;)_JD

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theJfL. day of June, 2017, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
DATED this ]

1

l...

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
[gj Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg(a)itd.idaho.gov

day of June, 2017.

Slade D. Sokol I
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EXHIBIT A

000587

Pioneer Title Co.
Policy Issuing Agent For:

Old Republic National Title Insurance Company

Title Insurance Commitment
File No.: 312209
Reference No.:

Schedule A
I. Effective Date: Aprill2, 2010 7:30AM
2. Policy or Policies to be issued:

A.

Liability

Premium

$0.00

$0.00

ALTA Owner's Policy- Standard
Proposed Insured: To be determined and agreed to by the Company
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A
B.

ALTA Lender's Policy-

$0.00

Proposed Insured:
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A

$0.00

3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment is:
Parcels I & II: Fee Simple; Parcel Easement I: Fee Simple, Easement described in Highway Easement Deed
recorded June 8, 2000 as Inst No. I 00044826 to be perfected.; Parcel Easement IIA: A non-exclusive
easement for a future public road by the State of Idaho, created by Corporation Easement recorded May I 0,
1996 as Inst No. 96039693. Parcel Easement IIB: A non-exclusive easement for future public road by the
State of Idaho, created by Easement recorded January 8, 1999 as Inst. No. 99002305
4. Title to the estate or interest in the land is at the Effective Date vested in:

See Next Page
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PARCEL I and II:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. DayFamilyTrust created by Instrument dated March 24, 1977
as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest of his
spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Dan E. Day,
presumptively subject to the community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring
title, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest
of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-ninth interest; Donna
Day Jacobs, presumptively subject to the community interest of her spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated
of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-ninth interest; and David R. Day, presumptively subject to the
community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided oneninth interest.

PARCEL EASEMENT I:
Baker Investments, L.L.C., also shown of record as Baker Investments, L.L.C., an Idaho Limited Liability
Company

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA & liB
The State ofldaho
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
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EXHIBIT A
PARCELl:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Northeast quarter
EXCEPT those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, Page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967
as Instrument No. 677552, records of said county.
AND EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Southeast quarter
EXCEPT that portion thereof to the Ada County Highway District by Deed recorded 4, 1980 as
Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

PARCEL EASEMENT I:
A strip of land, 60.0 feet in width, over and across portions of the Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 2
North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, the beginning and ending points of which
are more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Comer common to Section 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence
North 00°10'46" East, 1319.16 feet along the North-South center Section line of said Section 18 to
the Northeast comer of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of said Section I 8; thence
North 89°38'38" West, 673.97 feet along the North line of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter to the POINT OF BEGINNING of said floating easement and being I 160.57 feet right of I84 Eastbound lane centerline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Comer common to Sections 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the Section line common to said
Sections 18 and 19
South 89°37'39" East, 24.9 feet to a point; thence leaving said common Section line
North 00°22'1 0" East, 30.00 feet to a point, said point being the ENDING POINT of said floating
easement and being 1222.40 feet right ofl-84 Eastbound lane centerline Station 475+85.34.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA:
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A Non-Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State of Idaho, created by Corporation
Easement from J.D. Aldecoa and Son, Inc. and recorded May IO, I996 as Instrument No. 96039693,
described as follows:
A portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section I 8, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
A strip of land 50.0 feet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way boundary oflnterstate 84,
Project No. NH-84-2(047)59 Highway Survey, as shown on the plans thereof now on file in the
office of the Idaho Transportation Department, and as described in that certain Warranty Deed to the
Micron Technology Inc. executed by the Grantor herein on the 8th day of May, 1996, recorded May
10, 1996 as Instrument No. 96039692 and Rerecorded May 15, 1996 as Instrument No. 96040862,
and lying between Eisenman Road Survey Station 86+38.83 as shown on said Highway Survey and
Grantor's Southerly property line (being the South line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter). The Westerly boundary being further defined by the Easterly boundary of an additional I 0
foot Easement recorded January 8, 1999 as Instrument No. 99002305, which is Parcel Easement liB,
below.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIB:
A Non-Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State of Idaho, created by Easement
from Thomas T. Nicholson and Diana R. Nicholson, husband and wife and Ronald C. Yanke and
Linda L. Yanke, husband and wife, recorded January 8, 1999 as Instrument No. 99002305, described
as follows:
A portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the South Quarter Section Corner of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the North-South Center Quarter
section line of said Section 18,
North 00°10'46" East, 1319.16 feet to a point marking the Center-South 1/16 Section Comer of said
Section 18; thence leaving said North-South Center Quarter section line, and along the South 1/16
section line of said Section 18
North 89°38'38" West, 643.56 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly Right-of-Way line of
Isaac's Canyon Interchange, said cap being 1133.65 feet right ofi-84 East bound lane centerline
station 462+68.57, as shown on the plans oflnterstate 84, Federal Aid Project No. NH 84-2(047)59
Highway Survey; thence continuing along said South 1/16 Section line of said Section 18,
North 89°38'38" West, 50.69 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly boundary line of an existing
50.0 foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement recorded May I 0, 1996 as Instrument No.
96039693, said cap being 1178.53 feet right ofi-84 East bound lane centerline Station 462+47.16,
also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence leaving said South 1/16 Section line of said
Section 18 and along said Westerly boundary line of an existing 50.0 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement the following courses and distances:
North 09°50' I 0" East, 618.36 feet to a point, said point being 150.00 feet right of Eiseman Road
centerline Station 91 +66. 77
Thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 678.00 feet, a central angle of 51°51 '49", an arc
length of613.72 feet, and a chord which bears North 41 °15' 14" West, 592.98 feet to a point, said
point being !50.00 feet right of Eiseman road centerline Station 86+88.83;
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Thence North 15°!9'19" West, 50.00 feet to a point marking the Northwest comer of said existing
50.00 foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said point being 150.00 feet right of
Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence leaving said Westerly boundary line of said existing 50.00 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement, South 74°40'41" West, 10.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00
feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence South 15°19' 19" East, 50.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman
Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence along a curve to the left having a radius of688.00 feet, a central angle of5! 0 !2'00", an arc
length of614.80, and a chord which bears South 40°55'19" East, 594.55 feet to a point, said point
being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 91 +60.65;
Thence South 09°50'10" West, 612.12 feet to a point on the South 1116 Section line of said Section
18;
Thence along said South 1/16 Section line, South 89°38'38" East, 10.14 feet to the REAL POINT
OF BEGINNING.
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Electronically Filed
7/7/2017 2:15:00 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF BENNETT G. DAY IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONVEYANCE OF
RIGHT TO CONDEMNATION
AWARD

v.

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
County of Ada
)
I, BENNETT G. DAY, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the

years. As Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and

Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, and as sole member of Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, I am one

AFFIDAVIT OF BENNETT G. DAY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONVEYANCE OF RIGHT TO CONDEMNATION AWARD- 1
19807-001 I 955791
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of the Plaintiffs in this matter, and as such, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth and
the documents identified in this Affidavit.
2.

I make this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary

judgment related to the issue of the conveyances of the rights to the condemnation award at issue
in this litigation.
3.

I personally directed the August 13, 2013 conveyances clearing up and correcting

my individual interest, and my interest held for my benefit in the Trust B of the Donald M. Day
and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust for the property near the Isaac's Canyon interchange
southeast of Boise at issue in this litigation (hereinafter, "Property"). The Corrected Quitclaim
Deeds were prepared at my direction to transfer all of my interests in and relating to the Property
to Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, a limited liability company wholly owned by myself. The
Corrected Quitclaim Deeds were attached as Exhibits Y and Z to the 2nd Day Aff. previously
filed in this matter.
4.

I made no other assignment, conveyance, or reservation of the Property, or rights

related to the Property, prior to and other than my transfer to Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC,
except for the conveyances for which the corrections were necessary. Nor have I ever intended,
contemplated, or made any efforts either individually, or as Trustee of the Trust B of the Donald
M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, to make any such assignments, conveyances, or
reservations.
5.

I specifically intended that the transfers conveyed all of my rights to the Property,

including any rights to a condemnation award.
II
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...

FURTHER, your affiant saith naught.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this :3Df1-day of June, 2017.

Notary Public for Idaho
My commission Expires:

5;- 1 0- d-C);:LQ)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

1'{L day of June, 2017, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0 . Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
DATED this ]

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
[3J Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg(W,itd.idaho.gov

f~day of June, 2017.

AFFIDAVIT OF BENNETT G. DAY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONVEYANCE OF RIGHT TO CONDEMNATION AWARD- 3
19807-00 I I 95579 1

000595

Electronically Filed
7/7/2017 2:15:00 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A,

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

BENNEIT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CVOl-16-20313
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD G. SMITH
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONVEYANCE OF
RIGHT TO CONDEMNATION
AWARD

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
)
County of Ada
I, RICHARD G. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
I.

I am an attorney making this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge

and belief related to my previous representation of the legal and property interests of members of
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD G. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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the families of Donald M. Day and Ernest E. Day, and as such, I have personal knowledge of the
facts set forth in this Affidavit.
2.

Members of the Donald M. Day and Ernest E. Day families requested my

assistance in a partnership settlement with their brother, Robert Day. The partnership included
all interest my clients held in the property near the Isaac's Canyon Interchange southeast of
Boise, which I have been informed is at issue in the above-captioned litigation (hereinafter,
HProperty"). As part of the settlement, Robert Day and his wife Charlotte Day conveyed all
interests and rights they held in the Property to two family trusts controlled by my clients -- the
Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust and the Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day
Living Trust. I provided them with recommendations for such transfer with which they agreed
and followed, and I prepared the deed which transferred all of the interests of Robert and
Charlotte Day.
3.

Later, as part of their estate planning, Ernest Day and Lois Day requested my

assistance with transferring all interests that they or the Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living
Tmst held to the Property. They asked that all their interest in the prope1iy be transferred to their
two sons, John F. Day and Dan E. Day. I provided them with recommendations for such transfer
with which they agreed and followed, and I prepared the deed which transferred all of their
interests.
4.

At the time of the recommendations noted in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, I was

unaware of any prior assignments, transfers, conveyance, or reservations of any of the rights or
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interests that they historically held in the Property, nor did my clients advise me of any such
assignments, transfers, conveyances, or reservations.
5.

I have no knowledge of any other conveyance of the Property or related to the

Property that were made by my clients, except for the conveyance from Robert and Charlotte
Day to the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust and the Ernest E. Day and Lois H.
Day Living Trust, and the conveyance from the Ernest E. Day and Lois H. Day Living Trust to

L u

John F. Day and Dan E. Day, upon my recommendation.

FURTHER, your affiant saith naught.

Ri~

2;-tL-

this~-- day

of July, 2017.

otary Public for Idaho
My commission Expires: -------'-'----------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

71-....._ day of July,

2017, a tme and correct copy of the

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transpmiation Depa11ment
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
DATED this

D
D
D
D
IZJ

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

'?.fl... day of July, 2017.
Sokol I
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Electronically Filed

7/10/2017 3:24:20 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
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)
)
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)
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the following
the response
following reply
to the
of
submits the
and through
and submits
undersigned counsel,
response of
counsel, and
reply to
by and
State’s motion
(“the Days”)
Plaintiffs
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Right of
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to the
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of the
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to the
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to the
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to the
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on the
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of the
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to the
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to the
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of the
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to the
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be addressed.
in the
has
nothing in
limitations of
the letter
letter states
long since
of limitations
of five
expired. Further,
since expired.
states
has a
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ruled on
would note

the
judgment.
that are
the various
to summary
are subject
various issues
issues that
subject to
summary judgment.
their experts
Further,
were to
the Days
opinions on
on June
to identify
experts and
related opinions
but
and related
June 6,
Further, the
identify their
2017, but
Days were
6, 2017,
non-retained
only
list of
the experts
Three of
of experts.
of the
experts are
four are
experts. Three
are retained,
and four
are non-retained
provided aa list
retained, and
only provided

their expert
the Days
experts.
by
expert disclosures
on June
experts. Subsequently,
supplemented their
disclosures by
June 30,
2017, the
Subsequently, on
Days supplemented
30, 2017,
non-retained experts.
their non-retained
The reason
the Days
for
providing some
by the
providing
opinions of
of one
of their
given by
experts. The
reason given
one of
some opinions
Days for
not disclosing
the need
the Court
the nature
the take,
not
opinions is
determine the
is the
to have
of the
disclosing opinions
Court determine
nature and
and scope
need to
have the
scope of
take,

it relates
particularly as
to access.
relates to
as it
access.
particularly
their opinions
the Court
the State
its experts
As
opinions on
As the
is aware,
is to
to disclose
experts and
on August
Court is
State is
August 7,
and their
disclose its
aware, the
7,
in rebuttal
Part of
will be
the opinions
the Day
2017.
be in
opinions will
opinions expressed
of those
rebuttal to
to the
experts.
2017. Part
those opinions
expressed by
Day experts.
by the

DEFENDANT’S MOTION
REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF S’ MEMORANDUM
IN RESPONSE
MEMORANDUM IN
MOTION
RESPONSE TO
REPLY
TO PLAINTIFFS’
TO DEFENDANT’S
TO
BIFURCATE - 55
TO BIFURCATE
—

000604

Days’ witnesses,
However,
from the
the Days’
the State
its
without opinions
opinions from
cannot adequately
State cannot
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Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
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Electronically Filed
7/11/2017 5:38:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE

Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., hereby move this Court for an order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: No Marketable and Insurable Title. Plaintiffs seek
summary judgment that the subject property in this matter has no marketable and insurable title.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE - Page 1
19807-001 I 956519
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This Motion is supported by a Memorandum and the Affidavits of Donna Day Jacobs, Glen
Lorensen, and Counsel filed concurrently herewith. Oral argument is requested.
DATED

·~

this ~ day of July, 2017.

Fredri V. Shoemaker I Slade D. Sokol I Jason
R. Mau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

SERVICE
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foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7 129
Boise, Idaho 83707- 1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
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D
D
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Facsimile: 334-4498
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Overnight Delivery
rgJ Email/iCo : chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
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Electronically Filed
7/11/2017 5:38:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB # 1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CVOI-16-20313

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs" or the "Day Owners"), by and through their counsel
of record, GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A., hereby submit their Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs' Complaint in this matter seeks just compensation and damages for the take
based on a failed promise of public access to two adjoining parcels of real property in the
Northeast quarter and Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise
Meridian (collectively the "Property"), owned by the Day Family. The State of Idaho, through
its agencies and agents (collectively, the "State"), had previously promised to provide access in
the form of a public frontage road, but has failed to fulfill its promise and has instead provided
only inadequate access that has rendered Plaintiffs' Property to be unmarketable and uninsurable.
Plaintiffs request this Court to enter an order that, as a matter of law, the access provided by the
State, rendering title to the Property unmarketable and uninsurable, is inadequate and
unreasonable access and, as a consequence, Plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation for that
lack of reasonable access based on the title insurance issue alone.
II. FACTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Property in this matter consists of land that previously enjoyed direct legal access to
State Highway 30 along a 1000 feet of frontage prior to the construction of I-84. 1 In all events,
as consideration for the surrender of those access rights taken for the construction of I-84, the
State promised the Day Family future access for their Property via a future frontage road.
Unfortunately, despite multiple attempts by the State over the last 20 years, the State was unable
to fulfill its promise.

The seminal reason for this ultimate failure centers around the 1997

1

Contrary to the State's assertion, Plaintiffs are not seeking damages based on the loss of access to SH 30 that their
Property enjoyed prior to the construction of 1-84. That historic access is, however, at least a helpful perspective in
demonstrating what the Days gave up in exchange for the State's 1967 promise of a future frontage road. If
anything, with the advent of this and other "controlled-access" or "limited access highways" the genesis of which
was the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, a future frontage road was ordained and in many respects more valuable
to the adjoining landowner than frontage on an Interstate, or other limited-access highway, without frontage road
access. (See: https:(/www. fl1wa.dot.gov/interstate/history.cfin.)
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construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, which eventually led to the ACHD's recent
decision preventing the Property from acquiring a public approach to allow for legal access. The
lack of a public approach, and other easement defects, have directly lead to the unfortunate
outcome of the Plaintiffs' inability to acquire insurable title to the Property. Even the State has
conceded this consequence: "The bottom line is that before the Isaac Canyon Interchange was
constructed the Day Property had insurable title to its property and had a legal right of access.
With the construction of the Interchange they will not be able to provide title insurance without
going through litigation." (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment RE: No Marketable and Insurable Title ("Aff. of Counsel"),~ 2, Ex. A.)
The Plaintiffs (and the State) worked with Pioneer Title trying to establish legal access.
(Fourth Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title ("4th Donna Aff."),

~~

6, 8.) The Day Family

tried to acquire insurable title to the Property, ultimately ordering title work for the Property in
201 0 from Pioneer Title Company (hereinafter "Title Commitment"), which excluded access
from policy coverage. (Affidavit of Glen Lorensen in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title ("Lorensen Aff."),
Donna Aff.,

~~

~

3, Ex. A; 4th

4, 6, 8.) Plaintiffs have sought a second opinion on insurable title, most recently

in 2015 from Alliance Title and Escrow Corporation, however the title work from Alliance Title
came to a very similar conclusion. (4th Donna Aff., ~~ 10, 11.)
Schedule B of Pioneer Title's 2010 Title Commitment included three Special Exceptions
(Exception Nos. 10, 22, and 48) stating Pioneer Title could not insure against a loss arising from
the lack of a right of access to the Property. (Lorensen Aff.,

~

4; 4th Donna Aff., ~ 8.) Exception

No. 22 included seven Notes to describe the problems Pioneer Title located in relation to the
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Property's access and outlined the questions that would need to be answered and resolved before
a right of access would be approved for insurable title. (!d. at Ex. A.) The seven notes are:
NOTE A: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not state the subject
property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrument No. 100044826 were to state the subject
property is appurtenant, the subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to
the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a
dedicated roadway. It does connect to Easement Parcels IIA and liB. We question
access over those parcels at this time.
NOTE D: If the State of Idaho extends the roadway to the North, across
Parcel Easements IIA and liB, access to Eisenman Road is restricted by
Instrument No. 96040862, which states the point of access is Station 86+88.83
feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is
given for the access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to
the West (Parcel No. S0618314950) is owned by the Ada County Highway
District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State of Idaho (Parcels IIA
and liB) is sufficient for access to Parcell.
NOTE F: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of
the Quarter comer common to Sections 18 and 19. We question if this creates
adequate physical access. We have checked the West half of Section 19 and do
not find an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 is not excepted or
reserved in Patent recorded as Instrument No. 100097111, which conveys the
Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and the East
Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. Sl618438400).
(!d.)

Pioneer Title's explanation of these Notes are that, first, regarding Note A, Instrument
No. 100044826, a Highway Easement Deed by and between the United States of America, acting
by and through the Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and the State
of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department by and through the Idaho Transportation Board
(hereinafter "lTD Deed"), deeded a 60-foot-wide "floating easement for a right-of-way" for
access, stating that the easement over the United States' land "was reasonably necessary for a
right-of-way for access to private property" as a result of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange project.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: NO
MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE TITLE -4
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(Lorensen Aff.,

~

5, Ex. B.) (The 60-foot-wide easement described in the lTD Deed is Parcel

Easement I in the Title Commitment.) For purposes of access, the lTD Deed does not state the
access is appurtenant to the Property or that the Property is the dominant property; it only states
the described conveyance is for access to private property, but does not state which private
property. (!d.) Pioneer Title will not insure access based on an easement in gross or an easement
or right-of-way that is not appurtenant to the property insured. (!d.)
Note B relates to Note A, and describes an additional problem because the legal
description of the lTD Deed does not reach the Property and the lTD Deed's language pertains
vaguely to only an "adjoining" landowner. (!d.

at~

7.) The adjoining property at the terminus of

the lTD Deed's legal description in the Northeast quarter of Section 19 is the Ada County
Highway District ("ACHD"), as owners of the northerly 25 feet as deeded in Instrument No.
8005940. (!d.) Further, Note C was meant to illustrate that the lTD Deed does not ultimately
connect to a dedicated roadway. (!d.

at~

8.)

The lTD Deed does not connect to the dedicated roadway because, as described in Note
D, Parcel Easements IIA and liB in the Title Commitment are restricted to a dedicated point of
access connection to Station 86+88.83 per Instrument No. 96040862. (!d.

at~

9.) The specific

problem for lack of a right of access purposes is the fact that no width is given for this access
point. (!d.) Typically, a title company will not base a right of access on just an access point; a
width must be identified. (!d.) Specific to the right of access here, the lack of a width makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether access would directly connect to the end of
Easement Parcels IIA and liB. (!d.) Further, although Easement Parcel IIA adjoins directly to
Parcel No. S0618314950 owned by ACHD, it does not directly adjoin to an open roadway. (!d.)
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Note E of the Title Commitment describes the policy of Pioneer Title prohibiting any
basis of a right of access upon an easement without dedicated public access or granted to a
specific parcel and appurtenant to it because Parcel Easements IIA and liB are vested in the State
ofldaho, as noted in No.4 on Schedule A of the Title Commitment. (!d.

at~

10.)

Note F relates to a problem with the lTD Deed's legal description because it depicts an
end point that does not provide access adequate to transition from the Southeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter of Section 18 to the Property (namely the Northeast quarter of Section 19)
even without consideration of the strip of land discussed in Note B deeded to ACHD. (!d.

at~

12.) The lTD Deed legal description for the "Ending Point of Easement" only extends 24.9 feet
into the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 18, the quarter-quarter section
directly north of the Northwest comer of the NE quarter of Section 19, thus creating a strip of
land only 24.9 x 30 feet connecting to the Property. (!d.) An additional easement along the
northerly boundary of the West Half of Section 19 would resolve this impossible access
transition, but no such roadways or easements exist in the Official Records of Ada County. (!d.)
The last issue, Note G, addresses the fact that the United States conveyed the easement in
the lTD Deed across the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and Southwest quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 18 on June 8, 2000, and subsequently transferred 15 acres therein to
B.W., Inc., an Idaho corporation, on November 13, 2000, without reservation of the easement
described in the lTD Deed. (!d.

at~

13.) No transfer or release by B.W., Inc. has been recorded

resolving this defect in the intervening 17 years.
Pioneer Title was unable to insure right of access for the Property for each of the seven
primary problems discussed in the Notes. (!d. at

~

14.) Pioneer Title requires Plaintiffs to
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address and resolve each one of the Notes before Pioneer Title will insure the right of access.
(!d.)

III. LEGAL ST ANDARD 2

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." "The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party."
However, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 383 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2016) (internal citations
omitted). Additionally, the "moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case .... " Silicon Int 'lOre, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 544, 314 P.3d 593, 599 (2013)
(internal citation omitted).
In inverse condemnation cases, all issues other than just compensation are resolved by the
Court as the trier of fact. See, e.g., Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828,
831 (2002) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1979), for the legal holding that
"all issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial court, except the issue
of what is just compensation"); see also State v. Hi Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 337, 282 P.3d
595, 598 (2012) ("The issues ofthe nature of the property interest alleged to have been taken and
whether a taking has occurred are questions of law."); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho
851, 853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 1993) ("all issues, whether legal or factual, other than just
compensation, are for resolution by the trial court").

2

Plaintiffs incorporate the identical legal standard as presented in their memoranda supporting their previous
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
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Where the Court will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325,
17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000); see also Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr.,
147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009) ("When ... the action will be tried before the court
without a jury, however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts.").

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

The Lack of Access Prohibits Plaintiffs from Obtaining (or Conveying) a Clear
Insurable Title
The Day Owners bring this motion to address the impact lack of adequate access has on

insurable title and in turn how critical insurable title is to a property's value. In its prior
Memoranda (notably the State's Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendant's
Motion to Bifurcate, p. 7) and oral argument, the State has been dismissive of the importance of
title insurance, saying that "appraisers do not poll title insurance underwriters." In fact, just the
opposite is true. Legal access, as evidenced by title insurance, is a keystone of an appraiser's
work. By example, in the 1998 Appraisal of the Day Property prepared by Knipe and Knipe, Inc.
-the State's go-to appraiser in multiple settings- Trey Knipe wrote: "The appraisers have not
been provided a title report for the subject property. Based on our research, it was discerned
that the property is encumbered by certain easements. However, it is specifically assumed that
the presence of these easements would not negatively affect the property's development
potential." (Aff. of Counsel, Ex. B.)
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Plaintiffs have previously brought to the Court's attention the legal import of access in
the condemnation setting. By way of overview, access to a public way is a property right and the
taking of a substantial access right is a taking of a property right that requires just compensation.

See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 291-96, 328 P.2d 397, 399-402 (1958) (impairment of a right
of access constituted a "taking of property"); see also State v. Hi Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,
337-41, 282 P.3d 595, 598-602 (2012) ("We have long held that access to an adjacent public
way--even in the absence of an expressly deeded right-is one of the incidents of land
ownership, the taking of which may require compensation."); Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway

Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000) ("This Court has recognized the right of a
property owner to access a public way is a vested property right appurtenant to the land abutting
the public way in question, and that an unreasonable limitation upon such a right may constitute
a taking requiring compensation.").
Typically, a taking of access can be found even though access to the property is not
entirely cut off. Harper Investments, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 251 Ga. App. 521, 554
S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Wright v. City of Monticello, 345 Ark. 420, 47 S.W.3d 851
(Ark. 2001) (section of street abandoned and conveyed by city held to be taking). A right to
compensation is also appropriate when governmental action causes a substantial loss of access to
one's property even though there is no physical appropriation of the property itself. Frick v. City

of Salina, 235 P.3d 1211 (Kan. 2010); Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 518 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

See also Harper Investments, 554 S.E.2d 619 (landowner who had access to highway entitled to
compensation when the Department of Transportation closed the landowner's access to the
highway for purpose of widening highway, despite fact that landowner may have had alternative
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access, because predecessor had exercised right of access by requesting access to highway at
specific time, and by granting request, the Department recognized the access and thus, a property
right was created).
Here, the Plaintiffs have been unable to obtain a title policy from a title company (despite
having sought that two reputable title companies) which insures a right of access. They ask the
Court to rule as a matter of law that the inability to obtain insurable title based on lack of access
to the Property causes a "substantial loss" and renders the remaining or substituted access to the
Plaintiffs' Property unreasonable.
Insurable title in Idaho is just that- title that is insurable, i.e., capable of being insured by
a title insurance company. Brown v. Yacht Club, 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Ct.
App. 1986). A lack of access is a problem restricting insurable title. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v.
West, 110 Md. App. 114, 139, 676 A.2d 953, 965 (1996); Green v. Sams, 209 Ga. App. 491,497,
433 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1993) (rev'd on other grounds). Lack of a right of access exists when a
parcel is landlocked without legally enforceable, unrestricted access to a public road. See, e.g.,
Hulse v. First American Title Co., 33 P.3d 122, 133 (Wyo. 2001) (discussed as part of
requirement for governrnent action not to result in landlocked property to protect between
constitutional eminent domain power and individual landowner's right to unfettered use and
enjoyment of private property). Lack of a right of access is different from mere lack of physical
or practical access; the lack of a right to access is a lack of legal access. Magna Enters., Inc. v.
Fid. Nat'! Title Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th 122, 125-26, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 683-84 (2002).
Further, for purposes of a lack of a right of access caused by a condemnation, the condemnee
does not bear the burden of reestablishing a right of access severed by a condemnor's actions.
State ex ref. Commissioner of Dep 't ofTransp. v. Vanatta, 728 S.W. 2d 341, 343 (Tenn. Ct. App.
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1986) (holding the State cannot argue that the landowner has burden "of seeking to recapture the
lost access").
The State's failure to fulfill its promise to provide a frontage road to the Property has
resulted in the Property being landlocked without legally enforceable, unrestricted access to a
public road. The lack of such access has disabled Plaintiffs from obtaining insurable title to the
Property. Lack of legal public access and the resultant inability to obtain a clean title insurance
policy is no small matter for otherwise developable real estate, this so because the owner must
have title insurance to sell lots, finance and construct public improvements, and borrow for other
development needs. (4th Donna Aff.

~

7.) Practically speaking, the Days must obtain a title

policy insuring title with a legal right of access, failing which title is not marketable. (!d.)
The lack of access and the underlying bases are detailed in the Notes in Special
Exception No. 22 in Schedule B to the Title Commitment. (Lorensen Aff., Ex. A.) Title work
obtained from an alternative title company, Alliance Title, similarly excepts right of access from
insurance coverage. (4th Donna Aff.,

~

10.) Specifically, the failures detailed by Mr. Lorensen

and Pioneer's Title Company title commitment are that: the lTD Deed, presumably conveyed for
the purposes of obtaining access to the Property in fulfillment of the State's promise to the
Plaintiffs, (i) fails to designate or identify a specific dominant property; (ii) does not include a
legal description that is contiguous to the Property; (iii) does not connect to a dedicated roadway;
and, (iv) does not include a description that provides for a continuous consistent travelable width.
(Lorensen Aff.,

~~

5, 7, 8, 12.) Also, Parcel Easements IIA and liB do not (i) include a

sufficiently-described public access because it is described as only a point which does not legally
reach the access parcels; (ii) do not directly adjoin a public roadway; and, (iii) are vested in the
State of Idaho and the right to use has not been conveyed to the Property. (!d.

at~~

8, 9, 10.)
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Finally, although the lTD Deed conveyed an easement for purposes of access, the United States
failed to reserve the easement from a subsequently filed Patent for the same property ostensibly
encumbered by that easement. (!d. at 13.) These problems with the right of access prevent the
Plaintiffs from obtaining clear insurable title from a title company. (!d.

at~

14.) The State does

not deny, and in fact has conceded that Plaintiffs cannot obtain insurable title:
The bottom line is that before the Isaac Canyon Interchange was
constructed the Day Property had insurable title to its property and had a legal
right of access. With the construction of the Interchange they will not be able to
provide title insurance without going through litigation.
(Aff. of Counsel, Ex. A.)
Therefore, the State's elimination of Plaintiffs' right of legal access to the Property has
disabled the Plaintiffs from obtaining critically-important insurable title to their Property.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule that as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs have no legal
access and cannot obtain insurable title to their property, with the result that the Property has
suffered a substantial loss and/or the remaining access is unreasonable and Plaintiffs are thus
entitled to just compensation for the resultant devaluation of their Property.
The Plaintiffs' inability to obtain a title insurance policy insuring access to their Property is,
on a stand-alone basis, sufficient justification for awarding just compensation. As Mr. Lorensen
of Pioneer Title explains, the obstacles to issuing a clean policy are intertwined with those
physical, practical, actual and safety-related access impediments. But, especially combined with
these other elements of the State's failure to restore access, the amount of just compensation due
the Plaintiffs is further enhanced.

V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue an order
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title,
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finding that the Property' s lack of a right of access prevents the owners from obtaining or
conveying insurable title to the Property and causes a substantial loss. As a result, the remaining
access is unreasonable and Plaintiffs are entitled to j ust compensation for the resulting damage to
their Property.
DATED

r

this ~ day of July, 2017.
BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A .

r

1

Jason . Mau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF GLEN LORENSEN,
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE
AND INSURABLE TITLE

v.

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Glen Lorensen, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the

years and am competent to testify regarding the matters

stated herein.
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2.

I am the Senior Title Officer for Pioneer Title Company in Boise, Idaho, and have

been employed by Pioneer Title as a title officer for 22 years. As Senior Title Officer, I have
overseen and personally participated in the preparation of title work for the property at issue in
the above-captioned litigation, being the Northeast quarter and Southeast quarter of Section 19,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, except those
portions conveyed in 1936, 1967, and 1980 for highway rights-of-way (the "Property"). I have
prepared title work for the Property at the request of the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned
litigation, and as such, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth and the documents
identified in this Affidavit based upon my experience with the applicable documents recorded in
the Official Records in Ada County and my familiarity with the access issues in this area,
especially those related to the Property.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Schedules A and B of

the most recent title commitment dated April 12, 2010, from Pioneer Title reflecting the inability
to insure without a right of access.
4.

Special Exception Nos. 10, 22, and 48 on Schedule B - Part II relates to the lack

of access issues that I encountered while searching the chain of title for this property. I have
identified seven primary issues with access and have noted each in Schedule B - Part II (Notes
A-G) in Exception No. 22.
5.

Note A deals with Instrument No. 100044826, a Highway Easement Deed by and

between the United States of America, acting by and through the Department of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration and the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department by
and through the Idaho Transportation Board (hereinafter "lTD Deed"). The lTD Deed deeded a
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60-foot-wide "floating easement for a right-of-way" for access, stating that the easement over the
United States land "was reasonably necessary for a right-of-way for access to private property"
as a result of the Isaac's Canyon interchange project. This 60-foot-wide easement is Parcel
Easement I in the Title Commitment. As my Note A states, the document does not state the
subject property is appurtenant. The lTD Deed only states it is for access to private property-it
does not state which private property. Pioneer Title cannot insure access based on an easement
in gross or an easement or right-of-way that is not appurtenant to the property insured. A true
and correct copy ofthe lTD Deed, Instrument No. 100044826, is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

Relative to the right of access issue is the language in the lTD Deed that the

document contemplates that the floating nature of the easement was to become permanent within
five years of June 8, 2000, if the underlying property owner did not elect to have the floating
easement moved as therein provided. There is no evidence of any election, such that the floating
easement is now permanent where depicted. The lTD Deed's Exhibit "A" or page 8 of the
recorded instrument, depicts the location of the floating easement, which was to become
permanent under the covenant described above. The cross-hatched portion on the said lTD Deed
Exhibit is highlighted blue in my Exhibit C for demonstrative purposes.

Also highlighted

(orange) for demonstrative purposes is the then-existing "50 foot wide easement that is adjacent
to the Interstate right-of-way located in [portions of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter of Section 18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise, Meridian; Ada County, Idaho],"
which was relinquished by the State as a result of securing the lTD Deed.
7.

Note B is related to Note A, describing an additional problem with the lTD Deed

even if Pioneer Title were overlook the appurtenance issue. The problem with the lTD Deed
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summarized in this Note is that the legal description of the lTD Deed does not reach or connect
to the Property and that the lTD Deed has language pertaining only to the "adjoining"
landowner. The adjoining property in the Northeast quarter of Section 19 at the time of the lTD
Deed would have been the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), as owners of the northerly
25 feet as deeded in Instrument No. 8005940.
8.

Note C is also related to the access issues with the lTD Deed for purposes of

insuring marketable title. The easement described in the lTD Deed (highlighted blue on the last
page of Exhibit C) does not connect to a dedicated roadway. This easement does connect to the
easements described as Parcel Easements IIA and liB in the Title Commitment, but, as will be
described below, I was unable at the time to verify if access was available at the time I
performed the title work for the Property because there were no recorded instruments describing
sufficient public dedication for access suitable to provide insurance for the title.
9.

NoteD is directly related to the questions with Parcel Easements IIA and liB that

were briefly noted in my description of Note C above. If Pioneer Title were able to overlook the
lack of access issues described in Notes A-C, there is still a problem with the point at which the
deeded access purports to connect to a dedicated public roadway. Instrument No. 96040862
directly restricts a dedicated point of access connection to Station 86+88.83 for Parcel Easements
IIA and liB. No width is given for the access point. Pioneer Title cannot base insurable access
on a point-there must be a width identified before I could determine whether insurable access
exists. Also, the description of the access point depicted in Instrument No. 96040862 does not
provide enough information to determine whether access would directly connect to the end of
Easement Parcels IIA and liB; thus my note about the location and that no width was given.
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Regarding the last sentence of Note D, Easement Parcel IIA adjoins directly to the thendescribed Parcel No. S0618314950 owned by ACHD, but does not directly adjoin to an open
roadway. Thus, that adjoining parcel could not provide the insurable access necessary to provide
the Property with marketable and insurable title. A true and correct copy of Instrument No.
96040862, is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct
copy of the southerly area of the May 19, 1998 Porter's Land Surveying, Inc. survey of the
Isaac's Canyon Interchange Proposed Access/Stock Drive Easements for demonstrative purposes
to show the location of the Station 86+88.83 and the location of the northerly portions of
Easement Parcels IIA and liB, and their relation to each other. Station 86+88.83 is highlighted
yellow, the northerly portion of Parcel IIA is highlighted blue, and the northerly portion of Parcel
liB is highlighted pink in Exhibit E. The westerly portion of the adjoining Parcel referenced in
Note D is highlighted as orange on Exhibit E.
10.

Note E describes the policy of Pioneer Title prohibiting a basis to issue insurable

access upon an easement without being dedicated to public access or granted to a specific parcel
and appurtenant to it. Parcel Easements IIA and liB are vested in the State of Idaho, as noted in
No.4 on Schedule A ofthe Title Commitment.
11.

I have not performed any additional property searches in the area surrounding the

Property to determine whether the access point has since been dedicated, nor have come across
such a dedication, but believe none have yet to go of record.
12.

Note F relates to another access problem with the lTD Deed as the legal

description depicting the end point would not provide access adequate to drive on to transition
from the easement in the lTD Deed to the Property (notwithstanding the strip of land discussed
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in Note B above). Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of an area of the May
19, 1998 Porter's Land Surveying, Inc. survey of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange Proposed
Access/Stock Drive Easements for demonstrative purposes to show the location of the southerly
end point of the easement depicted in the lTD Deed, just northerly of the Property.

The

southerly portion of the easement is highlighted yellow, the boundaries of the Property shown is
highlighted blue, and the strip discussed in Note B is highlighted pink on the first page of
Exhibit F. The second page of Exhibit F is the same area, but enlarged to depict the transition
point more clearly. The area covered in the legal description for the "Ending Point of Easement"
in the lTD Deed is highlighted in yellow on the second page of Exhibit F and shows that the
easement only extends 24.9 feet into the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section
18, the quarter-quarter section directly north of the Northwest comer of the NE quarter of
Section 19. Thus, the only portion of the easement that actually connects to the NE quarter of
Section 19 is a strip of land 24.9 x 30 feet, the location of which would require (for access from
the north) an immediate 90 degree transition from traveling directly east along the southerly
boundary of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and Southwest quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 18 on the lTD Deed easement to continue directly south to the
Northeast quarter of Section 19. This would appear to not provide adequate access to the
Property. Upon further analysis of this problem, I searched the records for the West Half of
Section 19 to determine if there was a roadway or easement along the northerly boundary line of
the West Half of Section 19 to allow for a wider road to determine if an adequate width could be
provided for this transition by an additional easement, but no such roadways or easements exist
in the Official Records of Ada County.
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13.

Note G depicts a title problem with the lTD Deed. The United Sratcs conveyed

the easement in the lTD Deed across the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and
Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 18 on June 8. 2000, <md transferred 15
acres therein to B.W., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, on November 13, 2000, without reservation of

the Easement. The property depicted in the Patent is highlighted in green on the first page of
Exhibit F.

14.

Based on any one of the seven primary problems discussed in detail above,

Pioneer Title is unable to insure right of access for the Property. To obtain marketable and
insurable title from Pioneer Title, the Day Family vvould be required to address and correct each
one of the Notes discussed above.
15.

Based on my belief and knowledge with the details surrounding the previous

attempts by Donna Day .Jacobs to address these issues, it is my understanding that neither the
Day Family or the State of Idaho has been able to correct any of the problems explained in the
Notes.
16.

Ir Pioneer Title were asked to provide a current Title Commitment for the

Property, it would still be required to include Exception Nos. I 0, 22, and 48, and would be
unable to provide title insurance for title with a right to access.
r1JRTHER, your affialll saith naught.

Glen Lorensen
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Residing at Galdwell, ID
My Commission Expires: 05-05·2023

CERTJFlCATE OF SERVJCF.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

thcJ!!.-~ay of July, 20 17, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Depm·tment
3311 W. Stnte Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Allorney.for Idaho Transportation Department

0

0

0

0

U.S. tvlail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

[gl Ernail/iCourl: chris.kmnbcrg@.itd. idaho.gov
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Title Insurance Commitment
Policy Issuing Agent For:

Old Republic National Title Insurance Company

File No.: 312209
Reference No.:

Schedule A
1. Effective Date: April 12, 201 0 7:30AM

2. Policy or Policies to be issued:

A.

Liability

Premium

$0.00

$0.00

ALTA Owner's Policy- Standard
Proposed Insured: To be detennined and agreed to by the Company
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A
B.

ALTA Lender's Policy-

$0.00

Proposed Insured:
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A

$0.00

3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment is:
Parcels I & II: Fee Simple; Parcel Easement I: Fee Simple, Easement described in Highway Easement Deed
recorded June 8, 2000 as Inst No. 100044826 to be perfected.; Parcel Easement IIA: A non-exclusive
easement for a future public road by the State of Idaho, created by Corporation Easement recorded May 10,
1996 as Inst No. 96039693. Parcel Easement Iffi: A non-exclusive easement for future public road by the
State ofldaho, created by Easement recorded January 8, 1999 as Inst. No. 99002305
4. Title to the estate or interest in the land is at the Effective Date vested in:

See Next Page
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PARCEL I and II:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Maljorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument dated March 24, 1977
as to an undivided one·sixth interest; John F. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest of his
spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one· fourth interest; Dan E. Day,
presumptively subject to the community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring
title, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest
of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-ninth interest; Donna
Day Jacobs, presumptively subject to the community interest of her spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated
of acquiring title, as to an undivided one· ninth interest; and David R. Day, presumptively subject to the
community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided oneninth interest.

PARCEL EASEMENT I:
Baker Investments, L.L.C., also shown of record as Baker Investments, L.L.C., an Idaho Limited Liability
Company

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA & liB
The State of Idaho
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.
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File No.: 312209

Reference No.:

Schedule B - Part I
The following Requirements must be met:

1. Pay the agreed amounts for the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insyed.

2. Pay us the premiums, fees, and charges for the policy.
3. Documents satisfactory to us creating the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insured must be
signed, delivered, and recorded,
4.

You must tell us in writing the name of anyone not referred to in this Commitment who will get an interest in
the land or who will make a loan on the land. We may then make additional requirements or exceptions.

5. Documents satisfactory to us releasing any encumbrances shown on Schedule B Part IT herein not to be
shown on the forthcoming policy or policies must be provided.

6. Te remove Paragraph No. 22 of Schedule C, which excepts from coverage access to that portion ofthe
property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate, we require the problems raised in the notes following said
Paragraph 22, be addressed. We also require approval from Old Republic Underwriting.
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File No.: 312209

Reference No.:

Schedule B - Part II
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the same
are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company.
General Exceptions:
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.
2. Encroachments, overlaps, boundary line disputes, and any other matters which would be disclosed by an
accurate survey or inspection of the premises including, but not limited to, insufficient or impaired access or
matters contradictory to any survey plat shown by the public records.
3. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.
4.

Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law
and not shown by the public records.

5. (a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance
thereof; (c) water rights, claims or title to water, whether or not the matters excepted under (a), (b) or (c) are
shown by the public records.
6. Taxes or special assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that
levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. Proceedings by a public agency which
may result in taxes or assessments, or notices to such proceedings, whether or not shown by the records of
such agency or by the public records.

Special Exceptions:
7. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 233-S1619110000
Amount: $292.80
General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 337-Sl619130000
Amount: $322.16
General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 337-81619417200
Amount: $640.24
8. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
9. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
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I 0. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Po!icy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects: That property lying Northeasterly of the Interstate.
NOTE: The purpose of this Commitment is to address access to that property lying Southwest of the
Interstate, not Northeast of the Interstate. Therefore this Exception will not be addressed further in this
Commitment.
11. An easement containing certain tenns, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
There is also granted hereby an easement adjacent to the above described highway right
of way for relocation of all irrigation and/or drainage ditches and structures now located on such right of way
and such surface drain ditches as may be necessary to the proper construction of the highway
In Favor of:
State of Idaho
'- j
Recorded:
July 2, 1936
(l 0
Filed In:
Book 217 of Deeds at Page 424
__________...

q ?J"""(

12. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under tei'fifsofDeed.
In Favor of:
State ofldaho
Recorded:
November 10, 1967
Instrument No.:
677552
13. An easement containing certain tenns, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Right of Way Easement
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
In Favor of:
Recorded:
November 27, 1985
Instrument No.:
8562748
Note:
this amended easement corrects the prior easement dated August 22, 1984 and recorded
under Instrument No. 8515402.
14. An easement containing certain tenns, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
A non-exclusive perpetual easement to construct, reconstruct, operate, maintain and
remove such telecommunications facilities as Grantee may require
U.S. West Communication, Inc.
In Favor of:
Recorded:
December 22, 1992
Instrument No.:
9288756
15. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 21, 1996
Instrument No.:
96087661
16. Tenus, conditions, and provisions of an Agreement
Between:
Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and State ofldaho,
Idaho Transportation Department by and through the Idaho Transportation Board
Dated:
April 6, 2000
Recorded:
June 8, 2000
Instrument No.:
100044826
17. Tenns ofMemorandum of Understanding between Boise Airport/Boise City & Ada County Highway District
RE: Lake Hazel/Gown Road Extension and Connection
Recorded:
August 20, 2004
Instrument No.:
104107486
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18. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7272
Survey No.:
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106028400
I 9. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7855
Recorded:
March 27, 2007
Instrument No.:
107043450
20. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7936
Recorded:
June 7, 2007
Instrument No.:
107081394
21. Mortgage to secure an indebtedness of$6,500,000.00, and any other obligations secured thereby.
Dated:
May 15, 2006
Mortgagor:
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho corporation
Mortgagee:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Mmjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as
his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David
R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Recorded:
May 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106081744
22. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects that property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate.
NOTE A: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not state the subject property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrument No. 100044826 were to state the subject property is appurtenant, the
subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a dedicated roadway. It does connect to
Easement Parcels IIA and liB. We question access over those parcels at this time
NOTE D: If the State of Idaho extends the roadway to the North, across Parcel Easements JIA and JIB,
access to Eisenman Road is restricted by Instrument No. 96040862, which states the point of access is Station
86+88.83 feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is given for the
access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to the West (Parcel No. 80618314950) is
owned by the Ada County Highway District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide
access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State ofldaho (Parcels IIA and liB) is sufficient for access to
Parcel I.
NOTE F: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of the Quarter comer corrunon to
Sections 18 and 19. We question if this creates adequate physical access. We have checked the West half of
Section 19 and do not find an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 is not excepted or reserved in Patent recorded as Instrument
No. 100097111, which conveys the Southwest Quarter ofthe Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and
the East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. 81618438400)
23. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
24. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
25. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
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26. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
27. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
28. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
29. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
THE FOLLOWING AFFECTS PARCEL EASEMENT I:
30. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.:
233*S1618325410
Amount:
$55.20
31. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.:
233~Sl618438400
Amount:
$7.86
32. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
33. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
34. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Public Utilities
In Favor of:
Salt Lake Pipe Line Co.
Recorded:
September 13, 1949
Instrument No.:
291007 in Book 21 of Misc. at Page 582
35. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Bureau of public roads for the department of highways, State of Idaho
Recorded:
September 15, 1961
Instrument No.:
511276 in Book 45 of Misc. at Page 91
36. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department of Highways, State ofldaho
Recorded:
May 12, 1966
Instrument No.:
639121 in Book 53 of Misc. at Page 349
37. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department ofHighways, State of Idaho
Recorded:
January 4, 1957
Instrument No.:
655539 in Book 54 of Misc. at Page 505
38. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Power Line Easement
In Favor of:
Idaho Power Company
Recorded:
October 16, 1985
Instrument No.:
8554689
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39. Tenus, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department of Highways, State ofldaho
Recorded:
July 18, 1996
Instrument No.:
96059985
40. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 21, 1996
Instrument No.:
96087661
41. An easement containing certain tenns, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
A 60.0-foot wide floating easement for a right-of-way for access
State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department
In Favor of:
Recorded:
June 8, 2000
Instrument No.:
100044826
Note: Right of Way Easement Relinquishment Deed recorded under Instrument No. 100046992. Said
relinquishment affects a 50-foot portion of an easement that is referenced in the above document.
42. Covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements contained in U.S. Patent
Recorded:
June 16, 2000
Instrument No.:
100046993
43. Covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements contained in U.S. Patent
Recorded:
November 30, 2000
Instrument No.:
100097111
44. Tenns and provisions of Road Permit granted by J.D. Aldecoa & Sons, Inc.
Recorded:
May 1, 1989
Instrument No.:
8919294
Consent of Grantor recorded under Instrument No. 97061932.
And of unrecorded Extension Letters as disclosed by Assignment
Recorded: October 3, 2001
Instrument Nos.: 101102325, 101102326, 101102328 and 101102329
45. Terms, conditions, and provisions of an agreement
Between:
City of Boise City and the Boise Airport, a division of the municipal corporation and
Ada County Highway District
Dated:
July 20, 2004
Recorded:
August 20, 2004
Instrument No.:
104107486
46. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106028400
47. Any question regarding the Easterly boundary of Parcel Sl618325410 by reason of the Assessor's Maps,
which appears to use the Westerly line of Easement Instrument No. 96059985 rather than the Fee Simple
boundary.
48. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
NOTE: We must detennine if the State ofldaho's Easement, Parcel IIA and liB, provides access to the pint
ofbeginnng of Easement Parcel I. Please see Exception 22, above, for questions.
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49. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
50. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
51. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
52. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
53. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
54. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
55. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
THE FOLLOWING AFFECTS PARCEL EASEMENTS IIA AND liB:
56. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.:
233-s1618314800
Amount:
$8.98
57. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
58. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
59. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Public Utilities
In Favor of:
Salt Lake Pipe Line Co.
Recorded:
September 13, 1949
Instrument No.:
291007 in Book 21 of Misc. at Page 582
60. Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements contained in Deed to the State of Idaho, conveying a
portion of the property adjoining
Recorded:
March 23, 1967
Instrument No.:
660439 in Book 542 of Deeds at Page 307
61. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under terms of Deed.
In Favor of:
State ofldaho
Recorded:
March 23, 1967
Instrument No.:
660439 in Book 542 of Deeds at Page 307
62. Terms and provisions ofRoad Permit granted by J.D. Aldecoa & Sons, Inc.
Recorded:
May 1, 1989
Instrument No.:
8919294
Consent of Grantor recorded under Instrument No. 97061932.
And of unrecorded Extension Letters as disclosed by Assignment
Recorded: October 3, 2001
Instrument Nos.: 101102325, 101102326, 101102328 and 101102329
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63. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Cattle and stock access purposes
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department
In Favor of:
Recorded:
May 10, 1996
Instrument No.:
96039693
64. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under terms of Deed.
In Favor of:
Micron Technology, Inc., a corporation
Recorded:
May 15, 1996
Instrument No.:
96040862
65. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 21, 1996
Instrument No.:
96087661
Affects: Sections 7 and 18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East
66. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Telecommunication Facilities
In Favor of:
U.S. West Communications, Inc., a Colorado corporation
Recorded:
December 5, 1996
InstrumentNo.:
96100021
67. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
The purpose of constructing or installing thereon a stock drive and future public road by
the State of Idaho
State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department
In Favor of:
January 8, 1999
Recorded:
Instrument No.:
99002305
68. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Power Line Easement
In Favor of:
Idaho Power Company
Recorded:
October 1, 1999
Instrument No.:
99097652
69. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
5925
Recorded:
September 16, 2002
Instrument No.:
102105438
70. Terms, conditions, and provisions of an agreement
Between:
City of Boise City and the Boise Airport, a division of the municipal corporation and
Ada County Highway District
Dated:
July 20, 2004
Recorded:
August 20, 2004
Instrument No.:
104107486
71. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
106028400
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72. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
End of Exceptions

NOTE: The CoWlty Records and/or the City Engineer's Office show the address to be:
N/A No Address, Boise, ID 83716

NOTE: There is no notice of record and therefore no search has been made for any unpaid assessments,
charges, or fees for sewer, water, garbage, irrigation, or other possible utility services.
NOTE: If the proposed insured under the Policy to issue has any questions concerning the coverage or
exclusions from coverage, the Company will be pleased to provide an explanation.
NOTE: Pursuant to the State of Idaho insurance regulations, a cancellation fee is to be charged on all
cancelled orders. Unless otherwise advised, orders will be considered cancelled six months after the effective
date on the Commitment. The amount of the fee assessed shall be in accordance with our rate filing with the
Idaho Department of Insurance.
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EXHIBIT A
PARCEL 1:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East ofthe Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Northeast quarter
EXCEPT those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, Page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967
as Instrument No. 677552, records of said county.
AND EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Southeast quarter
EXCEPT that portion thereof to the Ada County Highway District by Deed recorded 4, 1980 as
Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

PARCEL EASEMENT I:
A strip of land, 60.0 feet in width, over and across portions of the Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 2
North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, the beginning and ending points of which
are more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Comer common to Section 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence
North 00°1 0'46" East, 1319.16 feet along the North-South center Section line of said Section 18 to
the Northeast comer of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 18; thence
North 89°38'38" West, 673.97 feet along the North line of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter to the POINT OF BEGINNING of said floating easement and being 1160.57 feet right of I84 Eastbound lane centerline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Comer common to Sections 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the Section line common to said
Sections 18 and 19
South 89°37'39" East, 24.9 feet to a point; thence leaving said common Section line
North 00°22' 10" East, 30.00 feet to a point, said point being the ENDING POINT of said floating
easement and being 1222.40 feet right ofi-84 Eastbound lane centerline Station 475+85.34.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA:
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A Non~ Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State ofldaho, created by Corporation
Easement from J.D. Aldecoa and Son, Inc. and recorded May 10, 1996 as Instrument No. 96039693,
described as follows:
A portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
A strip ofland 50.0 feet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way boundary oflnterstate 84,
Project No. NH-84-2(047)59 Highway Survey, as shown on the plans thereof now on file in the
office of the Idaho Transportation Department, and as described in that certain Warranty Deed to the
Micron Technology Inc. executed by the Grantor herein on the 8th day ofMay, 1996, recorded May
10, 1996 as Instrument No. 96039692 and Rerecorded May 15, 1996 as Instrument No. 96040862,
and lying between Eisenman Road Survey Station 86+38.83 as shown on said Highway Survey and
Grantor's Southerly property line (being the South line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter). The Westerly boundary being further defined by the Easterly boundary of an additional 10
foot Easement recorded January 8, 1999 as Instrument No. 99002305, which is Parcel Easement liB,
below.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIB:
A Non-Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State of Idaho, created by Easement
from Thomas T. Nicholson and Diana R. Nicholson, husband and wife and Ronald C. Yanke and
Linda L. Yanke, husband and wife, recorded January 8, 1999 as Instrument No. 99002305, described
as follows:
A portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the South Quarter Section Corner of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the North-South Center Quarter
section line of said Section 18,
North 00°1 0'46" East, 1319.16 feet to a point marking the Center-South I /16 Section Comer of said
Section 18; thence leaving said North-South Center Quarter section line, and along the South 1/16
section line of said Section 18
North 89°38'38" West, 643.56 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly Right-of-Way line of
Isaac's Canyon Interchange, said cap being 1133.65 feet right ofl-84 East bound lane centerline
station 462+68.57, as shown on the plans oflnterstate 84, Federal Aid Project No. NH 8~2(047)59
Highway Survey; thence continuing along said South 1/16 Section line of said Section 18,
North 89°38'38" West, 50.69 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly boundary line of an existing
50.0 foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement recorded May 10, 1996 as Instrument No.
96039693, said cap being 1178.53 feet right of I-84 East bound lane centerline Station 462+47.16,
also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence leaving said South 1116 Section line of said
Section 18 and along said Westerly boundary line of an existing 50.0 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement the following courses and distances:
North 09°50' 10" East, 618.36 feet to a point, said point being 150.00 feet right of Eiseman Road
centerline Station 91 +66.77
Thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 678.00 feet, a central angle of 51°51 '49", an arc
length of613.72 feet, and a chord which bears North 41 °15'14" West, 592.98 feet to a point, said
point being 150.00 feet right of Eiseman road centerline Station 86+88.83;
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Thence North 15°19'19" West, 50.00 feet to a point marking the Northwest comer of said existing
50.00 foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said point being 150.00 feet right of
Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence leaving said Westerly boundary line of said existing 50.00 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement, South 74°40'41" West, 10.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00
feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence South 15° 19'19" East, 50.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman
Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence along a curve to the left having a radius of688.00 feet, a central angle of51°12'00", an arc
length of614.80, and a chord which bears South 40°55' 19" East, 594.55 feet to a point, said point
being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 91+60.65;
Thence South 09°50' I 0" West, 612.12 feet to a point on the South l/16 Section line of said Section
18;
Thence along said South 1/16 Section line, South 89°38'38" East, 10.14 feet to the REAL POINT
OF BEGINNING.
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THIS DEED,
and between

the

~

made this

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

after referred

to as

TRANSPORTATION

DEPARTMENT

BOARD,

3311

West

the

Dl:i:PARTMENT,

by

State

,

20001

through

acting by and

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT)I,TION,

and

Street,

and

through

Boise,

the

STATE

OF

IDAHO

the

Idaho

-

100044826

A~r; I

day of

·

by
the

herein-

IDAHO,

IDAHO

TRANSPORTATION

83703,

hereinafter

referred to as the STATE:

WI T N E S S E T H :

the STATE has filed application under the provisions

WHEREAS,

of

the

Section

Act

of

317),

.Congress
for

the

of

August

27,

right-of-way of

owned by the United States

1958,
a

ae

amended

highway over

in the ·State of IDAHO,

(23

U.S.C.

certain

land

which is under the

jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management;
and

WHEREAS,

this transf~r ie further authorized under the provi-

sions of the Act of Congress approved October 15, 1966

(80 Stat. 931,

937, Section 6 [a] [1} [A]);' and

WBEREAS,
delegations

of

the

Federal

Highway

.Administrator,

pursuant

authority from the Secretary of Transportation,
Page 1

to
has

RECORD AT THE REQUEST OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FBE 'EXEMPT - I.C. 67-2301
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.HIGHWAY EASEMENT "DEED
Project No. NH-F-84-2(047}59
Key No. 6178
Parcel No. 7
Parcel I.D. No. 0039339
determined that an easement over the land covered by the application
is

reasonably

property as a
Project No.

necessary

for

a

right-of~way

result of Interstate 84,

for

access

to private

Isaac's Canyon Interchange,

NH-F-84-2(047)59; and

WHEREAS, the Department of Interior, acting by and through the
Bureau

of

Land

Management,

has

agreed

to

the

transfer

by

the

DEPARTMENT of an easement over the land to the STATE;

NOW

THEREFORE,

the

DEPARTMENT,

as

authorized

by

law,

does

hereby grant to the STATE a 60. 0 foot wide floating easement for a
right-of-way for access on, over, across,

in,

and upon the following

described land .of the United States more particularly described as
follows to-wit:

a trip of land, 60.0 feet in width, over and acrose
portions of the Southeast ;( of the Southwest ;( and the
Southwest ~ of the Southeast~ of Section 18, Township 02
North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian; Ada County, Idaho;
the beginning and ending points of which are more
particularly described as follows:
A

BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the ~ Section
Corner common to Section 18 and 19, Township 02 North,
Range 01 East, Boise Meridian;
thence North 00°10 '46·" East
1319.16 feet along the
North·South center Section line of said Section 16 to the
Page 2
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Northeast corner of the

SE~SW~

of said Section 19;

thence North 99°38'38 11 West · 673.97 feet along the North
line of said SE~SW~ to the POINT OF BEGINNING of
said floating easement and being 1150.57 feet right of I84 eastbound lane centerline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:

an

Commencing at
Aluminum Cap marking the ~ Section
Corner common to s'ection 18 and 19, Township 02 North,
Range 03 East, Boise ·Meridian;
thence along the Section line common to aaid Sections 18
and 19, South 89°37'39" East - 24.9 feet to a point;
thence leaving aaid common Section line, North 00°22 '10''

East • 30.00 feet to a point, said point being the ENDING
POINT of said floating easement and being 1222.40 feet
right
of
I-64 · ea~tbound
lane
centerline
Station
475+85.34.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND. AGREED that the specific location of
the 60. o

f~ot

wide easement granted from the DEPARTMEN'T to the

STATE shall be allowed to float 'llithin the Southeast

southwest X and the Southwest

~of

~

of the

the Southeast X of Section 18,

Township 02 North, Range 03 East, Boise, Meridian.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that at the time of road
construction,

agreed
assigns,

upon

the
by

location

the

of

underlying

the

road

easement

landowner,

the

will

be

DEPARTMENT

mutually
or

and the STATE through ita Transportation Department.
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underlying landowner may give his final approval to the location of
the road easement in which event the floating easement shall become a
permanent easement.

In the event the adjoining property owner wishes

to develop its property

~nd

cannot come to a final or preliminary

agreement with the underlying property owner, then the Department or
its assigns may use the alignment as shown crosshatched on Exhibit A
until such time the underlying property requests that the road be
moved as provided herein.

If.the road is constructed on an alignment

other than that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit A, the alignment will
provide the same or equivalent accessibility to the adjoining property
owner as that shown as crosshatched on Exhibit "A", and be approved by
the STATE through its Transportation Department.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the party needing the
road constructed will be responsible for the cost of construction.

If

the road is . constructed and should have to be moved in the future
because its location is detrimental to the underlying property owner,
the

STATE

will

construction.

be

responsible

for

the

cost

of

realignment and

The realigned. road will provide the same or equivalent

access to the adjoining property owner as that shown crosshatched on
Exhibit A hereto.

The realigned road wi 11 be bui 1 t

to the same

standards as the original road and have the same point of beginning
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and ending point as described in this Highway Easement Deed.

If

utilities have been installed in the original road right-of-way, they
will

not

have

to be relocated and each utility shall

retain an

easement to service its facility as i f the original road remained
public right-of-way.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD

'AND

AGREED that, if within five years of

execution of this Highway Easement Deed, the underlying property owner
does not elect to have the floating easement moved as provided for
herein then the easement as shown as crosshatched on Exhibit A shall
become a permanent easement.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that, as a result of securing
this easement,

the STATE will relinquish the existing 50 foot wide

.easement thai: is adjacent to the Interstate right-of-way located in
the above described quarter sections.

IT IS EXPRESSLY INTENDED That these burdens and restrictions
shall run with the land and shall forever bind the DEPARTMENT, or its
assigns.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, Mary E. Gray, pursuant to delegations of
authority from the Secretary of Transportation,
Administrator,

the Federal Highway

by virtue of authority in me vested by law,

hereunto subscribed my name

as

of this

JBL_

have

day of June, 2000.

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDE L HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION
By
of Way

IN

WITNESS

WHEREOF,

I,

Steven

c.

Hutchinson,

pursuant

delegations of authority from the Idaho Transportation Board,
hereunto subscribed my name as of this ~

to
have

day of June, 2000.

IDAHO
STATE
even c. Hutchinson
Assistant Chief Engineer
(Developrnen t)
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STATE OF IDAHO )
COUNTY OF ADA

) ss:
)

I
L ·, .._:)~ ~ ~e c.x~:~
, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2000,
before me personally appeared Mary E.
Gray,
Federal Highway
Administrat~nd acknowledged that the foregoing instrument bearing
date of
>~ ~ ,2d2PQ
, was executed by her, in her official
capacity and by aut~ority in her vested by law/ for the purposes and
intents in said instrument described and set forth, and acknowledged
the same to be her free act and deed as,
Federal Highway
Administration.
I

Witness .my hand and seal this~ day of· June, 2000.

~~~a.~

L?ot':lrr
PuJ;>liwo~ ~® c~~
Res~d~ng ~n -~~6~,~~~~------~-------My commission expires

oo o

STATE OF IDAHO )
COUNTY OF

ADA

)
)

<"t""'.::::-Q;::: ~ .M '<A_~~
I,
...;~ "..__ ,-~
, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, do hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2000,
before
me
personally
appeared
Steven
C.
Hutchinson,
Idaho
Transportation Department, r.. .ADd ackno~ed that the foregoing
instrument bearing date of ott~ 1 L- C.. t -:z.
, was executed by
him,
in his
official. capacity as
Assistant
Chief
Engineer
(Development)/ for the purposes and intents in said instrument
described and set forth, and acknowledged the same to be his free act
and deed as, .Idaho Transportation Board.

Witness my hand and seal this 2-

day of June, 2000.

_5f:
·

('A-

C?~

Nota_ry Public for .:S:::uA'€+0
Residing in i3~~~l$~€t--~~~~~
My commission expires ~:.? 0 -

ii:50f
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FOR VALUE RECErVED, J.D. Aldecoa & Son, Inc., a corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of the state of Idaho, Grantor, does hereby grant,
bargain, sell and convey unto Micron Technology, Inc., a corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, Grantee, whose address is 8000
South Federal Way, P.O. Box 6, Boise, Idaho 83707·0006, the following described real
properly, together with all water rights appurtenant to the property and aU rights
of access between the right--of-way of Interstate 84 Os.aac's Canyon Interchange),
Project No. NH-84-2(047)59, Highway Survey, and the remaining contiguous real

property belonging to the Grantor except for a public road connection on both sides
of Eisenman Road Alignment Highway Survey between Grantor's Northerly property
line and Survey Station 86 + 88.83, located in Ada County, Idaho, to wit:
See Exhibit "A" {the property includes Parcels 6A, SB, and 6C}

hereinafter referred to as the "Premises."

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Premi~es, with its appurtenances unto
Grantees, Grantees' heirs, successors and assigns forever. And Grantor does hereby
covenant to and with Grantees that Grantor is the owner in fee simple of the
Premises; that the Premises is ·free from all liens, claims and encumbrances except
as set forth on Exhibit ' 1311 attached hereto and incorporated herein, and that Grantor
will warrant and defend the same from all other lawful claims whatsoever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor, pursuant to a resolution of Grantor's Boar~/
of Directors, has caused Grantor's corporate name to be hereunto subscribed this Ll:fl.l

day of'J:l)JU6

, 19~.

.
J.D. Aldecoa & Sons, Inc.
an Idaho corporation

J. D:. \'liJ ~lA' AP.RO
BOi~E

JD

960~0862

ALLIANCE TITLE :

~D.C C\J.

RECORDER
J. D:.VIC t:AVAP.RO
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Ada

)

On this f!? .,.#, day of 1/kl!f.. Y
, in the year 199'-, before me,
Notary P9bllc in and for the State of Idaho, personall,1 appeared
[2o ll o-rNY ft."O ~ CJ:I"
. , known or identified to me to be the P/?ff,.OEtfi':"
of the corporation that executed the :instrument or the person who exeeuted the
instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that such
corporation executed the same.

a

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year first above written.

Residing at: (3 uJr-e
My coromissi~o~;....::.:.;exp:::;..ir;;_e_s_::;-a--$-:.-f-...C
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Legal Description of Parcel No. 6A
Right-of'·Way required for
the Proposed Isaac's Canyon Interchange

(J.D• .Aldecoa Property)
Project No. NH 84·2(047) 59
Key No. 6178
A parcel of land located in the Northeast ]/4 of the Southwest l/4, and the
Northwest l/4 of the Southeast V4 ofSection 18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East,
Boise Meridian; Ada County, Idaho; more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at an Aluminum Cap marking the South 1/4 Section Corner of
Section 18~ T.2 N., R.3 E., B.M.;
thence, along the north~aouth center l/4 section line of said Section 18, N
0' !0'46 11 E 1319.16 feet to a point marking the Center-South l/16 Section Corner of
said Section 18, said point being 567.85 feet right of the east bound lane centerline
station 465+54.11, as shown on the plans of Interstate 84, Federal Aid Project No.
NH &1-·2(047) 59 highway survey, also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
thence, leaving said north-south center l/4 section line, and along the south
l/16 section line of said Section 18, N 89' 38'38" W 643.56 feet to a point on the new
southwesterly right-of-way: line of the proposed Isaac's Canyon Interchange to
Interstate 84, said point being ·n33.65 feet right of the said east bound lane
centerline station 462+68.57;
thence, leaving said south l/16 section line, and along the slrid new
southwesterly right·of~way line of said Interstate 84,
N g·so'lO" E 651.07 feet to a point at the intersection of said new southwesterly
right-of-way line and the new, westerly right·of·way lin~ of the proposed Eisenman
Road, said point being 100 feet right of centerline station 92+00 of said Eisenman
Road as shown on the plans of Interstate 84, Federal Aid Projec;t No. NH 84~2(047)
59 highway survey;
thence, leaving said new southwesterly right-of-way line of Interstate 84, along
said new westerly right-of-way line of Eisenman Road, and along a curve to the right
having a radius of 628.00 feet, a central angle of 55 '28'1211 , an arc length of 607.99
feet, and a chord which bears N 43.03'25" W 584.52 feet to a point being 100 feet
right of centerline station P.C 86+88.83 of said Eisenman Road;
thence, N 15"19'20" W 263.31 feet to a point at the intersection of sa!d new
westerly right.of-way line of Eisenman Road and the east-west center 1/4 section line
of said Section 18, said point being 100 feet right of centerline station 84+25.52) of
said Eisenman Road;
thence, leaving said new westerly right·of·way liD.e of Eisenman Road, and
along said east-west center 1/4· section line, S 89 '34'55'' E 187.01 feet to a point on

CORPORATE W.ARRANTY DEED
4489\2\DEEO

000663

2020000847

the new, easterly right-of-way line of said Eisenman Road, said point being 80 feet
left of centerline station 84+76.25, of said Eisenman Road;
thence, leaving said east-west center l/4 section line, and along said new
easterly right-of-way line of Eisenman Road, S 15 '19'20"E 212.58 feet to a point
being 80 feet left of centerline station P.C. 86+88.83 of said Eisenman Road;
thence, along a curve to the left having a radius of 4,48.00 feet, a central angle
of 50'02'39", an arc length of.391.30, and a chord which bearsS 40.20'39"E 378.98
feet to a point being 80 feet left of centerline station 91+50 of said Eisenman Road;
thence, leaving said new easterly right-of-way line of Eisenman Road, N
45 '14'12" E 91.20 feet to a point on the new southwesterly right-of-way line of the
proposed Isaac's Canyon Interchange to said Interstate 84, said point being 570 feet
right of the east bound lane station 456+00 of slrid Interstate 84;
thence, along said new·southwesterly right-of~way line
N 2 · 02'42" E 427.14 feet to a point of intersection of said new southwesterly right-ofway line and the east-west center l/4 section line of said Section 18, said point being
388.32 feet right of said east bound lane centerline station 452+28.92;
thence, leaving said new southwesterly right-of-way line, and along said eastwest center l/4 section line, S 89 •35'55" E 258.63 feet to a point on the existing,
southwesterly right-of-way line of a 50 foot wide Stock/Access Drive, said point being
150 feet right o£ said east bouo.d lane centerline station 458+27 .09;
thence, leaving said ·east-west center V4 section line, along the existing
southwesterly right-of-way line of said Stock/Access Drive, and along a curve to the
left having a radius of 11609.16 feet. a central angle of 7"17'36", an arc length of
1477.77 feet, and a chord which bearsS 26'20'07" E 1476.77 feet to a point at the
intersection of said southwesterly Stoc.k1Access Drive right-of~way line and the said
south l/16 section line of said Section 181 said point being 150 feet right of said east
bound lane centerline station 467+85.76;
·
thence, leaving said right-of~way line, and along said south l/16 section line,
N 89'38'38" W 481.31 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
said parciel contains 23.09 acres1 more or less;
. said parcel also being subject to any easements of record or in use.

Highway Reference Stations: 84+25.52 to 92+00.001 Eisenman Road; and
452+28.92 to 467+85.76, east bound lane of Interstate 84.
· The bearings shown on the above land description, unless otherwise noted, are
from the Idaho Plane Coordinate System, based on the North American Datum of
1927. for the West Zone of Idaho.
April 8. 1996.
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Legal Description of Parcel No. 6B

Right-of-Way required for
the Proposed Isaac's Canyon Inte~ange
(J.D. Aldecoa Property)
Project No. NH 84-2(047) 59
Key No. 6178

A parcel of land located in 'the Northwest l/4 of the Southeast l/4 of Section
18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian: Ada County, Idaho; more
particulariy de~cribed as follows:
Beginning at an .Aluminum Cap marking the South V4 Section Corner of
Section 18, T.2 N., R.3 E., B.M.;
thence, along the north-south center 1/4 section line of said Section 18, N
0'10'46 11 E 1319.16 feet to a point marking the Center-South l/16 Section Corner of
said Section 18;
thence, leaving said north-south center l/4 section line and along the south
l/16 section line of said Section 18, S 89'38'38" E 921.35 feet to a point on the
existing ea;;terly right-of-way of Interstate 84, said point being 100 feet left of the
west bou.c.d lane centerline station 469+87 .08 of said Interstate 84, as shown on the
plans of Interstate 84t Federal Aid Project No. NH 84-2(047) 59 highway survey, also
being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
thence, leaving said easterly right-of-way line and continuing along said south.
l/16 section line, S 89'38'38" E 182.20 feet to a point oQ. the existing southwesterly
right·of·way line of Federal. Way, said point being 254.11 feet left of the said west
bound hln.e centerline station 470+85.81;
thence, leaving said south l/16 section · line and along the existing
southwesterly. right-of-way line of said Federal Way,
N 17'52'3711 W 1110.19 feet to a point at the intersection of said existing
southwesterly right-of-way line and the new easterly right-of-way line of the proposed
Isaac's Canyon Interchange to Interstate 84, said point being 474.64 feet left of said
west bound centerline station 459+61.50;
thence, leaving said existil)g southwesterly right-of·way line of Federal Way
and along said new easterly right-of-way line of the proposed Isaac's Canyon

Interchange to Interstate 84, N 61.07'35 11 W 554.70 feet to the intersection of said
new easterly right-of-way line and the east-west center l/4 section line of said Section
18, said point being 150.31 feet ~eft of said west bound centerline station 454+98.80;
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thence> leaving said new easterly right-of-way line and along said east·west

center l/4 section line, N 89"39131 11 W 55.28 feet to the intersection of said east-west
center l/4 section line and the existing easterly right-of-way line of said Interstate
84, said point being 100 feet left of said west bound lane centerline station 454+75.64;
thence, leaving said· east-west center 1/4 section line, along said existing
easterly right-of-way line of Interstate 84 and along a curve to the left having a
radius of 11359.16 feet, a central angle of 7" 33'26 11 , an arc length of 1498.26 feet and
a chord which bears
S 27"51 134" E 1497.17 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
said parcel contains 9.01 acres, more or less;
said parcel also being subject to any easeme1:1ts of record or in use.

Highway Reference Station: 454+75.64 to 470+85.81, west bound

l~e

of

Interstate 84.
The bearings shown on the above land description, unless otherwise noted, are

from the Idaho Plane Coordinate System, based on the North. American Datum of
1927, for the West Zone of IdahQ.
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Electronically Filed
7/11/2017 5:38:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

CaseNo.: CV01-16-20313

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA
DAY JACOBS, IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
):ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Donna Day Jacobs, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

I am over the

years and am competent to testify regarding the matters

stated herein.

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY JACOBS, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE TITLE -1
19807-001/956521

000673

2.

I am one of the Plaintiffs in this matter, and as such, I have personal knowledge of

the facts set forth and the documents identified in this Affidavit based upon my experience in
development and management of the Day Family properties, and as the person primarily in
charge of the Day Family business affairs and assets, especially those related to the different
entities and forms of ownership of the interests related to the property near the Isaac's Canyon
Interchange southeast of Boise at issue in this litigation (hereinafter, "Property") that are owned,
or have been owned, by the members of the Day Family since 1935.
3.

I make this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary

judgment related to the issue of the lack of ability to procure marketable and insurable title to the
Property.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the most recent title

commitment from Pioneer Title reflecting the inability to insure without a right of access.
5.

I was and remain the member of the Day Family primarily responsible for finding

a solution to obtain access to the Property owned by the Day Family that is the subject matter of
this lawsuit, and also the person primarily responsible for obtaining a title insurance policy for
the Property that could provide marketable title with legal access to the Property.
6.

Beginning in 2010, I worked with Glen Lorensen and others at Pioneer Title

Company in an effort to determine if access to the Property could be obtained. Although I did
not view it as my obligation or the obligation of the Day Family to solve the access problem that
the State created by its construction of the Isaac's Canyon Interchange, I worked with both State
personnel and Pioneer Title Company in an effort to obtain a policy that would provide insurable

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA DAY JACOBS, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
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title with a legal right of access, as we had before the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was
constructed.
7.

Based on my education, training, and experience as a real estate developer and

owner, both for purposes of obtaining financing to construct public improvements, sell lots,
borrow money, whether through the issuance of bonds or traditional financing, obtaining
marketable title is an absolute necessity today and was in 1997. And, practically speaking, we
must obtain a title policy insuring title with a legal right of access for title to be marketable.
8.

I have spent many hours with Glen Lorensen, from 2008 until the title

commitment was issued on April12, 2010, and after that until2016, at Pioneer Title Company's
office, on the phone, and in correspondence, trying to obtain access to the Property that would
satisfy the title insurance company so as to enable it to issue a policy providing marketable title
to the Property, but Pioneer Title Company was not able to provide such a policy because of the
access problems. Several State employees, notably Andrew White and Steve Parry, also worked
with Pioneer Title Company in an effort to solve the access problems that prevented Pioneer
Title Company to issue a policy stating that our Property had marketable title and a legal right of
access. The access problems are detailed in Pioneer Title Company's title commitment, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Special Exception Nos. 10, 22, and 48 on Schedule B-Part 2 of that
title commitment describe the access problems.
9.

As Mr. Lorensen explained, an owner is unable to obtain marketable title for

himself or his lender without a title company's ability to determine that the property has a right
of access.
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10.

In a further effort to solve the lack of access to the Property created by the Isaac's

Canyon Interchange, I sought to obtain title insurance for the Property from another title
insurance company in Boise, namely Alliance Title and Escrow Corporation, and obtained a
preliminary title commitment dated May 20, 20 15, which is attached as Exhibit B hereto. I
sought the issuance of a policy from Alliance Title and Escrow Corporation because of the
inability of Pioneer Title to provide title policy insuring marketable title because of the access
problems. I first spoke with Steve Jewett at Alliance Title in early May of 20 15 and described
for him my efforts in obtaining a title policy from Pioneer Title Company that would enable the
Day Family to develop the property.
11.

Ultimately, Alliance Title and Escrow Corporation determined that it also cannot

issue a marketable and insurable title policy because of lack of access, and made that
determination for essentially the same reasons that Pioneer Title was unable to issue a policy, all
as more particularly documented in Exception 25 of Schedule B-II of the Preliminary Title
Commitment attached hereto as Exhibit B.
FURTHER, your affiant saith naught.

Donna Day Jacobs

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this '1-b-aay of July, 20 17.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JJ!!day of July, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-11 29
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
~ Email/iCourt. chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

Jason R. Mau
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a, PioneerTitleCo.
, .

(:l!;N;;

Title Insurance Commitment

f'ff0'<>1

Policy Issuing Agent For:
Old Republic National Title Insurance Company

File No.: 312209
Reference No.:

Schedule A
1. Effective Date: Aprill2, 2010 7:30AM
2. Policy or Policies to be issued:

A.

Liability

Premium

$0.00

$0.00

ALTA Owner's Policy- Standard
Proposed Insured: To be determined and agreed to by the Company
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A
B.

ALTA Lender's Policy-

$0.00

Proposed Insured:
Endorsements:

$0.00

Inspection Fee: N/A

$0.00

3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment is:
Parcels I & II: Fee Simple; Parcel Easement I: Fee Simple, Easement described in Highway Easement Deed
recorded June 8, 2000 as Inst No. I 00044826 to be perfected.; Parcel Easement IIA: A non-exclusive
easement for a future public road by the State of Idaho, created by Corporation Easement recorded May 10,
1996 as Inst No. 96039693. Parcel Easement liB: A non-exclusive easement for future public road by the
State ofldaho, created by Easement recorded January 8, 1999 as Inst. No. 99002305
4. Title to the estate or interest in the land is at the Effective Date vested in:

See Next Page
ALTA Commitment Form 2006
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PARCEL I and II:
Trust B of the DonaldM. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument dated March 24, 1977
as to an undivided one·sixth interest; John F. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest of his
spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one·fourth interest; Dan E. Day,
presumptively subject to the community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring
title, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day, presumptively subject to the community interest
of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-ninth interest; Donna
Day Jacobs, presumptively subject to the community interest of her spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated
of acquiring title, as to an undivided one-ninth interest; and David R. Day, presumptively subject to the
community interest of his spouse on December 31, 2008, the dated of acquiring title, as to an undivided one·
ninth interest.

PARCEL EASEMENT 1:
Baker Investments, L.L.C., also shown of record as Baker Investments, L.L.C., an Idaho Limited Liability
Company

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA & IIB
The State of Idaho
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof.

ALTA Commitment Form 2006
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File No.: 312209

Reference No.:

Schedule B - Part I
The following Requirements must be met:
1. Pay the agreed amounts for the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insured.
2.

Pay us the premiums, fees, and charges for the policy.

3. Documents satisfactory to us creating the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insured must be
signed, delivered, and recorded.
4.

You must tell us in writing the name of anyone not referred to in this Commitment who will get an interest in
the land or who will make a loan on the land. We may then make additional requirements or exceptions.

5. Documents satisfactory to us releasing any encumbrances shown on Schedule B Part IT herein not to be
shown on the forthcoming policy or policies must be provided.
6.

Te remove Paragraph No. 22 of Schedule C, which excepts from coverage access to that portion ofthe
property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate, we require the problems raised in the notes following said
Paragraph 22, be addressed. We also require approval from Old Republic Underwriting.

ALTA Commitment Fonn 2006
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File No.: 312209

Reference No.:

Schedule B - Part II
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the same
are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company.
General Exceptions:
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.
2.

Encroachments, overlaps, boundary line disputes, and any other matters which would be disclosed by an
accurate survey or inspection of the premises including, but not limited to, insufficient or impaired access or
matters contradictory to any survey plat shown by the public records.

3. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.
4.

Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law
and not shown by the public records.

5. (a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance
thereof; (c) water rights, claims or title to water, whether or not the matters excepted under (a), (b) or (c) are
shown by the public records.
6. Taxes or special assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that
levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. Proceedings by a public agency which
may result in taxes or assessments, or notices to such proceedings, whether or not shown by the records of
such agency or by the public records.

Special Exceptions:
7. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 233~S1619110000
Amount: $292.80
General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 337-S1619130000
Amount: $322.16
General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid
and the second half of which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.: 337-81619417200
Amount: $640.24
8. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
9. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
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I 0. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects: That property lying Northeasterly of the Interstate.
NOTE: The purpose of this Commitment is to address access to that property lying Southwest of the
Interstate, not Northeast of the Interstate. Therefore this Exception will not be addressed further in this
Commitment.
11. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
There is also granted hereby an easement adjacent to the above described highway right
of way for relocation of all irrigation and/or drainage ditches and structures now located on such right of way
and such surface drain ditches as may be necessary to the proper construction of the highway
\. J
In Favor of:
State of Idaho
Recorded:
July 2, 1936
(l 0
"2:7--t
Filed In:
Book 217 of Deeds at Page 424
----------

q

12. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under tetiilsofDeed.
In Favor of:
State of Idaho
Recorded:
November I 0, 1967
Instrument No.:
677552
13. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Right of Way Easement
In Favor of:
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
Recorded:
November 27, 1985
Instrument No.:
8562748
Note:
this amended easement corrects the prior easement dated August 22, 1984 and recorded
under Instrument No. 8515402.
14. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
A non-exclusive perpetual easement to construct, reconstruct, operate, maintain and
remove such telecommunications facilities as Grantee may require
In Favor of:
U.S. West Communication, Inc.
Recorded:
December 22, 1992
Instrument No.:
9288756
15. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 21, 1996
Instrument No.:
96087661
16. Terms, conditions, and provisions of an Agreement
Between:
Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration and State of Idaho,
Idaho Transportation Department by and through the Idaho Transportation Board
Dated:
April6, 2000
Recorded:
June 8, 2000
Instrument No.:
100044826
17. Terms of Memorandum of Understanding between Boise Airport/Boise City & Ada County Highway District
RE: Lake Hazel/Gown Road Extension and Connection
Recorded:
August 20, 2004
Instrument No.:
104107486
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18. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
I 06028400
19. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7855
Recorded:
March 27, 2007
Instrument No.:
107043450
20. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7936
Recorded:
June 7, 2007
Instrument No.:
10708I394
21. Mortgage to secure an indebtedness of$6,500,000.00, and any other obligations secured thereby.
Dated:
May 15, 2006
Mortgagor:
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho corporation
Mortgagee:
Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Mrujorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as
his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David
R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Recorded:
May 23,2006
Instrument No.:
I0608I744
22. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
Affects that property lying Southwesterly of the Interstate.
NOTE A: Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 does not state the subject property is appurtenant.
NOTE B: If Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 were to state the subject property is appurtenant, the
subject property is not contiguous due to the Deeds to the Ada County Highway District.
NOTE C: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a dedicated roadway. It does connect to
Easement Parcels IIA and liB. We question access over those parcels at this time
NOTE D: If the State of Idaho extends the roadway to the North, across Parcel Easements IIA and JIB,
access to Eisenman Road is restricted by Instrument No. 96040862, which states the point of access is Station
86+88.83 feet, which is 50 feet Easterly of the Westerly end of the Easements. No width is given for the
access point. Also, the property adjoining Easement Parcel IIA to the West (Parcel No. S06I83I4950) is
owned by the Ada County Highway District but, we believe it is not an open roadway and does not provide
access.
NOTE E: We question if an Easement to the State of Idaho (Parcels ITA and liB) is sufficient for access to
Parcel I.
NOTE F: Easement Instrument No. 100044826 extends 24.9 feet East of the Quarter comer common to
Sections 18 and 19. We question ifthis creates adequate physical access. We have checked the West half of
Section I9 and do not fmd an Easement or Public Road.
NOTE G: Easement Instrument No. I 00044826 is not excepted or reserved in Patent recorded as Instrument
No. I 00097I11, which conveys the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and
the East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section I8,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East. (Parcel No. S16I8438400)
23. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
24. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
25. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
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26. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
27. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
28. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
29. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
THE FOLLOWING AFFECTS PARCEL EASEMENT 1:
30. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.:
233-SI618325410
Amount:
$55.20
31. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20,2014.
Parcel No.:
233-SI618438400
Amount:
$7.86
32. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
33. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
34. An easement containing certain tenns, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Public Utilities
In Favor of:
Salt Lake Pipe Line Co.
Recorded:
September 13, 1949
Instrument No.:
291007 in Book 21 of Misc. at Page 582
35. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Bureau of public roads for the department of highways, State of Idaho
Recorded:
September 15, 1961
Instrument No.:
511276 in Book 45 of Misc. at Page 91
36. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department of Highways, State ofidaho
Recorded:
May 12, 1966
Instrument No.:
639121 in Book 53 ofMisc. at Page 349
37. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department of Highways, State ofidaho
Recorded:
January 4, 1957
Instrument No.:
655539 in Book 54 of Misc. at Page 505
38. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Power Line Easement
In Favor of:
Idaho Power Company
Recorded:
October 16, 1985
Instrument No.:
8554689
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39. Terms, provisions, rights and reservations contained in right of way granted
To: Department of Highways, State of Idaho
Recorded:
July 18, 1996
Instrument No.:
96059985
40. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 21 , 1996
Instrument No.:
96087661
41. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
A 60.0-foot wide floating easement for a right..of-way for access
In Favor of:
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department
Recorded:
June 8, 2000
Instrument No.:
100044826
Note: Right ofWay Easement Relinquishment Deed recorded under Instrument No. 100046992. Said
relinquishment affects a 50-foot portion of an easement that is referenced in the above document.
42. Covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements contained in U.S. Patent
Recorded:
June 16, 2000
Instrument No.:
I 00046993
43. Covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements contained in U.S. Patent
Recorded:
November 30, 2000
Instrument No.:
100097111
44. Terms and provisions of Road Permit granted by J.D. Aldecoa & Sons, Inc.
Recorded:
May 1, 1989
Instrument No.:
8919294
Consent of Grantor recorded under Instrument No. 97061932.
And of unrecorded Extension Letters as disclosed by Assignment
Recorded: October 3, 2001
Instrument Nos.: 101102325, 101102326, 101102328 and 101102329
45. Terms, conditions, and provisions of an agreement
Between:
City of Boise City and the Boise Airport, a division of the municipal corporation and
Ada County Highway District
Dated:
July 20, 2004
Recorded:
August20,2004
Instrument No.:
104107486
46. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
7272
Survey No.:
Recorded:
February 23,2006
Instrument No.:
106028400
4 7. Any question regarding the Easterly boundary of Parcel S 1618325410 by reason of the Assessor's Maps,
which appears to use the Westerly line of Easement Instrument No. 96059985 rather than the Fee Simple
boundary.
48. Not withstanding Paragraph 4 of the insuring clauses of the Policy(ies) to be issued, the Policy(ies) will not
insure against loss arising by reason of any lack of a right of access.
NOTE: We must determine if the State ofldaho's Easement, Parcel JIA and liB, provides access to the pint
ofbeginnng of Easement Parcel I. Please see Exception 22, above, for questions.
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49. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
50. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
51. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
52. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
53. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
54. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
55. INTENTIONALLY DELETED

THE FOLLOWING AFFECTS PARCEL EASEMENTS IIA AND lffi:
56. General taxes for the year 2013, which are liens, of which the first half has been paid, and the second half of
which will not become delinquent until June 20, 2014.
Parcel No.:
233-sl6l8314800
Amount:
$8.98
57. General taxes for the year 2014, which are liens and are not yet due and payable.
58. Liens, fees and charges for trash services as provided by Ada County Ordinance No. 467 amending Title 5,
Chapter 2, Section 4, of Ada County Code.
Ada County Billing Service
Ph:
(208) 287-6800
59. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For.
Public Utilities
In Favor of:
Salt Lake Pipe Line Co.
Recorded:
September 13, 1949
291007 in Book 21 of Misc. at Page 582
Instrument No.:
60. Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements contained in Deed to the State ofldaho, conveying a
portion of the property adjoining
Recorded:
March 23, 1967
660439 in Book 542 of Deeds at Page 307
Instrument No.:
61. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under terms of Deed.
In Favor of:
State ofldaho
Recorded:
March 23, 1967
Instrument No.:
660439 in Book 542 of Deeds at Page 307
62. Terms and provisions of Road Permit granted by J.D. Aldecoa & Sons, Inc.
Recorded:
May 1, 1989
Instrument No.:
8919294
Consent of Grantor recorded under Instrument No. 97061932.
And of unrecorded Extension Letters as disclosed by Assignment
Recorded: October 3, 2001
Instrument Nos.: 101102325, 101102326, 101102328 and 101102329
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63. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Cattle and stock access purposes
In Favor of:
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department
Recorded:
May I 0, I996
Instrument No.:
96039693
64. Relinquishment of Right of Access to Highway under terms of Deed.
In Favor of:
Micron Technology, Inc., a corporation
Recorded:
May I5, I996
Instrument No.:
96040862
65. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
3695
Recorded:
October 2I, I996
Instrument No.:
9608766I
Affects: Sections 7 and 18, Township 2 North, Range 3 East
66. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
Telecommunication Facilities
In Favor of:
U.S. West Communications, Inc., a Colorado corporation
Recorded:
December 5, I996
96100021
Instrument No.:
67. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
For:
The purpose of constructing or installing thereon a stock drive and future public road by
the State ofldaho
In Favor of:
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department
Recorded:
January 8, 1999
99002305
Instrument No.:
68. An easement containing certain terms, conditions and provisions affecting a portion of said premises and for
the purposes stated herein
Power Line Easement
For:
In Favor of:
Idaho Power Company
Recorded:
October I, I999
Instrument No.:
99097652
69. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
5925
Recorded:
September 16, 2002
Instrument No.:
I02105438
70. Terms, conditions, and provisions of an agreement
Between:
City of Boise City and the Boise Airport, a division of the municipal corporation and
Ada County Highway District
Dated:
July 20, 2004
Recorded:
August 20, 2004
Instrument No.:
104I07486
71. Matters disclosed by Record of Survey
Survey No.:
7272
Recorded:
February 23, 2006
Instrument No.:
I06028400
ALTA Commitmentfonn 2006
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72. INTENTIONALLY DELETED
End of Exceptions

NOTE: The County Records and/or the City Engineer's Office show the address to be:
N/A No Address, Boise, ID 83716

NOTE: There is no notice of record and therefore no search has been made for any unpaid assessments,
charges, or fees for sewer, water, garbage, irrigation, or other possible utility services.
NOTE: If the proposed insured under the Policy to issue has any questions concerning the coverage or
exclusions from coverage, the Company will be pleased to provide an explanation.
NOTE: Pursuant to the State ofldaho insurance regulations, a cancellation fee is to be charged on all
cancelled orders. Unless otherwise advised, orders will be considered cancelled six months after the effective
date on the Commitment. The amount of the fee assessed shall be in accordance with our rate filing with the
Idaho Department of Insurance.
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EXHIBIT A
PARCEL I:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Northeast quarter
EXCEPT those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, Page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967
as Instrument No. 677552, records of said county.
AND EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: Southeast quarter
EXCEPT that portion thereof to the Ada County Highway District by Deed recorded 4, 1980 as
Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

PARCEL EASEMENT 1:
A strip ofland, 60.0 feet in width, over and across portions of the Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 2
North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, the beginning and ending points of which
are more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Corner common to Section 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence
North 00°10'46" East, 1319.16 feet along the North-South center Section line of said Section 18 to
the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 18; thence
North 89°38'38" West, 673.97 feet along the North line of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter to the POINT OF BEGINNING of said floating easement and being 1160.57 feet right of 184 Eastbound lane centerline station 462+55.71
ENDING POINT OF EASEMENT:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the Quarter Section Corner common to Sections 18 and
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the Section line common to said
Sections 18 and 19
South 89°37'39" East, 24.9 feet to a point; thence leaving said common Section line
North 00°22' 10" East, 30.00 feet to a point, said point being the ENDING POINT of said floating
easement and being 1222.40 feet right of 1-84 Eastbound lane centerline Station 475+85.34.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIA:
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A Non-Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State of Idaho, created by Corporation
Easement from J.D. Aldecoa and Son, Inc. and recorded May I 0, I996 as Instrument No. 96039693,
described as follows:
A portion ofthe Northeast Quarter ofthe Southwest Quarter ofSection I8, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
A strip ofland 50.0 feet wide on the Westerly side of the right of way boundary of Interstate 84,
Project No. NH-84-2(047)59 Highway Survey, as shown on the plans thereof now on file in the
office of the Idaho Transportation Department, and as described in that certain Warranty Deed to the
Micron Technology Inc. executed by the Grantor herein on the 8th day of May, I996, recorded May
I 0, I996 as Instrument No. 96039692 and Rerecorded May 15, I996 as Instrument No. 96040862,
and lying between Eisenman Road Survey Station 86+38.83 as shown on said Highway Survey and
Grantor's Southerly property line (being the South line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter). The Westerly boundary being further defined by the Easterly boundary of an additional I 0
foot Easement recorded January 8, I999 as Instrument No. 99002305, which is Parcel Easement liB,
below.

PARCEL EASEMENT IIB:
A Non-Exclusive Easement for a Future Public Road by the State of Idaho, created by Easement
from Thomas T. Nicholson and Diana R. Nicholson, husband and wife and Ronald C. Yanke and
Linda L. Yanke, husband and wife, recorded January 8, I999 as Instrument No. 99002305, described
as follows:
A portion of theN ortheast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 18, Township 2 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho, described as follows to wit:
Commencing at an Aluminum Cap marking the South Quarter Section Comer of Section 18,
Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; thence along the North-South Center Quarter
section line of said Section 18,
North 00°1 0'46" East, 1319.I6 feet to a point marking the Center-South 1116 Section Corner of said
Section IS; thence leaving said North-South Center Quarter section line, and along the South 1/16
section line of said Section 18
North 89°38'38" West, 643.56 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly Right-of-Way line of
Isaac's Canyon Interchange, said cap being 1133.65 feet right ofJ-84 East bound lane centerline
station 462+68.57, as shown on the plans oflnterstate 84, Federal Aid Project No. NH 84-2(047)59
Highway Survey; thence continuing along said South 1116 Section line of said Section 18,
North 89°38'38" West, 50.69 feet to an Aluminum Cap on the Westerly boundary line of an existing
50.0 foot wide Pennanent Access/Stock Drive Easement recorded May I 0, 1996 as Instrument No.
96039693, said cap being 1178.53 feet right of I-84 East bound lane centerline Station 462+4 7.16,
also being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence leaving said South 1116 Section line of said
Section 18 and along said Westerly boundary line of an existing 50.0 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement the following courses and distances:
North 09°50'10" East, 618.36 feet to a point, said point being 150.00 feet right of Eiseman Road
centerline Station 91 +66. 77
Thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 678.00 feet, a central angle of 51°51 '49", an arc
length of613.72 feet, and a chord which bears North 41 °I5'14" West, 592.98 feet to a point, said
point being 150.00 feet right of Eiseman road centerline Station 86+88.83;
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Thence North I 5°19'I 9" West, 50.00 feet to a point marking the Northwest corner of said existing
50.00 foot wide Permanent Access/Stock Drive Easement, said point being 150.00 feet right of
Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence leaving said Westerly boundary line of said existing 50.00 foot wide Permanent
Access/Stock Drive Easement, South 74°40'41" West, 10.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00
feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence South I 5°19'19" East, 50.00 feet to a point, said point being 160.00 feet right of Eiseman
Road centerline Station 86+38.83;
Thence along a curve to the left having a radius of688.00 feet, a central angle of 51 °I2'00", an arc
length of 614.80, and a chord which bears South 40°55' I 9" East, 594.55 feet to a point, said point
being I 60.00 feet right of Eiseman Road centerline Station 91 +60.65;
Thence South 09°50'10" West, 612.12 feet to a point on the South I/I6 Section line of said Section
18;
Thence along said South I/16 Section line, South 89°38'38" East, 10.14 feet to the REAL POINT
OF BEGINNING.
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EXHIBITB
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ALLIANCE
TITLE

&

ESCROW

CORP.

PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT ATTACHED

Date:

May 2Q, 2015

File No.:

271521

l
'

Property:

None Given, Boise, ID 83703

Buyer/Borrower:

To Be Determined
~

...

~

Seller:

.

',

Trust B\ofthe Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust·created by
Instrument dated March 24, 1977 as to an yndivided one-ninth interest; John F.
Day, as to an undivided one-fourth intere~t; Dan E. Day, as to an undivided onefourth interest; Donna Day Jacobs as tq.an undivided one-ninth int~rest; and
David R. Day, as to an undivided one"ninth interest and Holcomb .Road LLC, an
Idaho Umited
Liability Company, as.. to an undivided 3/18th inte~est.
··
.
.
.

:

/

In connection with the above referenced transaction, w~rare providing you with the t611owing contact
information. Enclosed please find your Title Commitment.
·
·
Listing Agent:

Selling Agent:

Phone:

Phone:

Attn:

Attn:

Lender:

Buyer/Borrower:- To Be Determined

Phone:
Attn:

Seller:

www.alliancetitle.com
'

Wi1h dbzens of convenien11ccations across Idaho and parts of Montana.
Washingto~. and W•1oming, Alliance T!tlo & Escrow Corp. offers <J complete range
nt residential and commerr.ial real estate title, escrow and informa1iD•l services.
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000694

J..\.
ALLIANCE
TITLE

&

ESCROW

GORP.

;

Trust B of the Donald M. Day a~d Ma~orie D. Day Family
Trust created by Instrument da~d March 24, 1977 as to an
undivided one-ninth interest; Jorn F. Day, as to an
undivided one-fourth interest; Dan E. Day, as to an
undivided one-fourth interest; Dbnna Day Jacobs as to an
undivided one-ninth interest; antl David R. Day, as to an
undivided one-ninth interest and Holcomb Road LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Compan~. as to an undivided 3/18th
interest.

www.alliancetitle.com
With doiens of convenient locations across ldahc and parts of Montana,
Washington,\and Wyoming, Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. offers a complete range
of residential and commercial real estate tite, escrow and information services.

DAY01136
000695
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TITLE

&

ESCROW

CORP.

'

I

Commitment for Title Insurance
'

Subjed to conditions and stipulations contained therern
~

~

~

..

~

.

..

.

.

.

Your contacts for this transaction are as follows:
'

Title Officer

Escrow Officer !

Steve Jewett .
steve jewett@alliancetitle .com

(208}947-9133

.

.
~

.

Email escrowclosing=documents to:
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ALLIANCE
fiTlE

&

ESCROW

CORP.

ln an effort to assure that your transaction goes smoothly, please review the following checklist and
contact your Escrow Officer or iitle Officer if you answer ;'Yes" to any of the following:

•!• Will you be using a Power of Attorney?

•!• Are any of the parties :in title incapacitated or deceased?!
~

'

•!• Has a change in marital status occurred for any ofthe principals?

•!• Will the property be transferred into or from a trust, partnership, corporation orlimlted
Liability Company?
:

~
:

,'

'

'

'.

,'

.

•!• Has there been any cqnstruction on the property in the last six months.?

:

'

\

Remember, all parties signing documents must have a current driver's license or oth~r.valid
government issued photo !.D. ·
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Title Fees &Breakdown
Policy Issuing Agent for:

Chicago Title Insurance Company File No. 271521

Owner's Policy:
Premium:
Additional Coverage:
Credit:
Inspection:
Additional Chain:

$0.00

First Lender's Policy:
Premium:

$0.00

Credit:
Inspection:
Additional Chain:
Endorsements:

Breakdown of Fees:

Policy Underwriting Fees:
Policy Title Agent Fees:
Total Title Fees:

Recording Fees:
Idaho:
Montana:
Washington:
Wyoming:
E-File Fees::

$0.00
$0.00.
$0.00

,
·'

$10 for the first page, $3 for each additional page
· $7;0(J-per page for a standardiconformingdocument: Add.an additional
$1 0.00 per document if the document is non-conforming ( outside the
required margins etc.)
·

$72 for the first page of a Deed and $73 for the first page of a Deed of ·
Trust with, $1 for each additional page
$12 for the first page, $3 for each additional page
An additional $4.50 per document in Idaho and
An additional $5.00 per document in Washington, Wyoming & Montana

If you have any questions, please contact Steve Jewett
9288 W Emerald, Ste. 102, Boise, ID 83704
Phone: (208) 378-1666 Fax: (208), 378-1306

DAY01139
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Customer Refhence No.
File No. 271521
Undenwiter: Chicago Title Insutance Company

.~LT A Plain Language Commitment Form
INFORMATION
The Title Insurance

Commit1~1ent

is a legal contract between you and the Company. It is issued to

show the basis on which we 'will issue a Title Insurance Policy to you. The Policy will insure you
against certain risks to the lanp title, subject to the limitations shown in the Policy.
The Company will give you a\sample of the Policy form if you ask.
'

The Policy contains an arbz]tration clause. All arbitrable matters when the Amount of
Insurance is $2,000,000 or tess shall be arbitrated at the option of either the Company or
you as the exclusive remedy of the parties. You may review a copy of the arbitration rules at
<http://www.alta,or'5f>.
·
The Commitment is based on the land title as of the Commitment Date. Any changes in the land title
or the transaction may affect tile Commitment and the Policy.
The Commitment is subject to !its Requirements, Exceptions and Conditions.
THIS INFOR1v1ATION lS NOT PART OF THE TITLE INSURANCE COMMITMENf. YOU
SHOULD READ THE COMf\1:ITMENT VERY CAREFULLY.
If you have any questions abo · the Commitment, contact your title officer, Steve Jewett
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File No. 271521
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TITLE INSUR-\.NCE COl\'11'\'JITMENT

BY
Chicago Title Insurance ComJlany
AGREEMENT TO ISSUE POLICY
vVe agree to issue a policy to )\ou according to the terms of the Commitment. When we show the
policy amount and your name hs the proposed insured in Schedule A, this Commitment becomes
effective as of the Cornmitment Date shmvn in Schedule A.

If the Requirements shown in this Commitment have not been met within six months after the
Commitment Date, our obligation under tllis Commitment will end. Also, our obligation under this
Commitment will end when the Policy is issued and then our obligation to you will be under the
Policy.
Our obligation under this Commitment is limited by the following:

The Provisions in Schedule A.\
The Requirements in Schedule[B-I.
The Exceptions in Schedule B-II.
The Conditions.
This Commitment is not valid without SCHEDULE A and Sections 1 and Il of SCHEDULE B.
Cll!C'-00 TfTI.Il INSU~ANQ!: COMFI\NY
By·
\

~Ji!;tl4L

Issued by:

Alliance Title & Escrow Corp.

~·
(}/}

,1

/
By: __ _

i/

.

-··--···----··--···--··-----

Authorized si,t,rner
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Customer Reference No.
File No. 271521
Underwriter: Chicago Title Insurance Company

SCHEDULE A

Order No.: 271521
1. Effective date: April 21, ~012 at 7:30A.M
2.

Policy or Policies to be issued:

(a)

~~1;~6~ner's

Policy [

ml Standard Cover·age

·

I

Amount:
J>rcmium:

I Extended Coverage

$0.00

Proposed Insured:

To Be Determined
(b)

ALTA Loan
(6-17-06)

Policy

~~-l

i

t_l

Standard Coverage

[J

Amount:
Premium:

Extended Coverage

$0.00

Endorsements:

Proposed Insured:

3.

FEE Sfl'v1JlLE interest in tl1e Land described in this Commitment is owned, at the Commitment
Date, by:

Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977 as tp au undivided one-ninth interest; John F. Day, as to an
undivided one-fourth inte~·cst; Dan E. Day, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Donna
Day Jacobs as to an undiv~ded one-ninth interest; and David R. D~ty, as to an undivided
one-ninth interest and Hotcomb Road LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, as to an
undivided 3/18th interest..
4.

The Land rcfened to in this:Commitment is described as follows:

See attached: EXHIBIT .~

DAY01142
000701

Customer Reference No.
FileNo. 271521
Underwriter: Chicago Title Insurpnce Company

EXHIBIT A
Parcel I:
The Northeast quarter of the Section 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian,
in Ada County, Idaho; ·
EXCEPT those portions jtllcrcof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded .July 2,
1936 as Instrument No. ~70934 in Book 217 of Deeds, Page 424 and by deed recorded
November 10, 1967 as In~trument No. 677552;
AND EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to Ada County Highway District by deed

recorded February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940.
Parcel II:
The southeast quarter ofSection 19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, in
Ada County, Idaho;
·
EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005941.
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Customer Reference No.
File No. 271521
Underwriter: Chicago Title Insurance Company

SCHEDULE B - SECTION I
REQUJREME:\TTS
\

The following requirements rn'ust be met:
a.

Pay the agreed amounts for the interest in the land and/or the mmtgage to be insured.

b.

Pay us the premiums, tees and charges for the policy.

c.

Documents satisfactory to us creating the interest in the Land and/or the Mortgage to be
insured must be signeq, delivered and recorded.

d.

You must tell us in >vrlting the name of anyone not referred to in this Commitment who wil1
get an interest in the L~nd or who will make a loan on the Land. We may then make
additional requirement~ or exceptions.

e.

If the title is to be insuted in the trustee(s) of a trust. (or iftheir act is to be insured),
this company vvill reqUire a copy of the trust instrument creating said trust, and all
amendments thereto, t~gether with a written verification by all present tmstees that
the copy is the true an~ correct copy of the trust, as it may have been amended, that
is in full force and effect and that it has not been revoked or tem1inated.

f.

The company will require a copy of articles of organization, operating agreements, if
any, and a current list qfirs members and managers for Holcomb Road, LLC, a
limited liability company.

g.

E-vidence, satisfactory (o the company, must be submitted that Bennett G. Day had
the authority to execut~ for the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust
the deed recorded as InstTument No. 113093237.

h. The parties to be insured herein must acknowledge that they have read Paragraph 25,
Schedule B: and that the title insurance policy, when issued will not insure against
the lack of a right of access to and 11-om the land,
Note No. 1: We find th¢ following activity in the pasr 24 months regarding transfer
of title to subject propejty:
Quitclaim Deed:
Grantor: Bennett G. Da~, a single person, as his sole and separate property
Grantee: Holcomb Roaa, LLC, an ldaho Limited Liability Company
Recorded: August 15, 2nl 3
Instrument No.: lUQ_9)!236
Aftects: A 1/9th interesi.

DAY01144
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Customer Reference No.
File No. 271521
Underwriter: Chicago Title lnsur,ance Company
Note No.2: We find tlne following activity in the past 24 months regarding transfer
of title to subject property:
Quitclaim Deed:
[
Grantor: Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust created by Instrument
dated March 24, 1977,
Grantee: Holcomb Rqad, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company
Recorded: August 15,[2013
Instrument No.: l12QY3237
Affects: a 1/3rd interest of it's l/6th interest.

Note No.3: We find qo activity in the past 24 months regarding transfer of title to
subject property. We note the following transter of title to subject property:
Wan-anty Deed
l
Grantor: Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho Corporation
Grantee: Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust created
by Instrument dated IV!arch 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; Jolm F.
Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth
interest; Bennett G. D~y as to an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate
property; Donna Day Jacobs as to an tmdivided one-ninth interest as her separate
property; and David R. day, as to an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate
!
property
Recorded: December 31, 2008
Instrument No.: l 0813l8051
Affects: The remaining interests.
Note No.4: This Company reserves the right to add additional requirements upon
receipt of the details o( this transaction.
Note No.5: In the event this transaction fails to close and this commitment is
cancelled a fee will be charged complying with the state insurance code.
Note No. 6: Accordi.ng[to the available County Assessor's Office records, the
purpotted address of said land is:
.None Given.

Boise.J[)[8370~

Note No.7: We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your business,
and inform you that yol)lr Title Officer is Steve Jewett whose direct line is (208)
947-9133.
'

A copy of our Privacy,Policy is available on our website at
W'IVW.alliancetide.coml'About/Privacy-Policy or via email, or paper format upon
request. Please contadt yonr Title Officer if you would like to request a copy of
our Privacy Policy.
·
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Customer Reference No_
File No. 271521
Underwriter: Chicago Title Insm·ance Company

SCHEDULE B- SECTION II
EXCEPTIONS
Any policy we issue will haye the following exceptions unless they are taken care of to our
satisfaction.
·
1. Rights or claims of partieJ in possession not shown by the public records.
2. Any encroachment, cncurr).brance, violation, variation, or adverse circumstance at1ecting
the Title that would be disClosed by an accurate and complete land survey of the Land.
3. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.
4. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter
fumished, imposed by law and not shown by the public records.
5. (a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts
authorizing the issuance thereof; (c) water rights or easements appurtenant to water
rights, claims or title to water, whether or not the matters excepted under (a), (b), or (c)
are shmvn by the public records.
6. Taxes or special assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the public records
of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public
records. Proceedings by a public agency which may result in taxes or assessments, or
notices of such proceedings, whether or not shown by the records of such agency or by
the public records.
7.

General Taxes tor the year:2014 a Lien, the first half is paid and the second half is now
due and payable.
,
Parcel No.: S16t211000Q I
ln the original amount of: ~270.46
Affects: Portion of Parcel ].

8.

General Taxes for the year 2014 a Lien, the first half is paid and the second half is now
due and payable.
:
Parcel No.: SJ619130QQQ I
In the original amount of: $292.54
Affects: Remainder of Parcel 1.

9.

General Taxes for the year Q014 a Lien, the first half is paid and the second half is now
due and payable.
'
Parcel No.: 81619417200'
ln the original amount of: 3581.36
Affects: Parcel 2.

10. Taxes, including any assessh1ents collected therewith, for the year 2015 which are a lien
not yet due and payable.
11. Liens, levies and assessments of the Ada County Trash Services.
12. Ditch, road and public utility easements as the same may exist over said premises.
13. Negati·ve easements, condit~ons, restrictions, and access rights contained in the deed to
the State ofldaho.
·
Recorded: July 2, 1936
Instrument No.: 1702)4

DAY01146
• • • iw•

000705

Customer Reference No.
File No. 271521
Unden\>Titer: Chicago Title Insurance Company
I 4. Negative easements, conditions, restrictions, and access rights contained in the deed to
the State ofidaho.
.
Recorded: November JO,. 1967
Instmment No.: 67_7552

15. An easement for the purpqse shown below and rights incidental thereto as set forth in
document:
\
Granted To: Mountain St~tes Telephone and Telegraph Company
Purpose: Public Utilities :
Recorded: November 27,'1985
Instrument No.: ~~(>2748!
Note: Said easement corrects
that easement recorded as Instrument No. .8515402.
'

16. An easement for the purpose shown below and rights incidental thereto as set forth in
document:
!
Granted To: U.S. West Communication, Inc.
Purpose: Public Utilities !
Recorded: December 22, i 992
fnstrument No.: 928875{2 \

17. A Mortgage to secure an indebtedness as shown below secured thereby:
Amount $6,500,000.00 !
Mortgagor: Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho Corporation
Mortgagee: Trust B ofthe.Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust created by
Instrument dated March 24,, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; Jolm F. Day as to
an undivided one-fourth interest Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest;
Bennett G. Day an undivid~d one-ninth interest as his separate property; Donna Day
Jacobs an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property and David R. Day an
undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property
Dated: May 15, 2006
Recorded: May 23, 2006 :
Instrument No.: I 06Q&_1744
We note the following
Day.

mat~er

pending against a person with a name similar to: Dan E.

18. A lien filed in the Office of' the Secretary of State:
Type: Overpayments
!
Named Party: Daniel Day !
Lien No.: 506495

19. A lien filed in the Office oflthe Secretary of State:
Type: Overpayments
Named Party: Daniel Day
Lien No.: 668280

I

20. Right, title and interest of the spouse of John F. Day, if married on December 3 I, 2008,
date of acquiring title and mp.y matters which may appear against the spouse.
21. Right, title and interest of tiie spouse of Dan E. Day :if married on December 31, 2008,
date of acquiring title and any matters which may appear against the spouse.

22. Right, title and interest of tire spouse of Bennett G. Day, former owner. if malTied on
December 31, 2008, date of!acquiring title and any matters which may appear against the
spouse.

DAY01147
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Underwriter: Chicago Title Insufrance Company

23. Right, title and interest of the spouse of Donna Day Jacobs, if married on December 31,
2008 date of acquiring tiqe and any matters which may appear against the spouse.
24. Right, title and interest of the spouse of David R. Day, ifmatTied on December 31, 2008,
date of acquiring title and!any matters which may appear against the spouse.
25. Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 of the covered risks of this policy, this policy does not
insure against loss m·ising!by reason of any lack of a right of access to and from the land.
i

The intent of the easement recorded as Instrument No. 100044826 may be to provide
access to that portion of the subject property lying west of Highway I-84. However, the
State of Idaho is the grantee and the dominant property is not identified. The casement
a.~:,rreement speaks to an adyoining lando\\ner, but the subject property does not adjoin the
property because of the conveyance to the Ada County Highway District by deed
recorded as Instrument No. 8005940. Additionally, per the easement agreement the
exact location of the easement is not yet defined.
The easement recorded as !Instrument No. 100044826 does not connect to a public road.
Easements recorded as Instrument Nos. 96039693 and 99002305, which were granted to
the State of Idaho for the purpose of constructing or installing Stock Drive and Future
Pubbc Road, may have been intended to be the extension of the easement to a public
right of way. However, it has not been established as a public road nor the use of it
granted to the subject prop~rty. Additionally, access rights to Eisenman Road may be
restricted and additional research is necessary to establish whether it can be accessed
from the easements in Inst~ument Nos. 96039693 and 99002305.

END OF SCHEDULE B
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CONDITIONS
1. DEFINITIONS
(a) "Mortgage" means mortgage, deed of trust or other security instrument. (b) "Public
Records" means title records that give constructive notice of matters affecting your title
according to the state ;statutes where your land is located.

2. LATER DEFECTS
The Exceptions in Sc4edule B -Section II may be amended to show any defects, liens or
encumbrances that appear lor the first time in the public records or are created or attach
between the Commitrr\ent Date and the date on which all of the Requirements (a) and (c) of
Schedule B- Section Ij are met. We shall have no liability to you because of this amendment.

3. EXISTING DEFEC11S
If any defects, liens orliencwnbrances existing at Commitment Date are not shown in
Schedule B, we may a~1end Schedule B to show them. If we do amend Schedule B to show
these defects, liens or Jncumbrances, \Ve shall be liable to you according to Paragraph 4
below unless you kne\i of this infonnation and did not tell us about it in \vriting.

4. LIMITATION OF OUR LIARILITY
Our only obligation is to issue to you the Policy referred to in this Commitment, when you
have met its Requirem4nts. If we have any liability to you tor any loss you incur because of
an error in this Commi~ment, our liability will be limited to your actual loss caused by your
re1ying on this Commitment when you acted in good faith to:
Comply with the Requirements shovv'TI in Schedule B - Section I

or
Eliminate with our wri~en consent any Exceptions shown in Schedule B -Section II.
We shall not be liable for more than the Policy Amount shown in Schedule A of this

Commitment and our liability is subject to the tem1s of the Policy form to be issued to you.
5. CL41MS MUST BE BASED ON THIS COMMITMENT
Any claim, whether or llot based on negligence, which you may have against us concerning
the title to the land must be based on this Commitment and is subject to its terms.

DAY01149
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Electronically Filed
7/11/2017 5:38:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE
AND INSURABLE TITLE

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

That I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs, and have personal knowledge of

the matters stated herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE TITLE -1
19807-001 I 958374
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a January 29, 20 I 0

email from Deputy Attorney General Steven Parry (which was previously attached as Exhibit 19
to the Complaint filed herein).
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of relevant pages of the

Complete Appraisal, Restricted Report of the Day Property, dated December 14, 1998, by Knipe

& Knipe, Inc.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi s /

J"h-- day of July, 20 17.

Notary Public, State of Idaho
Residingat ~~' J!::J
My Commission expires: .S - r o c9 Od-<D

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE TITLE- 2
19807-001 /958374
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

~day of July, 2017, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
(gJ Email/ iCourt: chris.kro nberg@ itd.idaho. gov

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAI NTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTI AL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: NO MARKETABLE AND I NSURABLE TITLE - 3
19807-001 I 958374
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l

From:
To:

Steven Parry
ddjacobs@mindspring.c m

Date;

l/29/20105:51:54PM

Subject: To49.doc

To:

Bill Smith
Andrew White
Dave Jones

Lana Servatius
From: Steven M. Pan-y
Re:

Isaac Canyon I Day Famil Property I Access

The Day family owns a tra t of land east and south of the Isaac Canyon Interchange.
T-Iistorically the property had acces from US Highway 30. With the original construction of the
Interstate the property had access om the stock drive public right of way which bordered the interstate.
With the construction of th Isaac Canyon Interchange the stock drive for this property was
obliterated. At the time the prope between the Day property and Eisman Road was BLM property.
The Department negotiated an easement withdrawal from the BLM for the Section 18 property.
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of e map showing the 2.83 acre easement. After the easement leaves
Section 18 it adjoins public right o way of the Ada County Highway District.
In April 2000 the Federal ghway Administration granted to the Idaho Transportation
Department the easement that is de icted in Exhibit A. Exhibit B is a copy of the easement. Subsequent
to the grant of the easement the B
disposed of the property and it is now owned by Dennis Baker.
The disposal was subject to the eas ment
The easement has become ermanent at the location shown on Exhibit A and the Department has
relinquished the old stock drive pu lie right of way.
Pioneer Title has raised qu tions and does not believe they can insure the property due to
defects they perceive in the easemft The easement does not name tbe adjoining property owner(s) as
the beneticiari es of the easement. While this issue can be debated it is the Title Company that has the
final say on the issue where the De artment is transfening an undeveloped access road easement
Enclosed as Exhibit Cis a py of a letter I wrote to the Day family attorney in September of
1
2000 which recounts the meetings y.'ith ACHD and the preliminary design work that the Department had
done to insure that the new easement was on a constructable alignment The letter closes:

I

I
Andrew White and I met wikh Pioneer Title Company this past week and came up with a solution
that was acceptable to all concerned. The Title Company would accept a recorded acknowledgement to
the Department as title holder of thb easement from the underlying fee owner. The acknowledgement
would need to provide that the pro~erty owner acknowledges that the June 2000 easement was for the
purpose of an access road right of ~ay for the benefit of the Day family and other similarly situated
property owners.
I don't believe there are any other similarly situated property owners and once the road is
constructed it would be turned ove to the Ada County Highway District. I have prepares a proposed

t

tile:f/C·\Documents and Settings\u r\LocaJ Settings\Temp\FD631B75-C1FB-4E29-B I 83- !... 8/8120

d
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acknowledgement fonn which I be ieve would be sufficient. There are other solutions to the problem
but they all involve huge costs (e.g construction of a local road and turning it over to ACJID).
The bottom line is that befi e the Isaac Canyon Interchange was constructed the Day property
had insurable title to its property d had a legal right ofaccess. With the construction of the
Interchange they will not be able t provide title insurance without going through litigation.
[f the underlying property
er declines to agree to an acknowledgement then the Department
may want to consider a quiet title ·on on the exact nature of the Highway Easement Deed, executed
by Mary Gray in June of2000.

file://C:\Documents and Settings\us r\Local Settings\Temp\FD631B75-C1FB-4E29-B183-1... 8/8/2012
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KNIPE & KNIPE, INC.

KNIPE 0, KNIPE
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Commercial
Est ale Services

f~oal

LOCATED IN RIVER RUN CENTEI\
671 E. River pork La no • Suilo I 30
Baise. Idaho 83706

Complete Appraisal, Restricted Report
of the

Day Property
located in the
SE 1/4, NE 1/4 of Section 19, T2N, R3E
Isaac's Canyon, Ada County, Idaho
K&K File No.: 98.920

for
Ernest and Lois Day
2433 Claremont Drive
Boise, JD 83702

MAILING AODRI~;s
P.O. Uox 1696 • Ooise,ldoha 8Jl01
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Assumptions, Contingencies & Scope Limitations

Underlying Assumptions, Contingencies & Scope limitations
Overview
In the course of the normal appraisal process, situations arise wherein we must make standard
(generic) and specific and/or extraordinary assumptions with regard to information not readily
available to us. All Standard, Specific and/or Extraordinary Assumptions & Limiting Conditions
which may appear in the report are believed to be compatible with generally accepted appraisal
principles, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), and Appraisal Institute
requirements. All are to be considered a part of the report, and the reader is advised that acceptance
of the report constitutes acceptance of all Assumptions and Limiting Conditions.

Standard Underlying Assumptions & limiting Conditions
Standard Assumptions and Limiting Conditions include such issues as construction components
of existing construction; adaptability of soils to development; existence of typical easements, etc.
Additionally, since Idaho is a non-disclosure state, details of comparable property sales or leases are
presumed to be accurately portrayed by the parties to the respective agreements; in lieu of
cooperation by the parties (or in some cases, where parties have no recollection of such details),
assumptions and/or reasonable approximations are sometimes necessitated. Such generic
assumptions are provided for in the Standard (Generic) Underlying Assumptions and Limiting
Conditions contained in the Addenda. The reader is encouraged to read this section of the report.

Special I Extraordinary Underlying Assumptions & Limiting Conditions
More Specific Assumptions & Limiting Conditions are sometimes required depending upon the
individual nature of the appraisal problem, and are clearly disclosed in the following Special
Assumptions & Limiting Conditions, and/ or in the discussions within the report to which they
pertain. These assumptions are of matters which we have no knowledge, expertise, or timely ability
to clarify. Standard Rule 2-lc of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice require, as
applicable to the appraisal problem, clear and accurate disclosure of, and an indication of any impact
on value of, a third classification of assumption: "extraordinary assumptions and limiting
conditions" that directly affect the outcome of appraisal. In the event any specific and/ or
extraordinary assumptions and limiting conditions arc deemed relevant to the subject and its
valuation, they will be set forth immediately following, and/ or in the discussions within the report to
which they pertain.

Special/ Extraordinary Assumptions Relative To This Appraisal

I
I
I
I=
I

The appraisers have not been provided a title report for the subject property. Based on our
research, it was discerned that the property is encumbered by certain easements. However, it is
specifically assumed that the presence of these easements would not negatively affect the property's
development potential.
Additionally, Ada County records indicate multiple individuals/ lrusts sharing ownership of the
subject property. However, the subject property has been appraised as though owned under a single
ownership interest with an undivided interest in the whole, irrespective of minority
share/ ownership. Any fractional ownership interests and values accorded such when added
together, may or may not equal the value of the whole as herein estimated.
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that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Plaintiffs have therefore failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is based on the pleadings already
on file in this matter, as well as the Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Dismiss submitted
herewith. The State requests a hearing on its motion.
DATED this 15th day of July 2017.
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I.
I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
(“the Days”)
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs (“the
Days”) have
contract claims
an inverse
inverse condemnation
and an
condemnation
have asserted
asserted two
two contract
claims and

Days’ contract
Right-of-Way
claim
barred. The
based on
time barred.
The Days’
contract claims
on aa 1967
that are
claim that
claims are
are based
are time
1967 Right-of-Way

Contract
Setting aside
the issue
the State
Whether the
Contract and
of whether
State breached
those
and aa 1967
1967 Warranty
breached those
Deed. Setting
aside the
issue of
Warranty Deed.
limitations based
agreements,
year statute
written document
the five
of limitations
on aa 1967
statute of
five year
1967 written
document has
based on
has obviously
agreements, the
obviously
1
limitations1 on
Days’ inverse
expired
year statute
The four
the Days’
expired as
of 1972.
of limitations
on the
condemnation
inverse condemnation
1972. The
statute of
four year
as of

claim,
if the
the breach
which arose
of December
expired as
Even if
of
well. Even
December 5,
has obviously
breach of
arose as
as of
as well.
obviously expired
claim, which
1997, has
5, 1997,
in 1997,
the
the 1967
the five
limitations on
of limitations
on those
contracts allegedly
those claims
ﬁve year
claims
statute of
1967 contracts
occurred in
allegedly occurred
1997, the
year statute

has
expired.
has clearly
clearly expired.
In an
their time
time barred
effort to
the dismissal
the Days
the July
In
of their
an effort
to avoid
on the
barred claims,
dismissal of
avoid the
claims, the
Days rely
rely on
July

19,
from Steve
letter from
former Deputy
the Idaho
to the
General assigned
Idaho
2000 letter
Steve Parry,
assigned to
Attorney General
Deputy Attorney
19, 2000
Parry, former
Transportation
who at
time represented
the time
the current
Transportation Department,
to A.J.
at the
of the
represented some
current
some of
Department, to
A]. Bohner,
Bohner, who
Days’ Complaint
plaintiffs. See,
paragraph 29
page 13
Exhlbit 15
the Days’
the
plaintiffs.
29 on
on page
13 of
of the
15 to
to the
and Exhibit
Complaint and
See, paragraph

“I will
Complaint.
will also
In that
that letter,
that the
will not
the Department
Department will
not
represent to
to you
states: “I
Complaint. In
also represent
letter, Parry
Parry states:
you that

if an
assert
be
limitations defense
of statute
of limitations
an agreement
on new
cannot be
assert any
new access
defense if
agreement on
statute of
access cannot
any type
type of
reached.” Although
reached.”
who Bohner
Although itit is
Bohner represented
the time,
not clear
at the
represented at
those current
clear who
current
is not
time, only
only those
that were
that statement
Plaintiffs that
Bohner can
Plaintiffs
by Bohner
by Parry.
on that
statement by
represented by
can rely
were represented
Parry.
rely on

Parry’s waiver
At
Parry’s
purport to
be aa perpetual
itself did
its express
to be
express terms,
waiver itself
perpetual waiver.
waiver. At
did not,
terms, purport
not, by
by its

,

most,
by one
it had
tolling or
limitation period
the effect
the statute
limitations by
extending the
effect of
of tolling
or extending
of limitations
period –
had the
one limitation
statute of
most, it
from the
five
years for
years for
– from
for the
the contract
for the
the inverse
the
contract claims
inverse condemnation
claim 7
claims and
and four
condemnation claim
five years
four years
Parry’s statement
date
promise. Additionally,
promise or
written promise
itself had
statement itself
of his
or agreement,
his promise.
had
date of
as a
a written
agreement, Parry’s
Additionally, as

See,
Inc. v.
Highway District No. 4,
5-224; C
194
Idaho 140,
139 Idaho
I.C. §§ 5-224;
P.3d 194
C&
& G,
v. Canyon
75 P.3d
Canyon HighwayDistrictNo.
140, 75
See, I.C.
G, Inc.
4, 139
(2003).
(2003).
11
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Parry’s statement
aa statute
period of
was intended
if Parry’s
limitations period
statement was
of limitations
of five
intended to
to apply
ﬁve years.
statute of
Futther, if
years. Further,
apply

until the
would be
be void
void as
public policy.
policy.
it would
the end
until
of time,
end of
against public
as against
time, it
Days’
For
limitations has
the statute
For any
all of
all of
the Days’
of those
of limitations
on all
of the
those reasons,
and all
has run
statute of
run on
reasons, the
any and

claims
and they
should be
dismissed.
be dismissed.
claims and
they should
II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

A.
A. Standard
of Review
Standard of
Review
When
motion to
the Court
the same
to dismiss,
reviewing aa Rule
applies the
standard as
Rule 12(b)(6)
same standard
When reviewing
Court applies
as
dismiss, the
12(b)(6) motion
used to
judgment motion:
motion:
to review
review aa summary
used
summary judgment
When
pursuant to
we
an action
action pursuant
to I.R.C.P.
an order
When this
this Court
order dismissing
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6),
reviews an
dismissing an
Court reviews
12(b)(6), we
apply
we apply
judgment. After
After
the same
motion for
for summary
of review
to aa motion
standard of
review we
same standard
summary judgment.
apply the
apply to
non-moving party,
in favor
from the
the record
all facts
the non-moving
the
viewing all
party, the
inferences from
Viewing
of the
facts and
favor of
and inferences
record in
will ask
for relief
relief has
The issue
not Whether
the
Whether aa claim
Court
whether the
claim for
ask whether
has been
stated. The
been stated.
Court will
issue is
is not
plaintiff will
will ultimately
ultimately prevaiL
prevail, but
whether the
party is
plaintiff
the party
entitled to
offer evidence
to offer
to
but whether
evidence to
is entitled
support
the claims.
support the
claims.
Coalition
for Agriculture's Future
Future v.
CoalitionfbrAgriculture’s
Idaho 142,
160 Idaho
923
P.3d 920,
v. Canyon
369 P.3d
142, 145,
Canyon County,
145, 369
920, 923
County, 160
“looks no
pleadings.” Goodman
In reviewing
than the
the motion,
the Court
the pleadings.”
(2016).
reviewing the
no further
further than
Goodman v.
Court “looks
v.
motion, the
(2016). In

Lothrop, 143
143 Idaho
151 P.3d
822 (2007).
Idaho 622,
P.3d 818,
Lothrop,
622, 626,
626, 151
818, 822
(2007).
Parry’s statement
limitations period
B.
additional
statement extended
the statute
statute of
B. Parry’s
of limitations
extended the
one additional
pe riod by
by one
statutory
from the
the date
his promise
date of
of his
promise..
period from
statutory period
“is to
In Idaho,
in all
all
the statute
limitations “is
In
be liberally
of limitations
to be
must be
applied in
and must
statute of
be applied
construed, and
Idaho, the
hberally construed,

made.” Mendini
cases
where an
Mendini v.
Milner, 47
not specifically
an exception
exception is
47 Idaho
P.
Idaho 439,
276 P.
cases Where
is not
v. Milner,
speciﬁcally made.”
439, 276
“statutes
313,
142 Cal.
314 (1929)
P. 35
Cal. 471,
Vandal! v.
v. Teague,
76 P.
35 (1904)).
Further, “statutes
(citing Vandall
Teague, 142
471, 76
313, 314
(1929) (citing
(1904)). Further,

implication.”
will not
creating
be strictly
by implication.”
not be
creating exemptions
exemptions are
to be
extended by
are to
construed and
and will
be extended
strictly construed

Mendini v.
Milner, 47
47 Idaho
P. at
at 314.
314.
Mendini
Idaho 439,
276 P.
v. Milner,
439, 276
The
in this
limitations in
The relevant
the statute
application of
relevant statutory
exception to
to application
of the
of limitations
this case
statute of
I.C.
case is
is I.C.
statutory exception
5-238:
§§ 5-238:
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— Effect
Acknowledgment
– Effect
partial
Effect on
Eﬁe ct of
statute –
Acknowledgment or
or new
promise —
on operation
of statute
of partial
new promise
ope ration of
7
payment.
continuing
sufficient evidence
N0 acknowledgment
or promise
of aa new
or continuing
acknowledgment or
promise is
new or
evidence of
is sufficient
payment. – No
contract
by which
unless the
the case
the same
the operation
which to
contract by
to take
take the
of the
operation of
of this
out of
same is
this chapter,
case out
is
chapter, unless
contained
by the
be charged
but any
in some
the party
to be
of
contained in
some writing,
charged thereby;
signed by
writing, signed
payment of
thereby; but
party to
any payment
in writing,
principal or
new promise
writing, duly
pay the
the
interest is
principal
or interest
to aanew
to pay
equivalent to
promise in
is equivalent
signed, to
duly signed,
the debt.
residue
of the
residue of
debt.

Note that
in taking
taking aa case
that the
the operation
the statute
not state
the effect
of the
operation of
of
effect of
of aa promise
Note
out of
promise in
statute does
state the
case out
does not
the
in effect
the statute
for aa long
long
the same
limitations. However,
effect for
of limitations.
statute of
been in
same statutory
language has
has been
However, the
statutory language
in Idaho,
time
time in
the statute
interpreted to
to restart
of limitations,
restart the
extending
and has
has been
been interpreted
limitations, essentially
statute of
essentially extending
Idaho, and

or
tolling application
from the
the date
the promise:
the statute
application of
of the
or tolling
of the
period from
one statutory
statute by
date of
promise:
statutory period
by one
in an
The
plea of
waived, either
The plea
the statute
either in
therefore may
an action
action
of the
personal one,
and therefore
statute is
is a
a personal
be waived,
one, and
may be
commenced,
plead itit waives
waives it,
or
it
may
be
waived
by
the
debtor
by
it
the
or
to plead
Where failure
debtor
failure to
be
waived
commenced, where
it,
may
by
by
“N0
writing, under
under the
provisions of
which is
the provisions
of section
section 4078,
follows: “No
Rev. St.,
is as
as follows:
writing,
4078, Rev.
St., which
acknowledgment
or promise
or continuing
continujn g contract,
of aa new
acknowledgment or
sufﬁcient evidence
promise is
new or
evidence of
is sufficient
contract, by
by
in
the operation
the same
the case
which
of the
operation of
of this
this title,
to take
which to
contained in
out of
same is
take the
unless the
is contained
case out
title, unless
therebv.” The
some
by the
said
the party
The effect
to be
charged thereby.”
some writing,
writing, signed
signed bV
be charged
partV to
effect of
of said
“sufficient
acknowledgment
bar, and
the bar,
the statute,
to furnish,
remove the
and to
acknowledgment was
under the
was to
to remove
furnish, under
statute, “sufficient
“take the
operation” of
evidence” to
evidence”
start anew
limitation statutes,
the operation”
the case
of the
of our
to “take
and start
out of
anew
our limitation
case out
statutes, and
the
statute.
running of
the bar
bar of
the statute.
the running
of the
of the

Moulton v.
P. 1019,
1019 (1899)
Idaho 424,
Moulton
v. Williams,
6 Idaho
55 P.
(emphasis added).
Williams, 6
424, 55
1019, 1019
added).
(1899) (emphasis
5-238 typically
Case
payment on
interpreting I.C.
efforts to
to collect
on debt
collect payment
I.C. §§ 5-238
involves efforts
debt
Case law
law interpreting
typically involves

and
waiver by
right to
limitations defense.
the debtor
the right
to assert
of limitations
of the
are
and aa waiver
assert aa statute
debtor of
defense. Such
Such cases
statute of
cases are
by the
instructive
that aa waiver
the
conﬁrm that
the statute
limitations defense
of limitations
of the
extends the
instructive as
statute of
defense only
waiver of
as they
they confirm
only extends
statute
Horkley v.
Horkley, 144
in Horkley
144
limitations period
For example,
term. For
of limitations
period by
one statutory
statute of
v. Horkley,
example, in
statutory term.
by one
Idaho
year period
that the
limitations
the court
the five
1138 (2007),
held that
of statute
of limitations
period of
Idaho 879,
173 P.3d
P.3d 1138
five year
statute of
001111 held
879, 173
(2007), the
debtor’s payment
on
by debtor’s
payment on
by the
the note.
the court,
the
on aa promissory
note was
on the
As stated
note. As
restarted by
stated by
was restarted
promissory note
001111, the

“was equivalent
in writing,
the residue
the debt,
payment “was
writing, duly
pay the
to aa new
to pay
of the
equivalent to
new promise
residue of
promise in
signed, to
debt,
payment
duly signed,
restarted” as
which means
Horkley v.
that the
limitations restarted”
the statute
the date
the payment.
which
of the
of the
of limitations
means that
statute of
date of
as of
v.
payment. Horkley

Horkley, 144
Modern Mills,
Mills, Inc.
Inc. v.
144 Idaho
112 Idaho
1140. See
at 881,
at 1140.
Idaho at
Idaho
173 P.3d
P.3d at
See also,
v. Havens,
Havens, 112
also, Modern
Horkley,
881, 173
1101,
within five
P.2d 400
complaint filed
ﬁled Within
period
400 (Ct.App.
ﬁve year
739 P.2d
statutory period
1101, 739
(Ct.App. 1987)
(Where complaint
1987) (Where
year statutory
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following
payment equivalent
was not
Joseph v.
time barred);
not time
following last
complaint was
to aa new
equivalent to
new promise,
last payment
v.
promise, complaint
barred); Joseph
Darrar, 93
Kelly v.
Leachman, 33 Idaho
44 (1893).
472 P.2d
P.2d 328
P.2d 44
Idaho 629,
Idaho 762,
328 (1970);
v. Leachman,
33 P.2d
Darrar,
93 Idaho
629, 33
762, 472
(1893).
(1970); Kelly
Idaho
promise not
limitation defense
not to
interprets aapromise
to assert
of limitation
contract
Idaho clearly
assert aa statute
statute of
defense as
as a
a contract
clearly interprets
that
that starts
the statute
limitations period
of limitations
to run
period to
starts the
statute of
anew:
run anew:
plaintiff‘s
limitation to
the application
the statute
the plaintiff's
The further
The
application of
to the
of the
of limitation
to the
objection to
statute of
further objection
cause
which started
that McDonald,
the obligation
obligation which
of action
action is
started
acknowledged the
cause of
is that
McDonald, Jr.,
Jr., acknowledged
In this
aa new
period for
limitation. In
for the
the running
the statute
the
of the
of limitation.
new period
running of
respect the
statute of
this respect
Supreme
the state
relating to
to
of the
5-238, I.C.A.,
Section 5-238,
state has
Supreme Court
considered Section
Court of
has considered
I.C.A., relating
acknowledging
in the
Dern v.
the case
110 P.
held in
of Dern
18 Idaho
P.
Idaho 358,
and held
acknowledging aa debt
debt and
case of
V. Olsen,
Olsen, 18
358, 110
‘This statute
164,
Ann. Cas.
1912 A,
L.R.A. 1915
1915 B,
1: ‘This
statute recognizes
recognizes two
two
Cas. 1912
1016, Ann.
164, 167,
167, L.R.A.
B, 1016,
A, 1:
It also
methods,
promise. It
the other
other aa promise.
an acknowledgment
acknowledgment and
one an
and the
recognizes two
also recognizes
two
methods, one
'neW'
'continuing’ contract.
'contract,’ one
the other
kinds
other aa 'continuing'
kinds of
of 'contract,’
contract. This
one a
and the
This
a 'new' contract,
contract, and
statute
would be
be complete
purposes of
present action
reading
it
as
it
for the
the purposes
the present
of the
action by
reading
complete for
statute would
as
by
'No
follows:
by
continuing contract
sufficient evidence
of aa continuing
contract by
acknowledgment is
follows: 'No acknowledgment
evidence of
is sufficient
the operation
the same
the case
which to
which
unless the
of the
operation of
of this
to take
out of
this title,
same is
take the
is
case out
title, unless
Wﬁting,’ etc.
in some
A debt
that has
not yet
the statute
contained
yet been
contained in
barred by
statute
some writing,'
etc. A
debt that
been barred
has not
by the
'continuing’ contract
of
within the
the meaning
meaning of
limitations is
contract within
of this
of limitations
this
is undoubtedly
undoubtedly aa 'continuing'
An acknowledgment
in writing
writing of
statute.
the existence
the
of the
of such
contract is
acknowledgment in
existence of
such aa contract
statute. An
is the
contract' Within
'continuing contract'
acknowledgment
within the
the meaning
meaning of
of aa 'continuing
of this
this statute,
acknowledgment of
and
statute, and
simply
fixes aa new
from which
It in
in
run. It
which the
new date
the statute
begins to
limitations begins
date from
statute of
to run.
simply ﬁxes
of limitations
no
is simply
waiver
original contract.
the original
or modifies
Itis
no respect
contract. It
modiﬁes the
respect changes,
alters, or
changes, alters,
simply aawaiver
that portion
limitations which
the
the statute
of
which may
prior to
of limitations
to the
of that
portion of
of the
have run
statute of
run prior
may have
'‘
'ac
'acknowledgment.'‘
knowledgment.
178779 (D.
Cummings
Langroise, 36 F.
123 F.2d
Cir.
F.2d 969
F. Supp.
Idaho 1940),
Cummings v.
969 (9th
Supp. 174,
v. Langroise,36
174, 178–79
aff’d2 123
(9th Cir.
1940), aff'd,
(D. Idaho

1941)
(emphasis added).
1941) (emphasis
added).
that the
the date
the accrual
the breach
Assuming
of the
of the
of contract
contract and
condemnation
inverse condemnation
Assuming that
breach of
and inverse
date of
accrual of

claims
year statute
limitations on
the five
of limitations
on a
contract claim
expired
claim expired
December 5,
statute of
five year
claims is
is December
a contract
1997, the
5, 1997,
December
year statute
limitations on
the four
the inverse
of limitations
on the
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
claim
December 5,
and the
statute of
four year
2002, and
5, 2002,
Parry’s promise,
the
expired
promise, made
prior to
therefore prior
expired December
to the
2001. Parry’s
December 5,
made July
was therefore
2000, was
19, 2000,
July 19,
5, 2001.

expiration
period on
expiration of
the statutory
the contract
the inverse
on the
contract claims
of the
condemnation claims.
inverse condemnation
claims and
and the
claims.
statutory period
Parry’s promise
Applying
the clear
holding of
not to
of Idaho
to assert
of
clear holding
Idaho case
assert aa statute
statute of
promise not
case law,
Applying the
law, Parry’s

if the
limitations
parties could
the statute
the parties
not agree
limitations defense
of
on aa new
extended the
new access,
statute of
defense if
could not
agree on
access, extended
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limitations
the contract
the inverse
limitations on
on the
contract claim
to July
on the
condemnation claim
to July
inverse condemnation
claim to
claim to
and on
2005 and
19, 2005
July 19,
July
19,
Both of
time
long since
the claims
of those
2004. Both
those statutory
since run
periods have
run and
and the
are now
now time
have long
claims are
statutory periods
19, 2004.
barred.
barred.
“only non-statutory
It
worth noting
bar to
It is
in
limitation defense
noting that
that the
the “only
to aa statute
of limitation
statute of
non-statutory bar
defense in
is worth
estoppel.” City
663764,
Idaho
McCall v.
Buxton, 146
the doctrine
146 Idaho
doctrine of
of equitable
Idaho is
Idaho 656,
equitable estoppel.”
is the
v. Buxton,
ocCall
656, 663–64,
City of

201
J.R. Simplot
Int'l, Inc,
Inc., 126
201 P.3d
126 Idaho
Idaho 532,
P.3d 629,
Chemetics Int'l,
63@37 (2009)
Simplot Co.
Co. v.
v. Chemetics
(quoting J.R.
629, 636–37
532,
(2009) (quoting
534,
1039, 1041
not eliminate,
1041 (1994)).
or extend
extend
Equitable estoppel
estoppel does
887 P.2d
does not
eliminate, toll,
P.2d1039,
534, 887
(1994)). Equitable
ml or
the
McCall v.
limitations. City
the statute
146 Idaho
201 P.3d
statute of
of limitations.
at 637
at 664,
Idaho at
P.3d at
v. Buxton,
637 (citing
(citing
Buxton, 146
664, 201
ocCall
City of
Ferro v.
Saint Pius X, 143
it
143 Idaho
149 P.3d
Ferro
Idaho 538,
815 (2006)).
P.3d 813,
v. Society
Rather, it
ofSaintPiusX,
540, 149
813, 815
Society of
538, 540,
(2006)). Rather,
“merely bars
limitations as
from asserting
the statute
“merely
for aa reasonable
statute of
asserting the
of limitations
defense for
time
bars aa party
reasonable time
as a
a defense
party from

truth.” City
after
the party
the truth.”
after the
asserting estoppel
or reasonably
estoppel discovers
could have
discovers or
discovered the
have discovered
reasonably could
party asserting
City

of
McCall v.
Saint Pius
146 Idaho
201 P.3d
Ferro v.
at 664,
at 637
Idaho at
P.3d at
v. Buxton,
637 (citing
v. Society
(citing Ferro
ofSaintPius
Buxton, 146
Society of
ocCall
664, 201
X, 143
143 Idaho
149 P.3d
Idaho 538,
815 (2006)
P.3d 813,
even under
under
(emphasis added)).
Thus, even
added». Thus,
540, 149
813, 815
538, 540,
X,
(2006) (emphasis
circumstances
– which
which circumstances
might establish
in this
that might
not exist
this
equitable estoppel
estoppel 7
circumstances that
circumstances do
establish equitable
exist in
do not
in perpetuity.
case
– the
waived in
limitations defense
the statute
not waived
of limitations
statute of
defense is
case 7
is not
perpetuity.

C.
As aa matter
in perpetuity
limitations defense
the statute
matter of
of the
of limitations
is void
of law,
statute of
waiver of
defense in
void
C. As
a waiver
perpetuity is
law, a
as
against
public
policy.
public
as against
policy.
Party’s promise
Parry’s
purport to
in
limitations does
not to
the statute
not purport
to invoke
invoke the
of limitations
to be
promise not
statute of
does not
be in
Party’s promise
forth aa specific
perpetuity. The
which Parry’s
would
The promise
not set
period during
during which
promise does
set forth
speciﬁc period
promise would
does not
perpetuity.

be effective,
but that
be
that omission
that the
not support
the promise
an argument
intended to
to be
omission does
promise was
argument that
support an
be
does not
was intended
effective, but
everlasting.
everlasting.

if by
it did
it would
Even
be aa perpetual
would be
be void
void as
its language
intend to
to be
Even if
did intend
against
perpetual promise,
language it
as against
promise, it
by its
“may be
public policy.
policy “may
be found
in the
In Idaho,
in the
forth in
the constitution
the
or in
constitution or
public
public policy
and set
set forth
found and
Idaho, public
policy. In
decision.” Stearns
in neither
forth by
neither itit is
statutes,
where itit is
judicial decision.”
or where
sometimes set
set forth
found in
Stearns v.
is found
is sometimes
v.
statutes, or
by judicial
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“Whether aa contract
Williams,
public
240 P.2d
P.2d 833,
72 Idaho
contract is
against public
Idaho 276,
840 (1952).
is against
Williams, 72
276, 287,
287, 240
833, 840
(1952). “Whether

policy is
from all
for the
the court
all the
the facts
determine from
of law
to determine
of each
question of
facts and
and circumstances
circumstances of
each
is a
a question
law for
court to
policy
case.” Quiring
case.”
Stearns v.
944 P.2d
P.2d 695,
Idaho 560,
130 Idaho
701 (1997)
v. Quiring,
v.
(citing Stearns
Quiring v.
560, 566,
566, 944
695, 701
Quiring, 130
(1997) (citing

Williams,
240 P.2d
P.2d 833
72 Idaho
Idaho 276,
833 (1952)).
Williams, 72
276, 240
(1952)).
The
violates public
public policy
The test
for deciding
Whether a
contract violates
test for
deciding whether
follows:
a contract
is as
as follows:
policy is
in determining
The
by courts
determining whether
The usual
Whether aa contract
test applied
contract offends
offends public
applied by
public
usual test
courts in
policy
whether the
the contract
the public
interest is
contract has
to the
public interest
antagonistic to
has a
and is
a
is Whether
is antagonistic
policy and
tendency
if itit isis opposed
the interest
the public,
interest of
to the
an evil;
of the
or has
has a
toward such
such an
a
opposed to
tendency toward
public, or
evil; if
tendency
policy, itit will
will be
the
to offend
offend public
public policy,
even though
though the
declared invalid,
be declared
invalid, even
tendency to
in good
in the
faith and
parties
the public
the
parties acted
no injury
to the
result in
public would
and no
acted in
would result
good faith
injury to
that
the test
not what
particular
be applied
test to
to be
What is
particular instance;
applied is
but that
done but
is not
is actually
instance; the
actually done
which
or
might
be
done
under
the
terms
of
the
contract;
it
is
the
evil
it
might
the
the
the
which may
terms
or
of
evil
done
under
is
be
contract;
may
tendency
that is
the contract
not its
its actual
the public
of the
contract and
to the
public that
and not
actual injury
is
tendency of
injury to
the law
its general
the door
determinative,
to its
general tendency
to
looks to
and closes
door to
closes the
determinative, as
as the
law looks
tendency and
temptation by
to recognize
temptation
refusing to
agreements.
such agreements.
recognize such
by refusing

Quiring
944 P.2d
P.2d 695,
Idaho 560,
130 Idaho
Stearns v.
v. Quiring,
703 (1997)
v. Williams,
(quoting Stearns
Williams,
Quiring v.
560, 568,
568, 944
695, 703
Quiring, 130
(1997) (quoting
72
policy are
240 P.2d
72 Idaho
at 283,
P.2d at
at 839).
that are
Contracts that
Idaho at
public policy
are void
are
void because
Violate public
because they
283, 240
839). Contracts
they violate
in the
it found
the court
the parties
the position
them. Quiring
unenforceable and
parties in
to leave
position it
and the
unenforceable
leave the
found them.
001111 is
is to
v.
Quiring v.

Quiring,
944 P.2d
at 568,
P.2d at
at 703.
Idaho at
130 Idaho
703.
568, 944
Quiring, 130
The
public policy
limitations is
The public
the statutes
of limitations
clear:
statutes of
is clear:
underlying the
policy underlying

A statute
limit for
ﬁling aa
A
by its
time limit
limitation is,
its very
for filing
of limitation
deﬁnitive time
statute of
nature, aa definitive
very nature,
is, by
“are
limitation “are
initiate aaparticular
complaint
particular type
complaint to
to initiate
of action.
of limitation
action. Statutes
Statutes of
type of
designed
uncertainty With
with regards
to future
to promote
promote stability
and avoid
regards to
avoid uncertainty
designed to
future
stability and
litigation.”
litigation.”
Bonner County
Bonner
1258 (Ct.
App. 2014)
Idaho 291,
156 Idaho
323 P.3d
P.3d 1252,
v. Cunningham,
Cunningham, 156
1252, 1258
2014)
291, 297,
297, 323
County v.
(Ct. App.
In specific
(quoting
Dep't of
Transp., 128
1, 44 (1996)).
128 Idaho
Idaho 439,
Wadsworth v.
915 P.2d
speciﬁc
v. Dep't
P.2d1,
(quoting Wadsworth
442, 915
0fTransp.,
439, 442,
(1996)). In

relation
the Idaho
relation to
to an
an inverse
condemnation claim,
inverse condemnation
Idaho Supreme
Supreme Court
has noted:
noted:
Court has
claim, the
Public
that inverse
the conclusion
Public policy
condemnation claims
inverse condemnation
favors the
conclusion that
subject
claims be
be subject
policy favors
”The
to
period of
limitations. “The policy
limitations is
to some
of limitations.
behind statutes
of limitations
some period
statutes of
is
policy behind
protection
protection of
the courts
protection of
of defendants
against stale
of the
against
defendants against
stale claims,
and protection
courts against
claims, and
resources.”
needless
expenditures
of
resources.”
Johnson
v.
Pischke,
108
Idaho
397,
402,
of
Johnson
Idaho
needless expenditures
v. Pischke, 108
700
397, 402, 700
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P.2d
promote stability
limitation are
are designed
and
P.2d 19,
25 (1985).
Statutes of
of limitation
to promote
designed to
stability and
19, 25
(1985). Statutes
litigation.
with regards
avoid
uncertainty with
regards to
to future
avoid uncertainty
future litigation.
Wadsworth
Dep't of
Transportation, 128
4 (1996).
128 Idaho
Idaho 439,
P.2d 1,
Wadsworth v.
915 P.2d
v. Dep’t
442, 915
QfTransportation,
439, 442,
(1996).
1, 4
In this
stating he
after Parry
letter stating
the Days
sixteen years
In
ﬁled suit
he would
wrote his
this case,
suit sixteen
would
his letter
Parry wrote
case, the
years after
Days filed

not
parties could
if the
limitations if
not raise
the statute
the parties
not agree
the
of limitations
agree on
on aa new
statute of
raise the
new access.
access. Plainly,
could not
Plainly, the
“take”,
Days
in relation
relation to
are now
raising stale
not only
the December
stale claims,
alleged “take”,
to the
December 5,
now raising
1997 alleged
claims, not
Days are
only in
5, 1997
in relation
that were
in 1967.
but in
breaches of
relation to
are no
contracts that
no
to alleged
alleged breaches
of contracts
but
Witnesses are
were executed
executed in
1967. Witnesses

longer
in relation
what occurred
relation to
available to
the 1967
and the
the same
longer available
to testify
to the
same is
about what
1967 contracts,
occurred in
is
contracts, and
testify about
largely
the events
related to
of the
to December
December 5,
events related
true of
1997.
largely true
5, 1997.
Idaho
but other
jurisdictions that
other jurisdictions
this issue,
that have
Idaho lacks
have
addressing this
lacks case
case law
law specifically
speciﬁcally addressing
issue, but
that such
the statute
the effect
limitations defense
reviewed
waiver of
of limitations
of the
determined that
effect of
of aa waiver
statute of
defense have
have determined
such
reviewed the
in perpetuity.
waiver is
from
limitations period
the statute
the waiver
not in
of limitations
extends the
period from
waiver extends
waiver
statute of
is not
Rather, the
perpetuity. Rather,

either
period or
waiver was
was made.
v.
limitation period
from the
either the
the end
the limitation
the date
the waiver
Munter V.
of the
or from
end of
date the
made. See,
See, Munter
134 F.2d
232 F.2d
Lankford,
Fargo Bank
Bank &
F.2d
F.2d 373
Union Trust
Trust Co.,
Titus v.
v. Wells
Wells Fargo
& Union
Co. , 134
373 (D.C.Cir.
Lankford, 232
(D.C.Cir. 1956);
1956); Titus
th
(5th
223
Cir.
Noel v.
Baskin, 131
National Bank of
La
223 (5
131 F.2d
231 (D.C.
Circuit 1942);
Cir. 1943);
F.2d 231
First NationalBank
v. Baskin,
(DC. Circuit
1942); First
ofLa
1943); Noel

Junta v.
Mock, 203
Ahmad v.
Apartments, Inc,
Inc., 28
272 (Colo.
28 A.3d
P. 272
Terrace Apartments,
203 P.
A.3d
Junta
Eastpines Terrace
v. Mock,
v. Eastpines
1921). Ahmad
(Colo. 1921).
11 (Md.App.
264 (Conn.App.
A.2d 264
V. Williams,
855 A.2d
(Conn.App. 2004).
Williams, 855
(Md.App. 2011);
2004).
Haggelty v.
2011); Haggerty
Parry’s promise
Parry’s
perpetuity. Nor
in perpetuity.
it set
forth
that itit is
not state
Nor does
intended to
to last
state that
promise does
set forth
last in
does not
is intended
does it

aa date
which time
promise is
time the
the promise
the extent
extent the
the Days
attempt to
longer effective.
at which
no longer
To the
to argue
effective. To
date at
is no
argue
Days attempt
that
promise should
that argument
that the
the promise
against
reject that
should reject
should have
argument as
this Court
have aa perpetual
Court should
perpetual effect,
as against
effect, this
“promote stability
Doing so
with regards
and avoid
public policy.
regards to
to future
public
avoid uncertainty
future
so would
would “promote
uncertainty with
stability and
policy. Doing

litigation”, which
litigation”,
policy behind
behind the
limitations as
the Bonner
Banner
the public
the statute
which is
statute of
of limitations
as stated
stated by
public policy
is the
by the

County
supra. Rejecting
perpetual promise
promise argument
prevent the
litigation of
the litigation
Rejecting aaperpetual
of
argument would
also prevent
would also
court, supra.
County court,
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what
against aa very
what are
large and
are clearly
and needless
stale claims,
as well
well as
as protect
protect this
this Court
needless
Court against
claims, as
clearly stale
very large
expenditure
judicial resources.
of judicial
expenditure of
resources.
Parry’s promise
D.
was subject
year statute
limitations pursuant
the five
pursuant to
statute of
to I.C.
to the
of limitations
D. Parry’s
promise was
ﬁve year
I.C. §§
subject to
5-21
5-216.
6.
Parry’s promise
As
written agreement
not to
the statute
limitations
to raise
of limitations
agreement or
or promise,
As aa written
promise not
raise the
statute of
promise, Parry’s
“contract, obligation
defense
was itself
if the
not agree
itself aa “contract,
the parties
obligation or
parties could
on aa new
or
new access
defense if
could not
agree on
access was

writing.” I.C.
5-216. As
in writing.”
liability
that
alleging that
As such,
an instrument
claim alleging
instrument in
I.C. §§ 5-216.
founded upon
upon an
liability founded
such, aa claim

Parry
breached his
would have
be brought
in this
Within five
to be
brought within
or in
this case,
promise would
had to
ﬁve years,
have had
his promise
case, by
Parry breached
years, or
by
July
2005.
19, 2005.
July 19,
in
Idaho
when aa promise
not to
the statute
of limitations,
that when
to assert
Idaho recognizes
promise is
assert the
statute of
made not
limitations, as
recognizes that
is made
as in

original cause
the original
the statute
the statute
limitations has
of
of limitations
on the
of action,
this case,
this
before the
statute of
statute of
has run
run on
cause of
action, the
case, before
44
limitations
Kelly v.
Leachman, 33 Idaho
from the
the date
the promise.
limitations begins
P. 44
of the
to run
Idaho 629,
promise. Kelly
date of
v. Leachman,
33 P.
begins to
run from
629, 33

(1893).
(1893).

At least
that aapromise,
other jurisdiction
At
jurisdiction has
promise, agreement
held that
or contract
contract to
to
least one
agreement or
one other
has also
also held
waive the
limitations defense
the statute
the statute
itself subject
limitations. See,
of limitations.
of limitations
to the
statute of
defense is
subject to
statute of
waive
is itself
See,
th
(5th
(“Even if
American Employers
Employers Insurance
Insurance Co.
Cir.
the
ifthe
Cir. 1968)
F.2d 551,
American
391 F.2d
555 (5
Co. v.
v. Carney,
1968) (“Even
551, 555
Carney, 391

letter
be considered
plead the
the statute
not to
the statute
letter were
limitations the
of limitations
to plead
to be
promise not
statute also
were to
considered as
statute of
also
as a
a promise
promise as
well as
Adams v.
runs
notes.”); Adams
the promise
the notes.”);
against the
10 So.
runs against
as well
as the
v. Cameron,
S0. 506,
507 (Ala.
Cameron, 10
1892)
(Ala. 1892)
506, 507

(“It was
(“It
promise not
plead the
not to
the statute
the statute
to plead
of limitations,
against that
that
and the
statute runs
limitations, and
statute of
was only
runs against
only aapromise
itself”).
promise as
bill single
the bill
single itself.”).
well as
against the
promise
as well
as against
Parry’s July
that
the five
limitations to
Applying
of limitations
to Parry’s
means that
ﬁve year
promise means
statute of
2000 promise
Applying the
19, 2000
year statute
July 19,

the
until July
that waiver
the Days
the statute
The five
limitations until
on that
of the
of limitations
ﬁve year
could rely
2005. The
waiver of
statute of
19, 2005.
Days could
rely on
year
July 19,
Parry’s promise
period has
bound by
by Parry’s
promise and
the State
the Days
longer bound
no longer
cannot assert
period
has expired,
and the
assert
State is
is no
expired, the
Days cannot
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Days’ claims
Parry’s promise.
that
by Parry’s
that the
the State
the Days’
therefore
of the
Dismissal of
State is
estopped by
promise. Dismissal
is estopped
claims is
is therefore

required.
required.
III.
111.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
A
promise to
which promise
A promise
forth aa specific
the statute
not set
to waive
of limitations,
specific
set forth
statute of
promise does
limitations, which
waive the
does not

In this
that meant
time frame,
limitations period.
the statutory
time
period. In
meant
this case,
extends the
period by
one limitations
frame, only
statutory period
case, that
only extends
by one

that
promise made
that based
the statute
limitations expired
on aapromise
on July
of limitations
expired on
on July
statute of
based on
made on
2000, the
19, 2000,
19,
July 19,
July 19,
2005
the contract
the inverse
on the
contract claims
expired on
on July
2004 on
on the
condemnation claim.
inverse condemnation
and expired
claim.
2005 on
claims and
19, 2004
July 19,

if itit did,
it would
By
promise does
be perpetuaL
perpetual, but
but even
would be
not purport
its terms,
the promise
to be
against
even if
purport to
be against
does not
terms, the
did, it
By its
Parry’s promise
the
policy of
was subject
the public
itself was
of this
to avoid
public policy
state to
stale claims.
claims. Moreover,
this state
avoid stale
promise itself
subject
Moreover, Parry’s
limitations period.
For all
all of
to
period. For
of
of them,
of limitations
of these
to aa five
these reasons,
and any
ﬁve year
statute of
dismissal of
reasons, and
them, dismissal
year statute
any of

Days’ claims
the
the Days’
appropriate.
claims is
is appropriate.
th
15th
RESPECTFULLY
day
SUBMITTED this
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
this 15
of July
2017.
July 2017.
day of

/s/ Chris
Kronberg
Chris Kronberg
/s/
CHRIS
KRONBERG
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy
General
Attorney General
Deputy Attorney
Idaho
Department
Transportation Department
Idaho Transportation
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I hereby certify that on this 151h day of July 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
DEmail:
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Signed: 7/28/2017 05:06 PM

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
IN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
OF
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN

BENNETT G.
BENNETT
TRUSTEE OF
AS TRUSTEE
OF
G. DAY,
DAY, AS
B OF
THE DONALD
DAY AND
AND
TRUST
DONALD M.
TRUST B
OF THE
M. DAY
DAY FAMILY
FAMILY TRUST;
MARJORIE
MARJORIE D.
D. DAY
TRUST;
DAN E.
JOHN
HOLCOMB
JOHN F.
F. DAY;
E. DAY;
DAY; DAN
DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD
ROAD HOLDINGS,
limited
an Idaho
Idaho limited
HOLDINGS, LLC,
LLC, an
DAY JACOBS;
liability
DONNA DAY
liability company;
JACOBS;
company; DONNA
and
DAVID R.
R. DAY,
and DAVID
DAY,
Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,

CV01-16-20313
Case
No. CV01-16-20313
Case No.

AND ORDER
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORDER
DECISION AND
RE:
MITIGATION OF
DAMAGES
RE: MITIGATION
OF DAMAGES

vs.
VS.
STATE
STATE OF
IDAHO
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
Defendant.

THIS
before the
parties’ cross
MATTER came
THIS MATTER
Partial Summary
the Court
the parties’
for Partial
Motions for
on the
Court on
came before
cross Motions
Summary
Judgment.
A hearing
hearing was
the parties
wherein the
argument on
held on
on June
parties presented
on
Judgment. A
presented argument
June 14,
was held
2017, wherein
14, 2017,
their
parties filed
their respective
that hearing,
the parties
Following that
including aa
Motions. Following
ﬁled numerous
numerous motions,
respective Motions.
motions, including
hearing, the
request
was granted,
The request
for aa status
the parties
on July
parties
conference. The
request was
request for
and on
status conference.
granted, and
2017, the
12, 2017,
July 12,
agreed
pending issues
presented in
in the
all the
the pending
the cross
having aa ruling
ruling issued
Motions
to defer
on all
defer having
agreed to
cross Motions
issued on
issues presented
for
A hearing
mitigation of
Partial Summary
hearing
for Partial
for the
the issue
regarding mitigation
of damages.
except for
issue regarding
damages. A
Judgment, except
Summary Judgment,
is
which time
re-argued along
time the
remaining issues
Will be
for August
the remaining
along
is currently
at which
set for
August 14,
issues will
be re-argued
currently set
2017, at
14, 2017,
with the
with
that have
the other
the Court
the following
following
other Motions
Motions that
since been
ﬁled. Accordingly,
Court issues
have since
been filed.
issues the
Accordingly, the
Memorandum
mitigation of
With respect
the issue
of mitigation
of damages.
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
to the
Order solely
and Order
respect to
issue of
damages.
solely with
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BACKGROUND‘1
BACKGROUND

2
acres2 of
This
what
This is
involving about
is an
an inverse
condemnation and
of contract
contract case
of What
inverse condemnation
and breach
breach of
about 307
case involving
307 acres

Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs currently
Plaintiffs claim
the property
claim is
of the
is landlocked
at issue,
landlocked property.
own 100%
100% of
currently own
property. Plaintiffs
property at
issue,
Isaac’s Canyon,
in Isaac’s
in Ada
which is
the city
which
is located
of the
of Boise
Boise and
southeast of
and in
Ada County.
located in
County.
Canyon, southeast
city of

Department’s predecessor,
In the
In
with Idaho
predecessor,
the 1960s,
through several
Transportation Department’s
agreements with
Idaho Transportation
several agreements
19605, through
3
Days3 agreed
the
property for
their propeny
for the
the construction
(1the Days
Interstate (Iof their
to give
of aa new
construction of
give up
new Interstate
some of
agreed to
up some

ITD and
80N).
predecessor would
would ultimately
ultimately establish
its predecessor
The Days
an access
to
establish an
and its
road to
believed ITD
access road
80N). The
Days believed

the
property.
the Day
Day property.

4
1997,4 at
However,
time the
the Isaacs
which time
at which
on December
December 5,
Isaacs Canyon
However, on
Canyon
5, 1997,

it was
Interchange
was clear
property did
the Day
not have
Interchange project
direct
project was
clear the
did not
have direct
was substantially
substantially complete,
complete, it
Day propeny

access
public road.
the public
to the
road.
access to

On
into aa real
the Day
R. Craig
Craig Groves
On December
real estate
entered into
December 2,
and R.
estate purchase
purchase
Groves entered
family and
2005, the
Day family
2, 2005,
In December
and
pay $10,010,000
property. In
for the
the Day
to pay
December
and sale
agreement. Groves
sale agreement.
agreed to
Groves agreed
$10,010,000 for
Day property.

million
2008,
purchase of
the Day
the buyers
the purchase
after approximately
of the
on the
defaulted on
approximately $4.9
$4.9 million
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to the
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_____________________________
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Mr. Fredric Shoemaker, Esq.
Mr. Jason Mau, Esq.
Mr. Slade Sokol, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, PA
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 950
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ssokol@greenerlaw .com
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Clerk of the District Court
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1. I am retired from the title insurance industry after providing title and escrow services for
over 48 years. During those years I served as a title officer, commercial escrow closer,
vice president, founding member and was on the board of clirectors of a title company. I
participated in the preparation of title work and made decisions regarding the insurability
of thousands of requests for title insurance. In the course of making those decisions I was
required to read and understand recorded documents to determine the effect such
documents would have in issuing a title insurance policy. The opinions I am expressing
in this affidavit are based on my experience in the title insurance industry, personal
knowledge and review of documents identified herein.
2. I have reviewed the affidavit of Glen Lorensen, Senior Title Officer for Pioneer Title
Company of Boise and the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title. I disagree with Mr.
Lorensen' s conclusion that the Day Property is not insurable and therefore unmarketable
due to a lack of access to a public road for the following reasons:

a. Mr. Lorensen states the property is uninsurable due to a lack of access;
however, I have reviewed the attached policy of title insurance issued on May 6,

2006 by Lawyers Title Insurance Company insuring the purchaser by Deed from
the Day family to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc. in the amount of

$10,010,000.00. I have carefully read the policy and determined the policy does
not make any exception for a lack of access. Along with the Deed (a true and
correct copy is attached hereto) recorded from the Day family to the insured party
for the same property that Mr. Lorensen claims is uninsurable, a purchase money
mortgage (true and correct copy attached) was concurrently recorded in favor of
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the Day family as mortgagee in the amount of$6,500,000.00. The policy of title
insurance was issued years after the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) 60
foot floating easement was recorded. Clearly, Lawyers Title Insurance Company
found the property to be marketable and insurable. The decision by one or two
title insurance companies to list exceptions to coverage simply means that they
are not willing to accept what they perceive as risks. Other companies may not
see the same issues as risks and are willing to issue title insurance, as is the case
with the policy issued by Lawyers Title Insurance Company.
b. Mr. Lorensen concludes the Highway Easement Deed dated April 6, 2000
(Instrument No. 100044826) from the Federal Highway Administration to the
Idaho Transportation Department only states it is for access to private property
and does not state which private property and that therefore the easement is not
appurtenant to the Day property. After reviewing the deed creating the floating
easement, it is clear that the purpose of the easement was specifically for the
benefrt of the "adjoining property owner" and refers to an ''underlying property
owner". The deed goes on to state that in the event the location of the easement is
detrimental to the underlying property owner, the State will be responsible for the
cost of realignment and construction and that the realignment will "provide the
same or equivalent

~to

the adjoining property owner ..... " The deed also

states that "In the event the adjoining property owner wishes to develop its
property and cannot come to a fmal or preliminary agreement with the underlying
property owner, then the Department or its assigns may use the alignment as
shown crosshatched ... . .. If the road is constructed on an alignment other than
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that shown as crosshatched on Exlnbit A, the aligrunent will provide the same or
equivalent accessibility to the adjoining property owner... Further, the purpose of
the easement deed was to provide access to the adjoining land owner because the
lTD constructed the interstate highway and had taken away the prior access road
used by the Day family. Those provisions tell me the easement was specifically
created for the Day property and could be reasonably construed for title insurance
purposes to be appurtenant thereto. Even if the easement could not be considered
appurtenant for title insurance purposes, the FHWAIITD deed is a "Highway
Easement Deed" creating an easement specifically for "highway" purposes and
was granted to lTD for the right of way of a highway to provide access. In
discussing the location of utilities in the "original road right of way", the deed
refers to it as "public right of way". The easement is owned by a public agency
for highway purposes, specifically to provide access. For title insurance purposes,
there is no reason be believe that the Days could not use the easement to access
their property.
c. Mr. Lorensen states that the legal description of the FHWA/lTD Deed
(Instrument No. 100044826) does not reach or connect to the Day Property. He
believes that the FHWA/lTD Deed pertains only to the "adjoining landowner",
which he thinks is the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) because of
Instrument No. 8005940, which deeded the northerly 25 feet of the Day Property
to ACHD. I have examined the deed from the Days to ACHD and found that
ACHD accepted the grant as a dedicated public right-of-way. A true and correct
copy of the deed is attached hereto. I therefore conclude that the lTD floating 60
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foot easement connects to a public right-of-way which connects to the Day
property. Therefore, for title insurance purposes there is no gap in the ability to
access the lTD easement from the Day property.
d. Mr. Lorensen states the only portion of the lTD easement that actually
connects to the NE quarter of Section 19 is a strip of land 24.9 x 30 feet, the
location of which would require (for access from the north) an immediate 90
degree transition from traveling directly east along the southerly boundary of the
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and the Southwest quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 18 on the lTD easement to continue directly south to
the Northeast quarter of Section 19. Mr. Lorensen concludes that it would appear
to not provide adequate access to the property. My conclusion is that the
connecting point of the lTD easement is 24.9 feet x 60 feet since it is a floating
easement the width can be 30 feet on either side of the end point. Whether or not
it provides adequate access to the property is not for a title officer to determine.
The fact is that it does provide access which is the intent of the deed. Mr.
Lorensen makes the same argument at the other end of the access easement where
it is adjacent to Eisenman Road, claiming that no width has been identified for the
easement. The width of the easement is 60 feet, and the highway station just
identifies where the 60 foot easement ends.

e. Mr. Lorensen states that the United States conveyed 15 acres of land underlying
the easement to B. W. Inc. without reservation of the easement. I see no need to
reserve the easement in the deed because B .W. Inc. acquired title subject to the 60
foot easement that was already in existence at the time of the title transfer. As
AFFIDAVIT OF KEN FRANKLIN- 5
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evidenced by the recording of the Patent from the United States to B. W., Inc. for
fifteen acres, Pioneer Title Company prepared a title commitment for that sale
under its order number P 196231. True and correct copies of the patents from the
United States to B. W., Inc. are attached hereto.
3. Based upon the fact that Lawyers Title Insurance Company was able to issue its policy
of title insurance for the 2006 sale ofthe Day Property without taking exception to a lack
of access or the unmarketability, and based on my conclusions as above stated, I believe
that Pioneer Title Company's and Alliance Title Company's refusal to insure title to be a
decision made by their title officers that merely reflects a risk they are unwilling to take.
In my opinion the issues raised by Mr. Lorensen do not provide a basis to conclude that
the Day Property does not have insurable or marketable title.
Further your Affiant sayeth not.

~

DATED thi~ day of July 2017.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me

Residing: Boise, Idaho

this~ J~

t

Commission Expires: 3/29/2022
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000743

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31 51 day of Ju]y 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
0 Email: fshoerrnke!@greenerlaw.com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Issued
No.:

with

Policy

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
SCHEDULE A
Amount of Insurance: $10,010,000.00

Policy No.: A75-2521119
File No.: LT05-11577

Date of Policy: May 23, 2006

at 4:25pm

1. Name of Insured:

EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation

2. The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is
fee simple
and is at date of policy vested in:

EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation

3. The land referred to in this policy is described in the said instrument, is situated in the
County of Ada
, State of Idaho, and is identified as follows:

See Exhibit B

Exhibit B
PARCEL I
Township 2 North Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County/ Idaho.
Section 19: NE 1/4
1

Except those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July ~~ 1936,
as Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10,
1967 as Instrument No. 677552 records of said County.
1

(Continued)
Countersigned: ___________________________________________
Authorized Officer or Agent
Linda Fultz
This Policy Is Valid Only If Schedule B is Attached
American Land Title Association Owner's Policy Schedule A

(Rev. 10/17/92)

els
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE A (continuedf

LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued)

And Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed
recorded February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.

PARCEL II
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: SE 1/4
Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

000746

File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B

This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will not pay costs,
attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of:

1. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but
which could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or which may be asserted by
persons in possession, or claiming to be in possession, thereof.
2. Easements, liens, encumbrances, or claims thereof, which are not shown by the public
records.
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other
facts which a correct survey of the land would disclose, and which are not shown by the
public records.
4. Any lien, or right to a lien, imposed by the law for services, labor, or material
heretofore or hereafter furnished, which lien, or right to a lien, is not shown by the
public records.
5.

(a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts
authorizing the issuance thereof; (c) Indian treaty or aboriginal rights, including, but
not limited to, easements or equitable servitudes; or, (d) water rights, claims or title·
to water, whether or not the matters excepted under (a), (b), (c) or (d) are shown by the
public records.

6. Taxes or assessments which are not now payable or which are not shown as existing liens by
the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or
by the public records; proceedings by a public agency which may result in taxes or
assessments, or notices of such proceedings, whether or not shown by the records of such
agency or by the public records.
7. Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or construction charges for sewer,
water, electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other utilities unless shown as
an existing lien by the public records.
8. General taxes for the year 2005, which are a lien, payable on or before December 20 of
said year and not delinquent until after said date.
9. Easement adjacent to the highway right of way for relocation of all irrigation and/or
drainage ditches and structures granted by deed to the State of Idaho recorded July 2,
1936, as Instrument No. 170934, records of said County.
(Continued)

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy - 1970 - Form B (Rev. 10-17-70 and 10-17-84)
Form 1005-6 Schedule A
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B (continued)

EXCEPTIONS (continued)

10. Agreement between Emma N. Day a widow, and Ernest E. Day, Robert L. Day, and Donald
M. Day, And the State of Idaho, Department of Highways which, among other things,
extinguishes all access rights and all easements of access from the property to the
highways described therein recorded November 22, 1961, as Instrument No. 515882,
records of said County.
11. Rights of the State of Idaho to all access rights between the right of way of the
highway and the contiguous land as granted by deed recorded Nove~er 10, 1967, as
Instrument No. 677552, records of said County.
12. Lack of a right of access, if any, to that portion of the land lying North and East
of the Highway as the same affects the NE 1/4 of Said Section 19.
13. Right of Way Easement for communication and other facilities and incidentals thereto
in favor of THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY recorded March 22,
1985, as Instrument No. 8515402, and amended and recorded November 27, 1985 as
Instrument No. 8562748, records of said County.
14. Easement for telecommunication facilities and incidentals thereto in favor of US WEST
COMMUNICIATIONS, INC., recorded December 22, 1992, as Instrument No. 9288756, records
of said County.
15. Matters shown or disclosed by Record of Survey No. 3503, Isaac's Canyon Interchange
Survey No. 1 prepared by Porters Land Surveying and recorded April 10, 1996, as
Instrument No. 96029720, records of said County.
16. The interest, if any, of the spouse of JOHN F. DAY if married on December 29, 1998
and matters that might be disclosed by a search of the records against her name.
17. The interest, if any, of the spouse of DAN E. DAY if married on December 29, 1998 and
matters that might be disclosed by a search of the records against her name.
(Continued)

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B (continued)

EXCEPTIONS (continued)

18. A mortgage to secure payment of a note for $6,500,000.00, and any other amounts as
therein provided,
Recorded:
May 23, 2006 as Instrument No. 106081744, of Official Records
Dated:
May 15, 2006
Mortgagor: EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC.
Mortgagee: TRUST B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST created by
instrument dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest;
JOHN F. DAY as to an undivided one-fourth interest; DAN E. DAY as to an
undivided one-fourth interest; BENNETT G. DAY an undivided one-ninth
interest as his separate property; DONNA DAY JACOBS an undivided
one-ninth interest as her separate property and DAVID R. DAY an undivided
one-ninth interest as his separate property

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO
AMOUNT 12.00
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WARRANTY DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, TRUSTB ofthe DONALDM.DAYand MARJORIE D.
DAY FAMILY TRUST created by instrument dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided onesixth interest; JOHN F. DAY as to an undivided one-fourth interest; DAN E. DAY as to an undivided
one-fourth interest; BENNEIT G. DAY as to an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate
property; DONNA DAY JACOBS as to an undivided one-ninth interest as her separate property; and
DAVID R. DAY as to an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property, whose address is c/o
Bohner Law Office, Boise, Idaho, collectively referred to herein as Grantor, hereby CONVEYS,
GRANTS, BARGAINS and WARRANTS TO EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, whose address is 6223 North Discovery Way, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713,
collectively referred to herein as Grantee, all of the following described real property, situated in
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, to-wit:
PARCELl:
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada
County, Idaho.
Section 19: NE 1/4
EXCEPT those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho
by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as Instrument No. 170934 in
Book 217 ofDeeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10,
1967 as Instrument No. 677552, records of said County.
AND EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada
County Highway District by deed recorded February 4, 1980 as
Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II:
Township 2 North, Range3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada
County, Idaho.
·
Section 19: SE l/4
EXCEPT that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County
Highway District by deed recorded February 4, 1980 as Instrument
No. 8005941, records of said County.
TOGETHER with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders,
including water rights, if any, rents, issues and profits thereof; and all estate, right, title, and
interest in and to the property, as well in law as in equity, of the Grantor, except as to current year
taxes and easements of record.
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TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said premises with their appurtenances unto the
said Grantee, their heirs and assigns forever, and the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and
with the said Grantee that they are the owners in fee simple of said premises and that they are
free from all encumbrances except as'stated above in this Deed. Grantor further covenants and
agrees that they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
The Trustee of the Grantor Trust who signs this Deed hereby certifies that this
Deed and the transfer represented thereby was authorized by the Trust and signs said Deed with
such authority.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor have caused their names to be hereunto
affixed on the date indicated in the notarial acknowledgments which are a part hereof.
TRUST B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D.
DAY FAMILY TRUST created by instrument dated

March 24, 1977

STATE OF IDAHO )
)
County of Ada
)

ss.

.dt

On this /~day of May, 2006, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said State, personally appeared BENNETT G. DAY, known to me to be the Trustee of
the TRUST B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST created by
instrument dated March 24, 1977, the person that executed the above instrument on behalf of
said Trust, and acknowledged to me that said Trust executed the same.
WARRANTY DEED- 2
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seal the day,,,,aRfl,xear first above writte~.
····\~i R. co'',,_,
~·
....·,..~ ......... '4fA ##
.

....

• •• ~..... '-

.:' L"'v •••

i

.., '

•

I

•

~OTA~

v~

,.

\

'

a*
{~ P -·- cr :} * :i
:

NO!~

PUB IC for ,oCJ ,o
~
Res1dmg at
Yb.er•dta~ .
My Commission Expires:.; /6~01:?.

_

.l..... i
'•,..,,,,
-1rl1••••••••
OF \~ "''.
,,,..........
u>·••• Ust.\

\

•.?>··

..........,.:-

.t

.-"'

'''~Vi\"~o

STATE OF C*L:IFOIU*A
County of

)

~

I\J0r-

ss:

On this 131PJ day of May, 2006,, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, personally appeared JOHN F. DAY, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year first above written.

KAREN L WEYBRJGHT
Nurary Public
Srar~: of Idaho

STATE OF IDAHO )
)
County of Ada
)

ss:

~day

On this
of May, 2006, , before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, personally appeared DAN E. DAY, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal the day and year first above written.

...,............,.,

••• ~i R. coA_,,,
...... ~ ••••••••• ."7<)) ,,,
~... (),«:; •••
•••• if> \

:,:

: • ~0 TA l?y ••

:• *::•
:

\

-·- c I'

\• ~>us\..\

":ou>··
.... .?- •

•~

:

I* :

•

., .....

I'

~

•..........,
"
. ., A/,.................
?~~

NOTARYP
Residing at-+~~~;.c..A."""-'~r.c....:..---+.-==::....;:::~=--:-:=-
My Commission Expires:_--..=~""-"~~.=..~~.a::::;.....;__

.....

,,,,,,,,,,,,
li OF \~ r.•'"

WARRANTY DEED- 3

000753

.. •

~

:

STATE OF IDAHO )
)
)
County of Ada

ss:

/(~/fL

.

. On this
day of May, 2006, , before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for saitl State, personally appeared BENNETT G. DAY, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

)
)
)

County of Ada

ss:

L;f:fJ_

On this J
day of May, 2006, , before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, personally appeared DONNA DAY JACOBS, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that
she executed the same.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
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On this
day of May, 2006,, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, personally appeared DAVID R. DAY, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
•• ~o*-··~ay and yearftrst above written. ~/'"~•
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After Recording
Return to:
Michael T. Spink
Spink Butler, LLP
P.O. Box639
Boise, ID 83701
FOR RECORDING INFORMATION

MORTGAGE

l~ay

THIS MORTGAGE (the "Mortgage") is made this
of May, 2006, by and between
Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., an Idaho corporation, whose address is 6223 N. Discovery Way,
Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713 ("Mortgagor"), and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day
Family Trust created by instrument dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest; John F.
Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Dan E. Day as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Bennett G.
Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate property; Donna Day Jacobs an undivided one-ninth
interest as her separate property and David R. Day an undivided one-ninth interest as his separate
property, whose address is c/o the law office of Anthony Bohner, Boise, Idaho ("Mortgagee").
WITNESSETH:
That Mortgagor, for the purpose of securing the debt and obligations hereinafter referred to, with
interest thereon, and the performance of the agreement and covenants herein contained, does by these
presents, jointly and severally, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL, CONVEY, WARRANTY, CONFIRM AND
MORTGAGE unto the Mortgagee, and its heirs, successors and assigns, the following described real
estate situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho. to-wit:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof;
together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging
including, without limitation, water and water rights, irrigation apparatus and fixtures, rents, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, and interests in land lying within the right-of-way of any road adjoining the real
estate (together the "Mortgaged Estate") to have and hold forever;
That Mortgagor and Mortgagee ~cknowledge and agree that this Mortgage shall be released
upon Mortgagor's payment in full of all amounts due under that certain Promissory Note dated May 15,
2006 between Mortgagor and Mortgagee in the principal amount of Six Million Five Hundred Thousand
and No/100 Dollars ($6,500,000.00), plus any future advances made by Mortgagee to Mortgagor, plus
interest.
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE MORTGAGE, Mortgagor agrees:
1. To pay when due the principal on the indebtedness evidenced by the Promissory Note ("Note"),
and all other sums as provided in the Note in immediately available funds without notice, demand,
counterclaim, setoff, deduction or·defense and without abatement, suspension, deferment,
diminution or reduction.
2. To pay when due all claims for labor performed and materials furnished to the Mortgaged Estate;
to comply with the laws, ordinances, regulations, covenants, conditions and restrictions now or
hereafter affecting the Mortgaged Estate or any part thereof; not to commit or permit any waste or
deterioration of the Mortgaged Estate, and to keep the Mortgaged Estate in good condition and
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repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; and not to commit, suffer or permit any
act to be done in or upon the Mortgaged Estate in violation of law, ordinance or regulations.
3. That Mortgagor has good, absolute and fee simple title to the Mortgaged Estate and Mortgagor is
lawfully seized and possessed pf the Mortgaged Estate and every part thereof and has the right
and authority to convey the Mortgaged Estate as security for the obligations of Mortgagor secured
hereby as herein provided and Mortgagor shall forever warrant and defend the title to the
Mortgaged Estate and the Mortgagee against all claims and demands of all persons
whomsoever.
4. To use all good faith efforts to insure the Mortgaged Estate against loss by fire or other casualty
for full insurable value of the Mortgaged Estate and without co-insurance of any kind. All policies
of insurance shall be issued in the name of Mortgagor with loss payable clauses reflecting
Mortgagee's interest hereunder. Mortgagor agrees that should Mortgagor fail to keep the
Mortgaged Estate so insured, Mortgagee may so insure the Mortgaged Estate at the expense of
Mortgagor, but Mortgagee is not under obligation to provide any such insurance. The amount so
paid by Mortgagee shall be added to and be deemed a part of the indebtedness secured by this
Mortgage and shall bear interest at the adjusted short-term rate of interest charged by the largest
commercial bank in Boise, Idaho on the date such interest begins to accrue ('Default Rate") and
shall be immediately due and payable in full by Mortgagor.
5. To appear and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights or powers of Mortgagee and to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of
title and attorney fees in a reasonable sum, in any such action or proceeding in which Mortgagee
may appear.
·
6. That if Mortgagee is made a party defendant to any litigation concerning this Mortgage or the
Mortgaged Estate or any part thereof or interest therein, or the occupancy thereof by Mortgagor
(except to the extent such claim or litigation arises out of the acts of Mortgagee), then Mortgagor
shall indemnify, defend and hold Mortgagee harmless in any such litigation, whether or not such
litigation is prosecuted to judgment. If Mortgagee commences .an action against Mortgagor to
enforce any of the terms of this Mortgage or because of the breach by Mortgagor of any of the
terms hereof, or for the recovery of any obligations secured hereby, Mortgagor shall pay to
Mortgagee reasonable attorney fees and expenses, and the right to such attorney fees and
expenses shall be deemed to have accrued on notice of such enforcement and shall be
enforceable whether or not litigation is commenced or prosecuted to judgment.
7. To pay, prior to delinquency, all real property taxes and assessments, general and special, and
all other taxes and assessments of any kind or nature whatsoever, including, without limitation,
nongovernmental levies or assessments such as maintenance charges, levies or charges
resulting from permits, conditions and restrictions affecting the Mortgaged Estate, or which
become due and payable, and which create, may create or appear to create a lien upon the
Mortgaged Estate, or any part thereof and to pay and promptly discharge all liens, encumbrances
and charges upon the Mortgaged Estate. If Mortgagor shall fail to pay any such tax or
assessment or to discharge any such lien, encumbrance or charge prior to delinquency
Mortgagee may, but shall not be obligated to, pay and discharge the same. The amount so paid
by Mortgagee shall be added to and be deemed a part of the indebtedness secured by this
Mortgage and shall bear interest at the Default Rate and shall be immediately due and payable in
full by Mortgagor. In addition to the payments due in accordance with the terms of the Note,
Mortgagor shall, at the option and upon written demand of Mortgagee following any uncured
default of Mortgagor under the terms of this Mortgage and/or the Note, pay each month onetwelfth (1/12) of the estimated annual taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, maintenance
and other charges upon the Mortgaged Estate, nevertheless in trust for Mortgagor's use and
benefit and for the payment by Mortgagee of any such items when due. Mortgagor's failure to so
pay shall constitute a default under this Mortgage.
·
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8. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended by Mortgagee pursuant to the
provisions hereof, with interest from date of expenditure at the Default Rate. Should Mortgagor
fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Mortgagee may, but without
obligation to do so and without notice to or demand upon Mortgagor and without releasing
Mortgagor from any obligation hereof. make or do the same in such manner and to such extent
as Mortgagee may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Mortgagee being authorized
to: (i) enter upon said Mortgaged Estate for such purposes; (ii) appear in and defend any action
or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Mortgagee;
(iii) pay, purchase, contest or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the
judgment of Mortgagee appears to be prior or superior hereto; and (iv) in exercising any such
powers, or in enforcing this Mortgage, by foreclosure or otherwise, pay necessary expenses,
employ counsel and pay such counsel's reasonable attorneys' fees.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED:
1. Any insurance proceeds from claims with respect to the Mortgaged Estate and any award for
damages in connection with any condemnation for public use of or injury to said Mortgaged
Estate is hereby assigned and shall be paid to Mortgagee who shall apply or release such monies
received by Mortgagee to Mortgagor so long as such monies are used for the express purpose of
the repair and replacement in connection with such condemnation or injury.
2. By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due date, Mortgagee does not waive
its right either to require prompt payment when due of all other sums so secured or to declare
default for failure to so pay.
3. As additional security, Mortgagor hereby assigns and transfers to Mortgagee all present and
future rents, issues and profits of the Mortgaged Estate, and hereby gives to and confers upon
Mortgagee the right, power and authority to collect such rents, issues and profits in the event of a
default by the Mortgagor in any of the terms and conditions hereof or of the Note. Mortgagor
irrevocably appoints Mortgagee Mortgagor's true and lawful attorney-in-fact, at the option of the
Mortgagee at any time the Mortgagor is in default under the Mortgage, and from time to time
during such default, in the exercise of good faith, to demand, receive and enforce payment, to
give receipts, releases and satisfactions, and to sue, in the name of Mortgagor or Mortgagee, for
all such rents, issues and profits and apply the same to the indebtedness secured hereby;
provided, however, that Mortgagor shall have the right to collect such rents, issues and profits
prior to or at any time there is not an event of default under the Mortgage. The collection of such
rents, issues and profits and. the application thereof to the debt hereby secured shall not cure or
waive default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such default.
4.

IN CASE OF DEFAULT, in the payment of the Note, or any part thereof, or in case of default of
payment of any other sums secured by the Mortgage or payable hereunder, or in case of default
in the performance of any of the obligations of the conditions or agreements herein contained,
time being of the essence hereof, then each entity that comprises Mortgagor is directly and
primarily liable, jointly and severally, for Mortgagor's obligations hereunder.
4.1.

In the event of a monetary default in connection with the Note and/or the Mortgage,
Mortgagor shall have ten (10) days following receipt of written notice to cure such default.
In the event of a non-monetary default in connection with the Note and/or the Mortgage,
Mortgagor shall have thirty (30) days following receipt of written notice to cure such
default; provided, however, if such cure cannot reasonably be accomplished within such
thirty (30) day cure period and Mortgagor is diligently and in good faith pursuing such
cure, such thirty (30) day cure period shall be reasonably extended. In the event such
monetary or non-monetary default is not cured during the applicable cure period,
Mortgagee may declare all obligations secured hereby to be immediately due and
payable and the same shall thereupon become immediately due and payable without any
presentment, demand, protest or further notice of any kind.

MORTGAGE-3
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Thereafter, Mortgagee may:
(i)

Enter upon and take possession of the Mortgaged Estate. or any part thereof that
has not been previously released to Mortgagor pursuant to the Partial Release
schedule set forth above. The entering upon and taking possession of the
Mortgaged Estate shall not cure or waive any default and. notwithstanding the
continuance in possession of the Mortgaged Estate, Mortgagee shall be entitled to
exercise every right provided for by law upon occurrence or any event of default;
and/or

(ii)

Commence an action to foreclose this Mortgage, appoint a receiver, or specifically
enforce any of the covenants hereof.

4.2.

Should Mortgagee foreclose this Mortgage in the manner provided by law, Mortgagee
shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto
including reasonable attorney fees and reasonable attorney fees on appeal, in such
amount as shall be fixed by the court. Mortgagee shall be entitled to possession of any
portion of the Mortgaged Estate not previously released to Mortgagor pursuant to the
Partial Release schedule set forth above during any redemption period allowed under the
laws of the State of Idaho.

4.3.

Every power or remedy given by this Mortgage to Mortgagee or to which Mortgagee may
be otherwise entitled, may be exercised, concurrently or independently, from time to time
and as often as may be deemed expedient by Mortgagee and Mortgagee may pursue
inconsistent remedies. The failure on the part of Mortgagee to promptly enforce any right
hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. Mortgagor has executed this Mortgage as of the day and year first
written above.
MORTGAGOR:
EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC.,
an Idaho corporation

By: R. Craig Groves
Its: President

List of Exhibits:
Exhibit A - Legal Description of Mortgaged Estate
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

.;h
On this J£I:aay of May, 2006, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared
R. Craig Groves, known or identified to me to be the President of Edmonds Groves Land Holdings, Inc., the
Idaho corporation that executed the within and foregoing instrument. or the person who executed the instrument
on behalf of said Idaho corporation, and acknowledged to me that such Idaho corporation executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day and
year in this certificate first above written.

MORTGAGE-S
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EXHIBIT A
DESCRIPTION OF MORTGAGED ESTATE
PARCELl
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: NE X
Except those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July 2, 1936, as
Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10, 1967 as
Instrument No. 677552, records of said County.
And Except that portion thereof conveyed'to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded February
4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.
PARCEL II
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: SE X
·
Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded February 4,
1980 as Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.
·

MORTGAGE- Exhibit A
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QUITCLAil\1 DEED
For Va.lu~ Receh·ed

a

DAY; ROBERT L. DlW; ERNEST E. DAY and
DONALD M. DAY. ~ners of Record

EMMA N.

tin hereby <"Ora·('>"· rclc:tsc. Tcmi;sc nnll foruvcr tiUil clnim unto

Ada County Highway District
318 East 37th Street
Boise. Idaho 83704

the following described premilles, to-wit:

A strip of land for public right-of-way located in the Northeast Quarter of Section
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho, more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northeast~ of Section 19, \.2N. •
R. 3E.·, B.M •• the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING.
Thence: In an Easterly direction along the Section Line of the Northeast ~
of Section 19, a distance of 1320.0 feet to a point.
Thence: South 45°00'00" East, a distance of 1866.76 feet to the Southeast
Corner of the Northeast ~ of the Northeast ~ of Section 19.
Thence: South along the Easterly boundary line of the Northeast ~ of Section
19$ a distance of 1320.0 feet to the Southeast Corner
the Northeast~ of Section 19.
Thence: West along the Southerly 1ine of the. Northeast~ of Section 19,
a distance of 25.0 feet to a point.
Thence : North along a line 25.0 feet parallel and adj~cent to the East
line of the Northeast~ of Section 19, a distance qf 1274.29 feet to a point.
Thence: North 45°oo•oo" West, a distance of 1896.04 feet to a point .
Tnance: West along a line 25.0 feet parallel and adj&cent to the North
line of the Northeast~ of Section 19. a distance of 1274.29 feet to the West line
of the Northeast~ of Section 19.
Thence: North along the West line of the Northeast~ of Section 19. a
distance of 25.0 feet to the ~EAL POINT OF BEGINNING.
The Ada County Highway 01 strict herew1 t!'l acce>Jt.s fr.om Grantor, the aforementioned
dedicated public right-of-way to have and to hold the s~id premises with their
appurtenances unto the said Grantee. its heirs and assign:, forever, that said
Grante~ WILL NOT have the responsibility for construction and/or maintenance of
said :>ublic r1ght-of-way until said public right-of-way has been const1·ucted to
the min;mum standards for roads by adj~cent property owners and/or persons using
road. and accepted for maintenance by the Ada County Highway District or its
successors.

of

£?- 2.? - ?.5(

""
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Q~TCLAIM DE~3 :1.5~0/} 8!)059-41:
For Value Received. ROBERT l. DAY; EP~lST E. DAY and DONALD M. DAY.
0\•mers of Record,
do hereby convey. n=lease. remise and forever quit claim unto

Ada County Highway District
318 East 37th Street
Boise, Idaho 83704

the following de•crlbed premises, to-wit:

A strip of land for public right-of-way located in the Southeast Quarter of Section
19, Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho, more
pa~ticularly ~escribed as follows:

The East 25.0 feet and the South 25.0 feet of the Southeast Quarter of
Secti·on 19, T.2N., R.3E •• B.N •• Ada County, Idaho.
The Ada County Highway District herewith accepts from Grantor, the aforementioned
dedicated public right-of-way to have and to hold the said premises with their
appurtenance unto the said Grantee. its heirs and assigns forever. that said

Grantee WILL
s~id

have the responsibility for construction and/or maintenance of

I~OT

pubrrc-right-of-way until said public right-of-way has been constructed to

the minimum standards for roads by adjacer.t property owners and/or persons using
rc~d, and a~cepted for maintenance by the Ada Coun~y Highway District or its
successors •
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together with their appurtenances.
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The United States ofAmerica

To all to whom these presents sliall come, Greeting:
IDI-33366
WHEREAS
B.W., Inc., an Idaho Corporation

is entitled to a land patent pursuant to Section 206, Act of October 21, 1976, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 1716) for the following described land:
Boise Meridian, Idaho
T. 2 N., R. 3 E.,
section 18, SW1,4SW1,4SE1,4,
El/zSE 1,4 SE 1,4 SW 1,4 .
Containing 15 acres.
NOW KNOW YE, that there is, therefore, granted by the UNITED STATES
unto B.W., Inc., the land described above; TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said land
with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature,
there unto belonging, unto B.W., Inc., and to its successors and assigns, forever; and
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING TO THE UNITED STATES:

1.

A right-of-way thereon for ditches and canals constructed by the authority of
the United States. Act of August 30, 1890 (43 U.S.C. 945).

2.

A right-of-way for Federal Aid Highway purposes issued to Idaho Department
of Transportation, its successors or assigns, by right-of-way IDI 31669, pursuant
to the Act of August 27, 1958 (23 U.S.C. 317).

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the undersigt?.ed authorized
officer of the Bureau of Land Management in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of June 17, l948 (62
Stat.476), bas, in the name of the United States, caused
these letters to be made Patent, and the Seal of the Bureau
to be hereunto affixed.
GIVEN under my hand, in Boise, Idaho, the thirtieth
day of November in the year of our Lord two thousand and
of the Inde~ndence of the United States the two hundred
and TWENTY-F~

a a-re!

J1mmie Buxton
Branch Chief, Lands and Minerals
Resource Services Division

Patent No. 11-2001-0003
000764
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The United States of America

To all to whom these presents snail come, Greeting:
IDI-33176
WHEREAS
B.W., Inc., an Idaho Corporation
is entitled to a land patent pursuant to Section 206, Act of October 21, 1976, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 1716) for the following described land:
Boise Meridian, Idaho
T. 2 N., R. 3 E.,
section 18, lots 3, 4, N 1hSEIASW 1A,
SWIASEIASWIA, WlhSEIASEIASWIA,
E 1hSWIASEIA, NWIASWIASEIA.
Containing 141.33 acres.
NOW KNOW YE, that there is, therefore, granted by the UNITED STATES
unto B.W., Inc., the land described above; TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said land
with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature,
there unto belonging, unto B.W., Inc., and to its successors and assigns, forever; and
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING TO THE UNITED STATES:
1.

A right-of-way thereon for ditches and canals constructed by the authority of
the United States. Act of August 30, 1890 (43 U.S.C. 945).

2.

A right-of-way for Federal Aid Highway purposes issued to Idaho Department
of Transportation, its successors or assigns, by right-of-way IDBL 049407,
pursuant to the Act of November 9, 1921 (42 Stat. 216), as to the
EI/zSW 1ASEIA, NWIASWIASEIA of section 18, T. 2 N., R. 3 E., B.M.

3.

Rights-of-way for Federal Aid Highway purposes issued to Idaho Department of
Transportation, its successors or assigns, by right-of-way IDI 017072, right-ofway IDI 81, and right-of-way IDI 31669, pursuant to the Act of August 27,
1958 (23 U.S.C. 107(D), 317), as to the NlhSEIASWIA, SWIASEIASWIA,
WlhSEIASE 1ASWIA, E 1hSWIASEIA, NWIASWIASEIA of section 18, T. 2 N.,
R. 3 E., B.M.

Patent No. 11-2000-0019
000766

Page 2

IDI 33l76

4.

A right-of-way for road purposes as reserved under right-of-way IDI 33474,
pursuant to Title V of the Act of October 21, 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1767) as to the
N 1hSEIASWIA and Lot 4, Section 18, T. 2 N., R. 3 E., B.M., and the right to
enforce all or any of the terms and conditions of the right-of-way.

SUBJECT TO:

1.

Those rights for buried fiber optic cable purposes granted to U.S. West
Communications, its successors or assigns, by right-of-way IDI 20668,
pursuant to the Act of October 21, 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1761) as to the
E 1hSW'ASE'A, NW'ASW 1ASEIA of section 18, T. 2 N., R. 3 E., B.M.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the undersigned
authorized officer of the Bureau of Land
Management, in accordance with the ..Provisions of
the Act of June 17, 1948 (62 Stat.470), has, in the
name of the United States, caused these letters to be
made Pate~~ and the Seal of the Bureau to be
hereunto afnxed.
GIVEN under my hand, in Boise, Idaho, the fifteenth
day of June in the year of our Lord two thousand
and of the ln()ependence of the United States the two
hundred and TWENTY-FOURTH.

BQ~; Q~

tm.tme uxton
Branch Chief, Lands and Minerals
Resource Services Division

Patent No. 11-2000-0019
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2017 9:38:33 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jessica Ader, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

----------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: NO
MARKETABLE OR INSURABLE TITLE

COMES NOW the Defendant, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department ("the
State"), by and through undersigned counseL and responds to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment re: No Marketable or Insurable Title as follows:
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FORPARTIALSUMMARYJUDGMENT RE: NO
MARKETABLEORINSURABLE TITLE -1
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construction of
the State
the Day
access for
Property
Family future
road.”
via aa future
frontage road.”
Via
future frontage

Id. (This
paid the
the
the State
statement is
Id.
false as
State paid
is patently
as the
patently false
(This statement

owners
– 75%
value of
their property
Initial Day
the Initial
the value
of the
of the
of their
owners of
50 7
75% of
as
Property 50
property as
Day Property
consideration
for loss
of access.)
consideration for
loss of
access.)
—> “Unfortunately,

years, the
State
the State
the last
“Unfortunately, despite
multiple attempts
attempts by
20 years,
despite multiple
the State
over the
last 20
State over
by the

was
fulfill its
promise.” Id.
Id.
unable to
was unable
to fulfill
its promise.”
”The State’s
—> “The
State’s failure

fulfill its
promise to
provide aa frontage
frontage road
the Property
to fulfill
to the
has
road to
failure to
its promise
to provide
Property has

resulted
being landlocked
without legally
unrestricted access
in the
the Property
resulted in
landlocked Without
access
enforceable, unrestricted
Property being
legally enforceable,
road.” Days’
Days’ Memo.
to
11.
to aa public
at 11.
public road.”
Memo. at
—> “Specifically,
Pioneer’s Title
Title Company
title
the failures
Mr. Lorensen

by Mr.
“Speciﬁcally, the
Lorensen and
detailed by
and Pioneer’s
failures detailed
Company title

commitment
purposes of
ITD Deed,
commitment are
the ITD
for the
the purposes
that: the
of obtaining
obtaining
are that:
presumably conveyed
conveyed for
Deed, presumably
’s promise
Plaintiffs...” Id.
access
fulfillment of
State’s
promise to
Id.
the Property
the Plaintiffs…”
to the
to the
in fulfillment
the State
access to
Property in
of the

A written
A
year statute
which means
that any
written contract
contract has
of limitations,
on an
an
means that
claim based
has a
statute of
five year
limitations, which
a five
based on
any claim
alleged
breach of
by 1972.
the 1967
of the
Agreement had
to be
that statute
of
1972. Plainly,
ROW Agreement
alleged breach
statute of
1967 ROW
raised by
had to
be raised
Plainly, that
inferring
limitations
years ago.
ran forty-five
The Days
limitations period
to avoid
this obvious
fact by
period ran
forty-ﬁve years
avoid this
obvious fact
ago. The
Days try
try to
by inferring

“Days’ Memo”
Memo” refers
“Days’
Memorandum in
Motion for
for Partial
Partial
their Memorandum
refers to
to their
in Support
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Support of
of Plaintiffs’
Summary
Judgment Re:
Re: No
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title,
filed July
2017.
and Insurable
Title, filed
Summary Judgment
11, 2017.
July 11,
4“
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that
was aa timeless
that the
the ROW
rather than
having aa five
than having
of limitations,
timeless
ﬁve year
ROW Contract,
limitations, was
statute of
Contract, rather
year statute
7 fifty
promise over
years later
in this
time –
the Days
which the
at any
this case.
later in
over which
could sue
promise
sue at
case.
ﬁfty years
Days could
any time

Days’ case
This
promise theory
because itit allows
them to
the Days’
critical to
This timeless
timeless promise
to the
to come
allows them
come
is critical
case because
theory is

“before” condition
up with
– that
things
with aa novel
that the
the “before”
not as
condition is
to inverse
condemnation 7
inverse condemnation
novel approach
approach to
up
is not
as things
things should
actually
but rather,
what things
been based
the
of December
on the
December 5,
should have
were as
as of
have been
based on
rather, What
actually were
1997, but
5, 1997,

“promise” made
alleged
alleged “promise”
made fifty
ago.
years ago.
ﬁfty years

Without
that novel
the Days
Without that
meritless theory,
novel and
and meritless
theory, the
Days

motion
judgment based
based on
taking of
title falls
motion for
for summary
on alleged
of marketable
alleged taking
and insurable
insurable title
marketable and
falls
summary judgment
apart.
apart.
Relying
in circular
the alleged
the Days
frontage on
on the
broken promise
of frontage
on aa road,
circular
alleged broken
promise of
engage in
Relying on
road, the
Days engage
title insurance
for the
the refusal
logic
to
of two
logic to
to try
to create
insurance underwriters
underwriters to
create compensable
compensable damages
refusal of
two title
damages for
try to

issue
policy without
by the
brought their
title policy
their
for access.
the Days,
Without exceptions
As stated
exceptions for
stated by
issue aa title
access. As
they brought
Days, they
“motion to
“motion
in turn
title and
the impact
impact lack
to address
of adequate
on insurable
has on
insurable title
and in
how
lack of
adequate access
address the
access has
turn how
“the inability
critical
property’s value.
value.””55 They
title is
that “the
critical insurable
to aa property’s
to obtain
obtain insurable
insurable title
insurable
is to
add that
inability to
They add
loss’ and
‘substantial loss’
title
title based
the Property
the remaining
remaining
on lack
of access
to the
renders the
and renders
lack of
based on
access to
causes a
a ‘substantial
Propeny causes

Plaintiffs’ Property
or
unreasonable.” 6
the Plaintiffs’
or substituted
to the
substituted access
access to
Propeny unreasonable.”6

Huh?
which prevents
their property
that their
them from
from
prevents them
are saying
has poor
Huh? So
So they
poor access
access which
propeny has
they are
saying that
in turn
title insurance
obtaining
which in
unreasonable access.
obtaining title
covering access
creates unreasonable
insurance covering
access.
access which
turn creates

its face,
On
On its
face,

that
whatsoever. Further,
which to
that argument
the Days
no sense
no basis
to
provide no
upon which
argument makes
makes no
sense whatsoever.
basis upon
Futther, the
Days provide
establish
title on
the impact
the alleged
the
impact of
of the
of the
of insurable
or marketable
on the
alleged loss
marketable title
loss of
establish damages
insurable or
damages because
because of
in aa condemnation
nature
or quality
of access
condemnation case.
nature or
access in
case.
quality of

Appraisers
title insurance
fair market
not use
the existence
or lack
of title
to establish
market
Appraisers do
existence or
insurance to
lack of
establish fair
do not
use the
value.
value.
55
66

To
that fact,
Knipe &
the 1998
the Days
not only
which not
To refute
cite the
of Knipe
refute that
appraisal of
1998 appraisal
& Knipe,
fact, the
Knipe, which
Days cite
only

Days’ Memo.
Days’
at 8.
Memo. at
8.
Days’ Memo.
Days’
at 10.
Memo. at
10.
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State’s statement
does
their argument,
that appraisers
not support
the State’s
not
statement that
but supports
supports the
appraisers do
support their
does not
do not
argument, but

establish
value by
which ones
polling title
title insurance
fair market
market value
to see
underwriters to
ones would
establish fair
would
insurance underwriters
see which
by polling
provide protection
from the
the late
The quoted
protection against
Knipe does
against lack
of access.
provide
late Trey
lack of
quoted language
does
language from
access. The
Trey Knipe
not
in the
In fact,
it discusses
title insurance,
the entire
entire
not indicate
indicate anything
nowhere in
easements. In
about title
discusses easements.
insurance, it
anything about
fact, nowhere
in establishing
title insurance
fair market
mention title
appraisal
value.
market value.
establishing fair
insurance in
appraisal does
Knipe even
even mention
does Knipe
in an
The
fair
The key
comparing fair
to establishing
an inverse
condemnation case
inverse condemnation
establishing damages
damages in
case is
is comparing
key to

“before” conditions
market
value based
with the
market value
the date
the
on “before”
conditions as
of the
of take
take (December
date of
based on
as of
(December 5,
1997) with
5, 1997)

“after” condition.
in the
fair
property as
fair market
the property
the date
the “after”
The Days
market value
of the
of the
of take
take in
condition. The
date of
have
value of
as of
Days have

not
not even
the prescribed
genuine issues
of material
material
attempted to
to follow
follow the
even attempted
prescrlbed methodology.
issues of
Moreover, genuine
methodology. Moreover,
the quality
the Day
the
after construction
fact
before and
fact exist
to the
of access
to the
of the
exist as
constmction of
and after
as to
access to
Property before
quality of
Day Property

Isaacs
precluding summary
judgment.
in 1997,
Interchange in
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon Interchange
1997, precluding
summary judgment.
Further,
judgment.
matter of
the Days
not entitled
entitled to
of law,
to summary
are not
as a
a matter
Further, as
summary judgment.
law, the
Days are

Title
Title

right subject
insurance
limitations has
the statute
the
not aa property
of limitations
to taking,
on the
has run
insurance is
and the
statute of
subject to
run on
is not
taking, and
propeny right

breach of
promise regarding
regarding access.
of any
breach
alleged promise
access.
any alleged
II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
A.
Legal standard.
standard.
A. Legal

The standard
for summary
The
judgment is
well known:
known:
standard for
is well
summary judgment

‘the pleadings,
Summary
judgment is
proper
pleadings, depositions,
and
proper when
when ‘the
is
depositions, and
Summary judgment
if any,
that there
admissions
with the
the affidavits,
there is
together with
on file,
no
admissions on
show that
afﬁdavits, if
is no
ﬁle, together
any, show
genuine
issue
as
to
any
material
fact
and
that
the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
that
material
fact
and
the moving party is entitled to aa
genuine issue as to any
law.’ In
judgment as
judgment, this
a matter
In aa motion
matter of
motion for
for summary
this Court
as a
of law.’
judgment
Court
summary judgment,
all facts
in favor
all
should
party and
the nonmoving
and draw
facts in
favor of
of the
construe all
nonmoving party
draw all
should liberally
hberally construe
in favor
from the
the facts
the nonmoving
reasonable
facts in
favor of
reasonable inferences
inferences from
of the
nonmoving party.
party. Summary
Summary
judgment must
persons could
if reasonable
differing conclusions
reach differing
must be
reasonable persons
judgment
denied if
conclusions
could reach
be denied
or
presented.
from the
conﬂicting inferences
the evidence
or draw
inferences from
draw conflicting
evidence presented.

Lamprecht v.
Jordan, LLC,
LLC, 139
Iron
Lamprecht
Idaho 182,
139 Idaho
746 (2003)
P.3d 743,
v. Jordan,
75 P.3d
(citing Iron
182, 185,
185, 75
743, 746
(2003) (citing
Eagle Development,
Development, LL.
L.L.C.
Design Sys.,
Inc., 138
Idaho 487,
138 Idaho
Eagle
P.3d 509
C. v.
v. Quality
65 P.3d
509
487, 65
Sys., Inc,
Quality Design
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(2003)
Bd. of
citations omitted);
Idaho 131,
138 Idaho
59
See also
also Willie
Willie v.
v. Bd.
(internal citations
Trustees, 138
131, 133,
omitted); See
133, 59
(2003) (internal
of Trustees,
P.3d
304 (2002).
P.3d 302,
302, 304
(2002).

When
in aa light
light most
the evidence
the
most favorable
to the
When considering
considering the
favorable to
evidence in

if
nonmoving
party, the
whether aa genuine
the court
nonmoving party,
determine Whether
of material
fact exists
or if
to determine
material fact
exists or
court is
genuine issue
issue of
is to
the
judgment as
Hayden, 147
147 Idaho
the moving
not entitled
entitled to
to judgment
matter of
of law.
Idaho
Chandler v.
moving party
as a
a matter
law. Chandler
v. Hayden,
is not
party is
In this
in that
that there
215 P.3d
765,
both situations
there clearly
situations exist
exist in
485 (2009).
P.3d 485
this case,
genuine
is a
a genuine
clearly is
case, both
765, 215
(2009). In

issue
judgment as
the Days
not entitled
entitled to
of material
material fact,
to judgment
matter of
of law.
and the
are not
issue of
as a
a matter
law.
fact, and
Days are

MATERIAL FACTS.
B.
GENUINE ISSUES
B. GENUINE
OF MATERIAL
FACTS.
ISSUES OF
1.
marketable title.
The Day
has insurable
and marketable
title.
insurable and
1. The
Property has
Day Property
Days’ motion
Several
that mandate
the Days’
motion for
for
genuine issues
of material
fact exist
exist that
material fact
mandate denying
Several genuine
issues of
denying the

summary
judgment.
summary judgment.

First and
the fact
the Days
the Day
First
foremost is
fact that
that the
to
and foremost
sold the
is the
Property to
Days sold
Day Property

Edmunds
in 2006
for $10,010,000.00.
Land Holdings,
Inc. in
of
review of
2006 for
Groves Land
Edmunds Groves
as a
a review
Holdings, Inc.
$10,010,000.00. Significantly,
Signiﬁcantly, as
the
policy makes
based on
title policy
the related
the
there are
no exceptions
to coverage
on access
are no
exceptions to
related title
over the
makes clear,
coverage based
access over
clear, there
easements
provided by
Title Insurance
that purpose.
the State
for that
the Lawyers
State for
easements provided
Insurance Corp.
See the
Corp. Policy
purpose. See
Policy
Lawyers Title
by the
of
Affidavit of
Nick Schug,
In other
Title Insurance
the Aﬂ’idavit
other words,
to the
herewith In
of Title
submitted herewith.
attached to
Insurance attached
words,
Schug, submitted
of Nick
the
That fact
title. That
the
the Day
marketable title.
fact alone
alone undercuts
has insurable
insurable and
and marketable
undercuts the
Property obviously
obviously has
Day Property
Days’ entire
Days’
because aa couple
entire argument.
other underwriters
of other
underwriters have
argument. Merely
have apparently
couple of
decided
apparently decided
Merely because
in their
their policies
title insurance
that they
the Day
not
that
policies of
of title
to the
except access
would except
insurance does
access to
does not
Property in
they would
Day Property

At most,
mean
unmarketable. At
their decision
the property
regarding risk
mean that
that the
or unmarketable.
risk
uninsurable or
decision regarding
is uninsurable
most, their
propeny is
creates
precluding summary
judgment.
of material
fact precluding
material fact
creates aa genuine
genuine issue
issue of
summary judgment.
title is
that the
the fact
the Day
the
Buttressing
Buttressing the
fact that
marketable and
did have
and insurable
insurable title
have marketable
is the
Propelty did
Day Property

Affidavit of
Ken Franklin
Franklin submitted
property in
in 2006
their property
the Days
herewith. As
As he
he notes,
submitted herewith.
sold their
2006
notes, the
Days sold
Afﬁdavit
of Ken
and
was provided
without any
title insurance
for that
for lack
that sale
exception to
to coverage
of
and title
insurance was
provided for
sale Without
lack of
coverage for
any exception
access.
access.
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Days’ retained
Mr.
whether the
Franklin disagrees
title officer
with the
the Days’
the access
Mr. Franklin
regarding Whether
retained title
ofﬁcer regarding
access
disagrees with

easement
from the
the State
the federal
the Day
government is
to the
As
federal government
State obtained
easement the
obtained from
apputtenant to
is appurtenant
Property. As
Day Property.
in order
Franklin indicates,
Mr.
benefit of
property in
Mr. Franklin
for the
the beneﬁt
the adjoining
the easement
adjoining property
of the
to
order to
easement was
was for
indicates, the

replace
property lost
project. There
that propeny
the access
the Isaacs
There is
other
no other
lost because
of the
IC project.
replace the
Isaacs Canyon
is no
because of
access that
Canyon IC

if
that the
such
property except
the Day
the deed
the easement,
adjoining property
except the
such adjoining
states that
deed states
Further, the
easement, if
Propeny. Further,
Day Property.
moved,
with the
that adjoining
the same
adjoining property
or equivalent
to provide
owner with
equivalent access.
provide that
same or
access.
is to
moved, is
propeny owner

Those
Those

facts
be
for the
the use
the easement
the Day
therefore be
that the
of the
facts establish
easement was
and could
could therefore
establish that
was for
use of
Property and
Day Property
considered
Affidavit of
Ken Franklin.
Franklin.
it. See
to it.
Para. 2.b.,
apputtenant to
considered appurtenant
See Para.
ofKen
2.b.,Afﬁdavit
Moreover,
Franklin opines
from the
that the
the federal
the easement
Mr. Franklin
government was
federal government
opines that
easement from
was
Moreover, Mr.
Deed” for
“highway” purposes,
“Highway Easement
for “highway”
the State
identified
identiﬁed as
Easement Deed”
to the
to use
State to
granted to
use as
as
as a
a “Highway
purposes, granted

right
provide access.
In relation
right of
the deed
the
the placement
of utilities,
refers to
to the
of way
to provide
relation to
to the
placement of
utilities, the
deed refers
access. In
way to
“public right
“original road
way” and
easement
way”. The
right of
right of
intent of
The intent
the deed
the “original
of way”.
of the
of way”
easement as
and aa “public
road right
deed
as the

right of
was therefore
provide aa public
with aa public
public road.
for aa public
therefore to
to provide
of way
public agency
public right
road.
was
agency with
way for

Thus,
the
Thus, the

Days,
with the
the rest
the public,
the easement
for access
along with
rest of
of the
easement for
and access
could use
use the
access and
access was
was
public, could
Days, along
title insurance
insurable
purposes. See
Affidavit of
Ken Franklin.
Franklin.
for title
Para. 2.b.,
insurance purposes.
insurable for
See Para.
ofKen
2.b.,Afﬁdavit

Mr.
points out
Franklin points
title
that the
Mr. Franklin
the description
the easement
for title
of the
description of
easement is
out that
adequate for
is also
also adequate
“a description
that
not include
The Days
the easement
insurance
purposes. The
description that
that the
complain that
easement does
insurance purposes.
include “a
does not
Days complain
Width”.
provides for
for aa continuous
continuous consistent
consistent travelable
travelable width”.
provides

Days’ Memo.
Days’
11.
at 11.
Memo. at

However,
the
However, the

easement
provides for
width, and
beginning and
for aa sixty
the beginning
foot Width,
description clearly
points are
easement description
and the
and end
end points
are
clearly provides
sixty foot
7 where
that –
exactly
begin and
Affidavit
the sixty
foot wide
Para. 2.d.,
Where the
easement should
should begin
and end.
Wide easement
end. See
2.d.,Aﬂ’idavit
See Para.
exactly that
sixty foot

of
Ken Franklin.
Franklin. Moreover,
title officer
not for
for the
the title
the adequacy
the access.
determine the
ofﬁcer to
to determine
of the
is not
access.
Moreover, itit is
adequacy of
of Ken
Id.
Id.
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The
The Days
the access
the United
its
that the
United States
failed to
to reserve
claim that
easement across
States failed
across its
reserve the
also claim
access easement
Days also
property when
property was
that failure
the property
the insurability
title.
when the
impacts the
of title.
and that
somehow impacts
failure somehow
was sold,
insurability of
property
sold, and
See
Affidavit of
Lorensen at
provide aa copy
the Deed
at 7.
of the
failed to
to provide
Para. 13,
Lorensen has
has failed
Glen Lorensen
Deed
See Para.
7. Lorensen
13, Aﬂ’idavit
copy of
of Glen
from
Affidavit of
Ken
A copy
that deed
from the
the Aﬂ’idavit
the United
to the
United States
to B.W.,
Inc. A
of that
States to
attached to
deed is
is attached
B.W., Inc.
copy of
of Ken
in fact
That deed
Franklin, identifiable
identiﬁable as
fact except
to
Instmment No.
100097111. That
except and
No. 100097111.
and reserve
reserve to
as Instrument
deed does
does in
Franklin,

“right-of-Way for
the
purposes issued
the United
for Federal
Aid Highway
Department
United States
to Idaho
Federal Aid
Idaho Department
States aa “right-of-way
issued to
Highway purposes

of
pursuant to
right-of-Way IDI
IDI 31669,
its successors
the Act
Act of
of Transportation,
or assigns,
to the
of
successors or
Transportation, its
31669, pursuant
assigns, by
by right-of-way
317).” Plainly,
right of
August
the United
United States
of way
except and
States did
did except
and reserve
1958 (23
August 27,
reserve right
U.S.C. 317).”
Plainly, the
27, 1958
(23 U.S.C.
way

itit had
within the
right of
the State.
The only
the boundaries
the deed
to the
of way
of the
had given
State. The
given to
boundaries of
deed is
is
apparently Within
only right
way apparently
in
right of
for the
the access
the United
the State
for access
the right
the
by the
of way
United States
to the
State for
easement provided
provided by
States to
access easement
access in
way for

2000.
page of
Affidavit of
Lorensen.
F to
first page
Exhlbit F
the Aﬂ’idavit
the first
to the
of Exhibit
Glen Lorensen.
2000. See
See the
of Glen
Mr.
purchaser took
Franklin points
that the
Mr. Franklin
the
the land
the subsequent
to the
took the
points out
out that
land subject
subsequent purchaser
subject to
it was
in existence
easement
Affidavit of
time of
the time
the sale.
at the
of the
Para. 2.e.,
easement because
existence at
sale. See
2.6.,Aﬂ’idavit
See Para.
because it
was already
already in
of

Ken Franklin.
“[0]ne who
Ken
to an
an easement,
Franklin. Generally
who purchases
land expressly
subject to
purchases land
easement,
speaking, “[o]ne
Generally speaking,
expressly subject
or
with notice,
burdened with
with an
the land
or with
or constructive,
that itit is
an existing
existing easement,
land
takes the
actual or
is burdened
constructive, that
easement, takes
notice, actual
easement.” Akers
subject
Akers v.
D.L. White
Inc., 142
142 Idaho
the easement.”
127 P.3d
to the
Idaho 293,
P.3d
subject to
v. D.L.
White Construction,
Construction, Inc,
293, 300,
300, 127

from the
the deed
the United
the State
196,
before
that the
United States
to the
State was
States to
203 (2005).
recorded before
Given that
was recorded
deed from
196, 203
(2005). Given

B.W.,
purchased the
property, at
based on
the underlying
the record
the Court,
Inc. purchased
at least
on the
least based
record before
before the
underlying property,
Court,
B.W., Inc.
B.W.,
property subject
LLC v.
the propeny
the access
Inc. took
took the
to the
easement. See,
subject to
Tiller White,
access easement.
v. Canyon
White, LLC
B.W., Inc.
Canyon
See, Tiller
Outdoor
Media, LLC,
LLC,160
Idaho 417,
160 Idaho
374 P.3d
P.3d 580
Outdoor Media,
580 (2016).
417, 374
(2016).
Days’ also
In
In support
their motion,
the Days’
attorney-client privileged
of their
to an
an attorney-client
reference to
support of
privileged
also reference
motion, the

internal
ITD memo
in which
the status
the
internal ITD
which aa retired
retired Deputy
memo in
of the
General opines
opines about
about the
status of
Attorney General
Deputy Attorney
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7
Propeny7..
insurable
title of
the Day
of the
insurable title
Day Property

That
was simply
That individual
and obviously
his
individual was
obviously his
wrong, and
simply wrong,

inopinion
bound by
If the
not bound
opinion is
not dispositive
the State
it. If
the opinion
opinion of
or even
of inand the
even relevant,
dispositive or
State is
is not
is not
relevant, and
by it.

house
then
the existence
to establish
or lack
of aa genuine
genuine issue
of material
material fact,
existence or
lack of
house counsel
enough to
counsel is
establish the
is enough
issue of
fact, then
in-house counsel
undersigned in-house
will go
the record
stating that
the Day
on the
that the
has had
had
record as
undersigned
counsel will
go on
as stating
Propeny has
Day Property

it is
title since
insurable
not known
the Isaacs
known
of the
construction of
marketable title
since construction
insurable and
and marketable
and it
Isaacs Canyon
is not
Canyon IC,
1C, and

Parry’s comments
whether itit had
prior to
then
the same
the construction.
whether
to the
of fact,
comments are
construction. If Parry’s
are evidence
same prior
evidence of
had the
fact, then

so
counsel’s, and
of material
material fact
fact exists.
are undersigned
and aa genuine
exists.
genuine issue
undersigned counsel’s,
so are
issue of
7 and
“the Widely
Idaho
widely accepted
practical 7– rule
that “the
long been
that
more practical
Idaho recognizes
and more
has long
rule has
been that
accepted –
recognizes that
doubt.”
marketable
be free
title must
from reasonable
marketable title
must be
free from
reasonable doubt.”

Brown
Brown v.
Yacht Club
Coeur d’Alene,
v. Yacht
Club of
d ’Alene,
of Coeur

“the test”
“‘Whether aa
test” is
111 Idaho
In other
722 P.2d
other words,
Ltd., 111
P.2d 1062,
Idaho 195,
1065 (1986).
is “‘whether
1062, 1065
words, “the
Ltd,
195, 198,
198, 722
(1986). In

reasonable
prudent [person],
with the
the question
the facts
of the
of law
question of
facts and
familiar with
and apprised
reasonable prudent
apprised of
law involved,
involved,
[person], familiar
business.’”
would accept
in the
title in
the title
the ordinary
of business.’”
would
accept the
course of
ordinary course

Brown v.
Brown
Yacht Club
Coeur
v. Yacht
Club of
of Coeur

111 Idaho
d’Alene,
Ltd., 111
Purchaser §§
722 P.2d
at 198,
P.2d at
at 1065
Idaho at
Am.Jur.2d Vendor
Vendor and
and Purchaser
1065 (citing
d ’Alene, Ltd,
77 Am.Jur.2d
(citing 77
198, 722

132,
at 316
316 (1975)).
132, at
(1975)).
“merely means
In contrast,
title “merely
In
property is
being insured,
not
of being
that property
insurable title
means that
capable of
is capable
contrast, insurable
insured, not
marketable.” Brown
that
Brown v.
Ltd.,, 111
111 Idaho
title is
that title
or marketable.”
at 198,
Idaho at
Yacht Club
Coeur d’Alene,
is good
good or
v. Yacht
Club of
d ’Alene, Ltd.
198,
of Coeur
722 P.2d
201 P.2d
722
Hebb v.
P.2d at
at 1065
P.2d 156
156 (Wash.
1065 (citing
v. Severson,
Severson, 201
(citing Hebb
1948).
(Wash. 1948).

road”
“legally enforceable,
The
unrestricted access
The Days
the lack
of “legally
to aa public
public road”
assert the
lack of
access to
enforceable, unrestricted
Days assert
Days’ Memo.
resulting
being landlocked
in their
in claiming
their property
title. Days’
resulting in
claiming aa loss
of insurable
at
Memo. at
insurable title.
landlocked in
loss of
propelty being

11.
11.

in order
their propeny,
title
that in
The
property, they
The Days
to sell
sell their
must be
to obtain
order to
obtain title
able to
argue that
be able
they must
Days argue

insurance.
If they
title insurance,
their title
title is
That
the Days
not marketable.
cannot obtain
obtain title
claim their
marketable. That
insurance. If
is not
insurance, the
they cannot
Days claim
is
definition of
not the
the true
the Days
of marketable
what the
that they
marketable title,
arguing is
are really
true definition
is not
so what
is that
title, so
really arguing
they
Days are
This
years ago,
but itit is
that
the Days
not clear
This memo
memo was
to the
clear that
given to
was apparently
is not
apparently given
Parry many
Days by
many years
ago, but
by Parry
Parry
that the
the privilege
the client
client and
not the
the attorney.
to do
to the
had authority
belongs to
and not
given that
privilege belongs
do so
so given
authority to
attorney.
Parry had
77
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“market” the
cannot
buy insurance
title to
their
the title
cannot buy
to protect
protect against
against loss
of access,
cannot “market”
to their
insurance to
loss of
so they
access, so
they cannot

property.
property.
The
property fails
title to
their property
that title
the definition
deﬁnition
The Days
not actually
to meet
meet the
asserting that
to their
are not
fails to
actually asserting
Days are
title”. The
“marketable title”.
of
that the
The Days
not provided
the Day
of “marketable
to support
facts to
support that
have not
provided any
Propeny
Days have
Day Property
any facts
title or
does
not have
title.
the State
the lack
or that
that the
of marketable
marketable title
marketable title.
State somehow
somehow created
created the
lack of
does not
have marketable

Days’ motion
Therefore,
the true
deﬁnition of
the extent
extent the
the Days’
motion relies
of marketable
to the
relies upon
upon the
marketable title,
tale definition
Therefore, to
title, itit

must
be denied.
must be
denied.
title insurance
Given
with title
that did
not except
for
the Day
that the
except coverage
has sold
insurance that
sold with
Given that
coverage for
did not
Propeny has
Day Property

access,
whether the
the State
at minimum,
of material
fact exists
to Whether
took insurable
State took
material fact
exists as
insurable
genuine issue
issue of
as to
minimum, aa genuine
access, at
Days’ motion
title to
the Day
For this
the Days’
motion must
or
be denied.
or marketable
to the
this reason
must be
reason alone,
marketable title
denied.
Property. For
alone, the
Day Property.

regarding access
the Day
not break
The State
break any
State did
to the
2.
promise regarding
2. The
did not
access to
Property.
Day Property.
any promise

The
would be
The only
the State
the 1967
of any
to replace
State to
alleged promise
1967
promise by
replace access
source of
access would
be the
only source
any alleged
by the
Days’
Right of
Right
neither supports
the 1967
the Days’
of Way
Contract and
and perhaps
and neither
1967 Warranty
perhaps the
supports the
Warranty Deed,
Deed, and
Way Contract

assertions
used to
that the
the State
cannot be
to claim
State
assertions regarding
claim that
those documents
regarding access.
documents cannot
access. Additionally,
be used
Additionally, those
made
promise regarding
kind of
Initial Day
the Initial
other than
regarding any
of promise
than the
made any
Propeny.
property other
Day Property.
any kind
any property
Based
promise by
by the
the State
the type
the
on those
no promise
to replace
of access
those two
Based on
State to
replace the
two documents,
access the
documents, no
type of
Initial Day
the claims
the Days,
the State
Initial
to the
of the
to SH
SH 30
State
claims of
had to
exists. Therefore,
30 exists.
Therefore, contrary
contrary to
Propeny had
Day Property
Days, the

did
not breach
regarding access.
did not
breach aa promise
promise regarding
access.

Days’ motion
As
the Days’
motion is
As noted
noted above,
is totally
totally
above, the

dependent
promise that
provide aa frontage
that the
the State
the type
frontage road
on an
an alleged
to replace
State would
dependent on
alleged promise
road to
replace the
would provide
type
Initial Day
of
promise.
the Initial
The State
of access
that the
to SH
SH 30.
State never
never made
had to
such promise.
30. The
made any
access that
Propeny had
Day Property
any such

Rather,
Initial Day
the State
the Initial
for loss
the owners
signiﬁcant damages
of the
State paid
paid the
owners of
loss
damages for
Rather, the
Propeny significant
Day Property
of
1-84, and
Initial Day
the remaining
the new
remaining Initial
of access
to SH
SH 30
interstate I-84,
that the
and the
new interstate
and promised
promised that
access to
30 and
Day
1-84 would
Property
via aa future
the system
frontage road
of I-84
to the
of public
south of
public roads
have access
road
roads Via
would have
access to
future frontage
Propeny south
system of
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and
plans. 8 The
the interstate
The State
on aa specific
segment of
of the
interstate highway
specific segment
stock drive
shown on
State
and stock
drive as
as shown
highway plans.8
provided that
that access.
provided
access.

The
promised that
The State
the future
frontage road
that the
State never
never promised
stock drive
and stock
road and
future frontage
drive

would be
would build
that the
for the
the previous
the State
SH 30
frontage access,
replacement for
State would
build aa road
previous SH
road
would
be aa replacement
30 frontage
access, that
on
would be
be built,
built, who
would take
jurisdiction over
right of
the
the access
take jurisdiction
on the
of way,
when aa road
who would
over the
road would
access right
way, when
Days’
it. Without
the existence
the alleged
the Days’
road
would maintain
promise, denial
maintain it.
Without the
of the
of the
or who
alleged promise,
denial of
who would
road or
existence of

motion
motion is
is necessary.
necessary.
Days’ assertions,
Contrary
the Isaacs
the Days’
the easements
after construction
of the
to the
construction of
obtained after
easements obtained
Isaacs
assertions, the
Contrary to
Right of
Canyon
not intended
fulﬁll the
the 1967
other promise.
IC were
intended to
to fulfill
of Way
Agreement or
or other
promise.
were not
1967 Right
Canyon IC
Way Agreement

Rather,
were obtained
way provided
in
right of
mitigate the
the State
the loss
the right
of way
to mitigate
of the
State in
provided by
obtained to
loss of
Rather, they
they were
by the
fulfilling its
its obligations
the 1967
fulfilling
obligations under
Contract.
ROW Contract.
1967 ROW
under the

As
basis for
partial
the Court
the 1967
the basis
for aa motion
motion for
for partial
As the
well aware,
contracts are
are the
1967 contracts
Court is
is well
aware, the
summary
judgment filed
by the
that itit has
the State.
The State
its obligations
ﬁled by
fulﬁlled its
State asserts
obligations under
State. The
asserts that
under
has fulfilled
summary judgment
1-84 highway
in the
those
by providing
providing right
right of
the I-84
for aa future
of way
contracts by
those contracts
plans for
descrlbed in
as described
future
highway plans
way as

frontage
that reason,
that itit has
For that
the State
not breached
frontage road
stock drive.
State claims
those
and stock
road and
breached those
drive. For
claims that
has not
reason, the
Until the
contracts,
the
the Days
the Court
no claim
on loss
of access.
claim based
sorts out
out the
and the
have no
loss of
based on
access. Until
Coutt sorts
contracts, and
Days have
in 1967
nature
whether the
the agreement
for access
the State
the State
its
of the
fulﬁlled its
State fulfilled
agreement for
and Whether
1967 and
State made
nature of
access the
made in

“before” condition
the “before”
contractual
of material
fact exists
to the
condition
material fact
contractual obligations,
exists as
genuine issue
issue of
as to
obligations, aa genuine

involving
well as
fail
title. Therefore,
the Days
motion must
involving access,
marketable title.
must fail
and marketable
insurable and
as well
as insurable
Therefore, the
access, as
Days motion
as
matter of
of law.
as a
a matter
law.

This
plans attached
Affidavit of
James Morrison
Morrison filed
the highway
the Afﬁdavit
This fact
fact is
to the
ﬁled
attached to
established by
is established
highway plans
by the
of James
April
April 28,
in the
right of
the 1967
the right
of
2017. Those
Those highway
ROW Contract)
plans (referenced
1967 ROW
show the
(referenced in
Contract) show
highway plans
28, 2017.
way
for
the
future
frontage
road
ending
at
or
near
the
Initial
Day
Property
boundary.
See
also,
Initial
for
the
the
future frontage road ending at or near
Day Propeny boundary. See also,
way
the highway
the Afﬁdavit
the
Affidavit of
James Morrison
Morrison filed
ﬁled June
to the
2017. Those
Those
attached to
plans attached
June 7,
highway plans
7, 2017.
of James
in
right
that
the
highway
plans
(not
referenced
in
the
1967
ROW
Contract)
make
clear
that
no
right
of
way
was
make
no
of
referenced
clear
ROW
1967
Contract)
highway plans (not
way was
purchased by
Initial Day
the State
for aa frontage
the east
the Initial
frontage road
to the
of the
State for
road to
east of
purchased
Propeny.
Day Property.
by the
88
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3.
public roads.
The Day
has access
the system
to the
ofpublic
roads.
access to
3. The
Property has
system of
Day Property
The
be used
that the
the State
The Days
failed to
to establish
cannot be
to
State access
easements cannot
have failed
establish that
access easements
used to
Days have
provide public
public access
the Day
to the
provide
access to
Property.
Day Property.

At minimum,
At
public use
use of
the availability
the
of public
of the
minimum, the
availability of

Days’ motion.
easements
by the
that
the State
the Days’
The fact
motion. The
of the
fact that
requiring denial
denial of
easements obtained
obtained by
State is
is disputed,
disputed, requiring
State’s easements
the system
the
public could
the State’s
public roads
the public
of public
to access
easements to
roads is
could use
established by
is established
access the
use the
system of
by
in which
the
Affidavit of
Amy Revis
the Affidavit
the State
which she
that the
an
she states
states that
reached an
Revis (filed
State reached
(filed May
31, 2017),
2017), in
May 31,
ofAmy

agreement
from the
with the
the access
for an
the Ada
District (ACHD)
an approach
agreement with
approach from
Ada County
access
County Highway
Highway District
(ACHD) for
easement
Affidavit of
Amy Revis
The Revis
at 2.
2. The
afﬁdavit
on to
to Eisenman
Eisenman Road.
Para. 5,
easement on
Revis at
Revis affidavit
Road. See
See Para.
5, Afﬁdavit
ofAmy
also
Willing to
ACHD was
the fact
the ACHD
its easement
fact that
that the
to allow
allow access
easement located
located
across its
also discusses
discusses the
was willing
access across
State’s easement.
the State’s
the Day
adjacent
Affidavit of
Amy Revis
Revis at
to the
at 3.
Para. 7,
and the
easement. See
adjacent to
See Para.
3.
Property and
7,Afﬁdavit
Day Property
ofAmy

Further,
would have
public to
use the
the Day
the State
the public
the access
to get
get to
to the
to use
State would
easement to
allowed the
have allowed
access easement
Further, the
Day
Property.
Affidavit of
Amy Revis
the Day
at 4.
4. Public
Public access
to the
Para. 11,
Revis at
See Para.
access to
is
Property is
Property. See
11, Afﬁdavit
Day Property
of Amy
available,
the Day
not landlocked.
and the
landlocked.
is clearly
available, and
Property is
clearly not
Day Property
C.
judgment as
a matter
matter of
The Days
are not
not entitled
entitled to
to judgment
as a
C. The
of law.
law.
Days are

“before” condition
1.
part of
failed to
the “before”
the
The Days
establish the
condition as
have failed
to establish
as part
of the
1. The
Days have
taking.
alleged
alleged taking.
“before”
In Idaho,
in an
In
the measure
of damages
an inverse
condemnation case
on aa “before”
inverse condemnation
damages in
measure of
case is
is based
based on
Idaho, the

“after” fair
and
value analysis:
fair market
market value
and “after”
analysis:
in agreement
The
universally in
that the
The authorities
the measure
authorities are
almost universally
of damages
are almost
agreement that
damages
measure of
for
or
impairment
of
a
right
of
access
to
a
highway
upon
which
right
impairment
for the
the destruction
the
of a
of access to a highway upon which the
destruction or
property of
fair market
the difference
the fair
market value
the
of an
an owner
of the
owner abuts
difference between
abuts is
between the
is the
value of
property
fair market
the taking,
market value
the same
property immediately
before the
value of
of the
and fair
same
immediately before
taking, and
property
impairment of
the destruction
the access.
The basis
after the
property immediately
or impairment
of the
destruction or
access. The
basis
immediately after
property
of
right of
the damages
not the
the value
the right
the highway,
of the
of the
of access
to the
but
damages awarded
awarded is
is not
value of
access to
highway, but
in the
rather
value of
before and
rather the
the difference
the value
the property
the destruction
after the
of the
destruction
and after
difference in
property before
or
based upon
in turn
impairment of
the access,
the highest
highest and
this in
or impairment
of the
and this
and best
turn is
best
is based
upon the
access, and
use to
which the
before and
the land
the taking.
taking.
after the
to which
and after
land involved
involved is
suitable before
use
is suitable
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Lobdell v.
Mabe v.
P.2d 135,
Idaho 559,
Idaho
407 P.2d
137 (1965)
Lobdell
v. State,
89 Idaho
v. State,
83 Idaho
(citing Mabe
State, 89
State, 83
564, 407
135, 137
559, 564,
(1965) (citing
222,
Morrison v.
Ariz. 318,
29A
P.2d 988
P.2d 799;
rel. Morrison
v. Thelberg,
87 Ariz.
350 P.2d
988 (1960);
360 P.2d
State ex
ex rel.
Thelberg, 87
222, 360
318, 350
799; State
(1960); 29A
4 Nichols
Eminent Domain
Eminent Domain
C.J.S.
p. 597;
Nichols on
Domain §§ 141,
18 Am.Jur.
Domain §§ 280;
on
AmJur. 919,
C.J.S. Eminent
141, p.
919, Eminent
280; 4
597; 18

Eminent
p. 201).
Notice that
Eminent Domain,
that key
to
Condemnation Appraisal
Appraisal Practice,
Practice, p.
Domain, 588,
14,2431; Condemnation
201). Notice
588, §
key to
§ 14,2431;
“taking” and
that there
the FMV
FMV of
the propeny
the damages
the
be aa “taking”
property must
be
there must
of the
must be
must be
calculation is
and the
damages calculation
is that
in order
established
taking in
the taking
to establish
order to
before the
establish damages.
established before
damages.

“taking” of
The
that the
The Days
the State
the Days
claiming that
committed aa “taking”
of the
State committed
are claiming
insurable and
and
Days are
Days insurable
Days’ motion,
In order
title by
their property.
marketable
by landlocking
property. In
for this
the Days’
to grant
grant the
marketable title
landlocking their
order for
this Court
Coutt to
motion,

itit would
would need
what access
the Day
to analyze
of December
December 5,
had as
before
need to
1997 before
access the
as of
analyze What
Propeny had
Day Property
5, 1997
the Isaacs
for
construction
whether that
would have
been adequate
of the
IC and
that access
construction of
and Whether
Isaacs Canyon
adequate for
access would
have been
Canyon IC

marketable
title.
marketable and
and insurable
insurable title.

“before” condition
However,
the Days
not established
the “before”
condition
established the
have not
However, the
Days have

of
Nor have
in an
their property
the Days
of their
an inverse
condemnation case.
required in
inverse condemnation
established
case. Nor
have the
as is
is required
propeny as
Days established
that
would have
that the
the access
have been
been insurable.
insurable.
access would

For
be
their motion
For those
motion should
those reasons
should be
reasons alone,
alone, their

denied.
denied.
“before” condition
Instead
provided adequate
the required
Whether itit provided
condition and
of establishing
required “before”
establishing the
and whether
Instead of
adequate
“promise” of
access
purposes, the
title purposes,
for insurable
the Days
of
on aa vague
marketable title
insurable and
and marketable
access for
vague “promise”
simply rely
Days simply
rely on
The Days
the location
access
to aa frontage
location or
or type
of access
to aa frontage
frontage road.
frontage road
never define
deﬁne the
road
road. The
access to
access to
Days never
type of

upon which
which they
basis as
who would
would have
not establish
the road,
to who
upon
factual basis
have built
built the
establish aa factual
do not
as to
road,
rely. They
they rely.
They do
taken
jurisdiction over
basis is
a fatal
fatal flaw
that factual
it. Failure
ﬂaw
taken jurisdiction
or maintained
to establish
maintained it.
factual basis
over itit or
establish that
Failure to
is a
that the
title as
marketable title
the Days
not shown
the Day
had insurable
and marketable
because the
have not
as
insurable and
shown that
because
Property had
Days have
Day Property

of
of

“before” condition
December
prior to
the Isaacs
Without aa “before”
condition
to construction
of the
Isaacs Canyon
construction of
December 5,
IC. Without
1997 prior
Canyon IC.
5, 1997

“after” condition,
to
that the
in relation
relation
the “after”
the Days
cannot argue
the State
State took
to compare
compare to
to the
took anything
argue that
condition, the
anything in
Days cannot
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to
marketable title.
title.
t0 insurable
0r marketable
insurable or

Denial
a matter
matter of
Denial of
their motion
motion as
law is
therefore
as a
of law
of their
is therefore

appropriate.
appropriate.
2.
limitations has
has run
The statute
statute of
2. The
of limitations
on any
breach of
of promise.
promise.
run on
any breach
Moreover,
if the
limitations has
the statute
the 1967
the State
of limitations
on the
contracts. So
statute of
1967 contracts.
even if
State
has run
run on
So even
Moreover, the
somehow
years ago
its promise
the statute
ran forty-five
regarding access,
on any
claim
somehow breached
breached its
fOITy-five years
promise regarding
statute ran
ago on
access, the
any claim
in July
based on
waived reliance
limitations in
the statute
the extent
extent the
the State
on the
on aa breach.
To the
of limitations
breach. To
statute of
reliance on
State waived
based
July

2000,
years and
bars any
breach of
promise
limitations bars
the statute
that waiver
of limitations
of promise
ﬁve years
and the
waiver only
lasted five
statute of
2000, that
only lasted
any breach
claims.
breach of
promise on
The Days
the statute
limitations has
which the
cannot rely
on aa breach
of promise
on which
of limitations
has run
statute of
claims. The
run
Days cannot
rely on
in
in order
their motion
taking. Denial
motion as
for
to establish
Denial of
of their
matter of
of law
order to
appropriate for
establish aa taking.
as a
a matter
law is
is also
also appropriate
this
this reason
reason alone.
alone.

right subject
taking or
a matter
matter of
title insurance
not aa property
insurance is
3.
to taking
or
As a
is not
of law,
subject to
3. As
law, title
property right
compensation.
CO mpe ns ation.
7-711 provides
Idaho
provides the
basis for
in aa condemnation
the statutory
for damages
setting.
condemnation setting.
Idaho Code
Code §
damages in
statutory basis
§ 7-711

“value of
It provides
that damages
for the
the “value
the property
It
provides that
be assessed
be
to be
of the
to be
are to
sought to
damages are
assessed for
propeny sought

condemned,
pertaining to
the realty,
all improvements
thereon pertaining
improvements thereon
to the
of each
and of
and every
and all
each and
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of July, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U .S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
~::g) iCourt Service

D Email:

fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2017 9:38:33 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jessica Ader, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
ISB#4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
State of Idaho

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVO 1-16-20313

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK SCHUG

)

: ss.
County of Ada

)

Nick Schug, having been first duly sworn upon oath, states the following:

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK SCHUG- 1
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I

1. I am employed as the Idaho Title Manager by Nextitle, LLC, which is the successor
in interest to Lawyers Title of Idaho.
2. As Title Manager, part of my duties and responsibilities include maintaining files
containing documents relating to various title commitments and policies of insurance,
to include such documents that Nextitle, LLC acquired from Lawyers Title of Idaho
as its successor in interest. I am therefore making the following statements regarding
such documents based on my own personal knowledge.
3. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of Owner's Title of Policy Insurance, File
No. LTOS-11577, issued by Lawyers Title ofldaho, a document that was created and
maintained in the regularly conducted course and practice of business activity:
Further youT Affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

day

NIChCHUG
Idaho Title Manager
Nextitle, LLC

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

,J\ t&~j
,yla,:·~-~

P.J. NAVA
NOTARY PUBLIC

2017.

lat tc~~~

Notary Public for aho
Residing at Ada County, Idaho
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF IDAHO

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK SCHUG - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

ce~?' that on this S l

s'r"

~

day o~ 2017, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
Email: fshoemaker@grecncrlaw.com

0

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
·Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK SCI-lUG - 3
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Issued
No.:

with

Policy

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
SCHEDULE A
Amount of Insurance: $10,010,000.00

Policy No.: A75-2521119
File No.: LT05-11577

Date of Policy: May 23, 2006

at 4:25pm

1. Name of Insured:

EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation

2. The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is
fee simple
and is at date of policy vested in:

EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation

3. The land referred to in this policy is described in the said instrument, is situated in the
County of Ada
, State of Idaho, and is identified as follows:

See Exhibit B

Exhibit B
PARCEL I
Township 2 North Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County/ Idaho.
Section 19: NE 1/4
1

Except those portions thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by deed recorded July ~~ 1936,
as Instrument No. 170934 in Book 217 of Deeds, page 424 and by deed recorded November 10,
1967 as Instrument No. 677552 records of said County.
1

(Continued)
Countersigned: ___________________________________________
Authorized Officer or Agent
Linda Fultz
This Policy Is Valid Only If Schedule B is Attached
American Land Title Association Owner's Policy Schedule A

(Rev. 10/17/92)

els
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE A (continuedf

LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued)

And Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed
recorded February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005940, records of said County.

PARCEL II
Township 2 North, Range 3 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
Section 19: SE 1/4
Except that portion thereof conveyed to the Ada County Highway District by deed recorded
February 4, 1980 as Instrument No. 8005941, records of said County.

000790

File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B

This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will not pay costs,
attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of:

1. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but
which could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or which may be asserted by
persons in possession, or claiming to be in possession, thereof.
2. Easements, liens, encumbrances, or claims thereof, which are not shown by the public
records.
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other
facts which a correct survey of the land would disclose, and which are not shown by the
public records.
4. Any lien, or right to a lien, imposed by the law for services, labor, or material
heretofore or hereafter furnished, which lien, or right to a lien, is not shown by the
public records.
5.

(a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts
authorizing the issuance thereof; (c) Indian treaty or aboriginal rights, including, but
not limited to, easements or equitable servitudes; or, (d) water rights, claims or title·
to water, whether or not the matters excepted under (a), (b), (c) or (d) are shown by the
public records.

6. Taxes or assessments which are not now payable or which are not shown as existing liens by
the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or
by the public records; proceedings by a public agency which may result in taxes or
assessments, or notices of such proceedings, whether or not shown by the records of such
agency or by the public records.
7. Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or construction charges for sewer,
water, electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other utilities unless shown as
an existing lien by the public records.
8. General taxes for the year 2005, which are a lien, payable on or before December 20 of
said year and not delinquent until after said date.
9. Easement adjacent to the highway right of way for relocation of all irrigation and/or
drainage ditches and structures granted by deed to the State of Idaho recorded July 2,
1936, as Instrument No. 170934, records of said County.
(Continued)

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy - 1970 - Form B (Rev. 10-17-70 and 10-17-84)
Form 1005-6 Schedule A
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B (continued)

EXCEPTIONS (continued)

10. Agreement between Emma N. Day a widow, and Ernest E. Day, Robert L. Day, and Donald
M. Day, And the State of Idaho, Department of Highways which, among other things,
extinguishes all access rights and all easements of access from the property to the
highways described therein recorded November 22, 1961, as Instrument No. 515882,
records of said County.
11. Rights of the State of Idaho to all access rights between the right of way of the
highway and the contiguous land as granted by deed recorded Nove~er 10, 1967, as
Instrument No. 677552, records of said County.
12. Lack of a right of access, if any, to that portion of the land lying North and East
of the Highway as the same affects the NE 1/4 of Said Section 19.
13. Right of Way Easement for communication and other facilities and incidentals thereto
in favor of THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY recorded March 22,
1985, as Instrument No. 8515402, and amended and recorded November 27, 1985 as
Instrument No. 8562748, records of said County.
14. Easement for telecommunication facilities and incidentals thereto in favor of US WEST
COMMUNICIATIONS, INC., recorded December 22, 1992, as Instrument No. 9288756, records
of said County.
15. Matters shown or disclosed by Record of Survey No. 3503, Isaac's Canyon Interchange
Survey No. 1 prepared by Porters Land Surveying and recorded April 10, 1996, as
Instrument No. 96029720, records of said County.
16. The interest, if any, of the spouse of JOHN F. DAY if married on December 29, 1998
and matters that might be disclosed by a search of the records against her name.
17. The interest, if any, of the spouse of DAN E. DAY if married on December 29, 1998 and
matters that might be disclosed by a search of the records against her name.
(Continued)

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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File No.: LT05-11577

Policy No.: A75-2521119
SCHEDULE B (continued)

EXCEPTIONS (continued)

18. A mortgage to secure payment of a note for $6,500,000.00, and any other amounts as
therein provided,
Recorded:
May 23, 2006 as Instrument No. 106081744, of Official Records
Dated:
May 15, 2006
Mortgagor: EDMONDS GROVES LAND HOLDINGS, INC.
Mortgagee: TRUST B of the DONALD M. DAY and MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST created by
instrument dated March 24, 1977 as to an undivided one-sixth interest;
JOHN F. DAY as to an undivided one-fourth interest; DAN E. DAY as to an
undivided one-fourth interest; BENNETT G. DAY an undivided one-ninth
interest as his separate property; DONNA DAY JACOBS an undivided
one-ninth interest as her separate property and DAVID R. DAY an undivided
one-ninth interest as his separate property

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Owner's Policy
Schedule B
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2017 9:38:33 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jessica Ader, Deputy Clerk
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Idaho Transportation Department
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Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
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DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
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rule provides
Instead, the
propeny. Instead,

compensation
jury trial,
then determine
the court
which party
determine which
compensation can
can be
and the
can then
gets
be made
made via
Via a
a jury
001111 can
trial, and
patty gets
what amount
amount
What

of
of compensation.
compensation.
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Although
judgment motion,
Although the
the Days
the issue
ﬁled aa summary
presented is
have filed
issue presented
is
motion, the
summary judgment
Days have
essentially
interpretation rather
rather than
the existence
of legal
legal interpretation
than aa question
of the
of aa genuine
genuine issue
of
question of
one of
existence of
issue of
essentially one
material
problem of
matter of
the arguments
the Days
not avoid
the problem
of law,
of
material fact.
As aa matter
fact. As
arguments raised
avoid the
raised by
do not
law, the
Days do
by the
standing
in this
that is
that personal
not attach
the fact
standing in
attach to
to real
real property
or the
fact that
personal property
this case
is
case or
does not
property does
property that
transferred
by deed.
with no
upon
the Days
transferred by
this Court
no legal
legal basis
provided this
have provided
deed. Simply
Court With
basis upon
stated, the
Simply stated,
Days have
which to
their motion.
which
motion.
to grant
grant their
II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
A.
An inverse
that must
claim is
condemnation claim
personal property
A. An
is personal
must be
inverse condemnation
assigned
be assigned
property that
because
it is
appurtenant to
not appurtenant
is not
to real
re al property.
prope rty.
be caus e it
a“chose
action”, also
in action”,
An inverse
An
“chose in
not real
known
condemnation claim
real property,
inverse condemnation
claim is
is not
is a
also known
property, itit is

“thing in
action”, which,
it is
in action”,
as
which, as
personal property.
property. As
As such,
general intangible
intanglble property,
is
as a
a “thing
as general
is personal
such, it
property, is

It
not
with the
the conveyance
not appurtenant
not transfer
transfer With
of real
real property.
to real
real property
appurtenant to
and does
does not
conveyance of
property and
property. It
must
be specifically
upon by
in the
the deeds
the Days
no language
relied upon
must be
Because no
assigned. Because
language in
deeds relied
speciﬁcally assigned.
Days
by the
Grantor’s rights
Days’ motion
the Grantor’s
the Days’
motion must
contains
contains an
an assignment
of the
must be
personal property,
rights as
assignment of
as personal
be
property, the

denied.
denied.
“general intangible”
Black’s Law
intanglble” as
Black’s
defines “general
follows:
Law Dictionary
as follows:
Dictionary defines

Any
property other
tort claims,
than accounts,
other than
chattel paper,
personal property
commercial tort
accounts, chattel
claims,
paper, commercial
Any personal
letter-ofinvestment property,
deposit
deposit accounts,
instruments, investment
document, goods,
accounts, document,
goods, instruments,
property, letter-ofcredit
letter of
other minerals
credit rights,
of credit,
or other
minerals before
and oil,
before
rights, letter
credit, money,
oil, gas,
money, and
gas, or
extraction.
rights.
extraction. Some
in action,
examples are
things in
and literary
are goodwill,
Some examples
goodwill, things
literary rights.
action, and
(citing
(citing UCC
9-102(a)(42).
UCC§§ 9-102(a)(42).
th
(10th
Black’s Law
141 Idaho
Black’s
ed.
Karle v.
Idaho
Law Dictionary
ed. 2014)
See also,
v. Visser,
Dictionary (10
Visser, 141
(emphasis added).
2014) (emphasis
added). See
also, Karle

‘thing in
(“‘chose in
action’ or
action’ fall
in action’
in action’
fall under
118 P.3d
deﬁnition
804,
or ‘thing
139 (2005)
P.3d 136,
under definition
804, 807,
136, 139
807, 118
(2005) (“‘chose

intanglble”) (citing
A
of
In Re
Re Richardson,
216 B.R.
219 (S.D.Ohio.
general intangible”)
ofaa general
BR. 206,
Richardson, 216
(S.D.Ohi0. 1997)).
(citing In
206, 219
1997)). A

“thing in
“chose”, also
“chose in
action” or
action”, is
“chose”,
personal property,
property, not
in action”
in action”,
not real
known as
or “thing
real
also known
as a
a “chose
is personal

property:
property:
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1.
proprietary right
personam, such
by another
A proprietary
another person,
1. A
right in
in personam,
such as
debt owed
as a
a debt
owed by
person, aa
joint-stock
in a
in tort.
share
for damages
The right
tort. 2.
or aa claim
2. The
right to
claim for
share in
a joint-stock company,
damages in
to
company, or
bring
that one
or thing.
Personal property
bring an
an action
thing. 3.
one
recover a
action to
3. Personal
to recover
a debt,
debt, money,
property that
money, or
person
but another
person possesses,
possesses, the
the owner
regain
another person
being able
to regain
person owns
owner being
owns but
able to
thing in
in action;
right in
in action.
possession
— Also termed
termed thing
action.
through aa lawsuit.
lawsuit. iAlso
possession through
action; right
th
(10th
Black’s Law
Black’s Law
Black’s
ed.
with Black’s
Consistent With
Law Dictionary
Law
ed. 2014)
Dictionary (10
(emphasis added).
2014) (emphasis
added). Consistent

thing in
in action
Dictionary,
personal property:
or thing
action as
Idaho Code
deﬁnes aa chose
chose or
Code also
also defines
as personal
Dictionary, Idaho
property:

Personal
property” includes
of
in action,
Personal property”
things in
includes money,
evidences of
chattels, things
action, evidences
goods, chattels,
money, goods,
7 secured
in the
debt
uniform commercial
the uniform
general intangibles
intanglbles as
commercial code
and general
deﬁned in
debt and
as defined
code –
secured
transactions.
transactions.
“Every kind
I.C.
property that
personal.”
kind of
not real
real is
of property
that is
I.C. §§ 73-114(2)(c)
is personal.”
is not
(emphasis added).
added). “Every
73-114(2)(c) (emphasis
55-102.
Idaho
Idaho Code
Code §
§ 55-102.

“coextensive with
In contrast,
With lands,
In
tenements and
real property
and hereditaments,
hereditaments,
is “coextensive
contrast, real
property is
lands, tenements

claims.” I.C.
possessory rights
property is
rights and
deﬁnition of
Further definition
of real
real property
at
and claims.”
I.C. §§ 73-114(2)(e).
found at
is found
possessory
73-114(2)(e). Further

I.C.
§ 55-101:
I.C.§55-101:
Real
property or
Real property
or real
real estate
estate consists
of:
consists of:
1.
mining claims,
rights to
1. Lands,
to land,
ditch and
water rights,
and water
and mining
rights, and
Lands, possessory
claims,
possessory rights
land, ditch
both
placer.
both lode
and placer.
lode and
2.
which is
2. That
That which
afﬁxed to
to land.
land.
is affixed
3.
which is
That which
to land
appurtenant to
land
3. That
is appurtenant
“thing in
action” as
action” or
a“chose
in action”
in action”
Obviously,
“chose in
or “thing
an inverse
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
claim is
as
is a
Obviously, an

defined
property. In
McKay v.
In McKay
not real,
therefore personal,
Idaho statute
deﬁned by
and case
and therefore
statute and
case law
law and
v.
persona], not
real, property.
by Idaho
930-31 (2016),
Walker,
that aa mortgage
the court
152-53, 369
held that
mortgage is
Idaho 148,
160 Idaho
P.3d 926,
369 P.3d
001111 held
is
Walker, 160
148, 152-53,
926, 930-31
(2016), the
in action.
not
paraphrase McKay:
McKay:
for aa chose
not real
The same
true for
To paraphrase
real property.
action. To
holds true
same analysis
chose in
analysis holds
property. The

“real
55-101 is
the other
deﬁnition of
other statute
Idaho
of “real
section 55-101
providing aa definition
Idaho Code
statute providing
Code section
is the
“Lands,
property.” The
property.”
“Lands,
possessory
in that
The definition
deﬁnition found
that statute
statute includes:
includes: (1)
found in
possessory
(1)
placer;”
mining claims,
rights
both lode
rights to
to land,
ditch and
water rights,
and water
and mining
and placer;”
lode and
claims, both
rights, and
land, ditch
“That
”That which
land.”
land”; and,
(2)
which is
“That
which
is
appurtenant
to
which
afﬁxed to
to land”;
to land.”
appurtenant
is affixed
is
and, (3)
(2) “That
(3)
557101. A
I.C.
A [chose
in action]
A [chose
in action]
not land.
not create
create
I.C. §§ 55–101.
land. A
is not
does not
action] is
action] does
[chose in
[chose in
right to
A [chose
in action]
right nor
it
aapossessory
possessory right
water right
not aa ditch
nor is
ditch or
to land.
or water
land. A
is it
is not
action] is
[chose in
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1
appurtenantl to
aamining
mining claim.
A [chose
in action]
it appurtenant
not affixed
nor is
affixed to
to land
to
claim. A
land nor
is not
is it
action] is
[chose in
In short,
in action]
not real
land.
property as
by Idaho
real propeny
Idaho
deﬁned by
land. In
is not
as defined
short, aa [chose
action] simply
[chose in
simply is
557101. Because
Code
it is
in action]
not real
real property,
section 55–101.
Because aa [chose
is
is not
Code section
action] is
[chose in
property, it
557102.
personal
property. I.C.
personal propeny.
I.C. §§ 55–102.

930-31.
152-53, 369
at 152-53,
at 930-31.
McKay v.
Idaho at
160 Idaho
P.3d at
v. Walker,
369 P.3d
Walker, 160
McKay

In
property, the
McKay court
In explaining
that aa mortgage
definition of
the definition
not real
the McKay
explaining that
of
real property,
mortgage is
coutt used
used the
is not
“apputtenant” as
Black’s Law
“appurtenant”
by Black’s
Law Dictionary:
deﬁned by
as defined
Dictionary:

A thing
thing is
in relation
A
when itit stands
something else
incident
to something
relation of
of an
an incident
apputtenant to
stands in
is appurtenant
else when
to
with the
the use
the
principal and
to aa principal
of the
and is
connected with
and enjoyment
is necessarily
use and
necessarily connected
enjoyment of
latter.
be incidental
A thing
thing is
incidental or
to be
or appurtenant
to land
when itit is
latter. A
appurtenant to
land when
deemed to
is deemed
is by
by
in the
right used
right
way, or
water-course, or
with the
the land
for its
its benefit,
the case
or water-course,
or
of aa way,
land for
as in
used with
case of
benefit, as
from or
for light,
the land
of
of aa passage
or heat
heat from
or across
of another.
another.
land of
across the
passage for
light, air,
air, or
in original).
McKay v.
152-53, 369
at 152-53,
at 930-31,
note 11 (emphasis
930-31, note
Idaho at
160 Idaho
P.3d at
v. Walker,
369 P.3d
original).
Walker, 160
(emphasis in
McKay
in action
not appurtenant
to real
real propeny.
As
action is
Obviously,
property such
property. As
personal property
such as
apputtenant to
chose in
is not
as a
a chose
Obviously, personal

it would
such,
be conveyed
when itit is
with real
not be
another owner.
transferred to
real property
to another
owner.
would not
is transferred
conveyed with
such, it
propeny when

Because
property or
in action
not real
action such
an inverse
condemnation claim
real property
or
inverse condemnation
claim is
such as
chose in
Because aa chose
as an
is not
in order
it must
transfer itit to
appurtenant
provides that
to it,
must be
to transfer
that aa
to another.
another. Idaho
order to
Idaho law
assigned in
apputtenant to
be assigned
law provides
it, it

“thing in
“chose in
“arising out
action”, also
action”, “arising
“thing
violation of
in action”,
in action”,
right of
the Violation
known as
of
of the
of aa right
out of
also known
as a
a “chose

“Upon the
owner.” I.C.
property, or
be transferred
the owner.”
the
transferred by
or out
of an
an obligation,
out of
I.C. §§ 55-402.
55 -402. “Upon
obligation, may
property,
may be
by the
in the
death
passes to
where, in
provided
the owner
the cases
of the
to his
personal representatives,
death of
owner itit passes
except Where,
his personal
cases provided
representatives, except

ofﬁce.” Id.
in
passes to
in office.”
Id. See,
in the
it passes
the Code
of Civil
to his
or successor
Civil Procedure,
Purco
successorin
Code of
his devisees
devisees or
Procedure, it
See, Purco

Fleet Services,
Inc. v.
Idaho State
Department of Finance, 140
140 Idaho
Idaho 121,
351
P.3d 346,
Fleet
v. Idaho
State DepartmentofFinance,
90 P.3d
Services, Inc.
121, 126,
126, 90
346, 351
(“Idaho recognizes
in action
assignable.”) (citing
(2004)
McClusky v.
that choses
action are
recognizes that
are generally
choses in
v.
(citing McClusky
generally assignable.”)
(2004) (“Idaho
191-91 (1973)).
511 P.2d
Galland,
474-75, 511
P.2d 289,
Idaho 472,
95 Idaho
Galland, 95
472, 474-75,
289, 191-91
(1973)).

‘assignment’ is
in its
“Ordinarily,
word ‘assignment’
limited in
the word
its application
application to
to aa transfer
transfer of
of intangible
“Ordinarily, the
intanglble
is limited

rights,
property, as
in action,
in or
rights in
with property,
including contractual
or connected
contractual rights,
and rights
connected with
choses in
as
rights, choses
action, and
rights, including
11
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itself.” Purco
distinguished
from transfer
property itself.”
Purco Fleet
Fleet Services,
Inc. v.
Idaho State
the property
distinguished from
v. Idaho
State
Services, Inc.
transfer of
of the
Department of Finance, 140
Assignment §§ 11
140 Idaho
at 126,
at 351
Idaho at
351 (quoting
AmJur.2d Assignment
P.3d at
6 AmJur.2d
90 P.3d
DepartmentofFinance,
(quoting 6
126, 90
(1999)
(emphasis added)).
added».
(1999) (emphasis
Clearly,
used to
the language
the Day
transfer ownership
to transfer
of the
real
ownership of
language used
Property only
conveyed real
Clearly, the
only conveyed
Day Property
right to
property, not
personal property,
not personal
to claim
arising out
of an
an inverse
inverse
claim damages
out of
such as
as a
a right
damages arising
property,
property, such

“all singular
condemnation
by the
the Days,
the relevant
relevant deed
condemnation claim.
As described
claim. As
states: “all
singular
descrlbed by
deed language
language states:
Days, the

the
the buildings,
hereditaments and
thereunto
and appurtenances
appurtenances thereunto
improvements, tenements,
tenements, hereditaments
buildings, structures,
structures, improvements,
in anywise
belonging or
the reversion
belonging
or in
reversion and
remainder and
and reversions,
and remainders,
remainders,
appertaining, the
reversions, remainder
anywise appertaining,

thereof.” Days’
4-5. That
Days’ Memo.
rents,
profits thereof.”
That language
the
at 4-5.
reﬂects the
Memo. at
and proﬁts
issues and
language essentially
rents, issues
essentially reflects
55-101and I.C.
The additional
deﬁnition of
terms of
definition
property found
I.C. §§ 55-101and
additional terms
of
of real
real property
atI.C.
I.C. §§ 73-114(2)(e).
found at
73-114(2)(e). The

thereof” do
“reversion and
“reversion
profits thereof”
not
remainder and
and reversions,
and remainders,
and proﬁts
issues and
do not
reversions, remainder
remainders, rents,
rents, issues

“LLC Deeds”
Deeds”
consist
in the
Per the
the Days,
the language
the “LLC
of or
or convey
personal property.
consist of
language used
used in
property. Per
convey personal
Days, the
“together With
consisted
with any
undiscovered interest
with all
all of
the
interest therein,
together with
of the
of “together
consisted of
therein, together
any undiscovered

thereto.” Days’
Days’ Memo.
appurtenances
pertaining thereto.”
5. That
the Days,
That language
of no
no help
to the
Memo. at
help to
at5.
appurtenances pertaining
language is
is of
Days,
in the
it only
as
property and
personal property.
Nowhere in
not assign
the Day
references real
and does
does not
assign personal
as it
realproperty
property. Nowhere
only references
Day

right to
Property
the
the right
there an
to an
an inverse
condemnation claim
or the
an assignment
of the
inverse condemnation
claim or
assignment of
deeds is
is there
Property deeds

therefrom.
proceeds therefrom.
proceeds

The
the lack
The Days
to circumvent
of assignment
of personal
of aa
consisting of
personal property
circumvent the
assignment of
lack of
property consisting
Days try
try to
right
citing to
For example,
irrelevant case
right to
to an
an inverse
condemnation claim
to irrelevant
inverse condemnation
claim by
case law.
law. For
example, City
City of
by citing
of
’Alene v.
142 Idaho
not involve
Coeur
d’Alene
310 (2006)
question of
of
Idaho 839,
136 P.3d
P.3d310
involve aaquestion
Coeurd
v. Simpson,
did not
Simpson, 142
839, 136
(2006) did

standing
in
taking in
taking. The
The case
standing or
or inverse
condemnation by
inverse condemnation
involved aa regulatory
case involved
regulatory taking
physical taking.
by physical
which neither
property rights
neither standing
nor the
the transfer
For
transfer of
which
standing nor
of personal
an issue.
personal property
rights was
raised as
was raised
as an
issue. For
those
the case
inapposite.
those reasons
reasons alone,
case is
is inapposite.
alone, the
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Presumably
the Days
for its
its discussion
cite Simpson
of Nollan
Nollan v.
discussion of
Simpson for
v. California
Coastal
Presumably the
Califbrnia Coastal
Days cite
Commission,
the issue
L. Ed.
2d 677
of
483 U.S.
107 S.
Ct. 3141,
Ed. 2d
and the
US. 825,
S. Ct.
97 L.
677 (1987)
issue of
Commission, 483
3141, 3164,
3164, 97
825, 867,
867, 107
(1987) and

if he
whether aa subsequent
property has
the property
for inverse
Whether
of the
he
inverse condemnation
owner of
claim for
has a
condemnation if
subsequent owner
a claim
pre-existing regulatory
purchased real
property with
process of
which he
with knowledge
the pre-existing
real propeny
of the
of which
he
knowledge of
purchased
regulatory process
Eismann’s
Days’ situation.
in J.
nothing to
That has
complains.
with the
The discussion
the Days’
to do
situation. The
complains. That
has nothing
discussion in
J. Eismann’s
do with
“one of
right to
in the
dissent
that the
the right
the most
the
to exclude
others is
of the
most essential
sticks in
notes that
essential sticks
dissent simply
exclude others
is “one
simply notes

bundle
bundle

propeny.” City
of
Coeur d’Alene
rights that
that are
of rights
characterized as
are commonly
as property.”
d ’Alene v.
v.
commonly characterized
ofCoeur
City of

142 Idaho
Simpson,
Dolan v.
Eismann dissenting
at 857,
at 328,
dissenting (quoting
Idaho at
136 P.3d
P.3d at
v. City
J. Eismann
Simpson, 142
(quoting Dolan
328, J.
857, 136
City of
of

Tigard,
114 S.Ct.
Being able
512 U.S.
129 L.Ed.2d
321 (1994)).
to
L.Ed.2d 304,
able to
S.Ct. 2309,
US. 374,
Tigard, 512
2320, 129
2309, 2320,
374, 393,
304, 321
393, 114
(1994)). Being
in this
in the
from the
the Day
not an
the Simpson
exclude
Nothing in
an issue
trespassers from
this case.
Simpson
exclude trespassers
is not
issue in
case. Nothing
Property is
Day Property

decision
rights includes
that fee
the argument
simple ownership
ownership of
of real
real property
fee simple
argument that
includes
decision supports
supports the
propeny rights
personal property
rights.
personal
property rights.
Similarly,
Hughes v.
the Days.
P.2d 397
of no
no help
to the
Idaho 286,
328 P.2d
help to
397 (1958)
is of
v. State,
80 Idaho
State, 80
Similarly, Hughes
286, 328
Days.
(1958) is
All
Hughes stands
All Hughes
that aa general
that abuts
for is
the fact
for land
for access
fact that
general easement
easement for
stands for
exists for
land that
abuts a
is the
access exists
a
street
be taken
that itit cannot
taken without
Without compensation.
street or
or highway,
cannot be
compensation.
and that
highway, and

Hughes does
not involve
involve
Hughes
does not

whether the
based on
personal or
right is
that right
that is
the claim
Whether
on loss
of that
or real
real property
claim based
loss of
is personal
is automatically
automatically
propeny that
that fee
the real
Nor does
the case
the claim
transferred
purchaser of
property. Nor
transferred to
to aa purchaser
of the
real property.
support the
claim that
fee
does the
case support

simple
personal property
property rights.
rights.
simple ownership
ownership includes
includes personal
The
by the
that all
The Days
all real
the
interests are
real property
transferred unless
are transferred
unless reserved
reserved by
also argue
argue that
propeny interests
Days also
citing Joyce
grantor,
Joyce Livestock
Livestock Co.
Idaho 1,
1441dah0
156 P.3d
502 (2007)
P.3d 502
United States,
Co. v.
v. United
grantor, citing
States, 144
(water
(2007) (water
1, 156

rights
with real
unless reserved
by grantor);
rights pass
real property
P.
Idaho 661,
167 P.
Crandall v.
reserved by
pass with
v. Goss,
30 Idaho
Goss, 30
grantor); Crandall
661, 167
propeny unless
1025
be maintained
by aa homesteader
1025 (1917)
of adverse
against an
an
claim of
maintained by
homesteader against
can be
possession can
adverse possession
(1917) (a
(a claim
easement
by railroad);
Paddock v.
is
22 Idaho
126 P.
P. 1053
Idaho 498,
easement abandoned
1053 (1912)
abandoned by
v. Clark,
Clark, 22
(wateris
railroad); Paddock
498, 126
(1912) (water
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real
but grantor
transfer of
rights upon
real property
to land,
grantor can
of land);
water rights
can reserve
upon transfer
I.C.
apputtenant to
reserve water
land, but
propeny appurtenant
land); I.C.
73-114. None
§§ 55-101;
property rights
rights
55-101; I.C.
None of
of those
55-604; and
personal property
those cases
and I.C.
involve personal
I.C. §§ 55-604;
LC. §§ 73-114.
cases involve

right transfers
and
with aa
nothing to
that aa personal
the Days
attempt to
therefore have
to claim
to do
transfers with
personal right
claim that
and therefore
have nothing
do the
Days attempt
73-114 support
55-604 and
conveyance
property. Moreover,
55-101, I.C.
of real
real propeny.
support
and I.C.
I.C. §§ 55-101,
I.C. §§ 55-604
LC. §§ 73-114
Moreover, I.C.
conveyance of

State’s position
the
the State’s
position as
as argued
argued above.
above.

7 is
A chose
in action
A
– an
action 7
an inverse
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
claim –
chose in
is

in fee
not
be assigned
person
not included
the person
simple ownership
of real
real property,
must be
ownership of
fee simple
and must
included in
assigned by
propeny, and
by the

holding
the claim.
holding the
claim.
rights to
The
next argue
that aa conveyance
The Days
the rights
of property
to an
an award
of
can include
include the
award of
argue that
conveyance of
propeny can
Days next

money
the case
the Days
arising out
of aa condemnation.
condemnation. Once
cited by
out of
Once again,
inapposite.
case law
law cited
is inapposite.
again, the
money arising
Days is
by the
in aa direct
that in
for the
the proposition
Bank of
America v.
proposition that
Bank
P.2d 1035
direct
stands for
1035 (Cal.
v. Glendale,
50 P.2d
Glendale, 50
(Cal. 1935)
1935) stands
ofAmerica

“Where the
condemnation
by deed,
the conveyance
the land
condemnation case,
of the
condemnation is
land pending
pending condemnation
is by
conveyance of
case, “Where
deed,

without reservation,
just rule
right to
the only
for the
the right
the money
Without
certain and
to take
that the
to be
and just
paid for
take
rule is
is that
be paid
reservation, the
money to
only certain
or
property shall
person or
persons owning
the person
the property
the property
shall be
owning the
having an
to the
or persons
or damage
or having
an
paid to
damage the
be paid
propeny or
interest
where itit
time when
that point
therein at
the time
the condemnation
interest therein
completion Where
at the
when the
condemnation has
point of
of completion
has reached
reached that
right to
is
becomes an
the compensation
the right
not subject
to the
an enforceable
to abandonment
when the
compensation becomes
abandonment and
enforceable
and when
subject to
is not
condemnor.” Bank
demand
America v.
the condemnor.”
The case
against the
Bank of
P.2d at
at 1037.
has
1037. The
demand against
v. Glendale,
50 P.2d
case has
Glendale, 50
ofAmerica
nothing to
nothing
with whether
whether an
personal property,
be
to do
an inverse
inverse condemnation
condemnation claim,
can be
as personal
do with
claim, as
propeny, can

conveyed
property.
with real
the personal
Without an
an assignment
of the
real property
assignment of
personal propeny.
conveyed with
propeny without
court’s ruling
Critical
was that
under the
the Street
Act of
the
the Glendale
Critical to
ruling was
Opening Act
that under
Street Opening
of 1903,
to the
Glendale court’s
1903, the
time up
the condemnation
the demand
for payment
city
payment
until the
condemnation proceedings
at any
proceedings at
abandon the
could abandon
demand for
up until
city could
any time

became enforceable.
under the
In contrast,
in aa condemnation
the California
California Code
of
carried out
enforceable. In
condemnation carried
out under
became
Code of
contrast, in
Civil
proceedings only
Within thirty
the city
the proceedings
the
after the
Civil Procedure,
have abandoned
abandoned the
could have
Procedure, the
thirty days
city could
only within
days after
initial
just compensation
be paid.
paid.
forth the
initial interlocutory
initial estimate
setting forth
the initial
of just
to be
compensation to
estimate of
decree setting
interlocutory decree
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Obviously,
the case
not aa direct
at bar
direct condemnation
condemnation case
involving questions
of
questions of
bar is
case at
is not
case involving
Obviously, the
whether the
proceedings and
just compensation
the State
the just
Whether
condemnation proceedings
when the
compensation
State could
and when
abandon condemnation
could abandon
Days’
becomes an
America to
the logic
the Days’
an enforceable
logic of
of Bank
Bank of
to the
enforceable award.
award. However,
becomes
However, applying
ofAmerica
applying the

case
would mean
in terms
that the
the right
the compensation
terms of
right to
to the
of an
an (alleged)
mean that
compensation in
enforceable demand
demand
case would
(alleged) enforceable
that time
time could
arose
who were
were owners
proceeds
on December
at that
those WhO
December 5,
and only
owners at
arose on
receive proceeds
could receive
1997, and
only those
5, 1997,

from
plaintiffs.
from the
the demand.
not include
all of
the current
of the
Those owners
owners do
demand. Those
include all
current plaintiffs.
do not
Clay
N.W. 982
than Bank
farther afield
145 NW.
afield than
Bank of
982 (Neb.
even farther
v. Howard,
is even
Howard, 145
1914) is
(Neb. 1914)
County v.
Clay County
of
In Clay
America. In
but
the county
for aa road
condemnation proceedings
proceedings for
started condemnation
road but
America.
county started
County, the
Clay County,

abandoned
paying any
taking the
the effort
effort without
the land
The owners
Without taking
or paying
compensation. The
owners conveyed
land or
abandoned the
conveyed
any compensation.
right of
then
The county
for the
the road
the property
ten years
the
years later
without any
of way.
later Without
reservation for
road right
property ten
county then
way. The
any reservation

sought
way for
it to
right of
into the
the court,
for the
the road,
for itit into
the right
asking it
to
of way
to obtain
obtain the
and made
made payment
sought to
court, asking
payment for
road, and
decide
that
the current
the grantor.
The court
grantor. The
to whom
Whom payment
or the
held that
current owner
owner or
should be
decide to
be made,
court held
payment should
made, the
because no
was taken
property, the
the grantor
the property,
the current
taken while
While the
get
no land
grantor owned
owner should
should get
current owner
land was
owned the
because
the
the funds
the owners
the taking
taking actually
when the
owners when
were the
funds as
as they
occurred.
actually occurred.
they were
State’s position
in this
Clay
position in
The court
the State’s
this case.
court specifically
supports the
case. The
speciﬁcally
actually supports
County actually
Clay County

stated
property at
that person
time of
the property
the time
the damage
entitled to
owning the
to payment:
at the
of the
person owning
stated that
damage is
is entitled
payment:

It is
that the
the subsequent
the road
not prevent
the
It
prevent the
of the
vacation of
road could
subsequent vacation
is also
also argued
argued that
could not
Howards
their damages,
from collecting
the county
the
collecting their
that the
cannot abandon
and that
Howards from
abandon the
damages, and
county cannot
land,
and
thus
escape
payment
therefor.
Drath
v.
Burlington
&
M.
R.
R.
Co.,
Drath
therefor.
thus
M.
R.
R.
15
Burlington
and
escape payment
v.
&
land,
C0., 15
in the
Neb.
N. W.
principles laid
With the
the principles
the cases
18 N.
Neb. 367,
717. We
laid down
down in
W. 717.
We fully
cases
agree with
367, 18
fully agree
cited;
but
the
facts
in
this
case
require
the
application
of
different
principles.
in
At
this case require the application of different principles. At
cited; but the facts
the
time that
that the
the time
the Howards
the land
to Grant,
he conveyed
to Wiberg
and he
Howards conveyed
land to
Wﬂ)erg
Grant, and
conveyed the
conveyed to
and
portion of
it
had
been
taken
for
a
public
highway.
No
actual
n0 portion
N0
taken
and McClellan,
had
been
actual
it
a
public
McClellan, no
highway.
for
of
time the
the land
the time
the Howards
easement
so that
at the
easement existed
existed over
Howards conveyed
over the
land at
that
conveyed itit away,
away, so
the
land
with
an
existing
easement
takes
the
an
the cases
holding that
one who
who buys
the
that one
land
with
easement
takes
existing
cases holding
buys
land
finds it,
he ﬁnds
right to
remains with
the vendor,
and the
the right
not
with the
land as
damages remains
as he
to damages
do not
vendor, do
it, and
apply.
such circumstances
Under such
owner of
the owner
the land
the time
land at
time it
circumstances the
at the
it was
was
apply. Under
of the
actually
person who
taken is
the person
who is
the damages.
recover the
damages.
entitled to
is the
is entitled
to recover
actually taken
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Clay
N.W. at
words, had
In other
145 NW.
the damage
other words,
at 983
to
had the
v. Howard,
983 (emphasis
damage to
Howard, 145
(emphasis added).
added). In
County v.
Clay County
7 existed
7 created
the
in the
right of
time
the time
the Clay
the right
the property
at the
of way
easement –
existed at
created in
case by
property –
County case
Clay County
way easement
by the

of
That is
the sale,
the former
former owner
the compensation.
the
entitled to
of the
to the
compensation. That
owner would
have been
been entitled
would have
is precisely
precisely the
sale, the
case- only
argument
in this
that the
the State
the owners
the Day
making in
this caseof the
of
State is
owners of
argument that
is making
as of
Property as
only the
Day Property

for
the alleged
December
when the
– are
entitled to
to compensation
compensation for
December 5,
are entitled
alleged damage
damage occurred
occurred 7
1997, when
5, 1997,

damages
their personal
therefore have
personal
those owners
and therefore
Unless those
owners specifically
have standing.
assigned their
standing. Unless
damages and
specifically assigned
property right
right to
the inverse
not
to the
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
claim and
and related
owners do
related damages,
subsequent owners
do not
damages, subsequent
property
have
the inverse
right to
to any
or to
to even
condemnation claim.
inverse condemnation
claim.
have aa right
even prosecute
prosecute the
damages or
any damages
Another
by the
In Re
Re
Another case
the Days
the transfer
transfer of
regarding the
of condemnation
condemnation awards,
cited by
case cited
awards, In
Days regarding
State’s position.
in supporting
the State’s
132 P.
further in
Twelfth
Avenue South,
position.
P. 868
supporting the
868 (Wash.
goes further
South, 132
Twelfth Avenue
(Wash. 1913),
1913), goes

The
property before
The case
transfer of
of property
condemnation proceedings
complete and
before condemnation
proceedings were
and
were complete
involved aa transfer
case involved
property had
property when
Logging Company
The Yesler
the property
taken or
or damaged.
Yesler Logging
when
had been
been taken
owned the
damaged. The
property
Company owned
condemnation
way through
jury verdict
all the
the way
through the
the jury
condemnation proceedings
started and
and all
verdict awarding
awarding damages.
proceedings started
damages.
Before
judgment was
was entered
well as
property was
was taken,
the property
the
Before judgment
entered and
before the
and payment
as well
as before
taken, the
payment made,
made, as
logging
property to
logging company
the property
the Seattle
The electric
Electric Company.
to the
electric company
Seattle Electric
sold the
asked
Company. The
company sold
company asked
to
be substituted
in the
proceedings for
but the
logging company,
the
the proceedings
for the
the logging
the trial
trial court
to be
denied the
substituted in
001111 denied
company, but
request.
request.
Reversing,
the property
the date
the occurrence
the court
to owner
of the
of the
of the
of
owner of
pointed to
date of
court pointed
occurrence of
as of
Reversing, the
property as
damage
party to
the appropriate
to receive
compensation:
appropriate party
receive compensation:
damage as
as the
In the
in the
the absence
the deed
the contrary,
In
of conveyance
to the
or of
of
of any
reservation in
absence of
deed of
conveyance to
contrary, or
any reservation
other contravening
facts
payment of
contravening equity,
showing estoppel
or other
of aa less
facts showing
estoppel or
such as
less
as payment
equity, such
price
by reason
proceeding, the
person owning
the pending
price by
of the
condemnation proceeding,
owning the
reason of
the person
the
pending condemnation
land
right to
or damage
in the
the time
the right
the city
land at
time the
take or
damage it
irrevocable in
became irrevocable
at the
to take
it became
city
should
for such
such damage.
both
Prior to
time both
to that
that time
the compensation
compensation for
should be
damage. Prior
entitled to
be entitled
to the
the
pay for
right are
that right
for that
the right
the obligation
obligation to
right to
to take
take or
or damage
to pay
and the
are inchoate,
damage and
inchoate,
An abandonment
uncertain,
the
of the
abandonment of
never mature.
and contingent,
and may
mature. An
contingent, and
uncertain, and
may never
the
the
the
the
condemnation
the
city
would
defeat
the
one
and
abort
the
other.
Where
condemnation by
other.
abort
defeat
one
and
Where the
city would
by
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conveyance
pending condemnation
by deed,
the land
the
Without reservation,
of the
condemnation is
land pending
is by
reservation, the
conveyance of
deed, without
right
that the
only
just rule
be paid
paid for
for the
the right to
the money
certain and
to take
take or
or
to be
and just
rule is
is that
money to
only certain
damage
property shall
be paid
paid to
the property
the person
the property
shall be
owning the
to the
or persons
or
person or
persons owning
damage the
property or
having
when the
time when
that
therein at
the time
the condemnation
interest therein
at the
an interest
condemnation has
having an
has reached
reached that
right to
it is
point
when the
not subject
the right
completion where
to abandonment
to
point of
of completion
abandonment and
Where it
and when
subject to
is not
the compensation
the condemnor.
an enforceable
against the
the
becomes an
compensation becomes
condemnor.
enforceable demand
demand against
In Re
Avenue South,
South, 132
132 P.
the court
the right
In
Re Twelfth
P. at
at 869.
refers to
to the
right to
to
court refers
869. Significantly,
Signiﬁcantly, the
Twelfth Avenue
“vested personal
payment” once
compensation
personal right
process is
right to
the condemnation
condemnation process
to enforce
compensation as
enforce payment”
once the
is
as a
a “vested

complete,
payment into
Id.
into the
the court.
including payment
court. Id.
complete, including
The
were not
Rohaly v.
in Rahaly
not raised
The conveyance
standing were
of personal
personal property
and standing
raised as
as issues
issues in
v.
conveyance of
property and
524 (N.J.App.
State,
Department of
Environmental
Protection and
A.2d 524
and Energy,
732 A.2d
vironmental Protection
State, Department
(N.J.App. 1999),
ofEn
Energy, 732
1999),

if the
relied
by the
predated ownership,
taking predated
that if
the subsequent
the Days
the taking
relied upon
to claim
owner can
claim that
can
upon by
subsequent owner
ownership, the
Days to
thing. Rather,
still prosecute
for no
the
The case
no such
an inverse
condemnation claim.
still
inverse condemnation
stands for
claim. The
such thing.
prosecute an
case stands
Rather, the

issue
the property
Whether the
invasion or
or aa regulatory
taking.
owner suffered
suffered aa physical
issue was
was whether
physical invasion
regulatory taking.
property owner
The
between aa regulatory
taking
not understand
the difference
The trial
trial court
difference between
did not
understand the
001111 apparently
apparently did
regulatory taking
“Applying this
from Pinkowski,
taking: “Applying
the trial
trial court
and
physical taking:
rationale from
this rationale
and aa physical
court mistakenly
Pinkowski, the
mistakenly

concluded
DEP involved
taking condemnation
the installation
the wells
the DEP
condemnation
installation of
of the
involved aa regulatory
concluded the
wells by
regulatory taking
by the
plaintiff‘s
case
physical invasion
than aa physical
rather than
the wrong
for evaluating
invasion case
wrong standard
applied the
and applied
evaluating plaintiff's
standard for
case rather
case and
a,
entitlement
Rohaly v.
Department of Environmental Protection
entitlement to
to compensation.”
compensation. Rahaly
and
Protection and
v. State,
State, DepartmentofEnvironmental

Energy, 732
A.2d at
at 526.
732 A.2d
526.
Energy,
in the
When
was not
the taking
not really
the case.
The trial
taking occurred
trial court
When the
an issue
had simply
occurred was
issue in
case. The
001111 had
really an
simply

ruled
property prior
that the
prior to
the property
the property
inspection of
to
failed to
to make
make an
an adequate
of the
owner had
had failed
ruled that
adequate inspection
property owner
that he
the
not that
the claim.
purchase, not
standing to
to prosecute
On appeal,
that the
he lacked
claim. On
prosecute the
ruled that
lacked standing
001111 ruled
purchase,
appeal, court

taking
taking was
rather than
the case
for further
further
than regulatory
remanded the
and remanded
was aa physical
case for
taking, and
regulatory taking,
physical rather
proceedings to
if aa permanent
taking occurred.
The Rohaly
permanent compensable
determine if
to determine
proceedings
compensable taking
occurred. The
001111
Rahaly court
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mistakenly
what can
in What
taking occurred
that aa taking
that the
the fact
termed dicta,
fact that
can only
be termed
occurred
commented, in
mistakenly commented,
dicta, that
only be
prior to
prior
the acquisition
the property
not aa bar
to the
of the
to standing:
standing:
acquisition of
bar to
is not
property is
“taking” that
Further,
that predates
the ownership
not an
ownership of
of land
an
predates the
land apparently
is not
Further, aa “taking”
apparently is
owner's right
right to
through an
impediment to
impediment
to seek
an inverse
to aa subsequent
inverse
seek redress
subsequent owner's
redress through
condemnation
see also
Nollan v.
condemnation action.
action. See
See ibid.;
also Nollan
v. California
Coastal
ibid.; see
California Coastal
C0mm’n,483 U.S.
Comm'n,483
833
n.
2,
107
S.Ct.
3141,
3147
n.
2,
97
L.Ed.2d 677,
n.
3147
n.
n.
L.Ed.2d
107
687 n.
97
US. 825,
833
S.
Ct.
3141,
825,
677, 687
2,
2,
their full
22 (1987)
prior owners
be understood
understood to
must be
to have
full
transferred their
owners must
have transferred
(“[T]he prior
(1987) (“[T]he
property
East Cape
May Assocs. v.
lot”); East
in conveying
the lot.”);
rights in
Cape MayAssocs.
v.
conveying the
property rights
(“East Cape
114 (App.Div.1997);
State,
N.J.Super. 325,
A.2d 114
300 N.J.Super.
693 A.2d
Cape May
State, 300
325, 337,
(App.DiV.1997); (“East
337, 693
May
is
predecessors would
would have
rights its
its predecessors
entitled to
to assert
development rights
Whatever development
assert whatever
have
is entitled
had”).
had.”).
526-27. The
Rohaly v.
Department of Environmental Protection
The
A.2d at
at 526-27.
and Energy,
732 A.2d
Protection and
v. State,
State, DepartmentofEnvironmental
Rahaly
Energy, 732

references
by the
proposition. For
the Rohaly
not stand
for the
the stated
For example,
references cited
cited by
stand for
stated proposition.
001111 do
do not
example,
Rahaly court
102 S.Ct.
Loretto v.
Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 868
TeleprompterManhattan
Loretta
S.Ct. 3164,
v. Teleprompter
US. 419,
73 L.Ed.2d
868
CATVCorp.,458
419, 102
3164, 73

“It isis constitutionally
(1982)
whether appellant
in a
her
irrelevant Whether
comments in
footnote that
that “It
appellant (or
a footnote
constitutionally irrelevant
(1982) comments
(or her
‘landowner owns
predecessor in
previously occupied
in title)
this space,
at least
since aa ‘landowner
least as
had previously
owns at
predecessor
occupied this
as
title) had
space, since

land’.”
in connection
much
use in
With the
the land’.”
the space
the ground
connection with
much of
of the
he can
or use
can occupy
space above
above the
as he
ground as
occupy or

Loretto v.
Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S.
102 S.Ct.
at 438,
at 3177
note 16.
TeleprompterManhattan
16.
Loretta
3177 note
S.Ct. at
v. Teleprompter
US. at
CATVCorp.,458
438, 102
nothing to
The
when aa taking
whether the
With when
the installation
the cable
The note
taking occurred,
installation of
of the
note has
to do
but Whether
has nothing
cable
do with
occurred, but

TV
was actually
used by
by the
building.
the owner
the building.
TV equipment
that was
of the
owner of
equipment occupied
occupied space
space that
actually used
the other
not support
its contention
the
other two
contention regarding
Similarly,
by Rohaly
regarding the
cited by
support its
two cases
cases cited
do not
Rahaly do
Similarly, the

timing of
timing
physical takings.
taking because
than physical
the taking
rather than
The
of the
takings. The
those cases
involve regulatory
because those
cases involve
regulatory rather

brief Rohaly
between aa regulatory
physical
taking and
not explain
the difference
brief
explain the
difference between
and aaphysical
decision does
does not
regulatory taking
Rahaly decision

A
taking,
but the
the difference
the case
not help
the Days.
critical to
difference is
to understanding
help the
understanding why
is critical
case does
does not
taking, but
Days. A
Why the
7
regulatory
– such
permit to
from the
the denial
taking 7
that may
of aa permit
to develop
one that
denial of
such as
arise from
develop property
as one
regulatory taking
property –
may arise

is
physical taking.
from aaphysical
taking.
is analyzed
differently from
analyzed differently

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE
PLAINTIFF S’ MOTION
PARTIAL SUMMARY
SUMMARY
MOTION FOR
FOR PARTIAL
RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT’S
TO PLAINTIFFS’
12
RIGHT TO
AWARD -- 12
CONDMENATION AWARD
RE: CONVEYANCE
JUDGMENT RE:
CONVEYANCE OF
JUDGMENT
OF RIGHT
TO CONDMENATION

000806

Rohaly relies
Nollan, supra,
supra, and
May Associates,
Associates, supra.
supra. Both
Both of
relies on
on Nollan,
of those
those
and East
East Cape
Cape May
Rahaly
Days’ reliance
cases
that the
the Days’
the analysis
on
demonstrates that
and the
involve regulatory
reliance on
used demonstrates
cases involve
takings, and
regulatory takings,
analysis used

Rohaly is
misplaced.
is misplaced.
Rahaly
In
East Cape
May Associates
Associates v.
New Jersey
Jersey DepartmentofEnvironmental
Department of Environmental
In East
Cape May
v. State,
State, New
114 (N.J.App.
the property
Protection, 693
wetlands
A.2d 114
owner was
denied aa wetlands
693 A.2d
was denied
Protection,
(N.J.App. 1997),
property owner
1997), the

development
permit by
New Jersey
the New
Department of
The issue
Protection. The
of Environmental
of
Environmental Protection.
development permit
issue of
Jersey Department
by the
whether the
in the
the owner
not at
all of
the predecessors
the property
Whether
interests in
at issue.
of the
owner had
obtained all
predecessors interests
issue.
had obtained
was not
property was
rights before
Rather,
the implementation
the
implementation of
of the
takings analysis,
those rights
before the
having those
under aa regulatory
Rather, under
regulatory takings
analysis, having

expectations” of
“distinct, investment
wetlands development
permit process
the “distinct,
investment backed
of
development permit
affected the
wetlands
process affected
backed expectations”

In reversing
in developing
their property.
grant of
the
the landowner
the
property. In
judgment to
of summary
to the
reversing aa grant
developing their
landowner in
summary judgment

state,
Penn Central
in the
the court
the criteria
the seminal
seminal case
criteria developed
of Penn
applied the
Transportation
Central Transportation
court applied
developed in
case of
state, the
Co.
New York
, 438 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 631,
S.Ct. 2646,
Co. v.
v. City
US. 104,
98 S.Ct.
57 L.Ed.2d
648 (1978):
Y0rk,438
124, 98
2646, 2659,
2659, 57
ofNew
104, 124,
631, 648
(1978):
City of
With
be taken,
With regard
the interest
interest alleged
taking
there has
to be
to the
regard to
has been
alleged to
been aa regulatory
taken, there
regulatory taking
ifif
(1)
was aa denial
viable use
property as
the property
there was
of economically
of the
denial of
use of
as a
a
economically Viable
(1) there
result
imposition;
the regulatory
of the
result of
imposition;
regulatory
investment-backed expectations;
(2)
property owner
the property
distinct investment-backed
owner had
had distinct
and
expectations; and
(2) the
(3)
it
was
an
interest
vested
in
the
owner,
as
a
matter
of
state
property
law,
it
in
the
matter
interest
an
of
state
vested
was
as
a
owner,
property
law,
(3)
and
power of
under common
within the
not within
the power
the state
of the
to regulate
common law
state to
and not
regulate under
law
nuisance
doctrine.
nuisance doctrine.
“distinct investment-backed
expectations” as
investment-backed expectations”
The reference
element of
The
to “distinct
an element
of aa
reference to
as an
regulatory
New
taking derives
from Penn
Penn Central
Transportation Co.
Central Transportation
derives from
Co. v.
v. City
regulatory taking
ofNew
City of
York,
438
U.S.
104,
124,
98
S.Ct.
2646,
2659,
57
L.Ed.2d
631,
648
(1978).
Penn
L.Ed.2d
648
S.Ct.
US.
98
57
Y0rk,438
2646, 2659,
104, 124,
631,
(1978). Penn
City's designation
Central
that New
York City's
Central Transportation
Transportation Co.
of Grand
holds that
Grand
New York
designation of
Co. holds
Central
Terminal
as
a
historic
landmark,
which
prevented
its
owner
from
erecting
Terminal
from
Central
erecting
as a historic landmark, which prevented its owner
an
in the
the space
the terminal,
not constitute
an office
ofﬁce tower
tower in
constitute aa regulatory
did not
space above
above the
terminal, did
regulatory
taking.
For regulatory
other things,
taking. For
action to
to constitute
among other
constitute aa taking,
things,
taking, itit must,
regulatory action
must, among
owner's “distinct
“distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and
investment-backed expectations,”
interfere with
the property
interfere
with the
and
property owner's
these
124725, 98
at 2659,
must be
at 124–25,
expectations must
L.Ed.2d
these expectations
Id. at
reasonable. Id.
S.Ct. at
98 S.Ct.
57 L.Ed.2d
be reasonable.
2659, 57
at
will depend
not expectations
at 648.
to aa
or not
expectations are
Whether or
are considered
considered reasonable
reasonable will
depend to
648. Whether
significant
whether the
in advance
extent on
its
the property
on whether
notice in
of its
signiﬁcant extent
owner had
advance of
had notice
property owner
investment
that the
the governmental
investment decision
which are
governmental regulations
to
are alleged
alleged to
regulations which
decision that
constitute
been or
would be
be enacted.
22
the taking
taking had
or would
constitute the
had been
enacted. Ciampitti
United States,
Ciampitti v.
v. United
States, 22
Cl.Ct.
310,
320–21
(1991)
(citing
Connolly
v.
Pension
Benefit
Guar.
Corp.,
475
32(%21
Pension
Cl.Ct. 310,
Benefit Guar. C0rp.,475
(1991) (citing Connolly v.
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U.S.
L.Ed.2d 166,
106 S.Ct.
180 (1986);
S.Ct. 1018,
Ruckelshaus v.
v.
US. 211,
89 L.Ed.2d
211, 227,
1018, 1027,
1027, 89
227, 106
166, 180
(1986); Ruckelshaus
Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S.
104 S.Ct.
81 L.Ed.2d
L.Ed.2d 815,
Monsanto
S.Ct. 2862,
US. 986,
287475, 81
C0.,467
100&07, 104
2862, 2874–75,
815,
986, 1006–07,
834–35
83435 (1984)).
(1984)).
East Cape
May Associates
Associates v.
New Jersey
Jersey Department
Department of
Environmental Protection,
Protection, 693
East
Cape May
v. State,
693
State, New
QfEnvironmental
A.2d
at 120.
A.2d at
120.
York of
Penn
Penn Central
denial by
the city
of New
of aa request
to build
involved aa denial
New York
request to
Central involved
build aa fifty
ﬁfty story
story
city of
by the

office
building over
preservation law.
land marks
Central Station
Station based
The owners
Grand Central
marks preservation
on aa land
law. The
office building
owners
over Grand
based on
of
at the
terminal sued,
the terminal
and the
the case
the U.S.
which held
of the
held
Supreme Court,
case eventually
wound up
up at
US. Supreme
eventually wound
Court, which
sued, and
taking of
that the
permit was
that
not aa regulatory
private property.
the denial
denial of
of private
of aa permit
was not
regulatory taking
property.

In
In doing
determining whether
the court
prong approach
approach to
three prong
whether aa
doing so,
to determining
developed aa three
001111 developed
so, the
taking occurred:
regulatory
occurred:
regulatory taking

Comt's decisions
In
In engaging
in these
the Court's
engaging in
these essentially
factual inquiries,
decisions
ad hoc,
inquiries, the
essentially ad
hoc, factual
have
particular significance.
The economic
identiﬁed several
that have
factors that
signiﬁcance. The
several factors
have particular
economic
have identified
impact
particularly, the
on the
which
the regulation
the claimant
the extent
claimant and,
regulation on
impact of
extent to
to which
and, particularly,
of the
the
investment-backed expectations
the regulation
has interfered
with distinct
regulation has
distinct investment-backed
expectations are,
interfered with
are,
of
Hempstead, supra,
relevant considerations.
considerations. See
See Goldblatt
Goldblatt v.
v. Hempstead,
369 U.S.,
course, relevant
supra, 369
US,
of course,
A
at
82
S.Ct.,
at
990.
So,
too,
is
the
character
of
the
governmental
action.
A
at 594,
82
at
governmental
the
character
the
action.
990.
is
S.Ct.,
594,
So, too,
of
“taking”
“taking” may
with property
be
the interference
interference with
more readily
when the
can be
found when
be found
readily be
propeny can
may more
characterized
invasion
by
government,
see,
e.
g.,
United
States
v.
invasion
characterized as
United
as a
a physical
e.
States
v.
physical
by government, see, g.,
Causby,
than when
1206 (1946),
when
L.Ed. 1206
328 U.S.
S.Ct. 1062,
US. 256,
66 S.Ct.
90 L.Ed.
1062, 90
256, 66
Causby, 328
(1946), than
interference
public program
burdens
from some
the benefits
interference arises
benefits and
program adjusting
and burdens
adjusting the
some public
arises from
of
promote the
life to
the common
of economic
to promote
common good.
economic life
good.
at 124,
at 2659
Penn Central
New York,
Penn
Transportation Company
438 U.S.
Central Transportation
2659
S.Ct. at
v. City
US. at
98 S.Ct.
York, 438
124, 98
Company v.
ofNew
City of

(emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
In Nollan
C0astalC0mm’n,483
In
Nollan v.
Comm'n, 483 U.S.
L.
107 S.
Ct. 3141,
v. California
US. 825,
S. Ct.
97 L.
3141, 3164,
3164, 97
825, 867,
867, 107
Califbrnia Coastal

Ed.
Nollans sought
permit to
the Nollans
coastal development
on
2d 677
to construct
construct aa new
sought aa coastal
development permit
Ed. 2d
new house
house on
677 (1987),
(1987), the
their
property. As
their beachfront
approving the
the permit,
the California
beachfront property.
condition of
As aa condition
of approving
California Coastal
Coastal
permit, the
their building
permit on
their beach
front
Commission
building permit
on giving
an easement
along their
easement along
conditioned their
Commission conditioned
beach front
giving up
up an

for
public use.
Nollans appealed
through the
the California
for public
The Nollans
the easement
requirement through
California state
easement requirement
state
appealed the
use. The
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system
ultimately appealed
by deciding
in their
their favor
the U.S.
which ruled
deciding
favor by
and ultimately
Supreme Court,
ruled in
appealed the
US. Supreme
system and
Court, which
that
taking had
that aa regulatory
occurred.
had occurred.
regulatory taking
Penn Central
New York
Penn
the cases
the
York was
among the
Transportation Co.
Central Transportation
was among
Co. v.
v. City
cases used
used by
ofNew
City of
by the
court
Nowhere in
in the
taking had
the case
there aa
Whether aa regulatory
to analyze
had occurred.
court to
occurred. Nowhere
case is
is there
regulatory taking
analyze whether
right to
the transfer
the
discussion
transfer of
of aa right
to prosecute
an inverse
condemnation claim
or the
inverse condemnation
claim or
prosecute an
discussion about
about the

proceeds therefrom.
whether such
personal property
property rights
rights are
Nor is
therefrom. Nor
there aa discussion
are
such personal
discussion about
about Whether
proceeds
is there
conveyed
In footnote
With real
that the
the Supreme
the
an aside
real property.
footnote 2,
Supreme Court
make an
aside that
Court does
does make
conveyed with
property. In
2, the
rights to
Nollans were
all rights
the lot:
to have
of all
to the
lot:
ownership of
Nollans
were assumed
assumed to
have ownership

Nollans' rights
Nor
because they
well after
rights altered
the land
the
Nor are
the Nollans'
after the
altered because
are the
acquired the
land well
they acquired
Commission
begun to
implement its
its policy.
long as
the Commission
to implement
Commission had
Commission could
could
So long
as the
had begun
policy. So
not have
the prior
the easement
not
prior owners
without compensating
compensating them,
of the
easement Without
owners of
have deprived
deprived the
them,
their full
rights
the prior
transferred their
full property
must be
to have
the
prior owners
owners must
have transferred
understood to
be understood
property rights
in
in conveying
the lot.
lot.
conveying the

Nollan v.
Comm'n, 483 U.S.
3164. The
C0astalC0mm'n,483
The comment
comment relates
at 867,
Nollan
107 S.
Ct. at
at3164.
relates
US. at
v. California
S. Ct.
California Coastal
867, 107
to
Nollans ifif they
purchased the
the property
the reasonable
the Nollans
investment backed
to the
of the
expectations of
reasonable investment
backed expectations
property
they purchased
with the
property.
their property.
with
restricting development
the policy
the knowledge
of the
of their
development of
knowledge of
policy restricting
in action
nothing to
The
with transferring
transferring aa chose
The comment
comment has
action such
an inverse
to do
inverse
such as
chose in
as an
has nothing
do With

condemnation
that the
its proceeds.
The court
the easement
not
condemnation claim
or its
claim or
easement had
had not
observing that
proceeds. The
001111 is
is merely
merely observing
that the
the Nollans
the property
the commission,
taken by
already
been taken
by the
Nollans were
were assumed
property
to own
own the
so that
assumed to
commission, so
already been

right
by the
from them.
that the
the commission
The comment
not alter
the fact
the
taken by
them. The
alter the
comment does
fact that
right being
being taken
commission from
does not
taking
was raised
taking occurred
the property.
the Nollans
the owners
While the
of the
No issue
to
owners of
Nollans were
were the
raised as
occurred while
issue was
as to
property. No
their right
the Nollans
whether the
Nollan is
transfer their
whether
right to
to damages
to aa subsequent
owner. Thus,
Nollans could
subsequent owner.
could transfer
damages to
is
Thus, Nollan

of
the Days.
of no
no help
to the
help to
Days.
An
An inverse
from that
that claim
the proceeds
condemnation claim
or aa claim
to the
inverse condemnation
personal
claim or
claim to
claim is
proceeds from
is personal
property. As
with the
not part
part of
not transfer
the fee
transfer with
simple estate
simple
As such,
of aa fee
are not
fee simple
estate and
and do
fee simple
do not
property.
such, they
they are
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estate
when the
the fee
The Days
simple estate
an appurtenance
to another.
another. The
estate as
fee simple
estate is
have
appunenance when
as an
is conveyed
conveyed to
Days have
failed
that the
that transferred
from the
the deeds
the owners
the Day
transferred ownership
failed to
to demonstrate
of the
demonstrate that
ownership from
owners of
deeds that
Day
in 1997
Property
personal property
based on
transferred personal
of aa claim
on inverse
consisting of
inverse
claim based
1997 also
also transferred
Property in
property consisting

condemnation.
their motion
motion is
therefore appropriate.
Denial of
of their
condemnation. Denial
appropriate.
is therefore
In jurisdictions
that aa subsequent
In
jurisdictions that
property owner
standing
that have
owner can
can have
have recognized
have standing
subsequent property
recognized that

to
bring an
to bring
an inverse
condemnation claim,
on language
inverse condemnation
the
courts rely
language specifically
transferring the
claim, courts
rely on
specifically transferring
rights
grantor in
In the
Matter of
in addition
in the
in In
the rights
the property
For example,
itself. For
addition to
to the
rights of
rights in
the Matter
example, in
property itself.
ofgrantor
of
North Hempstead
Town
North Hempstead,
Hempstead, 643
Town of
the town
town of
of North
N.Y.S.2d 135
Hempstead
643 N.Y.S.2d
135 (N.Y.App.
(N.Y.App. 1996),
ofNorth
1996), the

argued
property owner
in relation
that aaproperty
not claim
relation to
to aa condemnation
condemnation action
action
owner could
claim damages
could not
argued that
damages in
not the
the owner
because he
was not
he was
owner
because

time of
the property
the time
the condemnation
of
therefore
of the
at the
of the
condemnation and
and therefore
property at

claimant’s mother
lacked
for aa condemnation
The claimant’s
mother had
condemnation of
of
standing. The
compensation for
had been
been awarded
lacked standing.
awarded compensation

part of
part
the property,
of the
to take
take an
an advance
against what
What aa court
might
and had
court might
advance payment
had agreed
agreed to
payment against
property, and
award
then transferred
the property
her other
other children
transferred ownership
of the
to
children then
at aa later
later date.
ownership of
She and
and her
award at
date. She
property to
the
then sought
from the
the remaining
the later
the town.
The town
remaining child,
town refused,
sought the
later payout
town. The
arguing
who then
refused, arguing
child, who
payout from
that
because he
was not
that he
time of
not have
not the
the owner
the time
the condemnation.
standing because
he did
he was
at the
of the
condemnation.
owner at
have standing
did not
The
because
that the
With the
the claimant
the trial
The appellate
trial court
standing because
claimant did
have standing
appellate court
did have
001111 that
001111 agreed
agreed with
“together with
in the
rights [of
with the
the language
the deed:
the appurtenances
all the
the estate
the
of
of the
and all
estate and
and rights
appurtenances and
deed: “together
language in
[of the

grantor]”. In
In New
in
grantor]”.
the right
the grantor
the grantor
including the
right of
of the
grantor includes
grantor has
claim the
New York,
has in
includes any
York, including
any claim

“In purporting
relation
property: “In
property owned
by the
title to
the Town,
the property:
relation to
to the
to convey
to property
and by
owned by
purporting to
Town, and
convey title
by
from Real
the aforesaid
the grantors
including
Real Property
including the
grantors effectively
aforesaid language
language from
effectively
Propeny Law
255, the
Law§§ 255,

transferred
in law
in equity,
their interest,
the respondent
all of
transferred to
to the
of their
and demands
and in
respondent all
demands in
law and
interest, claims,
claims, and
equity,
1.” (citing
relating
New York,
relating to
to Parcel
Parcel 1.”
Real Property
A.D.2d
Law §§ 255;
Patouillet v.
v. State
State of
39 A.D.2d
York, 39
(citing Real
Propeny Law
255; Patouillet
ofNew

1012,
N.Y.S.2d 58)).
334 N.Y.S.2d
1012, 1013,
1013, 334
58)).
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Such
in the
transferring the
not found
the deeds
the Day
Such language
found in
language is
is not
deeds transferring
Therefore,
Property. Therefore,
Day Property.
assuming
would follow
it exists
in New
that Idaho
the law
not transfer
the Day
transfer
follow the
Idaho would
exists in
New York,
assuming that
law as
as it
deeds do
do not
York, the
Day deeds
right to
personal property
the right
the right
the
right to
to prosecute
an inverse
condemnation claim
or the
to the
personal
inverse condemnation
claim or
such as
prosecute an
as the
property such

proceeds from
from that
that claim.
claim.
proceeds
B.
transfer of
irrelevant to
The undivided
the transfer
B. The
is irrelevant
to the
of personal
undivided fee
fee rule
pers onal property.
rule is
property.
The
undivided fee
The undivided
not speak
the issue
Whether personal
transfers
to the
of whether
personal property
fee rule
rule does
speak to
does not
issue of
property transfers
as
property. Here
that is
the Days
an appurtenance
to real
real property.
Here again,
on case
of no
no help
to
help to
appunenance to
as an
case law
law that
is of
again, the
Days rely
rely on
th
(9th
them.
Acres of
Land, More
More or
Less, 352
Cir.
the
them. U.S.
1259 (9
Cir. 2003),
1.377Acres
352 F.3d
F.3d 1259
involves the
US. v.
v. 1.377
orLess,
ofLand,
2003), involves

interpretation
whether itit provides
by lessees
proceeds
interpretation of
the proceeds
of aa portion
portion of
of the
of aa lease
and Whether
lease and
lessees of
provides recovery
recovery by
from aa direct
The undivided
the Days
from
upon by
by the
relied upon
direct condemnation
condemnation action.
action. The
fee rule
rule relied
undivided fee
merely
Days merely
“when the
stands
that “when
eminent
the government
for the
the unsurprising
its power
proposition that
government exercises
of eminent
stands for
exercises its
unsurprising proposition
power of
sodomain,
people who
possessory interests
it compensates
in the
the people
the seized
the sointerests in
WhO have
seized land
compensates the
have possessory
land under
under the
domain, it

rule’.” U.S.
‘undjVided fee
called
Acres of
Land, More
More or
Less, 352
The
1.377Acres
or Less,
at 1269.
1269. The
called ‘undivided
fee rule’.”
352 F.3d
F.3d at
US. v.
v. 1.377
ofLand,
“the apportionment
court
just compensation]
that “the
left to
either the
the discretion
apportionment [of
to either
of
discretion of
court observed
observed that
is left
compensation] is
[of just

contract.” Id.
in aa contract.”
the
Id.
the court
the allocation
the parties
or the
allocation agreed
parties in
upon by
001111 or
agreed upon
by the

The
based on
when the
right to
The issue
the allocation
the damage
of who
to the
allocation based
on when
or
WhO had
issue of
damage or
had aa right
in U.S.
not raised
The case
condemnation
Acres of
Land, More
More or
Less. The
or Less.
condemnation occurred
1.3 77 Acres
raised in
occurred was
was not
US. v.
v. 1.377
case
ofLand,

has
who has
nothing to
With WhO
standing to
Whether
to do
to maintain
maintain an
an inverse
condemnation claim
or whether
inverse condemnation
claim or
has nothing
has standing
do with
personal property
purchaser
transfers to
an inverse
condemnation claim
to aa subsequent
inverse condemnation
personal
claim transfers
such as
subsequent purchaser
as an
property such
without an
personal property.
the personal
the case
Without
irrelevant. If
an assignment
of the
assignment of
case is
is completely
Therefore, the
completely irrelevant.
property. Therefore,
no
were
the Day
the owners
standing existed
no question
of standing
of the
of December
question of
December 5,
and the
owners of
existed and
1997 were
as of
Property as
Day Property
5, 1997
the
bar, the
pay compensation
in the
that itit could
the plaintiffs
plaintiffs in
the case
the State
for damages
at bar,
compensation for
State would
would agree
could pay
case at
agree that
damages
into
into the
that the
petition the
the Court,
the plaintiffs
plaintiffs could
the Court
for payment.
The Court
and that
could petition
Court for
Court would
would
payment. The
Court, and
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then
plaintiff would
be entitled
then determine
that scenario
not
But that
entitled to
determine how
much each
to receive.
scenario does
how much
each plaintiff
would be
receive. But
does not
exist.
eXEL
rule” argument,
‘imdjvided fee
In an
In
just
their “undivided
the Days
attempt to
the just
an attempt
to bolster
that the
fee rule”
assert that
bolster their
argument, the
Days assert

compensation
belongs to
from an
than the
the property,
rather than
the owner
an inverse
condemnation claim
to the
compensation from
inverse condemnation
claim belongs
owner
property, rather
“in rem”.
rem”. Days’
Days’ Memo.
that the
the property,
stating that
the claim
12. The
The Days
of
of the
at 12.
Memo. at
claim is
one “in
are simply
is one
simply
Days are
property, stating

wrong, as
personal and
property discussed
the definitions
definitions of
of personal
real propeny
no doubt.
and real
leave no
doubt.
as the
discussed above
above leave
wrong,
“determining the
An
An action
in rem
title to
rights of
rem is
the title
the rights
the
action in
an action
action “determining
to property
of the
and the
is an
propelty and

parties, not
time claiming
not merely
all persons
claiming an
among themselves,
at any
an
but also
persons at
against all
also against
themselves, but
parties,
merely among
any time
action.” Plainly,
interest
property; aa real
who has
in that
that property;
determining who
not about
interest in
real action.”
this case
has
about determining
case is
is not
Plainly, this

“res” merely
“object, interest,
in the
rights in
term “res”
the Day
The term
property rights
an “object,
or status,
means an
interest, or
Property. The
merely means
status,
property
Day Property.
th
(10th
Black’s Law
as
person.” Black’s
ed.
to aa person.”
Law Dictionary
as opposed
opposed to
ed. 2014)
Dictionary (10
2014)

Not surprisingly,
Moore v.
their proposition.
Not
the Days
for their
cite no
no authority
proposition. State
rel. Moore
State ex
ex rel.
v.
authority for
surprisingly, the
Days cite
Bastian, 97
402 (1976)
not stand
for the
the assertion
P.2d 399,
assertion
Idaho 444,
stand for
546 P.2d
97 Idaho
does not
Bastian,
certainly does
444, 448,
448, 546
399, 402
(1976) certainly
that
Acres of
that proceeds
from an
the land.
to U.S.
an inverse
condemnation belong
to the
inverse condemnation
belong to
1.3 77Acres
land. Similar
Similar to
proceeds from
US. v.
v. 1.377
of
Land, More
More or
Less, supra,
be established
that the
the damages
all Bastian
Without
or Less,
holds is
should be
Bastian holds
established without
damages should
is that
Land,
supra, all
consideration
various ownership
then apportion
the various
apportion
interests can
of the
interests. Those
ownership interests
Those ownership
consideration of
can then
ownership interests.
in that
in Bastian
Nothing in
that case
the award
the amount
after the
the
been established,
jury verdict.
verdict. Nothing
Bastian
amount has
has been
award after
case by
established, in
by jury

addresses
the issue
for inverse
the proceeds
therefrom
Whether aa claim
of whether
or the
inverse condemnation
claim for
condemnation or
proceeds therefrom
addresses the
issue of
passes with
with the
property.
the transfer
transfer of
of real
real property.
passes
III.
111.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

A
proceeds
A claim
for damages
well as
arising out
of an
an inverse
inverse condemnation,
claim for
out of
as well
as any
damages arising
condemnation, as
any proceeds
therefrom,
part of
not part
simple estate
As such,
of aa fee
or
personal property.
are personal
are not
fee simple
estate or
therefrom, are
such, they
propeny. As
they are
appurtenant
unless specifically
not transfer
transferred as
to it,
transfer to
to aa subsequent
appurtenant to
owner unless
and do
subsequent owner
do not
as
specifically transferred
it, and
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personal property. The deeds the Days rely on do not contain language conveying anything
other than real property. For that reason, as well as any reason that may arise at the hearing
on this matter, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny the Days' motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case
Nos CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
PLAINTIFFS’
PLAINTIFF S , MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
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Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
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as Trustee of
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Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
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Day, Dan E.
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W

I.
1- INTRODUCTION
Earlier in this matter, the Days
ﬁled aa Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking this
Days filed
200011 written promise of former Deputy
Court to rule as
as a
a matter of law that the July 19,
19, 2000

Attorney General Steve Parry unequivocally waived any
any statute of limitations defense that the
State may
wish to assert.
assert.
may Wish

The Days’ motion was
was not, and should not be
be regarded, as
as a
a

concession that they believe that but for Mr. Parry’s promise they would be
be barred from pursuing
this litigation. On the contrary, the Days’ motion simply sought to present one basis
basis to resolve
any
issue, move this lawsuit forward, and render unnecessary any
any debate over
any limitations issue,
limitations periods that, if not waived, were never exhausted. As evident from the State’s current
motion, the Days’ effort was unsuccessful.
unsuccessful. In opposition to the Days’ motion, the State argued
that no contract claim existed as
as of the date of the State’s waiver. It now argues in its Motion to
Dismiss that the State is no longer bound by Mr. Parry’s promise and therefore, the Days’ claims
should be
be dismissed as
ﬁled. However, the Days’ claims do not exclusively
as being untimely filed.
depend on Mr. Parry’s promise to extend any
any limitations period to assert their claims.
Here, the basis
basis of the State’s Motion to Dismiss both misstates statutes of limitation
principles and misapplies the applicable statutes of limitation to this matter.

None of the

applicable statutes of limitation have run on the Days’ claims. The State cites to many dates
leading up to the Days’ current deprivation of access
acres (“Day Property”), but
access to their 307 acres
Plaintiffs’ claims. Regardless of the State’s
fails to cite to the critical date of accrual for Plaintiffs’

arguments not relevant to,
to, and in avoidance of this date of accrual, the Days’ have not failed to
Plaintiffs’ have continued to maintain that the controlling date of
timely pursue their claims. The Plaintiffs’

1

The Plaintiffs inadvertently entered June
as the date of the Parry memorandum to Loren Thomas, Leonard
June 7,
7, 2000 as
G. Hill, and Lana Servatius as
as the date of the promise in its legal argument for the motion for partial summary
as being July
judgment, and the State repeated this date in its opposition, but Plaintiffs have correctly referred to it as
19,
Compl. ¶¶
19, 2000 everywhere else in the record. (See
(See Compl.
W 28-29.)
1
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accrual in this matter is May 16,
notiﬁed of the
State) were notified
(and the State)
16, 2016, when the Plaintiffs (and
permanent inability of the State to deliver the promised access.
access.

The permanency and

conclusiveness of the information available to the parties in May 2016 was
was not previously known
to the parties and could not have been
been known with
With the exercise of reasonable diligence, at
at least
Days’ part. Even if it were determined that the claims accrued at an
on the Days’
an earlier date,
date, the

promise of former Deputy Attorney General Steve Parry to not assert any
any limitations defense
disables the State from asserting that defense. Thus, the Days
Days ask that this Court deny the State’s
Motion to Dismiss.
II.
11. DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard of Review.
Similar to the review of motions for summary judgment, all inferences are
viewed in
are Viewed

favor of the non-moving party in review of aa Rule 12(b)(6)
v. Idaho
0wsley v.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Owsley
141 Idaho 129,
Indus. Comm’n,
are made in
Indus.
106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005). After all inferences are
Comm ’n, 141
129, 133,
133, 106

favor of the non-moving party,
party, the questions are
whether aa claim for relief has
are Whether
has been stated,
stated, and is
not Whether
whether the party will ultimately prevail.
prevail. Young
Ketchum, 137
Young v.
137 Idaho 102,
v. City of
102, 104,
104, 44
OfKetchum,
P.3d 1157,
whether the non-moving party is
1159 (2002).
1157, 1159
(2002). Ultimately, the determination is Whether
entitled to offer evidence to support its claims contained in the pleadings. Id.
Id. This is aa low
10W bar
which the Days
satisﬁed.
Days have satisfied.
B.

The Statute of Limitations Did Not Begin to Run Until the Taking Became Apparent
and Permanent.
The State has
has misconstrued how the applicable statutes of limitation apply to the present

case,
use the execution date and the valuation date as
as points for limitations
case, attempting to use
purposes in an
an attempt to avoid the fact that the Days
ﬁled their claims. The correct
Days have timely filed
date for focus in aa limitations determination is the date the cause of action accrues. A party’s
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primary burden upon the assertion of any
any statute of limitations defense is showing that litigation

based on aa written agreement was
was commenced more than five
years and more than four years
ﬁve years
based
years for
an
an inverse condemnation claim, after the cause of action accrued. The State has
has failed to meet
this burden as
ﬁve
has not shown that the accrual date of the Days’ claims accrued earlier than five
as it has
(or four) years
has only shown that the effective date of
years prior to November 1,
1, 2016. The State has
the promise to provide the promised public access
access and the stipulated valuation date occurred
more than five
ﬁve (or four) years
are germane to
years prior to November 1,
1, 2016. Neither of these dates are
the statute of limitations.
For the present case,
case, that date of accrual is on or about May 16,
16, 2016, when it became
clear that the State was
was not going to be
be able to provide the Days
With the access
has previously
access it has
Days with
been continuously laboring towards providing.
providing. May 16,
promised and had been
16, 2016, was the date
notiﬁed that ACHD policies did not allow aa public access
when the parties were notified
access point in the

location that the State provided its easement. The Days
ﬁled the present action within
Days then filed
months of ACHD’s pronouncement since that pronouncement made what
What both the State and the
Days
access, aa permanent situation. Therefore, for
Days believed would be only aa temporary lack of access,
limitation purposes,
purposes, only aa few months had passed
passed since the Days’ causes
causes of action actually
accrued.
accrued.
a.
a breach, not
a. Statute of limitations for written agreements begin to run on a
the date of execution.
Idaho Code §§ 5-216 requires aa party to commence litigation within five
ﬁve years
years for actions
based upon aa written contract or obligation.
obligation. The import
based

of the statute is that an
be
an action must be

commenced within
years of the date the cause of action accrued, not Within
within five
years of
Within five years
ﬁve years
146 Idaho 511, 517,
when the agreement became effective. Cuevas v.
198 P.3d 740,
v. Barraza, 146
517, 198
740,

746 (Ct. App. 2008).
2008). The basis for aa cause of action grounded in aa written agreement is typically
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aa breach of the agreement. Thus, under I.C. §§ 5-216, causes
based on aa written
causes of action based
agreement must be
be commenced Within
within five
Id. (“A cause
agreement. Id.
ﬁve years
years of the breach of the agreement.
of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitations purposes.”) Contrary to the
State’s assertions, the five
ﬁve year
1967 documents
year statute of limitations for an action related to the 1967
1972” as
had not
yet occurred. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot.
as of 1972”
as no breach had yet
n_0t “obviously expired as

to Dismiss, p.
p. 2.)
2.)
Any significance
signiﬁcance of the written agreement’s effective date is simply limited to proving
the existence of aa written agreement on which aa patty
party can base
base its cause of action.
action. See
See Cuevas,
Cuevas,
146
146 Idaho at 517,
198 P.3d at 746 (“If an enforceable contract can be proven . . . .”) Idaho courts
517, 198
.

.

.

have always looked to the date of accrual to analyze aa statute of limitations defense. See
See W.
W. T.
T.
P. 545 (1921) (finding
195 P.
Rawleigh Medical Co.
Co. v.
v. Atwater, 33
33 Idaho 399,
(ﬁnding the right of action
399, 195

accruing “immediately upon” breach).
breach). In Skaggs v.
Jensen, the Court recognized that aa written
v. Jensen,
leasing agreement with aa restrictive provision, which prohibited other leases
leases in the shopping
center to parties selling appliances, was
was executed in 1961.
1961. 94 Idaho 179,
179, 179,
179, 484 P.2d 728,
728, 728
(1971).
1961 effective date had no applicability to the Court’s application of the
(1971). However, the 1961
statute of limitations.
ﬁnal determination instead pointed to 1962
limitations. The final
Violation of the
1962 when aa violation
lease agreement provision occurred, and the later date when the suit was
was filed.
ﬁled. Id. at 180,
180, 484
“. . . more than five
P.2d at 729 (Thus,
was Whether
whether “.
ﬁve years
years elapsed between the time the
(Thus, the focus was
.

.

instituted”). Courts View
cause of action accrued and the time suit was instituted.”).
view the only two important

dates for application of the limitations period to be the date of accrual and the date the lawsuit is
commenced.
an attempt to infer that
Nonetheless, the State’s Motion to Dismiss cites different dates in an

the statute of limitations has
ﬁrst opens its brief arguing that I.C.
has run. The State first
LC. §§ 5-216 started

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS —5
PLAINTIFFS’
–5
19807-001 /960542
19807-001
/ 960542

000818

to run at
1972 as
at the execution of the 1967
1967 documents, and then urges 1972
as the expiration date.
(Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, p. 2.)
an alternative argument that
2.) Later, the State presents an
2
19972,, should be
the stipulated valuation date,
be Viewed
viewed as
as a
a date of accrual, and then
date, December 5,
5, 1997

“ﬁve year
calculates 2002 as
year statute of limitations on aa contract claim
as being the date the “five
expired.” (Id. at 5.)
5.) Idaho courts have never recognized such interpretations.
In Simons v.
was attempted, where
was argued that the
Where it was
v. Simons, a
a similar argument was
statute of limitations began
began to run on “the date of the signing of the document.” 134
134 Idaho 824,
824,
11 P.3d 20,
829,
829, 11
20, 25 (2000). However, that date had no bearing on the limitations determination

because according to the trial court, “statutory time limits do not begin to run
because

until aa cause of

action has
With the lower court’s reasoning and upheld its
has accrued.” Id. The Court agreed with
agreements’ conditions and obligations to determine aa controlling date and
assessment of the agreements’

concluded that the claim was timely filed.
ﬁled. Id. (agreeing that the action did not accrue until
October of 1995,
1987). Similarly, the
1995, eight years
years after the signing of the document, February 1987).
State cannot here use
1967 to base
use the execution date of 1967
base its limitations arguments. The Days’
claims did not accrue until the State’s promise to provide access
access to the Days’ Property “from the
future frontage road and stock drive” was
was permanently breached.
breached. As discussed throughout this
opposition, that was
was not until May of 2016.
b. Idaho Code Section 5-224 begins to run when the full extent of loss of the use
of property
propertv becomes apparent, not at an event that is promised to be
temporary.
Regarding the Days’ claim for inverse condemnation, the applicable statute of limitations
for such an
Within four years
an action is I.C.
LC. §§ 5-224, which requires litigation be commenced within
years of

22

The 1997
speciﬁc
1997 date may
seem to be
be considered important for determining the date of accrual, but for the specific
may seem
reasons argued below, namely the temporary status of the taking, the State’s waiver, and/or the justiﬁable
justifiable
uncertainty that delayed the accrual, the stipulated date of valuation should not also be
be considered the date of
accrual.
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the cause
Inc. v.
Dist. N0.
No. 4,
139 Idaho 140,
75
cause of action accruing. C&G,
v. Canyon Highway Dist.
140, 143,
143, 75
C&G, Inc.
4, 139
P.3d 194,
197 (2003).
194, 197
above, the claim does not accrue upon the initial execution of
(2003). As shown above,
an agreement between the parties,
parties, or at the point of temporary taking. For §§ 5-224 purposes, the
“at the point in time at
date of accrual for an inverse condemnation action is fixed “at
at which the

impairment, of such aa degree and kind as
plaintiff’s5
as to constitute a
a substantial interference with plaintiff’
147 Idaho 401, 405,
rel. Kempthorne, 147
v. State ex rel.
property interest becomes apparent.” Harris v.

210 P.3d 86,
86, 90 (2009)
(2009) (citations omitted).
Obviously, none of the parties were aware in 1967
1967 of the full extent of the deprivation of
access
been aware in 1997
1997 that the State’s subsequent
access to the Day Property, nor could they have been
multiple and continued efforts to ensure that access
was accomplished after the Isaac’s Canyon
access was
Interchange was constructed would be
be permanently thwarted several years
years later. These potential
uncertainties were the very reason this method of determining the accrual date for inverse
uncertainties
condemnation was
was adopted.
adopted.
To compel the landowner to produce evidence which is unnecessarily conjectural
in an
be confirmed
an attempt to predict his loss before either its existence can be
conﬁrmed or its
amount can be
be measured represents aa result which is neither just to the landowner
who has
has wrongfully been deprived of his property nor the public which must pay
pay
the just compensation required by
by the taking.
taking. It is not unreasonable to require aa
governmental entity which has
has violated a
a citizen’s basic constitutional right to
remain subject to suit until the occurrence of actual loss attributable to its
be verified and valued.
wrongful conduct can be
C & G,
Inc., 139
at 148,
139 Idaho at
75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, J.,
148, 75
J., specially concurring). While the
G, Inc,
discussion of this standard in direct physical taking cases
has been termed the “project
cases has
completion rule,” the term is aa misnomer for the circumstances here since completion of the
project to build the Isaac’s Canyon Interchange is not the determining project for accrual

purposes. See
at 143,
197.
purposes.
See id at
75 P.3d at 197.
143, 75
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The project completion standard was
was adopted in recognition that in direct physical taking
situations, the full extent of the loss of the use
use and enjoyment of property did not become
apparent until completion of construction.
Id., Farber v.
102 Idaho 398,
construction. [5].,
v. State,
State, 102
398, 400, 630 P.2d
685,
cases that would work. Yet, just simply looking at when aa project was
685, 687 (1981).
(1981). In many cases
completed does not contemplate the full scope or application of this standard. The F
Farber
arber Court
recognized that this project completion standard also must take into consideration all acts
acts related
to the construction project.
102 Idaho at
at 401, 630 P.2d at 688. “Unless the contract and all of
project. 102
the acts
be difficult
difﬁcult for the
acts performed pursuant to the contract have been completed, it would be
State to determine the nature or the extent of its liability or prepare aa defense to any
any claim.” Id.
Thus, “project completion” is herein cautioned as
as a
a potential misnomer as
as one might jump to the
conclusion that completion of the larger components of the Isaac’s Canyon Interchange project
matter.33
(bridge, on/off ramps and partial cloverleaf)
Cloverleaf) would be the deciding factor in this matter.

However, even Viewing
viewing the completion of the interchange as
as the important date for accrual of the
Days’ cause of action for inverse condemnation, the State’s efforts to complete the lesser
components re-routing the promised frontage road and stock drive were consistently pursued
through multiple efforts long after the basic interchange was completed. (Compl., ¶¶
24-38)
111124-38)
Further, although the interchange project included fixes to the elimination of the frontage road’s
earlier location, it is really the original Right of Way Contract that is central to determine that the
Days’ claims are
project: to provide
are all related to one goal of the original I-IG-80N-2(16)54 project:
access
EX. 3.)
access to the Days’ Property “from the future frontage road and stock drive.” (Compl., Ex.
3.)

33

The parties stipulated that December 5,
1997 was the date of substantial completion of the Isaac’s Canyon Project
5, 1997
based on the letter from ITD District Engineer Loren Thomas that the Isaac’s Canyon Project was “substantially
complete”. (Affidavit
Aff”), filed
complete”.
ﬁled on April 28, 2017, Ex. B.) They have never
(Afﬁdavit of James Morrison (“Morrison Aff.”),
stipulated that December 5,
1997 was the date of accrual of the Days’ causes
causes of action.
5, 1997
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The Isaac’s Canyon Interchange was not the project contemplated by the 1967
1967 Right of
Way Contract, it only interrupted the performance of the State’s obligation, and its completion
date has
has been stipulated as
does not compel the conclusion
as the valuation date. That stipulation does
that it is the accrual date is other than the date the parties realized that the State had failed and
would not be able to perform its obligation, on or about May 16,
Inc., 139
139
See C & G,
16, 2016. See
G, Inc,

Farber case
Idaho at
at 143,
197 (characterizing the Farber
case as
as a
a determination for a
a “continuing
75 P.3d at 197
143, 75
construction project”). Therefore, until that date,
assess the extent of its
date, the Days
Days were unable to assess
loss caused by
by the State’s failure to complete the project to provide the Property access.
access. See
See id.
at 144,
at 198
198 (“[U]ntil the State completed all the acts pursuant to the contract . . . the
75 P.3d at
144, 75
.

.

.

damages”) On that date,
parties [cannot] assess
assess the extent of damages.”)
date, it could be determined that the

State’s failure to remedy the situation was
was permanent,
permanent, thereby accruing Days’ claims.
deprivation44 of access
c.
iustifiable uncertainty
uncertaintv related to the permanent deprivation
access
c. The justifiable
supports finding
ﬁnding May
as the date of accrual.
Mav 2016 as

While Idaho courts have developed the Harris and F
Farber
arber principles for determining the
correct date of accrual for inverse condemnation actions, the circumstances of this case
case more
directly borrow from cases
are nearly identical to this fact pattern and the result of
cases that are
uncertainty as
as to the extent and permanence of the taking due to the government’s actions. The
circumstances of this matter are
where the justifiable uncertainty doctrine
are very much like cases
cases Where
has
been developed in the United States Court of Federal Claims. As the justiﬁable
justifiable uncertainty
has been
doctrine does not conflict
with the Harris and Farber principles discussed above,
conﬂict With
above, the Days
Days ask
that the principles be allowed to support aa determination that at
at the very least,
least, the State’s failures

4

‘

‘

‘

‘

‘

‘

“taklng of access”, and the like,
“deprlvatlon of access”, the “taking
The Days have and will
W111 continue
contlnue to use
use the phrases “deprivation
llke,
yet they are not contending that their Property is “landlocked”, or without any access and their claim for just
yet
compensation does
ﬁnding.
does not depend on this Court so
so finding.
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to follow through on their promise to provide access
has delayed the date of accrual to on or
access has
about May 16,
16, 2016.
The date of accrual for limitations purposes is delayed under the justiﬁable
justifiable uncertainty
doctrine when “the Government promises to mitigate the damage caused by
by aa taking, so
so that a
a
plaintiff is justiﬁably
justifiably uncertain as
as to the extent and permanence of the damage.” Prakhin v.
v.
United
122 Fed. Cl. 483, 489 (2015). The applicable inquiry for such a
United States,
a matter is “when
States, 122
the permanent nature of the taking is evident.” Biloxi Marsh Lands Corp.
111
Corp. v.
United States,
v. United
States, 111
Fed. Cl. 385,
C1. 2013). The doctrine was developed in cases
United
v. United
cases like Applegate v.
(Fed. Cl.
385, 387 (Fed.
States,
1304 (Fed.
1579 (Fed.
United States,
v. United
States, 25 F.3d 1579
States, 314 F.3d 1304
(Fed. Cir. 1994),
(Fed. Cir.
1994), and Banks v.
475-497. In Applegate,
2003). See
Applegate, the
114 Fed. Cl. 437, 475-497.
See Etchegoinberry v.
v. United States,
States, 114

government promised to build aa sand treatment plant to stop continuing erosion of the shoreline,
but had failed to do so
so by
by the time aa harbor project caused erosion that permanently washed
landowners’ property.
away
property. 25 F.3d at 1583.
1583. Even though the erosion had began in 1952,
1952, the
away landowners’

court found that the authorization to build the sand transfer plant in 1962,
1962, aa plan to restore the
beaches in 1968,
1971 and 1988
1988 caused by
1968, aa delay between 1971
by the Army Corps of Engineers, and aa
new proposal issued by
sufﬁcient evidence to
1988 was sufficient
by the Army Corps to build the plant in 1988
allow the plaintiff to invoke the justiﬁable
justifiable uncertainty doctrine and file
ﬁle its inverse condemnation
claim in 1992
1992 when the property was permanently washed away.
away. Id. The government’s repeated
promise to build the sand transfer plan meant that the landowners “did not know when or if their
land would be permanently destroyed.” Id. at 1582.
1582.
Corps’ repeated and clear promises
Similarly in Banks,
Banks, the court explained that the Army Corps’

to mitigate and actual mitigation efforts from 1970
1970 into the 1990s
19905 accrued the takings claim to a
a
point Where
where the Corps issued reports in 1996,
1999 that indicated that the damages
1996, 1997,
1997, and 1999
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1309-10. This was because
because the claimant had
at 1309-10.
irreversible. 314 F.3d at
were permanent and irreversible.

demonstrated that the “predictability and permanence” of the extent of the damage to the
claimant’s land was justifiably uncertain.
uncertain. Id. These justifiably uncertain principles were applied
in Etchegoinberry, Where
where the plaintiffs were not time barred on their inverse condemnation
claims because
because the Bureau of Reclamation had failed to comply with court orders based
based on
114 Fed. Cl. at
Congressional mandates first
ﬁrst adopted five
drainage. 114
ﬁve decades earlier to provide drainage.

483-497. There the court stated the “issue presented” was “effect of aa failure to act” which
483-497.
111 Fed. Cl. at 387
caused the “determent to plaintiffs’ property.” Id. at 483. See
See also Biloxi, 111

(identifying studies, reports, and recommendations to deal with erosion and restore outlet over
two decades prior to eventual decision by Corps to total close the area
area could be found to accrue
claims).
Thus, under Banks, the primary question to be
be analyzed is Whether
whether the predictability and
justifiably uncertain by
permanence of the extent of the damage is made justiﬁably
by the government’s
was not until May 16,
promises and efforts to mitigate. In the present matter, it was
16, 2016, that the
permanent failure of the State’s provision of the promised access
access became reasonably clear. Up

,

justifiably so,
whether the promised access
until that time, the Plaintiffs were uncertain – and justiﬁably
access
so, Whether
was going to be
be provided.
provided.
was

The ACHD determination made it clear that there would be
be no

dedicated public access
access and that in effect the construction of the Isaac’s Canyon Interchange had
actually been aa taking of the Days’ access
access to the Property required to develop it to its highest and
best use.
use.
best

Therefore, the date of accrual for limitation purposes could be
be no sooner than

W

Plaintiffs’ were justiﬁably
May 2016, as
justifiably uncertain as
as the Plaintiffs’
as to the permanent deprivation of the
5
Property.5
access
access to their Property.

5

The State’s struggle to identify an accrual date further demonstrates that the Plaintiffs are warranted in claiming aa
justifiable uncertainty as
justiﬁable
as to when the claims became permanent.
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Davs’ claims were filed timely.
d. The Days’
timelv.

The Days,
access to the
16, 2016, that the promised access
Days, upon learning, on or around May 16,
Property could not be
be accomplished and that the temporary deprivation of access
access had now
became permanent, sought to be compensated for this breach of contract and inverse
condemnation. As discussed above,
because
above, their claims could not have accrued until that time because
it was
was not until then that it became apparent that the State had breached its promise and that the
government’s deprivation of their access
permanent.
access had become permanent.
Not the only, but perhaps the most important signal event occurred on May 16,
16, 2016
when Gary Inselman, Development Services Manager for the Ada County Highway District

(“ACHD”), sent aa communication to Jim Morrison and copied Donna Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, aa co-Plaintiff,
stating that ACHD would not accept aa public approach for purposes
purposes of obtaining access
access to the
Property, the access
was necessary for developing it to its highest and best use.
use. (Compl., 111]
¶¶
access that was
39-40, Ex.
purposes, for the State to obtain the
EX. 23.) That announced the end,
end, for all practical purposes,
necessary access
via aa public street, to aa public road. (Id. at
access points to connect the Day Property, Via
¶ 40.) This ACHD communication notified the parties of the official
ofﬁcial determination which made

1]

the deprivation of access,
via aa public street, to the Property permanent.
permanent. This transition from
access, Via
what had been
been aa temporary
What

conditioniwhich the State,
condition—which
State, in performance of its obligation to

with access
been working to rectify—to
rectifyito aa permanent take, is the point
provide the Property With
access had been
where the Days’ causes
Where
causes

6
accrued.6
of action accrued.

The change from aa publicly-owned and publicly-maintained right-of-way,
right-of-Way, e.g.
e. g. a
a
“frontage road”, to privately-maintained easement is itself aa sufficient
sufﬁcient change in the type
use
type of use
from what
was promised to constitute aa taking. Killinger v.
What was
135
v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135

66

Again, the Days are not contending their Property is
a result of ACHD’s pronouncement. The
is landlocked as
as a
primitive, unimproved and challenging access
access remains.
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Idaho P.3d 266, 271
271 (2000). Thus, for limitation purposes, May 16,
Where the
16, 2016 was the date where
applicable statutes of limitations began to run on the Days’ claims.

The Days
ﬁled their
Days filed

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on November 1,
days under six months after
1, 2016, just days
their claims had accrued. Therefore, the Days
by the applicable statutes of
are not barred by
Days claims are

ﬁling was within the five
limitations; the filing
ﬁve year
year statutory timeframe of Idaho Code §§ 5-216 and
within
Within the four years
LC. §§ 5-224.
years of I.C.
C.

Parry’s Waiver of the Statute of Limitations Defense Bars the State’s Motion.
Days’ claims did not accrue until on or about
Even if the Court were to find
ﬁnd that the Days’

May 16,
by former Deputy
16, 2016, contrary to the State’s arguments, the waiver, or promise, made by
Attorney General Steve Parry,
as an
Parry, prevents the State from relying on the statute of limitations as
affirmative
afﬁrmative defense. The State’s arguments trying to limit the scope of Parry’s promise are
are

ﬁling of
flawed
ﬂawed as
as it unequivocally extends any
any limitations period to allow for the Days’ timely filing
the Complaint. And, the written waiver was
was made Within
within the five-year and the four-year periods
after the December 5,
1997 substantial completion date,
as
date, even if the State is granted that date as
5, 1997
the date of accrual. Therefore, the State has
has not provided adequate argument to support its
Motion to Dismiss and it should be denied.
The State’s Motion attempts to avoid the consequences of Parry’s waiver, arguing that
the waiver is unlawful or against public policy. In effect, the State advances aa theory to avoid its
constitutional compensation obligation by
ﬁrst partially performing on its promise, then
by first
promising not to assert aa statute of limitations defense when aa condemnee questions the extent of
that performance, then continuing to partially perform on its promise, but then later determining
that its waiver was
was very limited, further arguing that the waiver did not extend as
as long as
as its
continuing performance.
performance. However, the State’s arguments to avoid the waiver, and alternatively
to change the date of accrual, must in the end fail.
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“I truly believe the Department is taking this matter seriously
In 2000, Steve Parry wrote “I
and Will
will have some type
property. I will
Will also
access to the property.
type of proposal to provide substitute access
represent to you
an
any type
type of statute of limitation defense if an
you that the Department will not assert any
agreement on new access
be reached.” (Compl., ¶ 29,
EX. 15.)
access cannot be
15.) The intent of the promise
29, Ex.
11

clearithe State promised not to assert “any type
is clear—the
type of statute of limitation defense” if it could
not obtain agreement on access
access to the Days’ Property. The date it became apparent the State
could not obtain access
was, of course, about May 16,
access to the Days’ Property was,
16, 2016, the same date
the statutes of limitations for the inverse condemnation claim and the contract claims accrued.
Unlike the cases
cases the State cites involving the bare payment on a
a promissory note, (see
(see Mem. in
Supp.
was an
an explicit and completely new
at p. 4)
Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss at
4) Mr. Parry’s promise was
7 no agreement about access.
an event the State chose –
access. The State’s consistent,
promise, tied to an

multiple efforts over twenty years
years (Compl., 111]
¶¶ 24-38) attest to the fact that the failure to agree
was not evident, even as
was the State that
at least May 16,
was
as the State saw it, until at
16, 2016. And it was
had control over What
what would produce an
an agreement, including the final,
ﬁnal, but failed application for
7 submitted to the ACHD.
an
– not the Days
an “approach” the State 7
Days –

a.
a. Idaho Code Section 5-238 does not support the State’s position regarding its
waiver.
The State’s focus on I.C.
LG §§ 5-238 confuses the issue. Section 5-238 typically applies to
financial
been barred by
by the statute of
ﬁnancial obligations to revive remedies that would have otherwise been
limitations. For example, aa cause of action against an
an individual who
WhO signs a
a promissory note
and fails to pay
pay off the note begins to accrue on the day
v.
day after the date of maturity. Thomson v.
Sunny
118 Idaho 330,
Village Partnership, 118
1990).
Sunny Ridge Village
331, 796 P.2d 539,
330, 331,
539, 540 (Ct. App. 1990).
Under I.C. §§ 5-238, if the obligor simply makes aa partial payment after the maturity date,
date, but
does nothing more, it is deemed aa new promise to satisfy the debt for limitation purposes.
purposes. Id.
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According to the State,
years of the
ﬁve years
State, the Days
Days were required to bring aa contract suit within five
years of the promise, essentially arguing
promise, and an inverse condemnation suit within four years
that the promise was
was akin to an installment payment,
144 Idaho 879,
v. Horkley, 144
879,
payment, citing Horkley v.
173
1138 (2007).
173 P.3d 1138
case, the Supreme Court made it clear that it did not matter which
(2007). In that case,
previous missed installment aa later setoff was applied towards, I.C. §§ 5-238 transformed the later

setoff
setoff to aa new promise in writing and extended the limitations period to challenge the total
1139-40. Contrary to the State’s contention, the
original debt owed. Id. at
at 1139-40.
at 880-81, 173
173 P.3d at

years of
LC. §§ 5-238 promise limited all actions to within five years
case did not hold that the I.C.
Horkley case
that promise.
promise. The Supreme Court merely applied the payment date as
as one example of the
limitation period being extended, stating that under any
any of its examples it offered, the action was
timely filed
because as
ﬁled because
as a
a matter of law the obligation extended to that date. Id.
Granted, the application of Horkley did use
use the payment date as
as restarting the statute of
limitations, but the resultant rule of law from that case
case is not that any
any challenge related to the
note must have been
been pursued five years
years from that payment date (promise). The principle, similar
to that argued above,
based on aa failure to pay
above, is that an action based
pay that particular installment could
still be
be pursued within
years if no additional payments had been made to extend the
Within five
ﬁve years
limitations period further. The State’s remaining citations to Modern Mills,
Mills, Inc.
Inc. v.
v. Havens,
Joseph v.
waiver
are also mistaken in application of the (1)
Joseph
v. Darrar, and Kelly v.
v. Leachment are
(1)waiver
date/date of promise or payment and (2)
as related to amounts owed on a
a debt.
date, as
(2) the accrual date,
The two become the same date because the breach (date
(date of accrual for the claim) on the original
debt is extended as
pay in the form of aa
as a
a matter of law to the date of the new promise to pay
payment. See,
3 Idaho 629,
33 P.2d 44 (1893)
extinguished, the
payment.
See, e.g.,
e.g., Kelly, 3
629, 33
(1893) (“[T]he lien is not extinguished,
suspended”) Unlike Kelly, which involved only aa promise to pay
remedy only is barred or suspended.”)
pay aa
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debt on aa note not then yet
yet fully due,
was an
an explicit promise to not
due, Mr. Parry’s written promise was
interject aa statute of limitations defense until it became clear no agreement as
as to access
access could be
reached. In the present case,
are not the same,
same, and thus the
case, the date of promise and accrual date are
cases
be barred except for the debtor’s payment or
cases related to amounts owed on aa debt that would be
pay interest on the debt have no direct application.
promise to pay
While aa promise under I.C. §§ 5-238 is not necessarily inapposite to this matter, the
important point for the current action, is that Mr. Parry’s promise was
was not necessary,
as argued
necessary, as
above,
action. However, I.C. §
cause of action.
above, to preserve the Days’ cause
§ 5-238 does support an argument
that even if then time-barred, Parry’s waiver extended the time in which the Days
Days could have
filed.
ﬁled. The continuing part performance after that written promise, up until 2016 (see
(see Compl., ¶¶
111]
“sufﬁcient evidence” of the continuing performance under the contract and equivalent
30-39), is “sufficient

to aa new promise to provide the access
access to take the case
case out of the operation of the applicable
statutes of limitations.
was subsequent to the promise, and the
limitations. Nonetheless, the date of accrual was
Days
Days timely pursued their claims.
b. The waiver was reasonably
reasonablv limited.
The State also attempts to argue that public policy concerns disable the waiver it made.
Like the State’s miscalculated accrual dates,
dates, this peculiar argument cannot be supported, because
the waiver was given with reasonable limitations dictated by
by the State. The plain language of the
promise shows that it was
was not waiving the benefit
beneﬁt of the statute of limitations permanently;
instead, it was specifically
speciﬁcally limited to that period before the State and the Days
Days were unable to
reach an
EX. 15.)
an agreement for access.
access. (Compl., ¶ 29,
as noted above,
State, not the
above, the State,
15.) And, as
29, Ex.
11

Days,
an agreement did not occur
Days, controlled the destiny of that agreement. That failure to reach an
until the parties received the written May 16,
16, 2016 notice from ACHD that revealed to the Days
Days
that they could not agree to the fundamentally diminished access
dictated.
access ACHD’s position dictated.
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS —16
PLAINTIFFS’
–16
19807-001 /960542
19807-001
/ 960542

000829

Thus, the present action is unfairly characterized by
by the State as
as a
a “stale claim.”

That

characterization is unfair because
because not until receipt of the ACHD’s written position were the Days
Days
aware that the taking then became permanent and aa breach of the promise of access
access occurred.
The Days
ﬁled suit aa few months later. Those circumstances do not describe stale by
Days filed
any means.
by any
The State’s arguments and cited authority do not hold otherwise. Indeed, the authority
actually supports the general principle that the date of accrual is the controlling factor and that in
the case
case of a
a waiver, the time in which an action must be pursued runs from that waiver
extending the date of accrual. See,
131 F.2d 231, 232 (D.C.
v. Baskin, 131
1942)
See, e.g.,
e.g., Noel v.
(DC. Circuit 1942)
(reasoning that waiver extends the time to maintain the action beyond the date the claim
accrued). Therefore, the State cannot imply from its cited authority that the date of waiver
controls the deadline for suit or that the Days
sue prior to the time their
Days had an obligation to sue
7
accrued.7
claims accrued.

V. CONCLUSION
The State’s Motion to Dismiss misapplies the applicable date of accrual for limitation
purposes in this matter. Instead of recognizing that the date aa particular claim accrues is the
controlling factor in statute of limitations determinations, the State attempts to tie the applicable
deadlines for contract and inverse condemnation cases
cases to the effective date of agreement,
stipulated date of valuation, or the date of promise, to avoid its constitutional obligation to justly
compensate the Days
access to its Property.
Days for the permanent deprivation of the public access

77

The State’s argument that Mr. Parry’s written promise was subject to the five
year statute of limitations is also
ﬁve year
similarly immaterial to this matter because it is the date of accrual that is the important factor for limitations
purposes in this case,
purposes
be the date of accrual of Parry’s promise of the underlying claims for
case, whether the inquiry be
Party’s promise provides an independent basis to deny the State’s
breach of contract, or inverse condemnation. Mr. Parry’s
motion, but the Days’ claims are not solely dependent on that promise. The Days’ claims are,
ﬁrst instance,
are, in the first
based on the breach of contract and inverse condemnation that became permanent on or about May 16,
16, 2016, when
the parties were notified
notiﬁed that the State could no longer remedy the elimination of the type
promised..
access it had promised
type of access
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However, the Days timely filed their claims within months of being notified of the permanent
nature of the loss of use and enjoyment of their Property caused by the State' s failure to provide
the promised access. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny the Motion to
Dismiss.
DATED

this~day of August, 2017.

Fredric V. hoemaker I
Jason R. Mau I Slade D. Sokol
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

th~ day of August, 2017, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0 . Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D
D
D
IZ!

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg(cV,itd.idaho.gov

Fredric . Shoemaker I
Jason R. Mau I Slade D. Sokol
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W

I.
1- DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend that through the State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation’s
agents and agencies (“State”), the State has
at
has failed to provide promised access
access to the property at
issue in this matter (“Property”) which has
be at the very least
has rendered its title to the Property to be
uninsurable. Since Plaintiffs have not been provided With
with the promised access,
uninsurable.
access, they have sought
just compensation and damages in this suit; helpful to the determination of just compensation

and/or
and/0r damages owed for this deprivation of access
access is the fact that Plaintiffs cannot obtain title
insurance which insures aa right of access
property. The Plaintiffs contend that this
access to the property.
ﬁled the current motion for partial summary
uninsurable title is undisputed in this matter and filed

been deprived of
judgment requesting this Court order as
has been
as a
a matter of law that the Property has
insurable and marketable title by the State.
In response, the State,
State, among aa number of obscuring issues,
issues, relies primarily on aa draft,
un-countersigned, copy of aa policy from Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation.
un-countersigned,
Corporation.

(See
(See

contemporaneously filed
ﬁled Motion to Strike.) However, even if the copy
copy were determined to be
the best evidence available, it does not address the considerations made by
by other title companies
or rule out the possibility of error.
A.

The State has Failed to Address all Issues that Affect the Lack of Insurable Access
Days’ inability to obtain
The lack of insurable access
based upon the Days’
access in this Motion is based

title insurance without an
an exception to the right of access.
access. The lack of access
access and the underlying
bases,
are detailed in the Notes
access, are
bases, any
any one of which could account for the lack of aa right of access,
th
(4th
in Special Exception N0.
No. 22 in Schedule B to the Title Commitment issued by
by Pioneer Title. (4

Donna Jacobs Aff.,
EX. A.) The State contends that the un-countersigned copy
Afﬁ, ¶ 4,
4, Ex.
copy of the
11

presumed Lawyers Title Insurance Policy proves that the right of access
is insurable. The State
access is
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accounts for the difference of exceptions as
as only a
a difference in the assessment of risk.
However, this approach, even if the document were proven to be authentic, does not rule out the
failure to address each possibility that, any
any of which, could account for aa lack of insurable right
of access.
been
access. Nor does
does it account for the simple possibility that such a
a policy could have been
issued in error and Without
without the knowledge available to Mr. Lorensen or at
at a
a later time.
1.
a right to access.
1. The State has not addressed each issue causing the lack of a
access.
The State’s response addresses
F , and G,
at all) Notes A, B,
addresses (arguably if at
B, D,
D, F,
G, but not Notes
C
N0. 22 in Schedule B to the Title Commitment issued by
C and E,
E, from Special Exception No.
Pioneer Title. The Notes,
Notes, and the instruments cited therein, are addressed Without
without accounting for
aa complete examination of title, and in fact are only based
based on the assumption that another title
company may have issued aa title policy insuring the right of access,
access, but cannot guarantee that it
has.
has.
Ken Franklin bases
bases his affidavit
afﬁdavit on aa review of the Lawyers Title Insurance Company
Policy and “determined the policy does
does not make any
(Afﬁdavit
any exception for aa lack of access.” (Affidavit
of Ken Franklin (“Franklin Aff.”), 1]¶ 2.a.)
ﬁrst argues that Mr.
2.a.) Based upon that review, the State first
Franklin disagrees with Note A. In fact, Mr. Franklin does
Offers
does not disagree with Note A, but offers
another View
view that could be “reasonably construed” to be
be acceptable for title insurance purposes.
purposes.
(Id.
is the fact that Mr. Franklin, who in Paragraph 11 of his
(Id. at 2.b.) Immediately noticeable is
affidavit
afﬁdavit testifies
testiﬁes that he has
is unwilling to make
has “made decisions regarding . . . insurability,” is
.

.

.

any
erase the fact
here, only stating another possibility. Such aa position does not erase
any such decision here,
that the ITD Deed does not state to which property it is
is appurtenant, it just gives aa reasonable
alternative. The State’s explanation takes the alternatives as
an attempt to prove
as “facts” in an
otherwise.
otherwise. (Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable or
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Insurable Title (“State’s Response”), p. 8.)
8.) Such an assumption is not sufficient to raise aa
genuine issue of fact.
The State next discusses Mr. Franklin’s opinions relevant to Note F.
F. The State argues
that Mr. Franklin’s opinion shows that the easement description is adequate.
adequate. However, Mr.
Franklin’s opinion is
ﬂoating
is based upon his determination that the ITD easement “is a
a floating
easement.” (Franklin Aff.,
Aff, 1]¶ 2.d.) This statement betrays Mr. Franklin’s misunderstanding of aa

“if
critical document in this case.
case. The ITD Deed,
Deed, which was executed in 2000, clearly stated that “if
within five
of execution of this Highway Easement Deed,
ﬁve years
Deed, the underlying property owner
years of
does
ﬂoating easement moved . . . then the easement . . . shall become aa
does not elect to have the floating
.

.

.

.

.

.

p. 5.)
been no testimony or documents
EX. B,
permanent easement.” (Lorensen Aff.,
has been
Afﬁ, Ex.
5.) There has
B, p.
showing such an election, thus the easement is
ﬂoating and is
is no longer floating
is permanent, undermining
Mr. Franklin’s opinion based
based on the floating
ﬂoating nature of the easement.
easement. Further, the State argues
argues
that “it is
yet bases
bases its
ofﬁcer to determine the adequacy
is not for the title officer
adequacy of the access,” yet
arguments on the determinations made by
by Mr. Franklin, aa former title officer
ofﬁcer specifically
speciﬁcally
testifying on making many determinations regarding insurability. (Compare Franklin Aff.,
Aff, 1]¶ 11
(where he acknowledges making determinations) with Franklin Aff.,
(Where he disavows
Afﬁ, ¶ 2.d. (where
11

being able to “determine”).)

In summary,
address each of the Notes addressed in the
summary, the State’s arguments do not address
Pioneer Title commitment, but urges that its arguments warrant discrediting all Notes. Thus,
there is no dispute that anyone of those not addressed,
C and E,
addressed, Notes C
E, are not disputed, and
summary judgment is warranted as
as to lack of marketability and insurability as
as to those.
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Parrv’s statement that the right of access
2. Former Deputy
Attornev General Steve Parry’s
access
Deputv Attorney
was uninsurable trumps Ken Franklin’s opinions.
The State also attempts to discredit the conclusion of aa previous Deputy Attorney General
“uninsurable”. (State’s Response,
that the right of access
access was “uninsurable”.
Response, pp. 9-10.) The State declares that

the reference was
was from an
an internal ITD memo that was attorney-client privileged
communications.
EX. A.) The same
communications. (See
same reference and memo was cited
(See Aff. of Counsel, Ex.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint and included as
directly in the Plaintiffs’
EX. 19.)
an exhibit. (Compl.,
as an
19.) The
(C0mpl., 1]¶ 33,
33, Ex.

State did not object
Object to the statement or the Exhibit as
as being attorney-client privileged in its
Answer.
Answer. (Answer to Compl., ¶ 39
has correctly quoted a
39 (“ITD admits that Day has
a portion of the
11

email that is attached as
19 to the Complaint, and denies the remaining allegations of
as Exhibit 19
Paragraph H.33.”).) Yet, now the State inserts an
an objection of sorts,
sorts, but instead of seeking for it
to be withheld
Withheld from the present proceedings, has
has attempted to discredit the statement and claim it
is
pp. 9-10.) It is
whether the State is
is even claiming aa
is unclear Whether
is irrelevant. (State’s Response,
Response, pp.
privilege. However, it is
is clear that the State cannot declare that the disclosure was unauthorized.
unauthorized.

(Id.,
is nothing in the original memo that
Clear.. . . .”).) Further, there is
p. 10,
10, n.7 (“. . . it is not clear
(Id., p.
.

.

.

.

was emailed to Plaintiffs to suggest that the communication was
was confidential or not intended to
was
be disclosed to third persons.
persons. (Compl., Ex.
EX. 19;
be
19;

Aff. of Counsel, Ex.
EX. A filed
ﬁled 7/11/17.)

To object to the disclosure, the State must show that the communication was made for the
“purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services.” I.R.E. 502(b). The memo
concerns the former Deputy Attorney General’s attempts to obtain the promised right of access
access
for the Plaintiffs, not rendering legal services to the client, the State. (Compl., Ex.
EX. 19;
19; Aff. of
Counsel, Ex.
EX. A.) Even if considered legal services, the Deputy Attorney General was primarily
responsible for the legal work in the State’s attempt to provide the promised right of access,
access, and
would have been the individual, or agent of the client, the State,
State, with the right to waive any
any such
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be What
what he chose to do. Finally, there is no claim that Plaintiffs
privilege, which it appears to be
be, as
were given unauthorized access
access to this material, nor can there be,
as it was emailed directly to
the Plaintiffs by
by its original author. Thus, the State cannot at this late date object to the previous
disclosure, even if the material is regarded as
place.
ﬁrst place.
as privileged in the first
Although the State has
has not argued that Mr. Parry’s statement is inadmissible as
as hearsay,
hearsay, it
is
is admissible as
an exception. Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(15)
states:
as an
803(15) states:
Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in aa document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
of the document,
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of
with the property since the document was made have been
unless dealings With
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
3.
3. The State’s arguments do not rule out error.

Afﬁdavit of Ken Franklin address,
Of all the topics that the State and the Affidavit
address, it is very telling
what
What

it does not address: the fact that the State has not provided any
any testimony that aa title

company, or even Ken Franklin or Nick Schug, would today,
based on an
an examination of all
today, based
public records, in addition to the documents and previous title work reviewed, provide insurable

title without exception for the right of access.
access. It can only show that in one instance, it is assumed
that title was insured without
Without exception for aa right of access.
access. There is no claim that a
a later title
company has or would insure aa right of access
access based on this policy. The fact that there is no

,

such testimony demonstrating confidence in the policy suggests another probable explanation –

that the Lawyer’s Title policy was issued in error. No party has
has suggested that title insurance or
aa right of access
be based
based on this presumed final
been
ﬁnal policy. No such risk assessment has
has been
access should be
offered. Based on the problems identified
identiﬁed in regards to this one policy, and the insufficiency
insufﬁciency of
basing any
assumptions, Plaintiffs contend that no genuine issues of material
any facts on the State’s assumptions,

fact exist regarding the fact that right of access
uninsurable.
access to their Property is uninsurable.
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B.

The State Addresses Irrelevant Issues
In addition to its incomplete response to the lack of access
access issues introduced in the

Plaintiffs’ pending motion, the State attempts to address
Plaintiffs’
issues irrelevant to the
address additional issues

motion. Among the irrelevant issues,
issues, the State attempts to mischaracterize and unfairly reframe
the record. Of most concern is the State’s attempt to suggest that the Days
Days had previously
“signiﬁcant damages for loss of access.” (State’s Response,
received payment
payment for “significant
pp. 2,
11-12.)
Response, pp.
2, 11-12.)

Absent from such aa mischaracterization
payment was for the approximately
mischaracterization is the fact that the payment
1-84 and land transferred to the State for the
8.99 acres
of hillside northwest of the existing I-84
acres of

construction of I-80N and the taking of the direct access
EX. 3.)
access to former Highway 30.
30. (Compl., Ex.
3.)
The actual documents in the record related to this issue include the Right of Way Contract
clearly showing that the monetary amount transferred to the Days
Days at the time was related to the
“[p]ayment for 8.99 acres
acres of land and full control of access
access to the Interstate Highway & damages
to the remainder . . lump sum.” (Id.) No money was transferred to the Days
Days for the promised
.

.

access
has failed to provide to the Days
access which the State has
Days and refuses to compensate them for such
failure. (Id.)
The further arguments regarding the State’s breach of the contract are
are also irrelevant to
the present motion. Therefore, in observance of judicial economy, the Days
will not address
Days Will

W

them herein and reserve all necessary response if later required or necessary.
V.
V- CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue an
an order
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title,
finding
ﬁnding that the Property’s lack of aa right of access
access prevents the owners from obtaining or
conveying insurable title to the Property and caused aa substantial loss. As aa result, the remaining
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access
are entitled to just compensation for the resulting damage to
access is unreasonable and Plaintiffs are
their Property.
th
DATED this 77th
day
day of August, 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case
N04 CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
H‘f
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONVEYANCE OF
RIGHT TO CONDEMNATION
AWARD

v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
as Trustee of
Day, as
Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Jacobs,
Day, Dan E.
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the “Day Owners”), by
by and through their counsel
of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht PP.A.,
.A., hereby submit their Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation
Award.
Award.
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W

I.
1- DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs are all the vested owners in the subject property (“Property”). Defendant’s
opposition fails in the first instance because the conveying instruments at
at issue transferred all
and any
any “appurtenances” or “hereditaments,” or both, and either of those terms encompasses the
access
access rights at issue in this case.
case. The State’s argument is based on the pretextual, if not
specious, notion that the conveying interests should have specified
speciﬁed that they were transferring
“claims” or “choses in action.”

While that might be an alternative way to transfer an

appurtenance like the right of access,
less encompassing than using
access, it is not the only way and is less
the terms that were used.
used.
Secondly, there were really no claims that were yet
yet accrued at
at the time two of the four
deeds
at issue were executed, e.g.
deeds at
e.g. before the “claims” accrued or arose on or about
May 16,
sale, contract of deed,
deed, or other conveying
16, 2016. Thus, it is not surprising that no bill of sale,
instrument ever used the term “claim,” except perhaps for the two deeds
deeds Ben Day signed later
in 2016. The two deeds that were signed after May 16,
by Ben Day who, if
16, 2016, were signed by
need be,
deeds
Jacobs, that these deeds
be, can echo the sworn statements of his sister, Donna Day Jacobs,
“no intentions or
Property...” and that there was
transferred “all interest, in or related to,
was “no
to, the Property…”
rd
(3rd
Aff. of Donna Jacobs.)
efforts to divide or reserve any
Jacobs.)
any rights to aa condemnation award.” (3

Moreover, there is the uncontroverted factual history presented in multiple affidavits
afﬁdavits supports
Plaintiffs’ claim that the Plaintiffs represent all the rights to file this action. Even if otherwise,
Plaintiffs’

the State has
has no right to pursue this issue under the undivided fee rule. At best,
best, the State’s
argument that some of the Plaintiffs lack standing would simply require this Court to reserve aa
portion of the award.
award.
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The State also cannot cite to any
an inverse condemnation award
any authority showing that an
action.11 While the State’s only focus is to highlight whether
is personal property or aa chose in action.

any
by
any previous authority cited by
by Plaintiffs directly involves standing or inverse condemnation by
Plaintiffs’ Motion—to
Motionito show that regardless of What
physical takings, it misses the purpose of Plaintiffs’
what

rights the Plaintiffs have to bring this suit, no other persons or entities but those listed as
as
Plaintiffs in this matter could hold those rights. Therefore, the Plaintiffs ask this Court to grant
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award.
A.

All Indispensible Parties are Present in this Action.
There is no real, hard evidence that anyone but the named Plaintiffs own all rights related

to the Property, including all rights related to access
access to the Property. Instead, the State advances
its strained argument that the Day Owners should have treated the access
access rights, and the loss
thereof, as
assignment.
a bill of sale or an assignment.
as personal property, and therefore should have used a
Tellingly, the State’s recently filed Motion to Dismiss, arguing its statute of limitations
affirmative
afﬁrmative defense, does not include any
any claim that the Plaintiffs have failed to add an
Plaintiffs’ opening brief has
indispensible party. The Plaintiffs’
has demonstrated that all rights related to the

Property going all the way back to 1935
1935 are represented in the current vesting of the property,
and the named Plaintiffs. Additionally, and uncontroverted or even discussed by
State,
by the State,
Plaintiffs demonstrated that no party in the chain of title had ever intended to separate any
any rights
or divide any
any rights in the Property to aa third party or non-family member, or that anyone
involved in the transactions, including the lawyer who drafted the questioned conveying

1

Illustrative of the lengths to the State has gone to ignore the narrow point Plaintiffs make (regarding whether rights
without reservation or reference) in its Motion is the State’s discussion of the Clay County v.
v. Howard case,
case,
N.W. 982
145 NW.
where the State actually quotes from that part of the case
case explaining what the Court did not hold. 145
(Neb. 1914).
1914). Whatever broad reading the State is attempting to apply from the previously cited authority, it cannot
hide the fact that it does
these citations.
does not address the very narrow purpose for these
1

pass
pass
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instruments (see
(see Third Aff. of Donna Jacobs and Aff. of Richard Smith), were aware that any
any
rights were reserved or Withheld
withheld from the grantees.
B.

The Terms “Hereditaments” and “Appurtenances” are Sufficient
Sufﬁcient to Transfer Any
Right to Bring This Suit.
The interests that were transferred were covered by the hereditament and appurtenance

Plaintiffs’ deeds.
language of the Plaintiffs’
deeds. Notably, the State did not even address this hereditament or

appurtenance language. The four deeds
are attached to the Second
deeds which the State focuses on are
Aff. of Donna Jacobs,
as Exhibits W,
Jacobs, as
W, X, Y, and Z.

Exhibits W and X used
used both terms

“hereditaments” and “appurtenances.” Exhibits Y and Z use only the term “appurtenances.”
Either are
sufﬁcient.
are sufficient.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, aa “hereditament” is “any property that can be
be
inherited; anything that passes
passes by
by intestacy.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.
see also
ed. 2004); see
Tobias v.
v. State Tax Comm’n,
Comm ’n, 85
85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628,
628, 630 (1963)
(1963) (declaring freehold
estates,
property).
an interest in real property).
hereditament, an
estates, including corporeal or incorporeal hereditament,

No

distinction is made between personalty and realty.
realty.
Black's Law Dictionary, Online 2d Edition, defines
deﬁnes “hereditaments” as:
as: “Things capable
of being inherited, be
be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed, and including not only
lands and everything thereon, but also heirlooms, and certain furniture which, by
by custom, may
descend to the heir together with the land.”
The more encompassing and clearly inclusive of the right of
deﬁnition for
of access
access is the definition
“appurtenance.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Online 2d Edition, defines
deﬁnes “appurtenance” as:
as: “That
which belongs to something else;
an adjunct; an
an appendage; something annexed to another thing
else; an

more worthy as
passes as
as incident to it, as
as a
a right of way or other easement
as principal, and which passes
to land; an
an outhouse, barn, garden, or orchard, to aa house or messuage.” (Emphasis added.)
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th
Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev. 44th
Ed., is to the same effect and defines
deﬁnes “appurtenance” as:
as: “That

which belongs to someone else;
an adjunct; an
an appendage; something annexed to another thing
else; an
more worthy as
passes as
as incident to it, as
as principal, and which passes
as a
a right of way or other easement
to land; an
barn, garden, or orchard, to aa house or messuage.” (Emphasis added.)
an outhouse, barn,
added.)
The State cannot dispute the fact that this access
access right is appurtenant to the Property.
Real property includes rights to access,
v. State,
access, which is appurtenant to the land. Hughes v.
State, 80
400-01 (1958).
Idaho 286, 293, 328 P.2d 397,
397, 400-01

The important point is that the conveying documents could have been anything. The Day
Family’s lawyer chose aa quit claim deed. It could have been aa bill of sale,
an assignment of a
a
sale, an
contract, or something else.
what was transferred could also have been described by
else. And What
by
different terms. The right to be aa plaintiff in this suit could have been
been styled aa “claim,” an
an
“inverse condemnation claim,” or “right to sue,” but need not have employed those terms as
as the
State infers. If I own aa house With
with aa driveway, I can convey that With
with aa deed containing the legal
description for the house and add “hereditaments” and “appurtenances” and that Will
will include the
driveway, even though I do not specifically
speciﬁcally say,
say, “the claim for condemnation of my driveway.”
So
So too here.
C.

The Undivided Fee Rule
While the Plaintiffs freely admit that fee simple vesting is important for purposes of an
an

inverse condemnation award, the State is not the correct party to challenge or question issues
related to such vesting. Such aa challenge is properly pursued by,
by, aa party holding or
by, and only by,
claiming an
property. The State misinterprets the reason the undivided fee rule
an interest in the property.
Plaintiffs’ Motion, apparently believing that it was
was addressed in the Plaintiffs’
was to infer that vesting does
was
does

not matter. Plaintiffs discussed the undivided fee rule because
because regardless of the State’s issues
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with the current vesting, those issues do not need to be
be resolved before (even as
With
as it states)
states) the
State would “pay compensation for damages into the Court.” (Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Mot. for
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award (“State’s
Response”), p.
p. 17.)
17.)
The undivided fee rule stands for the principle that it is one award that is given for the
whole for just compensation and not separate awards to all vested owners
as a
a Whole
property as
individually.
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.
Auth. v.
Rutherford, 137
N.J. Super. 271, 279, 348
E. Rutherfbrd,
137 NJ.
v. E.
individually. NJ.
A.2d 825,
1975). Thus, any
825, 829 (Super. Ct. 1975).
any arguments related to the party representing such
interests is irrelevant prior to determinations related to the award. Accordingly, the State’s
apparent position that since it believes there is aa question as
an
as to the proper owners for an
enforceable demand infers it can avoid paying compensation for damages into the Court is
incorrect. The entire point of the undivided fee rule is to prevent aa condemnor from avoiding
business delving into who
party; its only
has no business
WhO is a
a proper party;
paying just compensation. The State has
pay the award the jury directs. All interests of the land must first be compensated; any
job is to pay
any
questions as
be resolved by
as to the proper owners of those interests can thereafter be
by the Court or by
by
contract.
Land, More or Less,
Less, 352 F.3d 1259,
[.377 Acres of
1269 (9th Cir. 2003).
contract. U.S.
US. v.
v. 1.377
1259, 1269
ofLand,
Therefore, the Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court enter an
an Order preventing the State from
continuing to address this non-issue, whether
Whether disguised as
Vivian
as “standing,” or otherwise. See
See Vivian
v.
152 Colo. 556,
v. Board of
803 (Colo. 1963)
1963) (“Once the reasonable
801, 803
556, 383 P.2d 801,
of Trustees, 152
market value of property subject to eminent domain proceedings has
has been established, the
apportionment of that amount among persons claiming an
an interest therein is a
a matter of no
condemnor.”).
concern to the condemnor.”).
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W

V.
V- CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue an
an order
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding
ﬁnding that the Plaintiffs represent the
complete fee simple, and that no other parties claim an interest in the Property, or any
any reserved
or assigned rights to the condemnation award; and that regardless of the extent of property rights
represented by
by the Plaintiffs, the State has
has no right to introduce arguments relative to fee simple
issues.
th
day
DATED this 77th
day of August, 2017.
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Plaintiffs,
v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
as Trustee of
Day, as
Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Jacobs,
Day, Dan E.
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
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of aa draft of the Lawyers Title Insurance Company policy. This Motion is
unauthenticated copy of
supported by
requested.
by aa contemporaneously filed Memorandum. Oral argument is requested.
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Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IE Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Slade D. Sokol
Sokol//
Jason R. Mau
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Filed
Electronically Filed
8/7/2017 3:06:17 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
By: Lusina Heiskari,

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208)
(208) 319-2600
319-2601
Fax: (208)
(208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
DAY ’
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case
N04 CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDPM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS’
PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVITS OF NICK SCHUG AND
KEN FRANKLIN

Plaintiffs,
v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
as Trustee of
Day, as
Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Jacobs,
Day, Dan E.
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by
by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht PP.A.,
.A., hereby file
ﬁle this memorandum in support of their Motion to
Strike the Affidavits of Nick Schug and Ken Franklin.
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I. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to an Order Striking the Exhibits Attached to the Affidavits of
Nick Schug and Ken Franklin.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No
In support of its response to Plaintiffs’

Marketable or Insurable Title, Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation
(“State”) submitted the Affidavits
Afﬁdavits of Nick Schug and Ken Franklin. Attached to each is aa copy
of the purported Lawyers Title Insurance Company Owner’s Policy of Title Insurance (“Policy
of Title Insurance”) related to the subject property. The attached Policy of Title Insurance
exhibits and the Franklin Affidavit
Afﬁdavit do not comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure
regarding summary judgment motions and opposition, and Idaho Rules of Evidence 602 and
901(a).
ﬁled as
an authenticated document, and as
afﬁdavit
are not filed
as an
as the Franklin affidavit
901(a). As the exhibits are
fails to demonstrate the personal knowledge of that document, an
an order striking the exhibits and
the Franklin Affidavit is appropriate.
appropriate.
Rule 56(c)(4)
CiVil Procedure states:
states:
56(c)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
An affidavit
used to support or oppose aa motion must be made on personal
afﬁdavit used
knowledge, set
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant
afﬁant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.
stated. Sworn or
certified
papers or parts thereof referred to in an
certiﬁed copies of all papers
an affidavit
afﬁdavit must be
attached to or served With
with the affidavit.
afﬁdavit. The court may permit affidavits
afﬁdavits to be
supplemented or opposed by
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
or further
by
affidavits.
afﬁdavits.
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4).
Afﬁdavits which are
are conclusory, are
are based on hearsay,
hearsay, and are not supported
56(c)(4). Affidavits
by
v. Ford Motor Credit
Posey v.
by personal knowledge do not meet the requirements of the Rule. Posey
Co.,
Res. Ltd.
Ltd.
141 Idaho 477, 483, 111
111 P.3d 162,
168 (Ct.
v. Shama Res.
162, 168
C0,, 141
(Ct. App. 2005),
2005), quoting State v.
P’ship, 127
Inc. v.
127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977,
981 (1995),
v.
C0., Inc.
977, 981
(1995), and citing Sprinkler Irrigation Co.,
Ins. Co.,
Inc., 139
John Deere Ins.
139 Idaho 691,
v. Nissan
85 P.3d 667,
C0., Inc,
691, 696-97, 85
667, 672-73 (2004)
(2004) and Oats v.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF NICK
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
SCHUG AND KEN FRANKLIN –— 22
19807-001 /963386
19807-001
/ 963386

000850

126 Idaho 162,
an
Motor Corp.
Corp. in USA.,
1099 (1994). The party submitting an
USA, 126
162, 166,
1095, 1099
166, 879 P.2d 1095,

affidavit
afﬁdavit has
has the burden to affirmatively
afﬁrmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to the
information in the affidavit
afﬁdavit and to establish that the affidavit is based upon personal knowledge.
knowledge.

“A witness may
Cates v.
Albertson’s’S Inc,
Inc., 126
1227 (1995).
126 Idaho 1030,
v. Albertson
1223, 1227
1034, 895 P.2d 1223,
1030, 1034,
(1995). “A
may
not testify to aa matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
ﬁnding that the
sufﬁcient to support aa finding
witness has
Witness
has personal knowledge of the matter.” I.R.E. 602.
“When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition to aa motion for

summary judgment, aa court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial.” Gem
State Ins.
Ins. Co.
145 Idaho 10,
1002 of the Rules
175 P.3d 172,
176 (2007). Rule 1002
Co. v.
v. Hutchison, 145
172, 176
14, 175
10, 14,
of Evidence, the best evidence rule, requires an
an original writing except as
as otherwise provided by
by
law. I.R.E. 1002.
an original unless a
1002. A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as
as an
a genuine
question is raised as
1003. The decision to permit or strike evidence
as to the authenticity. I.R.E. 1003.
submitted during summary judgment proceedings is aa discretionary decision. Fragnella v.
v.
Petrovich, 153
281 P.3d 103,
110 (2012).
153 Idaho 266, 281
103, 110
The Posey
Posey decision is instructive to the present motion. In that case,
an affidavit
afﬁdavit was
case, an
filed
by Frank Griffith,
141 Idaho
ﬁled by
an employee of defendant Ford, with several attachments.
attachments. 141
Grifﬁth, an
479, 111
111 P.3d at 164.
164. The plaintiff moved to strike the affidavit
afﬁdavit and attachments on the basis
that there was aa lack of foundation showing personal knowledge, that the attachments were
hearsay,
was conclusory.
Id. The trial court struck aa single statement from
afﬁdavit was
conclusory. Id.
hearsay, and that the affidavit
the affidavit
afﬁdavit but declined to strike the entirety of the affidavit
afﬁdavit or its attachments.
attachments. Id. On review,

Grifﬁth’s statement that his affidavit was made on personal
the Court of Appeals held that Griffith’s
“Wholly conclusory in the absence of any
knowledge was “wholly
any foundation showing actual
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participation in the transaction at
at issue or actual personal knowledge of
of the facts to which the

affidavit
based, in part,
part, on the fact
141 Idaho at 483, 111
111 P.3d at
afﬁdavit attests.” 141
at 168.
168. This holding was based,
that the transaction at
Grifﬁth did not
Grifﬁth worked in Colorado, Griffith
at issue occurred in Idaho but Griffith
claim to be
be aa Witness
witness to any
be aa party to
case, and Griffith did not claim to be
any of the events in the case,
any
any conversation or correspondence with the plaintiffs. Id.

Grifﬁth’s affidavit,
Regarding the attachments to Griffith’s
afﬁdavit had no
afﬁdavit, the Court noted that the affidavit
foundation as
as to who prepared the documents, even though he attempted to identify the
attachments despite failing to demonstrate requisite personal knowledge for authentication as
as
required by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901,
as to the legal effect of the
901, and contained argument as
documents.
documents. Id. The Court’s comment regarding admissibility of these attachments was simple
and pointed:
pointed: “none of which is admissible.” Id. Specifically, the Court held that “[t]he mere
receipt and retention by
does not
by aa business entity of aa document that was created elsewhere does
transform the document into aa business
business record of the receiving entity for purposes of I.R.E.
803(6).” Id. at 484, 111
111 P.3d at
at 169.
169. Based upon the foregoing, the Court of Appeals held that
multiple portions of the Griffith
Grifﬁth affidavit
afﬁdavit were inadmissible as
as were all attachments except those
authenticated by
Posey, 141
141 Idaho at 484, 111
11 1 P.3d at 169.
afﬁdavit. Posey,
169.
by the plaintiff’s own affidavit.
Here, the Policy of Title Insurance exhibits fail to meet the required standards. First,
although Mr. Schug asserts
asserts that Nextitle, LLC is the successor in interest to Lawyers Title of
Idaho, he says
says nothing about his knowledge about Lawyers Title record keeping system or that
he had “custody of
of the record as
has supervision of its
as a
a regular part of his or her work or who has
creation” (internal citations omitted). Id. Second,
are not
Second, the Policy of Title Insurance exhibits are
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duplicates or authenticated copies. Also, the Franklin Affidavit
Afﬁdavit fails to show that he has
has personal
knowledge to testify to the matters therein stated.
stated.
1.
1. The Policy
are not authenticated copies.
Policv of Title Insurance exhibits are
A primary condition precedent to admitting aa document is the best evidence rule
requiring an
an original writing. I.R.E. 1002.
1002. A duplicate is admissible if there is no genuine
“a counterpart produced
question as
I.R.E. 1003.
1003. Under the rule, aa duplicate is “a
as to its authenticity.
authenticity. I.R.E.

.” I.R.E. 1001(4).
by
as the original . . . .”
1001(4). Here the exhibit is stated to be aa
by the same impression as
.

.

.

true and correct copy of aa policy issued by
as
by Lawyers Title, but the exhibit is not countersigned as
all title policies are.
are. (Affidavit
as to how an un(Afﬁdavit of Nick Schug,
Schug, ¶ 3.)
3.) No explanation is given as
11

countersigned policy is to be
be accepted as
as a
a duplicate of an issued signed policy. Thus, a
a question
exists as
as to the document’s authenticity, i.e.,
i.e., that the document is what the proponent
claims/believes it to be.
I.R.E. 901(a).
be. I.R.E.
901(a). This additional condition precedent can be satisfied by
by
the “[t]estimony of
of aa witness with knowledge that aa matter is what
What it is claimed to be.” I.R.E.
901(b)(1).
afﬁant has
has the requisite personal knowledge related to the exhibits.
901(b)(1). Here, neither affiant
was an employer, title manager, title officer,
vice
Neither affiant was
ofﬁcer, commercial escrow closer, Vice
an agent
president, founding member, or director of Lawyers Title Insurance Company,
Company, or an

thereof, which issued the policy eleven years
years ago. Likewise, they do not testify that they were
involved in the transactions or title search giving rise to the exhibit.
exhibit. As such,
has
such, neither has
personal knowledge related to the exhibit and therefore each are incompetent to testify that the

exhibit is what the affiants
afﬁants claim them to be.
be. The exhibit fails to comply with the Rules because
there is no guarantee that the materials are
be. As
of what
What they purport to be.
are correct copies of
explained above,
are merely unsigned copies purported to
above, neither exhibit is countersigned. They are
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be copies
be

of aa properly countersigned Owner’s Policy. Like in Posey,
Posey, the mere retention by aa

separate business entity of aa document that was
was created elsewhere by unknown persons under
business record for purposes of
unknown practices does not transform the document into aa business
authentication.
authentication. Accordingly, they are
are entitled to no probative weight in the Court’s summary
judgment analysis.

1.
afﬁant has
Afﬁdavit does not show the affiant
1. The Franklin Affidavit
has the requisite personal knowledge
to testify
testifV on the matters contained therein.
Mr. Franklin’s testimony set
be stricken
set forth in Paragraphs 2,
3 should be
2, its subparts, and 3
based upon aa lack
based

of personal knowledge pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
CiVil Procedure 56(c)(4)
56(c)(4) and

Idaho Rule of Evidence 602. Pursuant to these rules, the affiant
afﬁant must have personal knowledge
of aa matter to be aa competent witness.
Witness. Mr. Franklin’s assertions in the many subparts of
Paragraph 2,
are wholly
3 are
as nothing in the
Wholly conclusory and without foundation as
2, and Paragraph 3
affidavit
afﬁdavit demonstrates that he was aa party to the relevant details of the transaction or conducted aa
search of the necessary public records or those available to aa title officer
ofﬁcer at aa title company.
Likewise, Mr. Franklin does not testify that he was ever an
an employee or agent of any
any entity
involved in the transaction or search of title giving rise to the Policy of Title Insurance exhibit.
exhibit.
The Franklin Affidavit
Afﬁdavit states
states that he is retired from the title insurance industry but does
not mention his basis
basis of commenting on the issues and events leading to the alleged final
ﬁnal product
represented in the Policy of Title Insurance exhibit, or that he is competent to testify regarding
matters of the practices and procedures of title examiners for Lawyers Title Insurance Company.
Company.
The affidavit does not explain how Mr. Franklin is competent to testify on matters involving the
determinations that were necessary to support the alleged final policy from Lawyers Title
Insurance Company.
Company.

The Franklin Affidavit
Afﬁdavit only describes aa review of the alleged final
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determinations supporting the product, not aa review of the actual search made in support of those
determinations.
Given the lack of foundational testimony demonstrating personal knowledge of the
matters reviewed and the decisions leading to the inclusion or failure to include in the exhibit,
the State has
has failed to meet its burden to affirmatively
afﬁrmatively show that Mr. Franklin is competent to
testify regarding the Policy of Title Insurance exhibit. As such,
such, Paragraph 2,
2, its subparts, and
Paragraph 33 of the Franklin Affidavit
be stricken.
Afﬁdavit should be
II. CONCLUSION
On the foregoing bases,
bases, the Plaintiffs respectfully requests an Order Striking the Policy of
Title Insurance exhibits and the Affidavit of Ken Franklin.
th
DATED this 77th
day
day of August, 2017.

G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Slade D. Sokol
Sokol//
Jason R. Mau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 77thth day
day of August, 2017, aa true and correct copy
copy of the
foregoing document was
was filed
Eﬁle System which
ﬁled with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile
sent aa Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311
3311 W. State Street
P.
BOX 7129
P. O. Box
83707-1 129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
for Idaho Transportation Department
Attorney for

II
I:
I:I
I:

U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IE Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Slade D. Sokol
Sokol//
Jason R. Mau
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Signed: 8/8/2017 04:32 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case
N0.: CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Plaintiffs,
v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Shorten Time,
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiffs’

and the Court having good cause
cause therefore;
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Shorten Time be GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’
GRANTED. The

time for hearing Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affidavits
Afﬁdavits of Nick Schug and Ken Franklin is
is set
set for
August 14,
pm.
14, 2017 at 3:00 p.m.
DATED this ____ day
day of August, 2017.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
G
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.

SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
Signed: 8/8/2017 11:02 AM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
8th day
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ____
copy of
day of August, 2017, aa true and correct copy
the foregoing document was filed
Eﬁle System
ﬁled with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile
which sent aa Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
IIDAHO
DAHO T
RANSPORTATION D
EPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION
3311
3311 W. State Street
P.
BOX 7129
P. O. Box
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
for Idaho Transportation Department
Attorney for
Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
G
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street,
Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208)
(208) 319-2600
319-2601
Fax: (208)
(208) 319-2601
for Plaintiffs
Attorneys for

II

U.S.
US. Mail
F acsimile: 334-4498
E] Facsimile:
Hand
Delivery
I:I
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IE Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

I:
D
D
D

U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
I:I Overnight Delivery
IE Email/iCourt: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
lpena@greenerlaw.com
reenerlaw.com
ena
1

Court Clerk
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Electronically Filed
8/8/2017 12:04:21 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF
GLEN LORENSEN, DONNA DAY
JACOBS AND COUNSEL RE: NO
MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE
TITLE

COMES NOW the Defendant, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department ("the
State"), by and through undersigned

counse~

and pursuant to Rule 56( c)( 4) and Rule 56( e),

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF GLEN LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS AND
COUNSEL RE: MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE TITLE - 1

000859

I.R.C.P ., hereby moves this Court for an order striking the affidavits of Glen Lorensen, Donna
Day Jacobs and the AffidavitofCounselflled in support ofPlaintiffs' Motionfor Partial

Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, for the reasons that the affidavits are
not based on personal knowledge, lack certified copies of documents, failed to attach documents
discussed in at least one of the affidavits, lack foundation as to opinions and rely on hearsay.
The State's motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Strike

Affidavits of Glen Lorensen, Donna Day Jacobs and Counsel Re: No Marketable and Insurable
Title submitted herewith. The State requests a hearing on its motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of August 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on this 8th day of August 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
DEmail:
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF GLEN LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS AND
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Electronically Filed
8/8/2017 12:04:21 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8813
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho.gov
ISB # 4151
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DANE. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF
GLEN LORENSEN, DONNA DAY
JACOBS AND COUNSEL RE: NO
MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE
TITLE

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF GLEN
LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS AND COUNSEL RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE- 1
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(“the State”),
COMES
State”),
Department (“the
the Defendant,
Transportation Department
of Idaho,
Idaho Transportation
COMES NOW
NOW the
State of
Defendant, State
Idaho, Idaho
State’s
by and
in support
the State’s
this memorandum
of the
submits this
memorandum in
support of
and through
through undersigned
and submits
undersigned counsel,
counsel, and
by

Motion to
Affidavits of
Glen Lorensen,
Lorensen, Donna
Donna Day
Day Jacobs
Jacobs and
No
Re: No
Motion
and Counsel
Strike Affidavits
Counsel Re:
to Strike
ofGlen
Marketable and
Insurable Title:
andlnsurable
Marketable
Title:
I.
I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In support
In
Motion for
for Partial
Judgment Re: N0
No Marketable
Marketable and
their Motion
of their
support of
and
Partial Summary
Summary JudgmentRe.‘

(“the Days”)
Insurable Title,
Affidavit of
Donna Day
Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, in
Plaintiffs (“the
Days”) submitted
the Fourth
Fourth Afﬁdavit
in
submitted the
Insurable
ofDonna
Title, Plaintiffs

Support
Plaintiffs’’Motion
Motion for
for Partial
Judgment Re:
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable
Re: No
and Insurable
Partial Summary
Support of
Summary Judgment
ofPlaintsS
Title,
Affidavit of
Counsel and
Affidavit of
Lorensen, in
Plaintiffs’’Motion
Motion
the Afﬁdavit
an Afﬁdavit
in Support
and the
Glen Lorensen,
Support of
ofCounsel
Title, an
ofPlaintiﬂS
of Glen
all of
for Partial
Judgment Re: N0
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title.
of those
those
and Insurable
Partial Summary
Because all
Title. Because
Summary JudgmentRe.‘
for

affidavits
personal knowledge
in terms
from aa lack
other bases,
or other
affidavits suffer
suffer from
of foundation
of personal
foundation in
knowledge or
lack
lack of
terms of
bases, lack
certified
in the
the affidavits,
of documents
certiﬁed copies
of attached
attached documents
and lack
lack copies
documents and
documents discussed
copies of
copies of
discussed in
afﬁdavits,
the
be stricken
from the
the affidavits
the record.
stricken from
afﬁdavits should
should be
record.
II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
A.
judgment
in relation
Legal standards
relation to
for affidavits
afﬁdavits submitted
standards for
A. Legal
to aa summary
submitted in
summary judgment
motion.
motion.
“be made
In
In order
conform to
to conform
to Rule
Rule 56(c)(4),
afﬁdavit must
must “be
on personal
personal
order to
and affidavit
made on
56(c)(4), and

in evidence,
that the
the affiant
afﬁant or
knowledge,
would be
be admissible
that would
or
facts that
set out
out facts
and show
show that
admissﬂﬂe in
knowledge, set
evidence, and

stated.” Further,
declarant
‘[s]w0rn or
the matters
matters stated.”
competent to
to testify
on the
or certified
certiﬁed copies
of
declarant is
copies of
is competent
Further, ‘[s]worn
testify on

all
parts thereof
be attached
with the
in an
all papers
the
thereof referred
or parts
referred to
to in
an affidavit
must be
to or
or served
afﬁdavit must
attached to
papers or
served With
affidavit.” If an
affidavit.”
personal knowledge
for the
the statements
other foundation
an affidavit
afﬁdavit lacks
or other
statements
foundation for
knowledge or
lacks personal

therein,
Posey v.
Ford Motor
Motor Credit
it falls
meeting Rule
short of
of meeting
Rule 56(c)(4)
requirements. Posey
falls short
Credit Co.,
v. Ford
therein, it
C0.,
56(c)(4) requirements.
141
141 Idaho
111 P.3d
that they
162 (Ct.App.
The affiant
affiant must
must also
demonstrate that
Idaho 477,
are
P.3d 162
also demonstrate
(Ct.App. 2005).
2005). The
477, 111
they are
competent
Dulaney v.
Alphonsus
information or
the information
opinions expressed.
competent to
to testify
on the
or opinions
expressed. Dulaney
v. St.
St. Alphonsus
testify on
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’S Inc,
Regional Medical Center, 137
Albertson’s
Inc., 126
126
45 P.3d
Idaho 160,
137 Idaho
816 (2002);
P.3d 816
RegionalMedicalCenter,
Cates v.
v. Albertson
160, 45
(2002); Cates

Idaho
presented in
In general,
in
1223 (1995).
the information
information and
P.2d 1223
Idaho 1030,
and documentation
documentation presented
895 P.2d
generaL the
1030, 895
(1995). In
an
be evidence
be admissible
Insurance Co.
affidavit must
that would
at trial.
trial. Gem
an affidavit
must be
would be
evidence that
admiss1ble at
Gem State
State Insurance
Co. v.
v.
Hutchison, 145
by the
fall short
145 Idaho
172 (2007).
The affidavits
the Days
short
afﬁdavits submitted
submitted by
Idaho 10,
175 P.3d
P.3d 172
Hutchison,
10, 175
Days fall
(2007). The
of
the requisite
of the
of admissibility.
requisite standards
standards of
admissﬂ3ility.
B.
Affidavit of
The Affidavit
the
lacks personal
foundation as
personal knowledge
B. The
or foundation
as to
to the
knowledge or
Counsel lacks
of Counsel
documents
the re to.
attached thereto.
documents attached
Days’ partial
The
Affidavit of
Counsel submitted
judgment
in support
The Afﬁdavit
the Days’
of the
partial summary
submitted in
support of
ofCounsel
summary judgment
title clearly
motion
basis upon
upon which
motion regarding
for
which counsel
marketable and
and insurable
insurable title
regarding marketable
counsel for
lacks any
clearly lacks
any basis

the
from aa state
that attached
the Days
thereto are
of an
an email
correct copies
email from
state
attached thereto
are true
and correct
true and
copies of
could swear
swear that
Days could
not aa recipient
the email
therefore has
employee,
personal
no personal
recipient of
of the
email and
and therefore
has no
Steve Parry.
Counsel is
is not
Parry. Counsel
employee, Steve

knowledge
the authenticity
the email.
not aa custodian
of the
of
he is
knowledge regarding
email. Further,
regarding the
custodian of
is obviously
authenticity of
Further, he
obviously not
state
whether the
the email
The
There is
no way
he could
know Whether
correct copy.
state emails.
email is
and correct
true and
could know
emails. There
is no
is a
a true
copy. The
way he
in this
that the
the unverified
the email
matter does
not provide
mere
provide
to the
mere fact
fact that
email is
attached to
unveriﬁed Complaint
this matter
Complaint in
is attached
does not

the
the requisite
for the
the email.
certiﬁcation or
or foundation
requjsite certification
foundation for
email.
Similarly,
performed by
by Knipe
the appraisal
of the
no personal
personal knowledge
knowledge of
appraisal performed
Knipe &
counsel has
&
has no
Similarly, counsel
in 1998.
Knipe
not aa custodian
of Knipe
Knipe &
Knipe records
or appraisals
he had
no
He is
and he
had no
records or
Knipe in
custodian of
1998. He
appraisals and
& Knipe
is not

involvement
in ordering,
writing or
the appraisal.
For these
the
of the
or even
involvement in
these reasons,
appraisal. For
even receiving
receiving aa copy
ordering, writing
reasons, the
copy of
Affidavit of
Counsel and
from the
its attachments
the record.
stricken from
attachments must
must be
and its
record.
be stricken
ofCounsel
Afﬁdavit
C.
Donna Day
Afﬁdavit of
The Affidavit
and foundation
lacks personal
foundation
personal knowledge
of Donna
knowledge and
Jacobs lacks
C. The
Day Jacobs
for
for the
the documents
it.
attached to
to it.
documents attached
“true and
correct” copy
Jacobs’ affidavit
Ms.
purports to
affidavit purports
to attach
attach aa “true
of what
What appears
to be
Ms. Jacobs’
and correct”
appears to
be aa
copy of

proposed title
title insurance
Title Co.
from Pioneer
commitment from
Her affidavit
silent as
Pioneer Title
Whether
affidavit is
to whether
insurance commitment
proposed
C0. Her
is silent
as to
the
was ever
transmittal letter
the document,
letter or
which has
other document,
no transmittal
or other
or officially
has no
ever issued
issued or
document, which
document, was
ofﬁcially
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transmitted
whether the
in relation
silent as
Her affidavit
the
transmitted in
relation to
to an
an actual
of property.
afﬁdavit is
to Whether
sale of
actual sale
is also
also silent
as to
property. Her
commitment,
information obtained
on information
obtained over
now over
over
over seven
ever updated
seven years
updated based
commitment, now
based on
was ever
old, was
years old,
the
the intervening
intervening years.
years.
Ms.
Pioneer Title
Title and
not the
the custodian
atPioneer
of such
no
Ms. Jacobs
and has
such documents
custodian of
documents at
Jacobs is
is obviously
has no
obviously not
title policy
personal knowledge
whether itit is
policy issued
of aa title
or
to Whether
correct copy
personal
knowledge as
and correct
true and
issued or
as to
is a
a true
copy of

maintained
was given
Title Co.
not even
Her affidavit
maintained by
Pioneer Title
of
afﬁdavit does
that she
state that
she was
even state
given aa copy
does not
C0. Her
copy of
by Pioneer
the
by Pioneer
which would
be in
in and
Title Company,
the policy
itself inadequate
for her
her to
Pioneer Title
of itself
to
and of
inadequate for
would be
policy by
Company, which
title insurance
certify
policy issued
Pioneer
of aa title
or maintained
that itit is
correct copy
maintained by
insurance policy
and correct
true and
issued or
is a
a true
certify that
copy of
by Pioneer

Title
Title Company.
Company.
her statement
her affidavit
The same
The
with her
statement that
that attached
to her
afﬁdavit is
are associated
problems are
attached to
same problems
associated With
is a
a

commitment” from
“preliminary title
copy
Title and
title commitment”
from Alliance
Her
of aa “preliminary
Corporation. Her
and Escrow
Escrow Corporation.
Alliance Title
copy of

affidavit
personal knowledge
for the
the document.
affidavit provides
no personal
no foundation
foundation whatsoever
knowledge
She has
whatsoever for
document. She
provides no
has no
of
Title and
not draft
it. She
not the
the custodian
for Alliance
of itit as
of documents
draft it.
she did
did not
She is
and Escrow
Escrow
Alliance Title
custodian of
documents for
as she
is not
Corporation
verify that
what she
it is
it to
that it
cannot testify
or verify
of What
to
correct copy
Corporation and
and cannot
and correct
she claims
claims it
true and
is a
a true
testify or
copy of
be. Thus,
be stricken.
her affidavit
the documents
stricken.
afﬁdavit and
to itit must
must be
attached to
and the
documents attached
be.
Thus, her
D.
that he
Afﬁdavit of
The Affidavit
lacks copies
D. The
of Glen
Glen Lorensen
Lorensen lacks
of documents
he discusses,
documents that
dis cusses,
copies of
lacks
and
lacks
verification
that
he
is
a
custodian
that
a
for his
his opinions,
and
veriﬁcation
lacks foundation
foundation for
lacks
he
is
custodian
opinions,
of
his affidavit.
afﬁdavit.
the documents
attached to
to his
of the
documents attached
1.
has provided
for the
the admissibility
the documents
foundation for
1. Lorensen
Lorens en has
no foundation
of the
documents
provided no
admissibility of
attached
his affidavit.
afﬁdavit.
attached to
to his
Days’ motion
in support
As
With the
the case
the other
the Days’
motion
other two
As is
of the
afﬁdavits submitted
submitted in
support of
is the
case with
two affidavits
the Lorensen
regarding
regarding insurability
affidavit lacks
Lorensen affidavit
that Lorensen
Lorensen is
and marketability,
detail that
lacks any
is
insurability and
marketability, the
any detail

aa custodian
Nor does
Title Co.
that he
Pioneer Title
of records
at Pioneer
he affirmatively
he prepared
prepared
records at
custodian of
establish that
C0. Nor
does he
afﬁrmatively establish
the
participated in
in its
title insurance
title commitment,
the title
its creation.
the alleged
or even
creation. Therefore,
alleged title
insurance
even participated
commitment, or
Therefore, the
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policy attached
A lacks
Exh1bit A
not be
to his
foundation and
attached to
afﬁdavit as
and as
such would
lacks foundation
would not
his affidavit
as Exhibit
as such
be
policy
admissible
based on
be stricken
it should
from
the policy
stricken from
at trial.
trial. Any
to the
or statements
on it
reference to
statements based
should be
admissﬂﬂe at
policy or
Any reference
the
the record.
record.
In
In fact,
for any
certification or
authentication for
Lorensen provides
no certification
or authentication
to
attached to
document attached
provides no
fact, Lorensen
any document
In addition
title commitment,
his
uncertified copy
the uncertiﬁed
the alleged
to the
of the
to his
affidavit. In
addition to
attached to
his
alleged title
his affidavit.
commitment, attached
copy of
Easement”. Obviously,
“Highway Easement”.
B is
affidavit
uncertified copy
Exh1bit B
affidavit as
of aa “Highway
Lorensen has
an uncertiﬁed
has
is an
as Exhibit
Obviously, Lorensen
copy of

no
With the
not aa custodian
the deed,
of such
or involvement
no personal
involvement with
personal knowledge
knowledge or
and is
such documents
custodian of
documents
is not
deed, and
either.
either.
Similarly,
what appears
be aa portion
Exh1bit C
the Lorensen
to the
Lorensen affidavit,
to be
portion of
of aa
appears to
C to
afﬁdavit, What
Similarly, Exhibit
surveyor’s drawing,
not be
the
trial based
surveyor’s
at trial
on the
foundation and
and would
would not
lacks any
be admissible
admissﬂﬂe at
based on
drawing, lacks
any foundation

Lorensen
Nothing in
with
in his
Lorensen affidavit.
afﬁdavit establishes
that he
he had
involvement With
afﬁdavit. Nothing
had any
establishes that
his affidavit
any involvement
creating
with
that he
that document.
the document,
the custodian
for that
The same
creating the
or that
he is
holds true
same holds
true With
custodian for
document. The
is the
document, or

,

E and
F to
Exhibit
Exh1bit D,
Exh1bit E
Exhlbit F
the Lorensen
for the
the documents
to the
Lorensen affidavit
afﬁdavit – no
no foundation
foundation for
and Exhibit
documents
D, Exhibit

exists,
All of
that Lorensen
the
the custodian
there is
of the
of those
no evidence
Lorensen is
those documents.
and there
evidence that
custodian of
documents. All
is no
is the
exists, and
documents
be stricken,
the Lorensen
of his
statements
to the
Lorensen affidavit
well as
afﬁdavit should
should be
his statements
attached to
documents attached
as well
as any
stricken, as
any of
based on
them.
on them.
based
that he
2.
attach to
failed to
his affidavit.
afﬁdavit.
2. Lorensen
Lorens en discusses
he failed
to attach
to his
dis cusses documents
documents that
in an
Rule
be attached
that documents
it.
Rule 56(c)(4)
an affidavit
afﬁdavit are
to be
to it.
attached to
are to
documents discussed
requires that
discussed in
56(c)(4) requires

Lorensen’s affidavit
Lorensen’s
well. He
not attached
afﬁdavit fails
here as
He discusses
of documents
that are
attached
number of
are not
documents that
fails here
as well.
discusses aa number

for his
the missing
to
provides no
opinions based
to his
he provides
no foundation
on the
missing documents.
foundation for
afﬁdavit and
his opinions
his affidavit
and he
documents.
based on

For
in paragraph
For example,
the affidavit,
the fifty
of the
Lorensen discusses
foot wide
paragraph 6
Wide
discusses the
6 of
affidavit, Lorensen
example, in
fifty foot
1-84 right
easement
way. He
was returned
but
right of
it was
that it
the United
to I-84
of way.
He states
to the
United States,
easement adjacent
states that
adjacent to
returned to
States, but

provides no
provide any
that statement.
Nor does
no copy
of any
statement. Nor
he provide
supporting that
documentation supporting
provides
does he
any documentation
any
copy of
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documentation
where that
right of
that fifty
or analysis
foot right
of way
He is
documentation or
located. He
is relying
is located.
identifying Where
analysis identifying
relying
ﬁfty foot
way is
else’s work,
on
not his
on hearsay
or someone
his own.
someone else’s
own.
work, not
hearsay or

In paragraph
In
paragraph 7,
the Ada
District
Lorensen discusses
Ada County
owned by
discusses property
property owned
Highway District
County Highway
7, Lorensen
by the

in
in the
that statement
for that
the northeast
statement
northeast quarter
quarter of
of Section
N0 basis
or supporting
Section 19.
supporting documentation
documentation for
19. No
basis or
is
provided.
is provided.
In paragraph
In
paragraph 13,
problem he
with the
the access
Lorensen discusses
he believes
exists With
believes exists
discusses aaproblem
access
13, Lorensen

easement
believes that
when the
from the
that when
the State
the United
the land
transferred to
to the
United States.
He believes
State from
easement transferred
States. He
land
underlying those
was transferred
the United
not reserve
the
transferred to
to B.W.,
United States
those easements
easements was
did not
reserve the
States did
underlying
Inc., the
B.W., Inc.,
access
the area
the United
transferred by
He even
to depict
of the
United States
to
depict some
easement. He
States to
even claims
some of
area transferred
claims to
access easement.
by the
F to
Exhlbit F
the deeds
B.W.,
to his
Lorensen failed
failed to
to attach
attach copies
of the
Inc. on
on Exhibit
afﬁdavit. However,
copies of
his affidavit.
deeds
However, Lorensen
B.W., Inc.

from
by Rule56(c)(4),
from the
the United
opinion
United States
to B.W.,
Inc. to
to his
required by
afﬁdavit as
States to
his affidavit
his opinion
as required
so his
B.W., Inc.
RuleS6(c)(4), so
about
basis or
the access
Whether the
no basis
or foundation.
easement was
foundation.
reserved has
about whether
access easement
was reserved
has no
3.
in relation
afﬁdavit in
relation to
the wrong
his affidavit
the
attached the
Lorens en attached
to his
to the
document to
wrong document
3. Lorensen
access
the State.
State.
acces s easement
e asement owned
owned by
by the
Attached
what purports
purports to
be aa
D to
Exh1bit D
the Lorensen
to the
Lorensen affidavit
of What
to be
Attached as
afﬁdavit is
is a
a copy
as Exhibit
copy of
Deed” transferring
“Corporate Warranty
“Corporate
from J.D.
transferring property
Micron
Inc. to
to Micron
Aldecoa &
J .D. Aldecoa
& Son,
Warranty Deed”
property from
Son, Inc.
D (also
Technology,
Exh1bit D
Inc. However,
Lorensen discussed
referred to
to as
Instrument No.
No.
discussed Exhibit
as Instrument
However, Lorensen
Technology, Inc.
(also referred

96040862)
width for
what Lorensen
in relation
11A and
11B as
for What
relation to
to access
lacking Width
Lorensen calls
easements IIA
and IIB
access easements
as lacking
calls aa
96040862) in
connection” in
“dedicated point
D
in paragraph
“dedicated
Exh1bit D
point of
of access
of his
He also
paragraph 9
his affidavit.
afﬁdavit. He
access connection”
9 of
also claims
claims Exhibit

does
whether access
public road
not specify
the end
the easements.
to aapublic
to the
of the
connect to
end of
easements.
road would
does not
access to
would connect
specify Whether
Lorensen’s statements
in Exhibit
D is
Exhlbit D
The problem
the
The
problem with
with Lorensen’s
statements regarding
What is
that the
shown in
regarding what
is shown
is that

document
purport to
the State.
the deed
not purport
transfer access
to the
to
to transfer
State. Rather,
easements to
document does
purports to
access easements
deed purports
does not
Rather, the
transfer
be used
used for
from J.D.
Micron Technology,
for right
transfer land
Inc. to
to Micron
Inc. to
to be
right of
of
Aldecoa &
land from
J .D. Aldecoa
& Son,
Technology, Inc.
Son, Inc.
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way for
That simple
for the
the Isaacs
simple fact
Interchange. That
fact makes
that Lorensen
Lorensen has
makes clear
clear that
attached
has attached
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon Interchange.
way
aa document
not describe
the access
the State.
transferred to
that does
to the
easements transferred
State.
document that
descr1be the
does not
access easements
Further
wrong deed
that Lorensen
the legal
the wrong
Further evidence
legal descriptions
of
Lorensen has
descriptions of
evidence that
attached the
deed is
is the
has attached
the
being transferred
6A
for Parcel
the parcels
Micron Technology
The legal
transferred to
Parcel6A
to Micron
Inc. The
legal description
description for
parcels being
Technology Inc.
State’s access
in the
than exists
that itit consists
far more
the State’s
indicates
more acreage
of 23.09
indicates that
exists in
consists of
23.09 acres,
acreage than
access
acres, far

easements.
6B states
that itit consists
for Parcel
The legal
of 9.01
Parcel6B
legal description
description for
states that
easements. The
located
consists of
9.01 acres
acres located
1-84 as
adjacent
the
the westbound
to highway
stations along
along the
to the
of I-84
indicated by
reference to
adjacent to
lane of
westbound lane
as indicated
highway stations
by reference

in the
Nothing in
westbound lane.
being transferred
that access
the deed
the
transferred to
to the
indicates that
easements are
are being
lane. Nothing
westbound
deed indicates
access easements

State.
It is
nothing to
With the
that the
the
the access
the deed
to the
to do
easements provided
provided to
State. It
obvious that
access easements
deed has
has nothing
do with
is obvious
Lorensen’s affidavit.
State,
to Lorensen’s
afﬁdavit.
contrary to
State, contrary

for his
his opinions.
foundation for
inadequate foundation
4. Lorensen
Lorens en provides
opinions.
4.
provides inadequate
All
work at
All that
Title Company
that he
that Lorensen
there
Pioneer Title
he works
Lorensen states
at Pioneer
works there
states about
his work
about his
is that
Company is
as
job duties
Title Officer.
Senior Title
He provides
no description
of his
or his
Ofﬁcer. He
description of
his training,
duties or
his
provides no
as a
a Senior
training, experience,
experience, job
responsibilities.
underwriting or
providing
in underwriting
He fails
to indicate
indicate that
that he
he has
or providing
experience in
responsﬂ3ilities. He
has any
fails to
any experience
title commitments.
insurance
very brief
brief description
for title
the very
there is
commitments. Based
on the
description of
of his
no
insurance for
his career,
Based on
is no
career, there

basis to
underwriting title
title insurance.
to believe
he has
experience underwriting
has any
insurance.
believe he
basis
any experience
In spite
the lack
the insurability
the Day
In
spite of
of the
of any
of the
Lorensen opines
opines about
lack of
about the
foundation, Lorensen
insurability of
Day
any foundation,
in paragraph
Property.
title commitment
that the
commitment attached
For example,
the purported
he states
to
attached to
paragraph 3,
states that
purported title
example, in
Property. For
3, he

“the inability
access”. Apparently
his
without aaright
right of
that is
not
affidavit indicates
to insure
of access”.
his affidavit
indicates “the
insure Without
is not
inability to
Apparently that
Lorensen’s opinion,
in the
If itit isis Lorensen’s
that is
the document.
even
but something
just stated
something that
stated in
even his
document. If
his opinion,
is just
opinion, but
opinion,

he
provided no
for it.
it.
he has
no foundation
foundation for
has provided
“Pioneer Title
He
unsupported statement
paragraph 55 that
in paragraph
Title cannot
that “Pioneer
statement in
He makes
cannot
makes aa conclusory,
conclusory, unsupported

right-of-way that
in gross
insure
that is
not
on an
an easement
or an
an easement
or right-of-way
easement in
easement or
insure access
access based
based on
is not
gross or
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insured.” He
appurtenant
for that
the property
that statement,
to include
to the
He provides
no foundation
foundation for
appurtenant to
include
provides no
statement, to
property insured.”

whether that
not indicate
opinion or
the opinion
opinion of
whether
What
or the
of an
an underwriter.
He does
that is
indicate what
underwriter. He
his own
own opinion
does not
is his
B to
documents
than the
Exh1bit B
the purported
other than
He
he reviewed,
to his
afﬁdavit. He
attached as
documents he
purported deed
his affidavit.
deed attached
as Exhibit
reviewed, other
“appurtenant” means,
describes
him to
training or
that would
no training
or experience
to know
know what
What “appurtenant”
or
experience that
allow him
would allow
descrlbes no
means, or

whether an
the State
Whether
an easement
to public
must be
to
public access
State must
easement dedicated
and accepted
appurtenant to
dedicated to
accepted by
access and
be appurtenant
by the
property that
uses itit for
people are
for access.
opinion was
that uses
to reflect
reﬂect reality,
are driving
driving
his unfounded
access. If his
unfounded opinion
was to
property
reality, people
on
property. In
In short,
their property.
that are
all over
the State
not appurtenant
on public
to their
public road
easements all
are not
appurtenant to
road easements
over the
State that
short,
Lorensen
provide any
basis for
public access
– whether
that the
for his
opinion that
the public
Whether
Lorensen fails
to provide
fails to
his opinion
easements 7
access easements
any basis
owned
by ACHD
be used
used by
ACHD 7– cannot
the State
the Day
other
or by
of the
to access
cannot be
State or
owners of
owned by
access other
Property to
Day Property
by the
by owners
the system
parts of
parts
of the
of public
public roads.
roads.
system of

Lorensen’s comments
Lorensen’s
understanding,
comments about
of access
to Eisenman
reﬂect no
no understanding,
lack of
Eisenman Road
Road reflect
about lack
access to

experience
in paragraph
in obtaining
obtaining encroachments
He claims
to public
encroachments to
experience and/or
public roads.
expertise in
claims in
paragraph
and/or expertise
roads. He
99 that
width 7– aa surprising
that the
the survey
the
the access
that the
of the
statement given
easements lack
lack Width
surprising statement
given that
access easements
survey of
easements
problem coming
with aa width.
that the
the
coming up
no problem
he relies
relies upon
Width. He
He further
had no
easements he
indicates that
further indicates
upon had
up With
“adjoin to
roadwaY’ in
in spite
easements
not “adjoin
the fact
the easements
to an
an open
spite of
of the
fact that
that the
easements do
open roadway”
easements are
are adjacent
adjacent
do not

right of
to
for Eisenman
the issue
the right
of way
He fails
to address
or discuss
of obtaining
obtaining an
an
to the
Eisenman Road.
Road. He
fails to
address or
discuss the
issue of
way for

from either
ACHD or
either ACHD
the State.
encroachment
encroachment onto
onto Eisenman
or the
State.
Eisenman Road
Road from

In paragraph
In
paragraph 12,
the adequacy
the access
Lorensen opines
to provide
of the
opines about
easement to
provide
about the
access easement
adequacy of
12, Lorensen

the
provides
the ability
the Day
not an
to drive
onto the
Lorensen is
an engineer,
and provides
drive onto
is obviously
engineer, and
ability to
Property. Lorensen
obviously not
Day Property.
“only portion
that actually
the “only
the easement
for his
no
portion of
opinion. He
no foundation
He states
that the
of the
foundation for
easement that
his opinion.
states that
actually

connects
but provides
NE quarter
the NE
to the
quarter of
of Section
19 is
strip of
of land
24.9 by
no
Section 19
connects to
provides no
land 24.9
is a
a strip
30 feet,
feet, but
by 30
foundation
particularly troubling
that statement.
That lack
for that
the
troubling given
of foundation
that the
foundation for
statement. That
foundation is
lack of
given that
is particularly
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diagram
wide easement
it shows
opinion as
he is
using completely
foot Wide
at
contradicts his
easement at
his opinion
shows aa sixty
diagram he
is using
as it
completely contradicts
sixty foot
the
the location
location he
he is
discussing.
is discussing.
him to
He
that qualifies
the insurability
the
opinions as
He simply
no expertise
to give
to the
of the
qualiﬁes him
expertise that
has no
give opinions
as to
insurability of
simply has

Day
would be
be limited
that issue
information on
limited to
to hearsay
hearsayi– he
he was
of information
on that
His only
was
source of
issue would
Property. His
only source
Day Property.
Title Co.
title policy.
told
by others
be found
not be
for the
the title
For
Pioneer Title
told by
others at
at Pioneer
that an
an underwriter
underwriter could
found for
C0. that
could not
policy. For

that
that reason,
the insurability
the Day
opinions expressed
regarding the
Lorensen regarding
of the
expressed by
insurability of
reason, any
Property
any opinions
Day Property
by Lorensen
must
be stricken.
stricken.
must be
“problems”
Lorensen’s statements
in paragraph
Lorensen’s
paragraph 15
whether any
regarding Whether
statements in
15 regarding
of his
his alleged
alleged “problems”
any of

with access
been resolved
by
With
attempts by
on hearsay.
He states
that he
he is
on attempts
are based
states that
resolved are
access have
have been
based on
is relying
hearsay. He
relying on
not himself,
not provide
for what
the State
Donna Day
Donna
provide any
What the
foundation for
State may
and does
does not
himself, and
Jacobs, not
Day Jacobs,
any foundation
may

have
in resolving
resolving access
have done
done in
access issues.
issues.
Because
provide foundation
for his
opinions regarding
underwriting of
of his
to provide
of
foundation for
his failure
regardjng underwriting
Because of
failure to
his opinions
the
policy, his
Title Co.
the Pioneer
certiﬁcation or
Pioneer Title
authentication of
to provide
or authentication
of documents
his failure
provide certification
documents
failure to
C0. policy,
attached
which he
to his
to attach
to his
afﬁdavit on
on which
he bases
his affidavit,
and his
his failure
attach documents
his affidavit
attached to
documents to
failure to
bases his
his
afﬁdavit, and
affidavit,
from the
the Lorensen
the record.
stricken from
affidavit should
Lorensen affidavit
should be
record.
be stricken
affidavit, the
III.
111.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
in support
their Motion
The affidavits
the Days
The
by the
Motion for
for Partial
affidavits submitted
of their
submitted by
support of
Partial Summary
Summary
Days in

JudgmentRe.‘
Judgment Re: N0
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title
fall well
the requirements
short of
requirements of
well short
of the
of Rule
Rule
and Insurable
Title fall

56(c)(4),
No information
information is
for the
the documents
foundation for
I.R.C.P. No
establishing foundation
provided establishing
documents
is provided
56(c)(4), I.R.C.P.
attached
None of
the affidavit.
the affiants
the attachments
afﬁants is
attachments and
to any
of the
of the
of the
afﬁdavit. None
and
attached to
custodian of
is a
a custodian
any of
therefore
whom or
the documents
therefore cannot
cannot testify
or how
how the
how they
are
were created,
documents were
about how
created, by
testify about
they are
by Whom
maintained.
maintained.
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Lorensen’s affidavit,
In
In regard
that he
to Lorensen’s
he failed
failed to
to attach
attach documents
he discussed
regard to
and
documents that
discussed and
affidavit, he

relied
violation of
provide adequate
in his
in Violation
relied on
on in
of Rule
Rule 56(c)(4).
He also
failed to
to provide
his affidavit,
adequate
also failed
afﬁdavit, in
56(c)(4). He
in his
foundation
title
the insurability
the 2010
regarding the
opinions expressed
of the
2010 title
to opinions
foundation as
afﬁdavit regarding
his affidavit
expressed in
as to
insurability of

State’s access
commitment,
width of
the State’s
the location
Whether
opinions about
of the
location and
easements and
and whether
and Width
about the
commitment, opinions
access easements
the easements
the
easements could
Eisenman Road.
Road.
could access
access Eisenman

For
that may
For all
all of
the hearing
hearing on
the
of these
well as
at the
on this
this matter,
these reasons,
arise at
as well
as any
matter, the
reasons, as
any that
may arise
State
by the
in
grant its
the Court
its motion
motion to
strike the
the affidavits
the Days
that the
to strike
affidavits submitted
submitted by
requests that
State requests
Court grant
Days in
their Motion
support
Motion for
for Partial
Partial Summary
Judgment Re: N0
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title.
of their
and Insurable
support of
Title.
Summary JudgmentRe.‘

th
8th
SUBMITTED this
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
RESPECTFULLY
day
this 8
of August
2017.
August 2017.
day of

/s/ Chris
Kronberg
Chris Kronberg
/s/
CHRIS
KRONBERG
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy
General
Attorney General
Deputy Attorney
Idaho
Department
Transportation Department
Idaho Transportation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1

I hereby certifY that on this 8 h day of August 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
DEmail:
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF GLEN
LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS AND COUNSEL RE: NO MARKETABLE AND
INSURABLE TITLE- 11
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Signed: 8/8/2017 04:39 PM

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
IN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
OF
FOR THE
OF THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN

BENNETT G.
BENNETT
TRUSTEE OF
AS TRUSTEE
OF
G. DAY,
DAY, AS
B OF
THE DONALD
DAY
DONALD M.
TRUST B
TRUST
OF THE
M. DAY
AND
AND MARJORIE
DAY FAMILY
FAMILY
MARJORIE D.
D. DAY
DAN E.
TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY;
E. DAY;
TRUST; JOHN
DAY; DAN
DAY;
HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS,
HOLCOMB ROAD
an
HOLDINGS, LLC,
LLC, an
Idaho
DONNA
limited liability
Idaho limited
liability company;
company; DONNA
DAY
DAY JACOBS;
DAVID R.
R. DAY,
and DAVID
JACOBS; and
DAY,

Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
VS.
STATE
STATE OF
IDAHO
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION
TRAN SPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
Defendant.

))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))

Case
No. CV01-16-20313
CV01 -16-203 13
Case No.

TIME
ORDER
ORDER SHORTENING
SHORTENING TIME

The
Motion to
by Defendant,
The Motion
Transportation
ﬁled by
of Idaho,
Shorten Time
Idaho Transportation
State of
to Shorten
Time filed
Defendant, State
Idaho, Idaho
Defendant’s Motion
in relation
Department,
Motion to
Affidavits of
Glen Lorensen,
Lorensen, Donna
Donna Day
Day
relation to
to Defendant’s
Strike Afﬁdavits
Department, in
to Strike
ofGlen

Jacobs and
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title,
Re: No
the Court,
and Counsel
and Insurable
before the
and
come before
having come
Counsel Re:
Jacobs
Title, having
Court, and
good
appearing therefore;
good cause
cause appearing
therefore;
Defendant’s Motion
IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED
ORDERED that
that Defendant’s
IT
Motion to
The
IS HEREBY
Shorten Time
granted. The
to Shorten
Time is
is granted.
Defendant’s Motion
time
Motion to
Affidavits of
Lorensen, Donna
Donna Day
Day Jacobs
Jacobs and
time set
for Defendant’s
and
set for
Glen Lorensen,
Strike Affidavits
to Strike
of Glen

Counsel
Re: No
No Marketable
Marketable and
Insurable Title
for August
the hour
2017 at
at the
of
and Insurable
set for
hour of
Title is
August 14,
Counsel Re:
is hereby
hereby set
14, 2017
3:00
p.m.
3:00 pm.

THVIE -- 1
1
ORDER
ORDER SHORTENING
SHORTENING TIME
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DATED this

_

day of August 2017.

Signed: 8/8/2017 03:25 PM

SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
Fourth Judicial District Judge
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8th day of August 2017, I caused to

be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

E] US. Mail

Chris Kronberg

|:| US. Mail
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I:I Fax to (208) 334-4498

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
Legal Section
PO. Box 7129
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I: Hand Delivered
|:|
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iCourt Service
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—
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Filed
Electronically Filed
8/10/2017 4:06:36 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208)
(208) 319-2600
319-2601
Fax: (208)
(208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
DAY ’
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
V,

Case
N04 CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
PLAINTIFFS’
PLAINTIFF S , MEMORANDUM
MEMORAIYDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO STATE’S
STATE S MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF GLEN
LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS
AND COUNSEL RE: NO
MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE
TITLE

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
as Trustee of
Day, as
Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Jacobs,
Day, Dan E.
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by
by and through their counsel of record, Greener
Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht PP.A.,
.A., hereby file
ﬁle this opposition to Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho
Department of Transportation’s (“State”) Motion to Strike the Affidavits
Afﬁdavits of Glen Lorensen,
Donna Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, and Counsel.
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO STATE’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF
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I.
1. DISCUSSION
A.

Introduction
The State seeks
seeks to strike (i)
Jacobs, in Support of
(i) the Fourth Affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs,

th
(“4th
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title (“4
Plaintiffs’

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Donna Affidavit”); (ii) Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Glen Lorensen, in Support of Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title (“Lorensen Affidavit”); and (iii)
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs’

Afﬁdavit”) (collectively, the “Affidavits”), on the
Marketable and Insurable Title (“Counsel Affidavit”)
bases that the affiants
afﬁants lack personal knowledge and/or the affidavits
certiﬁed copies
afﬁdavits lack certified
bases

of

documents.
are unfounded and should be denied. Further, these materials
documents. These arguments are
constitute untimely opposing documents that were required to be served at least 14
14 days
days before
the date of the hearing, not 66 days
days before the hearing.
A review of the Affidavits
Afﬁdavits demonstrates that the materials are
are admissible. Contrary to
the State’s assertions, there is sufficient
sufﬁcient testimony to verify the authentication of the materials
referenced because
because there is no question that the materials are
afﬁants claim.
are what the affiants
B.

Legal Standard
The standard by
by which aa trial court must address evidentiary questions on summary

been clearly established by
by the Idaho Supreme Court:
judgment has
has been
The admissibility of evidence under [former rule] I.R.C.P. 56(e)
56(6) is
aa threshold question the trial court must analyze before applying
the rules governing motions for summary judgment. The trial
court must look at the affidavit
afﬁdavit or deposition testimony and
determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as
as true, would
render the testimony admissible. The admission of evidence is
committed to the discretion of the trial court.
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Estay, 146
146 Idaho 674,
201 P.3d 647,
Herrera v.
v. Estay,
See also current I.R.C.P.
674, 680,
647, 653 (2009).
680, 201
(2009). See
56(c)(4).
56(c)(4).

(“An affidavit used
used to support or oppose aa motion must be
be made on personal

knowledge, set
afﬁant or
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
stated”).
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”).

As for timing of items filed
ﬁled in

“If the adverse
opposition to aa motion for summary judgment, I.R.C.P. 54(b)(2)
part: “If
states in part:
54(b)(2) states
wishes to oppose summary judgment, the party must serve an
an answering brief.
party Wishes

The

14 days
answering brief and any
be served at least 14
days before the date of
any opposing documents must be

the hearing.”
C.

Argument
The State seeks
Afﬁdavits stricken for alleged lack of personal knowledge.
knowledge.
seeks to have the Affidavits

These untimely objections were filed
ﬁled well after the State filed
ﬁled its opposition to the Plaintiffs’
motion. In fact, contrary to the State’s present untimely stance,
Opposition to the
stance, the State’s opposition
Plaintiffs’ motion raised no objections to the authenticity of these materials.
Plaintiffs’
materials. Yet, now after the

opposition deadline has
ﬁle further (and
has passed,
passed, the State decides to file
(and impermissible) opposition to
Plaintiffs’ motion and supporting documents, questioning the authenticity of these supporting
the Plaintiffs’

materials. The State contends that the Counsel Affidavit
Afﬁdavit shows no personal knowledge of the
Steve Parry email and Knipe & Knipe 1998
1998 appraisal. It also contends that the 4th Donna
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit fails to demonstrate any
any personal knowledge of the Pioneer Title and Alliance Title

Afﬁdavit failed to
commitments. Finally, the State contends that the Lorensen Affidavit
preliminary title commitments.
provide foundation for the admissibility of the documents attached therein, that it fails to attach

documents addressed in the affidavit
afﬁdavit and that it includes one document in error.
error. Each of the
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are contrary to the State’s previous positions in its opposition, are
are
untimely objections, which are

addressed below.
below.
1.
Afﬁdavit is Admissible
1. The Counsel Affidavit
The State first
ﬁrst objects to the admissibility of the Steve Parry email arguing that counsel is
Plaintiffs’ Motion
not aa custodian of the state emails. The State,
ﬁled opposition to Plaintiffs’
State, in its timely filed

for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title, introduced an
an argument
discounting the memorandum prepared by
by Mr. Parry,
Parry, clearly presuming that the document (the
State’s control) was aa true and correct copy.
original of which is under the State’s
copy. (Defendant’s

Plaintiffs’ Mot. for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title
Response to Plaintiffs’

(“State Response”), pp. 9-10.) However, the State now switches its position and now objects to
its admissibility.
admissibility. Similarly, the State also references the Knipe & Knipe appraisal in its
opposition, again presuming the document is What
what counsel has
has claimed the document to be
without any
pp. 5-6.) The State should be
be
any objection to its authenticity. (State Response, pp.
estopped from shifting its position on these documents. See,
139 Idaho
v. Bartschi, 139
e. g, Garner v.
See, e.g.,
430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031,
1038 (2003)
1031, 1038
(2003) (stating that quasi-estoppel prevents aa party from asserting
aa right inconsistent with aa party’s previous position to another’s disadvantage, applying the
doctrine where
be unconscionable to allow aa party to maintain aa position inconsistent
Where it would be
with one in which it previously acquiesced).
2. The 4th Donna Affidavit is Admissible
The State also argues that the documents attached to the 4th Donna Affidavit should be
be
stricken because
because Ms. Jacobs cannot testify to or verify its authenticity.
afﬁdavit
authenticity. However, the affidavit
contains sufficient
ﬁnding that the
sufﬁcient testimony to authenticate the documents to support aa finding
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documents are
what she
be. The 4th Donna Affidavit
Afﬁdavit states that Ms. Jacobs is
are What
she purports them to be.
the person primarily in charge of the Day Family Property, that she
ﬁnding aa solution
she worked on finding
to obtain access
she worked directly with Pioneer Title Company in regards
access to the Property, that she
to that access
an insurable right of access,
access for the express purpose of obtaining aa title policy with an
access,
that she
she has
has vast experience in obtaining title policies with an insurable legal right of access,
access, the
problems with obtaining an insurable right of access
as detailed in the title
access to this Property as
commitment prepared by Pioneer Title, her further efforts with Alliance Title, and her receipt of
the title commitment from Alliance Title. (4th Donna Affidavit, 111]
¶¶ 2-11.) This testimony is
adequate to show that Ms. Jacobs has
has personal knowledge and is competent to testify on the
matters. This testimony is sufficient to fulfill
fulﬁll the authentication requirements of I.R.E. 901
901 and
show that the documents are
what they purport to be.
are What
be. I.R.E. 901(a)
901(a) and (b)(1).
(b)(1). The State
provides no authority to support its conclusion that aa manager of family property intimately
involved in the attempts to acquire an
an insurable right of access
access cannot have personal knowledge
of the documents related to those attempts.
In addition, the State has
whether the Pioneer
has objected that Ms. Jacobs cannot testify Whether
Title commitment was transmitted in relation to an actual sale of property.
property. This argument
conflates
conﬂates aa title commitment with aa title policy, the latter of which is the title document issued in
relation to an
an actual sale of property; aa title commitment is aa preliminary document prepared in
anticipation of aa transaction, being the preliminary work for aa title policy. The State also objects
because Ms. Jacobs is not custodian
because

of the documents, but the authentication of these documents

are
are not based on her custody of the documents, they are
are based on her intimate knowledge and
association with the documents. Further, similar to the arguments above in relation to the
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Counsel Affidavit, the State has
has acquiesced the authenticity of the title commitment in its timely
opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion. Therefore, the State’s arguments in its Motion to Strike the
4th Donna Affidavit
Afﬁdavit must fail as
has not raised a
as the State has
a legitimate objection to the
authentication of the documents described and attached therein.
3.
Afﬁdavit is Admissible
3. The Lorensen Affidavit
Finally, the State objects to the foundation for the materials referenced in the Lorensen
Affidavit.
Afﬁdavit.

First, the State argues that Mr. Lorensen has
has not provided foundation for the

admissibility of the documents contained therein. Specifically,
states that no testimony
Speciﬁcally, the State states
establishes that Mr. Lorensen is the custodian of the Pioneer Title commitment, that he prepared
it, or participated in its creation, and that he did not authenticate the remaining documents.
These untimely objections are
be denied, especially since they are
are
are unfounded and should be
contrary to the position taken by
previously-filed brief in opposition to the
by the State in its previously-ﬁled
Plaintiffs’ motion.
Plaintiffs’

First, regarding the alleged failure to include testimony designating Mr. Lorensen as
as
custodian, this objection is unfounded as
are not relying on Mr. Lorensen’s
as the Plaintiffs are
testimony as
as a
a custodian of records. Mr. Lorensen did not archive or record the documents in the
official
ofﬁcial records of Ada County, he relied on them to prepare the title work addressed in
Plaintiffs’ motion. Next, the State’s argument that Mr. Lorensen did not prepare or participate in
Plaintiffs’

the creation of the title commitment could be no further from the truth. Mr. Lorensen’s Affidavit
Afﬁdavit

“I have overseen and personally participated in the preparation of title work
specifically
states: “I
speciﬁcally states:
for the property at
at issue in the above-captioned litigation.” (Lorensen Affidavit,
Afﬁdavit, ¶ 2.)
2.) It also
11

“I have prepared title work for the Property at the request of Plaintiffs in the abovestates: “I
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captioned litigation, and as
of the facts set
set forth and the
as such,
such, I have personal knowledge of
documents identified in this Affidavit
based upon my experience With
with the applicable documents
Afﬁdavit based
recorded in the Official Records in Ada County and my familiarity with the access
access issues in this
area,
area, especially those related to the Property.”

(Id.) This testimony absolutely meets the

personal knowledge requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(c)(4)
54(c)(4) and the authenticity requirements of I.R.E.

901.
as
Next, the State objects to the authenticity of the Highway Easement Deed attached as

Exhibit B. Exhibit B is aa copy
Ofﬁcial Records,
copy of the document recorded in the Ada County Official
sufﬁcient under I.R.E.
bearing the recordation information. The testimony of Mr. Lorensen is sufficient

901
be. The
901 to authenticate the document and show that it is what Mr. Lorensen claims it to be.
State has
has not offered any
as to the
any evidence to show that Mr. Lorensen is not qualified to testify as
Official
Ofﬁcial Records he examines as
ofﬁcer for Pioneer Title Company. The record for this
as a
a title officer
matter is filled
yet
ﬁlled with copies of documents recorded in the Official
Ofﬁcial Records of Ada County, yet
this is the first
ﬁrst objection as
has
as to the authenticity of any
any such documents. Further, the State has
Plaintiffs’
already acquiesced to the authenticity of the document in the State’s Response to Plaintiffs’

motion.

(State Response,
Response, p. 8.)
8.)

The State already had an
an opportunity to object to the

authenticity of the document, but chose not to do so;
so; therefore, it should be estopped from
objecting to the document now. As for the State’s authenticity objections to Exhibits C,
E, and
C, E,
F,
F , those Exhibits were provided for demonstrative and illustrative purposes to assist with
With Mr.
Lorensen’s testimony; thus, the authentication objections are
be ignored.
are misplaced and should be
The State also objects to foundation testimony related to statements made in Paragraphs
6,
because they do not correlate With
with attached materials.
Afﬁdavit because
materials.
13 of Mr. Lorensen’s Affidavit
6, 7,
7, and 13
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The testimony in Paragraph 66 does
with
does not rely on other documents. Paragraph 6
6 deals directly With
language in Exhibit B;
are needed for foundation. Plaintiffs concede that
B; no further documents are
the State correctly identifies
identiﬁes the lack of recorded instruments to help illustrate the testimony in
Paragraphs 77 and 13.
13. However, the deeds
are not instrumental to the testimony.
deeds are
testimony. Mr. Lorensen’s
testimony is related to circumstances related to the lack of aa right of access
access outlined in the
Pioneer Title commitment, not the contents of conveyances in the official
ofﬁcial records of Ada
County. Granted, copies of the deeds
deeds would help illustrate the points of testimony, but as
as stated
above,
Afﬁdavit includes adequate proof of Mr. Lorensen’s personal knowledge of
above, the Lorensen Affidavit
these particular deeds and the effect they have on the right of access
access for the Property. Thus, even
if this supporting testimony is stricken, there is still sufficient
sufﬁcient information and testimony
supporting the evidence related to aa uninsurable right of access.
access.
The State next incorrectly objects to Exhibit D,
was
D, suggesting that the wrong deed was
attached.

However, the Exhibit is aa re-recorded deed,
deed, and it does have the re-recorded

instrument number (96040862) in the lower right-hand corner. Further, the State objects to the
document claiming it was referenced as
as a
a deed transferring access
access to the State. The State misses
the reference entirely.
as shown in Exhibit A in the Lorensen Affidavit,
Afﬁdavit, and explained
entirely. Note D,
D, as
in paragraph 9,
a
as Exhibit D for the purpose of illustrating a
9, refers to the document attached as
restriction to access
11A and IIB,
access easements IIA
access easements.
HE, not to illustrate aa transfer of the access
Therefore, the objection is unfounded.
unfounded.
Finally, the State includes an
an additional argument related to all testimony in the Lorensen
Affidavit,
Afﬁdavit, contending that Mr. Lorensen does not have adequate experience. However, the State
has
Ofﬁcer with 22 years
has provided no authority showing that a
a Senior Title Officer
years of experience
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personally overseeing and participating in the title work for aa particular property, preparing all

detailed exceptions to the property, and personally familiar with all recorded documents in the
area
has no experience with insuring title. The objection is
area surrounding the particular property has
be denied.
unfounded and should be
4. The State’s Opposition to the Supporting Documents is Untimely
As noted in each of the arguments above,
ﬁled this additional,
has untimely filed
above, the State has
contrary opposition to the materials that the Plaintiffs filed
ﬁled in support of
of their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title. These new contradictory objections
should be
be rejected by the Court since they were not filed within the time requirements stated in
I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2).
56(b)(2). The Rule requires that aa motion for summary judgment and all supporting
documents be
be served at least 28 days
Wishes to oppose the
days prior to the hearing and that if aa party wishes
motion, that party is required to file
14 days
ﬁle an
an answering brief and opposing documents at
at least 14
days
hearing.
before the date of the hearing.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2).
56(b)(2). Plaintiffs’

Judgment Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title was filed
ﬁled on July 11,
11, 2017, and the hearing was
set
ﬁling. The State did timely file
ﬁle an
an
set for August 14,
14, 2017, more than 28 days
days following the filing.
answering brief in opposition on July 31,
hearing. The
31, 2017, exactly fourteen days
days prior to the hearing.
answering brief included no objections to the materials and testimony included in the Affidavits.
Afﬁdavits.
However, the State then filed its Motion to Strike on August 8,
days prior to the
8, 2017, only six days
hearing. The State did also file
ﬁle aa Motion to Shorten Time, but the State only requested the Court
enter an
an order to shorten the time to hear its motion; it did not ask for leave to file its additional,
inconsistent opposing documents untimely.
untimely. Therefore, Plaintiffs ask this Court to deny the
Motion to Strike for failure to file it timely.
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO STATE’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS OF
PLAINTIFFS’
GLEN LORENSEN, DONNA DAY JACOBS AND COUNSEL RE: NO MARKETABLE AND INSURABLE
TITLE –— 9
19807-001 /966015
19807-001
/ 966015

000882

II. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above,
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs,
Afﬁdavit of Glen
Jacobs, the Affidavit
above, the Fourth Affidavit
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Lorensen, and the Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs’

Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, provide the proper foundation for the
testimony and materials provided. The State’s arguments are
are unfounded, untimely, and
inconsistent with its timely filed
ﬁled opposition. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully asks
asks this Court to
deny the State’s Motion to Strike.
th
10th
day
DATED this 10
day of August, 2017.
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Counsel for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

-----------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Case No. CV01-16-20313

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department ("the State"), by and
through undersigned counsel, and submits the following memorandum in reply to Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss:
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I.
I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
in this
For
their causes
ﬁrst time
time in
this litigation,
that their
claiming that
For the
the first
the Days
of action
action
are claiming
litigation, the
causes of
Days are

in May
In contrast,
accrued
breach of
that aa breach
admitted that
of contract
contract and
2016. In
and
have previously
accrued in
contrast, they
previously admitted
they have
May 2016.
in fact
inverse
than 1997,
the Court
later than
condemnation occurred
no later
fact asked
to issue
an
inverse condemnation
Court to
and have
occurred no
have in
asked the
issue an
1997, and

order
their causes
that their
the Days
of action
action accrued
of 1997
or 1998.
stipulated
order that
1997 or
have stipulated
1998. Moreover,
accrued as
causes of
as of
Moreover, the
Days have
to
being December
the date
to the
of take
take being
December 5,
date of
1997.
5, 1997.
State’s motion
Responding
their claims
that their
the State’s
motion that
the Days
three
time-barred, the
Responding to
to the
claims are
make three
are time-barred,
Days make

in an
main
their causes
main arguments
effort to
for the
the accrual
arguments in
an effort
to establish
2016 date
of their
of action:
establish aa May
action:
accrual of
date for
causes of
May 2016
—> The
taking became
limitations did
not begin
The statute
the taking

begin to
until the
became apparent
of limitations
to run
apparent and
did not
run until
and
statute of
Days’ Memo.
permanent. Days’
permanent.
at 3.
Memo. at
3.
—> The
doctrine” delayed
Days’ claims
“unjustiﬁable uncertainty
until

the Days’
The “unjustifiable
the accrual
of the
claims until
accrual of
uncertainty doctrine”
delayed the
Days’ Memo.
May
at 9.
2016. Days’
Memo. at
9.
May 2016.
—> Steve

waived the
until such
time as
limitations defense
the statute
the parties
of limitations
parties failed
failed
statute of
defense until
such time
Steve Parry
as the
Parry waived
to
to agree
on an
an easement.
easement.
agree on

None of
relevant case
None
of those
those arguments
arguments are
are supported
supported by
law.
case law.
by relevant

II.
II.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
A.
A.

STANDARD
LEGAL STANDARD
LEGAL

“beyond doubt
Dismissal
when it
it is
Dismissal pursuant
to Rule
Rule 12(b)(6),
is appropriate
appropriate when
is “beyond
pursuant to
doubt
I.R.C.P., is
12(b)(6), I.R.C.P.,

that
which would
in support
him to
plaintiff can
that the
entitle him
the plaintiff
his claim
not set
claim which
of facts
of his
to
facts in
support of
can prove
set of
prove not
would entitle
relief.” Ernst
relief.”
Hemenway and
Moser, Co.,
Inc., 120
120 Idaho
821 P.2d
Ernst v.
P.2d 996,
1001
Idaho 941,
and Maser,
v. Hemenway
C0., Inc,
941, 946,
946, 821
996, 1001

(1991).
In considering
in the
motion to
the Court
the allegations
the
considering aa motion
to dismiss,
is to
to consider
allegations in
Court is
consider the
dismiss, the
(1991). In
pleadings and
whether any
the claims.
Per
supporting the
determine Whether
of facts
claims. Per
pleadings
facts could
established supporting
set of
and determine
could be
be established
any set
Rule
pleadings are
if facts
that are
then
the pleadings
the Court,
Rule 12(d),
of the
facts that
are outside
are considered
considered by
outside of
I.R.C.P., if
Court, then
12(d), I.R.C.P.,
by the
the
judgment upon
upon notice
parties.
the Court
the motion
motion to
the parties.
to one
of summary
notice to
to the
convert the
Court may
one of
summary judgment
may convert
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The
that avoid
The Days
the imposition
imposition of
the statute
cannot prove
of the
of facts
of
facts that
set of
statute of
prove any
avoid the
Days cannot
any set
limitations
their claims,
limitations to
therefore mandated.
is therefore
to their
dismissal is
mandated.
and dismissal
claims, and
Days’ Complaint
B.
The
that the
their claims
claims is
The Days’
the date
the accrual
accrual of
is
B.
date of
of the
of their
establishes that
Complaint establishes
in
in 1997.
1997.
In their
In
upon completion
their Complaint,
their claims
that their
the Days
completion
claims accrued
establish that
accrued upon
Complaint, the
firmly establish
Days firmly
1
Interchange.1 The
of
just aa couple
the Isaacs
The following
following are
of the
of examples:
examples:
are just
couple of
Isaacs Canyon
Canyon Interchange.

V
 The
portions of
unimproved 50
the top
the unimproved
The Interchange
Interchange was
top of
of portions
of the
constructed over
also constructed
over the
was also
50
right-of-Way access
right-of-way. .. ITD
without providing
providing just
just
ft.
ITD took
that right-of-way
ft. public
took that
public right-of-way…
access Without
compensation.
14 of
of Complaint
at 8.
compensation. Para.
Para. 14
Complaint at
8.
V
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ITD breached
 In
the agreement
the
the Interchange
Interchange and
constructing the
agreement by
1996-97, ITD
and the
breached the
by constructing
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with the
the public
the frontage
not connecting
the Day
frontage road
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connecting the
of the
public
but not
road but
Property with
Day Property
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21.
of Complaint
at 21.
Para. 55
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Complaint at
55 of

Nowhere in
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their Complaint
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time
the Days
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allege that
Complaint do
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Days allege
any time
other
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in 1997-98.
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Days rely
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Idaho Transportation
assigned to
Department, for
Attorney General
litigation
litigation over
the loss
the Day
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road access
access to
Property:
Day Property:

“ITD promised
V
 “ITD
promised to
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not assert
the statute
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of limitations
to not
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out
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has
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working
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been trying to work out a solution to
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ITD’s promise
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promise
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this lawsuit
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to file
of their
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lawsuit because
has not
upon ITD’s
acted to
limitations.” Complaint,
20-21.
regarding
pp. 20-21.
the statute
regarding the
of limitations.”
51 at
at pp.
Para. 51
statute of
Complaint, Para.
Days’ causes
Plainly,
their Complaint,
the Days’
having
on their
of action
action must
must be
construed as
based on
causes of
be construed
as having
Complaint, the
Plainly, based

accrued
in 1997
than in
later than
no later
or 1998.
1997 or
1998.
accrued no
C.
C.

The
that the
take is
The Days
the date
stipulated that
date of
of take
is December
December 5,
1997.
Days stipulated
5, 1997.

Not only
in 1997-98,
their causes
their Complaint
that their
Not
of action
action accrued
establish that
1997-98,
accrued in
Complaint establish
causes of
does their
only does
but to
pleadings in
in the
the extent
extent other
the record
the Days
other pleadings
to the
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record are
are considered,
have consistently
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considered, the
Days have

14 at
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13 at
at 7-8;
7-8; Para.
at 8;
19 at
at 9;
47 at
at 20;
51 at
at 20;
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Complaint, Para.
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20; Para.
20; Para.
8; Para.
9; Para.
22.
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Para.
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at
22;
and
Para.
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at
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at 21;
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Para.
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55 at
57
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22;
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the property
owner.
property owner.
Idaho
be clearer
– the
begins to
limitations begins
not be
the four
run on
four year
of limitations
to run
on an
an
statute of
clearer 7
Idaho law
law could
could not
year statute
inverse
project when
project is
arising out
the construction
the project
condemnation case
of the
construction of
of aa project
when the
is
inverse condemnation
out of
case arising
complete.
Inc. v.
District No.
No. 4,
Idaho 140,
complete. C
198
139 Idaho
P.3d 194,
75 P.3d
C&
& G,
v. Canyon
144, 75
Highway District
194, 198
Canyon Highway
140, 144,
G, Inc.
4, 139
(2003).
No authority
proposed by
based on
that rule
the Days
for the
the exception
the
exists for
exception to
to that
on the
and based
rule proposed
authority exists
Days and
(2003). No
by the
permanent versus
versus temporary
permanent
of damages.
nature of
damages.
temporary nature
The
The Days
102 Idaho
reliance on
on Farber
Farber v.
P.2d 685
is misplaced.
Idaho 398,
misplaced.
v. State,
630 P.2d
685 (1981)
State, 102
398, 630
Days reliance
(1981) is
State’s motion:
“Unless the
Farber
The
The F
the Days
the State’s
the
motion: “Unless
arber language
cited by
language cited
supports the
actually supports
Days actually
by the

it would
contract
would be
be
all of
the acts
the contract
contract and
of the
performed pursuant
to the
contract have
pursuant to
and all
acts performed
have been
been completed,
completed, it

difficult
prepare aa defense
for the
the State
the nature
the extent
extent of
its liability
difﬁcult for
determine the
to
to determine
or the
of its
or prepare
State to
nature or
defense to
liability or
claim.” Farber
any
Farber v.
102 Idaho
at 401,
P.2d at
at 688.
Idaho at
v. State,
630 P.2d
688.
State, 102
401, 630
any claim.”
In the
In
that the
all that
the Isaacs
the case
the State
IC Project
Project contract
contract
at bar,
complete all
State did
did complete
Isaacs Canyon
case at
Canyon IC
bar, the
in open
required,
parties stipulated
the parties
the date
which is
is why
of
to December
stipulated in
court to
December 5,
open court
1997 as
date of
as the
required, which
Why the
5, 1997
in 1997
take.
Now the
that the
the Days
the project
not actually
to argue
project was
take. Now
completed in
are trying
argue that
1997
was not
actually completed
trying to
Days are

because the
worked with
With them
them to
the access
the Day
the State
efforts
to improve
improve the
to the
Those efforts
State worked
access to
because
Property. Those
Day Property.
were post-project
post-project and
project completion
not alter
the project
alter the
completion date.
and do
were
date.
do not
their inverse
their
fall back
Conflating
the Days
Conﬂating their
condemnation and
contract claims,
on their
inverse condemnation
and contract
back on
claims, the
Days fall
“Isaacs Canyon
line argument
that the
bottom line
was not
the “Isaacs
not the
the project
Interchange was
bottom
project
and assert
assert that
argument and
Canyon Interchange

Right of
it only
by the
performance of
contemplated
the 1967
the performance
the
of Way
of the
contemplated by
interrupted the
1967 Right
Contract, it
only interrupted
Way Contract,
date.” Days’
State’s obligation,
Days’
State’s
been stipulated
its completion
the valuation
completion date
stipulated as
valuation date.”
and its
has been
date has
as the
obligation, and
This argument
Memo.
the 1967
the
at 9.
Contract related
to the
is obviously
nonsensical as
argument is
related to
Memo. at
ROW Contract
1967 ROW
9. This
as the
obviously nonsensical
1-84, not
construction
not to
the Day
construction of
of I-84,
to aa separate
to provide
to the
project to
provide access
separate project
access to
Property.
Day Property.
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which is
E.
that an
an
take is
The date
the same
the date
valuation which
the same
E. The
date of
of take
is the
same as
as the
date of
of valuation
is the
same date
date that
inverse
action accrues.
condemnation cause
of action
inverse condemnation
accrues.
cause of
The
valuation from
from the
the date
the statute
the date
The Days
of take
take and
of
to separate
and valuation
statute of
separate the
date the
date of
seek to
Days seek
limitations
limitations begins
meaningful authority
to run
on an
an inverse
condemnation claim.
claim. They
cite no
no meaningful
inverse condemnation
begins to
run on
authority
They cite
for
their proposition.
for their
proposition.
“measure of
In Idaho,
it has
In
that the
long been
the law
the “measure
for the
the destruction
of damages
or
destruction or
has long
law that
been the
damages for
Idaho, it

right of
impairment
which the
impairment of
the property
the
is the
of aa right
of access
to aa highway
of an
an owner
owner abuts
upon which
abuts is
access to
highway upon
property of

difference
value of
property immediately
fair market
fair
the fair
market value
the property
of the
difference between
the taking,
and fair
between the
immediately before
taking, and
before the
market
property immediately
market value
the same
or impairment
of the
impairment of
the destruction
the
same property
value of
destruction or
immediately after
after the
of the
access.” Lobdell
Lobdell v.
access.”
The
P.2d 135,
Idaho 559,
137 (1965)
407 P.2d
v. State,
89 Idaho
(emphasis added).
State, 89
added). The
135, 137
564, 407
559, 564,
(1965) (emphasis

holding
Sandpoint, 100
holding of
refined
of Tibbs
P.2d 1001,
Idaho 667,
100 Idaho
1005 (1979),
Tibbs v.
v. City
603 P.2d
1001, 1005
ofSandpoint,
671, 603
667, 671,
City of
(1979), refined
“The actual
access” occurred:
“destruction or
when the
impairment of
the “destruction
although
or impairment
of access”
when
occurred: “The
actual date
date of
taking, although
of taking,

not
fixed at
point in
not readily
in time
to exact
which the
exact determination,
the
the point
susceptible to
time at
determination, is
at which
is to
to be
be ﬁxed
at the
readily susceptible
plaintiffs’
impairment,
kind as
with plaintiffs’
interference with
of such
to constitute
substantial interference
constitute aa substantial
and kind
such aa degree
degree and
as to
impairment, of
apparent.” Tibbs
Tibbs v.
property interest,
Sandpoint, 100
at 671,
P.2d at
at
Idaho at
100 Idaho
became apparent.”
v. City
603 P.2d
interest, became
property
ofSandpoint,
671, 603
City of
Tibbs, the
1005
was clear
the law
the date
the
after Tibbs,
of take
take was
when the
clear -- the
law was
1005 (emphasis
date of
was when
(emphasis added).
Thus, after
added). Thus,
impairment of
destruction
valuation purposes.
purposes.
that was
the date
for valuation
or impairment
of access
destruction or
and that
also the
date for
access occurred,
was also
occurred, and

One
unanswered was
when did
begin to
left unanswered
limitations begin
the statute
of limitations
to run
on an
an inverse
question left
statute of
inverse
One question
did the
run on
was when
arising out
condemnation
project?
claim arising
condemnation claim
of aa construction
construction project?
out of
in C
That question
That
Inc. v.
Highway District
District No.
No. 4,
question was
Idaho
139 Idaho
answered in
was answered
C&
& G,
v. Canyon
Canyon Highway
G, Inc.
4, 139

140,
198 (2003):
P.3d 194,
75 P.3d
144, 75
140, 144,
194, 198
(2003):
rule” the
“project completion
ﬁnd the
the reasoning
the property
its “project
We
property
completion rule”
reasoning of
of Farber
Farber and
and its
We find
determining when
standard
for determining
for inverse
for
claim for
when aa claim
condemnation accrues
inverse condemnation
standard for
accrues for
citizen whose
purposes of
private citizen
the statute
limitations. .a private
taken by
of the
of limitations…a
land is
is taken
statute of
Whose land
purposes
by
means
project has
of aa construction
right to
construction project
means of
has the
the right
the
completion of
until completion
to wait
wait until
of the
.
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for purposes
purposes of
project before
her inverse
or her
his or
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
project
claim accrues
accrues for
before his
of
calculating
the statute
limitations.
calculating the
statute of
of limitations.
C
Inc. v.
Highway District
District No.
No. 4,
at 198
at 144,
Idaho at
198 (citing
139 Idaho
P.3d at
US. v.
v.
C&
& G,
v. Canyon
75 P.3d
(citing U.S.
144, 75
Canyon Highway
G, Inc.
4, 139
Dickinson, 331
Inc.
91 L.Ed
L.Ed 1789
331 U.S.
1789 (1947)
S.Ct. 1382,
US. 745,
67 S.Ct.
C&
& G,
Dickinson,
(emphasis added)).
1382, 91
added». C
745, 67
(1947) (emphasis
G, Inc.

All that
did
be calculated.
Inc. did
was to
that C
not change
the law
to when
when damages
to be
to
change the
did not
law as
are to
did was
calculated. All
damages are
as to
C&
& G,
G, Inc.
establish
point in
purpose of
determining
the cause
for the
the purpose
in time
when the
of determining
of action
action accrued
the latest
time when
establish the
latest point
cause of
accrued for
in relation
when the
begins to
project. C
limitations begins
the statute
relation to
government construction
to aa government
when
of limitations
to run
construction project.
run in
statute of
C

&
Inc. provides
permanent taking
taking urged
the temporary
the
distinction between
no distinction
and permanent
provides no
urged by
between the
& G,
temporary and
G, Inc.
by the
Days
purpose of
limitations.
for the
the purpose
the statute
of limitations.
of applying
of the
statute of
applying of
Days for
in relation
After
Inc., the
After C
the date
arising
relation to
claim arising
of take
take in
to an
an inverse
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
date of
C&
& G,
G, Inc,

out
the same
the cause
the date
which is
of aa construction
construction project
is the
when the
of action
action accrues,
is the
project is
out of
same as
date
as when
cause of
accrues, which
for
valuation and
begins to
limitations begins
for valuation
the statute
when the
of limitations
to run.
run.
statute of
and when
The
Kempthorne, 147
The Days
147 Idaho
on Harris
Harris v.
Idaho 401,
rel. Kempthorne,
v. State,
ex rel.
mistakenly rely
State, ex
401, 405,
405,
rely on
Days mistakenly
in C
210
Inc. Unlike
210 P.3d
Unlike the
the case
after C
at bar
bar and
and in
P.3d 86,
decided years
90 (2009),
case decided
C&
& G,
case at
C&
&
years after
86, 90
G, Inc.
(2009), aa case

G,
Inc., Harris
but an
not involve
Harris did
an inverse
condemnation allegedly
involve aa construction
inverse condemnation
construction project,
did not
allegedly
project, but
G, Ina,
in
caused
by aa mineral
Harris court
Inc. in
that reason,
mineral lease.
For that
not rely
the Harris
on C
court did
did not
lease. For
C&
& G,
caused by
reason, the
rely on
G, Inc.

Tibbs v.
resolving
when the
began to
but on
Sandpoint, 100
limitations began
the statute
on Tibbs
of limitations
to run,
resolving when
100
statute of
v. City
ofSandpoint,
run, but
City of

Idaho
P.2d 1001
1001 (1979).
Idaho 667,
603 P.2d
667, 603
(1979).
102 Idaho
help to
the Days
Similarly,
Farber v.
P.2d 685
is of
of no
no help
to the
Idaho 398,
v. State,
630 P.2d
685 (1981)
State, 102
Similarly, Farber
398, 630
Days
(1981) is

its holding.
as
Farber
the 120
120 day
the
requirement of
holding. F
notice requirement
of the
arber involved
involved the
misconstrued its
have misconstrued
as they
they have
day notice

Tort Claims
Idaho
plaintiff property
property had
been damaged
The plaintiff
his property
Claims Act.
Act. The
claimed his
owner claimed
Idaho Tort
had been
damaged by
property owner
by
state’s construction
plaintiff did
trial court
that the
the
project. The
the state’s
The trial
the plaintiff
not provide
construction project.
held that
proper
court held
did not
provide proper

Within the
that the
notice
period. The
plaintiff appealed,
the 120
120 day
The plaintiff
the notice
notice within
notice period.
notice period
arguing that
period
appealed, arguing
day notice

did
begin to
until after
project was
was complete.
not begin
the project
after the
to run
complete.
did not
run until
DEFENDANT’S REPLY
REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF 8’ MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM IN
DEFENDANT’S
OPPOSITION TO
TO
TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION
MOTION TO
DISMISS -- 77
TO DISMISS

000890

On
With the
the court
the property
On appeal,
on Gilliam
court agreed
agreed with
Gilliam v.
v. City
owner, relying
relying on
property owner,
appeal, the
City of
of
which held:
Centralia,
128 P.2d
P.2d 661
held:
661 (Wash.
Centralia, 128
(Wash. 1942),
1942), which
Where
without condemnation
condemnation proceedings,
or damages
takes or
Where aa municipality,
damages
proceedings, takes
municipality, without
private property
for
a
public
improvement,
the
statute
of
limitations
does
limitations
for
the
not
private
of
public
statute
a
improvement,
does not
property
owner’s right
right of
commence
the property
for compensation
to run
against the
of action
action for
compensation
commence to
run against
property owner’s
until construction
until
until
the improvement
improvement has
or until
of the
construction of
completed or
has been
been entirely
entirely completed
operations
time as
for such
thereon have
of time
to indicate
indicate
operations thereon
period of
have ceased
such aa period
ceased for
as reasonably
reasonably to
that
that the
the project
project has
has been
been abandoned.
abandoned.
Farber v.
Centralia, 128
102 Idaho
128 P.2d
Farber
P.2d
at 400,
P.2d 687
Idaho at
v. State,
630 P.2d
687 (quoting
Gilliam v.
v. City
State, 102
(quoting Gilliam
ofCentralia,
400, 630
City of
“permanent”
“temporary” and
in F
at
Nothing in
Farber
between “temporary”
the false
at 663).
arber supports
false dichotomy
supports the
and “permanent”
dichotomy between
663). Nothing
in Idaho
takings
by the
takings asserted
the Days.
The case
the date
arising out
is clear;
of take
take arising
of aa
Idaho is
law in
out of
asserted by
date of
case law
clear; the
Days. The

valuation purposes
purposes and
when the
construction
limitations begins
for valuation
for when
the statute
of limitations
construction project
to run
project for
begins to
and for
run
statute of
is
that date
the same,
the construction
is the
is when
when the
construction project
is complete.
project is
complete.
and that
date is
same, and
F.
a breach
it is
limitations on
claim begins
The statute
run as
contract claim
statute of
F. The
of limitations
on a
breach of
of contract
to run
as soon
as it
is
begins to
soon as
breached,
are sustained.
whether damages
of whether
damages are
regardless of
sustained.
breached, regardless
State’s efforts
The
years turned
that the
The Days
the State’s
the years
the
claim that
efforts to
to address
turned the
over the
issues over
address access
access issues
Days claim

Days’
permanent to
damages
breach of
from the
from permanent
the alleged
The Days’
of contract
contract from
to temporary.
alleged 1997
1997 breach
damages from
temporary. The

until May
then
then claim
that since
the damages
the contract
claim that
contract cause
of
since the
were only
damages were
cause of
temporary until
2106, the
only temporary
May 2106,

if
action
until that
that time.
that proposition.
not accrue
The Days
for that
time. The
action did
cite no
no authority
proposition. Further,
did not
accrue until
Further, if
authority for
Days cite
what the
were true,
valuation purposes
purposes would
the Days
the date
for valuation
what
of take
take for
arguing were
are arguing
date of
would be
be May
2016,
true, the
Days are
May 2016,
not December
not
December 5,
1997.
5, 1997.

“A cause
for breach
the breach
“A
upon the
breach even
though no
of action
action for
of contract
contract accrues
no
breach of
even though
accrues upon
cause of
later.” Mason
until later.”
125 Idaho
damage
Mason v.
Associates, 125
P.2d
Idaho 429,
871 P.2d
Tucker and
and Associates,
damage may
occur until
v. Tucker
429, 436,
436, 871
may occur
the Mason
846,
Mason court
party to
Without damages,
As the
to aa contract
contract could
court noted,
even without
could
853 (1994).
noted, even
damages, aa party
846, 853
(1994). As

bring
the
bring an
for specific
of contract
contract can
an action
action for
performance. Additionally,
specific performance.
breach of
can occur
occur the
Additionally, aa breach
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moment
which point
point the
begins to
Lido Van
limitations begins
moment aa contract
the statute
contract is
is signed,
at which
of limitations
to run.
Van
statute of
run. Lido
signed, at
and
Inc., v.
Kuck, 110
110 Idaho
P.2d 1199
1199 (1986).
Idaho 939,
and Storage,
719 P.2d
v. Kuck,
Storage, Inc,
939, 719
(1986).
’5 Response
in Defendant
As
Defendant’s
Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion
Motion for
for Partial
Partial
the State
As the
State made
clear in
made clear
to Plaintiﬂ’s

Summary
Judgment Re:
Re: No
No Marketable
Marketable or
Insurable Title,
that the
the Days
insist that
the State
0r Insurable
took
State took
Title, the
Summary Judgment
Days insist
“Direct Access”
Access” to
it based
what the
based on
the Days
what
on
define as
to aa state
to replace
promised to
state highway
and promised
replace it
as “Direct
highway and
Days define
Right of
the
Initial Day
from the
the owners
the Initial
the 1967
of the
to
of Way
Contract or
or Warranty
Deed from
1967 Right
owners of
Warranty Deed
Property to
Day Property
Way Contract
4
“with the
State.4 The
in their
the
their Complaint
that “with
the State.
The Days
the construction
the Interstate,
the
of the
construction of
state in
Complaint that
Interstate, the
Days state

Initial Day
Initial
be accessed
from any
the Interstate
Interstate could
longer be
of the
no longer
improved
southwest of
could no
accessed from
Property southwest
Day Property
any improved

Initial Day
public road
from the
the Initial
not allow
the Interstate
Interstate did
direct access
allow direct
public
and
did not
road because
access from
because the
Property and
Day Property
Property.”55 Thus,
right from
Initial Day
there
from
not right
the Initial
there were
other public
connecting to
no other
to the
public roads
were no
roads connecting
Thus, if not
Day Property.”

the
was constructed,
then as
the 1967
the signing
the new
the
signing of
interstate was
of the
ROW Contract,
new interstate
1967 ROW
soon as
as soon
as the
Contract, then
constructed, the
Days
were clearly
that the
its contractual
the
the State
obligation to
to replace
State had
contractual obligation
had breached
replace the
breached its
aware that
clearly aware
Days were
lost.66
highway
that the
the Days
frontage that
had lost.
highway frontage
Days had

Assuming
purposes of
that the
the 1967
the State
for purposes
Assuming for
of argument
Contract required
to
argument that
required the
State to
ROW Contract
1967 ROW
Initial Day
build aa road
then
that the
the Initial
the same
to SH
SH 30,
of access
to provide
build
had to
provide the
road to
same type
access that
Property had
30, then
Day Property
type of
it was
it has
in breach
the
been in
breach of
the contract
the State
of the
contract since
to build
since it
never agreed
build
State has
has never
has been
executed as
agreed to
was executed
as it
Initial Day
that
that type
it. The
The owners
the Initial
start to
of road,
or start
to build
of the
build it.
owners of
and
could have,
road, or
Propeny could
have, and
type of
Day Property

should
brought aa breach
breach of
performance.
claim and
of contract
contract claim
sought specific
should have,
and sought
speciﬁc performance.
have, brought
In aa similar
that the
limitations can
similar case,
In
begin to
the statute
the
of limitations
to run
Idaho has
has recognized
recognized that
can begin
run the
statute of
case, Idaho

moment
was signed.
Lido Van
Inc. v.
Kuck, 110
moment aa contract
110 Idaho
contract was
P.2d
Idaho 939,
signed. Lido
Van and
and Storage,
719 P.2d
v. Kuck,
Storage, Inc.
939, 719
in Lido
in relation
title and
1199
plaintiff in
Lido brought
breach of
The plaintiff
relation
1199 (1986).
of contract
contract action
action in
brought aa quiet
quiet title
and breach
(1986). The

See
at 5.
Para. 6
of Complaint
Complaint at
See Para.
6 of
5.
5-6.
See
Para.
7
of
Complaint
at
5-6.
at
Para.
See
7 of Complaint
66
at
See
Para.
8
of
Complaint
at
6.
Para.
See
8 of Complaint
6.
44
55
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At the
the
plaintiff knew
time of
that aa local
the purchase
the time
the purchase,
the plaintiff
of real
real property.
of the
knew that
local road
purchase of
road
purchase, the
property. At
that
property was
being used
used by
prevent
that ran
ran through
through the
the property
the public,
the purchase
after the
tried to
to prevent
but after
purchase tried
was being
public, but
by the
the
judgment to
finding
trial court
from using
the public
it. The
The trial
the defendants,
using it.
granted summary
to the
public from
court granted
defendants, finding
summary judgment
that
breach of
public still
still
that the
that the
limitations had
the statute
the breach
the public
claim and
of limitations
on the
of contract
contract claim
had run
run on
and that
statute of
owned
the road.
owned the
road.
it had
On
was time
because it
that the
time barred
the court
the breach
afﬁrmed that
On appeal,
of contract
contract was
court affirmed
breach of
barred because
had
appeal, the
it was
At the
been breached
breached at
was executed.
time it
time he
the time
the time
the agreement,
the purchaser
at the
he signed
signed the
purchaser
been
executed. At
agreement, the

property and
was being
being used
used by
by the
was familiar
familiar with
with the
that the
the propeny
the road
the public.
the
knew that
and knew
public. Because
road was
Because the
was

plaintiff
plaintiff had
that knowledge,
that time.
the breach
The
time. The
of contract
contract cause
of action
action accrued
at that
had that
breach of
cause of
accrued at
knowledge, the
began to
brought more
years later,
statute
than five
time
limitations began
the claim,
of limitations
to run
more than
five years
run and
and the
statute of
was time
claim, brought
later, was
barred. See
Alpine Village
McCall, 154
154 Idaho
Idaho 930,
617 (2013)
barred.
P.3d 617
See also,
Village Co.
CO. v.
v. City
303 P.3d
also, Alpine
930, 303
ocCall,
(2013)
City of
(Inverse
upon signing
signing development
condemnation cause
of action
action accrued
agreement because
development agreement
cause of
accrued upon
because
(Inverse condemnation

plaintiff
signing the
plaintiff had
wrongful act
the allegedly
the agreement.).
of the
knowledge of
had knowledge
act upon
upon signing
agreement).
allegedly wrongful
Days’ excuse
taking any
The
prior to
The Days’
the Isaacs
for not
not taking
legal action
action prior
to construction
of the
construction of
Isaacs
excuse for
any legal

“had no
Canyon
that they
the Day
immediate plans
IC is
is that
no immediate
plans to
to develop
develop [their
so the
[their property],
Family
Canyon IC
they “had
property], so
Day Family

“patient” is
roads.”77 Being
getting reconnected
was patient
patient with
public roads.”
with the
Being “patient”
the public
the process
not
of getting
to the
is not
reconnected to
process of
was
their contract
aa legal
basis to
bar their
limitations to
the application
the statute
application of
legal basis
to avoid
of the
of limitations
to bar
contract claims.
claims.
statute of
avoid the
11 P.3d
Simons
by the
134 Idaho
the Days,
20 (2000),
is obviously
no
Idaho 824,
cited by
P.3d 20
Simons v.
v. Simons,
Simons, 134
obviously no
824, 11
Days, is
(2000), cited

in that
their attempt
that
help
help to
attempt to
the statute
limitations. The
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Because the Days can prove no facts that avoid their claims being time-barred, their case should
be dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 101h day of August 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 101h day of August 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Slade D. Sokol
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P .A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

Ou.s. Mail
D Hand Delivered
D Fax to (208) 319-2601
X iCourt Service
0Email:
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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Electronically Filed
8/15/2017 2:48:26 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CVOI-16-20313

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FILE
ADDITIONAL BRIEF CITING
EXISTING PLEADINGS ON THE
ISSUE OF WAIVER AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, GREENER
BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A., hereby move the Court for an order allowing them to file
additional briefing citing to existing pleadings on the issue of waiver and equitable estoppel.
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19807-001 I 967503
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During oral argument on the hearing held on August 14, 2017, the Comi inquired of the
State's counsel if the principle of equitable estoppel would apply to the State' s claim that the
State's written waiver ofthe defense of statute of limitations was limited in duration.
The State's counsel asserted that no such claim or defense had been raised by the
Plaintiffs for equitable estoppel and, although Plaintiffs' counsel urged otherwise at the very end
of the hearing that day, Plaintiffs' counsel believes the Court's inquiry on this issue warrants
clarity to underscore Plaintiffs' previously stated position in their pleadings and briefing.
Therefore, to avoid any confusion, mistake or error, Plaintiffs' respectfully request they
be permitted to file the accompanying memorandum, which cites no new authority on equitable
estoppel and does not address any new pleadings, but only draws the Court's attention to the fact
that the defense of equitable estoppel has more than adequately been raised.
Respectfully submitted this} ~"''trday of August, 2017.
RKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department
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Facsimile: 334-4498
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8/15/2017 2:48:26 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM RE: APPLICATION
OF WAIVER AND EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL TO THE STATE'S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEFENSE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, GREENER
BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A., hereby submit this Supplemental Memorandum regarding
Application of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel to the State's Statute of Limitations Defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During oral argument on the hearing for the various motions held on August 14, 2017,
the Court inquired of the State's counsel if equitable estoppel would apply to the State's claim
that the State's written waiver ofthe defense ofthe statute of limitations was limited in duration.
The State's counsel asserted that the defense had not been raised and could not now be raised.
Although Plaintiffs' counsel countered this position very late in their oral argument, Plaintiffs
believe that the record should be set straight regarding the Plaintiffs' position regarding equitable
estoppel as it might apply to the State's statute of limitations defense.
A.

Equitable Estoppel Adequately Pled in Complaint.
Both waiver and equitable estoppel were adequately pled in the Complaint and Demand

for Jury Trial. Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint recites the State's communication to the
Day Family's attorney, which provides in part: "'I will also represent to you that the Department
will not assert any type of statute of limitations defense if an agreement on new access cannot be
reached.'"
Paragraph 29 of the Complaint continues: "During the following months and years, the
Day Family relied upon this promise from the State of Idaho and lTD to not assert a statute of
limitations defense in exchange for additional time to try and resolve its taking without just
compensation."
Paragraph 51 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint provided in part: "lTD promised to not assert
the statute of limitations defense while the parties have been trying to work out a solution to the
takings. lTD has been working on a solution since at least 1997. The Day Family has been

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM RE: APPLICATION OF WAIVER AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL TO THE STATE'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE- 2
19807-001 I 967492
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incurring damage since the takings but has not acted to file this lawsuit because of their reliance
upon lTD's promise regarding the statute oflimitations."
Paragraph 56 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint provided: "lTD promised to not assert the
statute of limitations defense while the parties have been trying to work out a solution to the
breach of contract. lTD has been working on a solution since at least 1997. The Plaintiffs have
patiently waited for lTD to comply. lTD's efforts to fulfill its promises continued through 2014
and 2015, and most recently in 2015, lTD indicated that it was preparing to build the public
access road to join Eisenman Road to the Day Property."
Finally, paragraph 57 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint provided: "The Day Family has been
incurring damage since the breach but has not acted to file this lawsuit because of their reliance
upon lTD's promise regarding the statute oflimitations."
B.

Legal Argument Regarding Equitable Estoppel Was Timely Raised.
In Plaintiffs' opening brief, namely Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on May 31, 2017, Plaintiffs' made the
following argument:
b. 1997-98 Taking Not Barred by Statute of Limitation That Was Expressly
Waived and State Is Estopped From Reneging On Its Waiver.

Plaintiffs' Motion also addressed the statute of limitation issue. (See
Plaintiffs' Motion, Part IV.D.) Plaintiffs will not repeat their arguments in full
here. The important point is that the State explicitly agreed, in writing, that it
would not raise the statute of limitation defense if the Plaintiffs deferred litigation
and allowed the State to work on fixing the access issue. (1st Jacobs Aff., ~~ 1718, 33-34 & Ex. M.) The Plaintiffs relied upon that agreement and the State
cannot now change course and claim that its express waiver was something
different and limited in some undisclosed way. See, e.g., Knipe Land Co. v.
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457-58, 259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011) ("A waiver is a
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and the party
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asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment."); Tipton v. Partner's
Mgmt. Co., 773 A.2d 488, 490 (Md. 2001) ("Any statute of limitations can be
waived by agreement of the parties."); Hughes v. Davidson-Hues, 330 S.W.3d
114, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 201 0) ("By comparison, the statute of limitations
generally extinguishes contractual rights at a certain date, but parties can agree to
waive application of the statute.").

If the State is going to renege on its express promise regarding the statute of
limitation, effectively attempting to double cross the Day family, then this Court
should find that the State is equitably estopped from now denying its written
waiver. See, e.g., Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 54, 480 P.2d 896, 900 (1971)
("All the elements of equitable estoppel are shown in this case and we hold
respondent is estopped to deny the existence of a valid contract. . . . Even if
respondent had a legal right to question the validity of the contract ... he waived
his right to challenge it on that basis."); see also Twin Falls Clinic & Hasp. Bldg.
Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344 (1982) ("Although this
Court has never passed upon the question of whether a party can be estopped from
pleading a statute of limitations, such has been well established in other
jurisdictions .... "); Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 464, 210 P.3d 563, 572
(Ct. App. 2009) ("Equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent assertion of a
statute of limitation defense if the defendant's statements or conduct caused the
plaintiff to refrain from prosecuting an action during the limitation period.").
(Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
pp. 9-11.)
C.

Under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) and Case Law, Plaintiffs Have More Than Adequately
Provided Notice of the Defense of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel in Anticipated
Response to the State's Claim that the Statute of Limitations Bars the Plaintiffs'
Claims.
Idaho courts follow a system of notice pleading, requiring only a concise statement of

facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief. Cafferty v. DOT, Dep 't of Motor
Vehicle Serv., 144 Idaho 324, 328, 160 P.3d 763, 767 (2007); see also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Idaho

has abandoned a technical approach to pleading under the rules of civil procedure. Massey v.
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Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 484, 328 P.3d 456, 464 (2014). Accordingly, a court will
look to whether an opposing party has been put on actual notice that the plaintiff was claiming a
particular issue when it looks at whether a party raised or plead an issue adequately. Cafferty,
144 Idaho at 328, 160 P.3d at 767.

Here, as stated above, the Plaintiffs have more than

sufficiently put the State on notice that it has plead facts speaking to the issues of waiver and
equitable estoppel, clearly anticipating the State introducing a statute of limitations defense. The
Plaintiffs' Complaint recites communications with the State specifically waiving such a defense,
the Plaintiffs' reliance on those communications throughout their dealings with the State, and the
harm which might result if the waiver would be disregarded . Therefore, the Plaintiffs have met
the requirements of I.R. C.P. 8( a)(l ); the issues of waiver and equitable estoppel have been
adequately raised .
Respectfully submitted

~) Y

this ~ day of August, 2017.

Fredric V. Shoemaker I Jason R. Mau I
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COMES NOW the Defendant, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department ("the
State"), by and through undersigned counseL and hereby moves this Court for its order allowing
the State to file a response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental MemorandumRe: Application ofWaiver

and Equitable Estoppel to the State's Statute of Limitations Defense. Plaintiffs were permitted
to file their supplemental memorandum regarding equitable estoppel pursuant to this Court's
order lodged and served August 29, 2107. A response from the State is necessary to provide
clarity and avoid any confusion, mistake or error in relation to the issues raised by Plaintiffs in
their supplemental memorandum.
81
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or memorandum, is there an allegation that the State misrepresented or concealed a material fact.
Without that allegation in their Complaint, the Days have no basis upon which to assert a claim
based on equitable estoppel.
DATED this 181 day of September 2017.

Is/ Chris Kronberg
CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
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JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
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liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,
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Case
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THE STATE'S
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v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
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Plaintiffs Bennett G. Day,
of Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D.
as Trustee of
Day, as
Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Jacobs,
Day, Dan E.
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
and David R. Day (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by
REENER
GREENER
by and through their counsel of record, G
B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
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BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
re: Supplemental Memorandum
P.A.,
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regarding Application of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of Limitations
Defense.
I. DISCUSSION
On August 29,
29, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiffs leave to direct the Court’s attention to
Plaintiffs’ pleadings in the record alleging or arguing those issues the State
those portions of the Plaintiffs’

previously claimed were not raised during oral argument on the hearing for the various motions
Plaintiffs’ supplemental materials did not introduce new argument
held on August 14,
14, 2017. The Plaintiffs’

or authority. Subsequently, the State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation (“State”)
asked for permission to file
ﬁle aa Response to Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing. The responsive brief
the State proposed to file
ﬁle does not object to or contradict any
any of the allegations highlighted by
by
the Plaintiffs, however, it claims to point out errors in the analysis, and in doing so,
so, introduces
new authority and argument to the record. Plaintiffs present this brief reply to point out the
State’s concession of issues pled in the Complaint and address this new authority.
The State first
ﬁrst argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged any
any false representation or
concealment in their pleadings, suggesting that such failure bars
bars any
any application of equitable
estoppel or quasi-estoppel.
quasi-estoppel. However, the Complaint does include allegations that beginning over
twenty years
access
years ago,
ago, the State concealed material facts from the Plaintiffs regarding limits on access
to Eisenman Road for the Day Property.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege:
In Paragraph 22 of the Plaintiffs’

In aa letter dated August 27,
1996, ITD and ACHD memorialize their
27, 1996,
agreement upon the “future approaches from new roadways to properties being
severed” by
Interchange. The letter lists the new extension of Eisenman
by the new Interchange.
Road as
where public roads would connect but the
as having various locations Where
location at the Green Gate was
was not listed. The agreement then states,
states, “Future
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY RE: SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM RE: APPLICATION OF WAIVER AND
PLAINTIFFS’
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public road access
as Exhibit
access as
as determined and approved by ACHD.” Attached as
9 is aa copy
access and
copy of that letter. This agreement about public road access
“approaches” along the new Eisenman extension was
was not disclosed to the Day
Family.

The attached letter illustrates information known to ITD that was
was not fully disclosed to
Plaintiffs’ pleadings clearly include allegations of
the Days
years later. Thus, the Plaintiffs’
Days until twenty years

concealment of aa material fact by
by the State. Accordingly, such concealment presents this Court
whether the application of estoppel is
with the extraordinary circumstances to consider Whether
matter.11
appropriate in this matter.

Finally, the State spends the remainder of its Response to cite authority to support its
argument that the Plaintiffs should not be able to raise aa new claim or add aa legal theory to their
pleadings. However, as
as noted in the initial supplemental briefing, no new arguments were being

introduced.
introduced. The Plaintiffs have simply illustrated that the pleadings and arguments already in the
record recognize the potential that the State would argue aa statute of limitations defense and take
the position that the defense had not been waived.
waived. The Plaintiffs were not required to raise aa
“new claim” or “add aa legal theory” prior to the State’s affirmative
be
afﬁrmative defense; they only need to be
able to point to sufficient
sufﬁcient allegations to overcome the State’s defense. The Plaintiffs are
are not
required to assert aa claim of equitable estoppel, but have alleged sufficient
sufﬁcient facts to provide for its
application in this matter if the Court determines it is relevant.
relevant.
Further, the distinctions between waiver and equitable estoppel are
are not so
so clearly
delineated as
as the State suggests.

Both are
based
are equitable claims (or defenses);
are based
defenses); both are

1

Such aa determination is appropriate and at least fairly raised as
ﬁrst voiced the issue at the
as it was the Court that first
hearing.
1
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(primarily) on the conduct of the party WhO
who is being estopped or against which aa waiver is

“... as
asserted 7– here,
by Plaintiffs, equitable estoppel requires “…
as
case cited by
here, the State. Quoting aa case
related to the party estopped (they)
are: (1)
(they) are:
(1) Conduct which amounts to aa false representation or
concealment of material facts, or,
least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the
or, at least,
facts are
are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to
assert;
by the other
assert; (2)
(2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by
party;
party; (3)
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to the party claiming the
estoppel, they are:
of the means of knowledge of the truth as
are: (1)
as to the
(1) Lack of knowledge and of
facts in question; (2)
based
(2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3)
(3) action based
Tew v.
thereon of such aa character as
v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho
as to change his position prejudicially.” Tew

50,
omitted).
896, 899 (1971)(citations omitted).
54, 480 P.2d 896,
50, 54,
II.
11. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ summary of the record provided for the Court’s convenience, the
Based on the Plaintiffs’

Plaintiffs have adequately pled both waiver and equitable estoppel in their Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial and have previously introduced the argument that equitable estoppel can
be applied to prevent assertion of aa statute of limitation defense because
because the concealed facts
caused them to refrain from prosecuting an
an action until the relevant information regarding future
approaches had been disclosed.
disclosed.

Plaintiffs contend that these allegations were timely and

sufficiently
sufﬁciently raised and allow this Court to properly determine whether the legal theory is
applicable to the present matter.
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Respectfully submitted this 6th day
day of September, 2017.
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of lodging of this

order.

DATED this

7

day of September 2017.

Signed: 9/5/2017 03:30 PM

The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland
District Court Judge
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO FILE REPLY RE:
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
RE: ADDITIONAL BRIEF CITING
EXISTING PLEADINGS ON THE ISSUE OF WAIVER AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL –— 11
19807-001 /973348
19807-001
/ 973348

000932

Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Reply Re: Additional Brief, shall be
be
which submitted concurrently with Plaintiffs’

deemed filed.
ﬁled.
IT IS SO
SO ORDERED this ____ day
day of September, 2017.
Signed: 9/8/2017 12:02 PM

Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland
District Judge

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th
____ day
day of September, 2017, aa true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was filed
by the
ﬁled and copies were served to the following persons by
method indicated:
indicated:
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Jason R. Mau
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A.
950 W. Bannock St.,
St., Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
for Plaintiffs
Attorneys for

US. Mail
I:I U.S.
319-2601
Facsimile: 319-2601
I:I Facsimile:
Hand
Delivery
I:I

Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311
3311 W. State Street
P.
BOX 7129
P. O. Box
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
for Idaho Transportation Department
Attorney for

II
I:
I:I
I:

D

Overnight Delivery
fshoemaker@ggeenerlawcom
IXI Email/iCourt: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
'mau
jmau@greenerlaw.com
eenerlaw.com
l ena
lpena@greenerlaw.com
eenerlaw.com
ktouchstone@greenerlaw.com
ktouchstone
reenerlaw.com
U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IXI Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

CLERK OF THE COURT
By
Deputy
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO FILE REPLY RE:
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
RE: ADDITIONAL BRIEF CITING
EXISTING PLEADINGS ON THE ISSUE OF WAIVER AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL –— 22
19807-001 /973348
19807-001
/ 973348

000933

Signed: 10/11/2017 03:38 PM

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
IN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
OF
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN

BENNETT G.
BENNETT
TRUSTEE OF
AS TRUSTEE
OF
G. DAY,
DAY, AS
B OF
THE DONALD
DAY AND
AND
TRUST
DONALD M.
TRUST B
OF THE
M. DAY
DAY FAMILY
FAMILY TRUST;
MARJORIE
MARJORIE D.
D. DAY
TRUST;
DAN E.
JOHN
HOLCOMB
JOHN F.
F. DAY;
E. DAY;
DAY; DAN
DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD
ROAD HOLDINGS,
limited
an Idaho
Idaho limited
HOLDINGS, LLC,
LLC, an
DAY JACOBS;
liability
DONNA DAY
liability company;
JACOBS;
company; DONNA
and
DAVID R.
R. DAY,
and DAVID
DAY,
Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,

CV01-16-20313
Case
No. CV01-16-20313
Case No.

AND ORDER
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORDER
DECISION AND

vs.
VS.
STATE
STATE OF
IDAHO
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
Defendant.

Defendant’s Motion
THIS
before the
MATTER comes
THIS MATTER
the Court
the following
Motion for
for
following Motions:
on the
Motions: (1)
Court on
comes before
(1) Defendant’s

Plaintiffs’ Motion
Partial
April 28,
Partial Summary
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
Judgment (filed
(filed April
Summary Judgment
Summary
28, 2017),
2017), (2)
(2) Plaintiffs’

Judgment
Limitation Defense
of Statute
of Limitation
Judgment Re:
Defense (filed
Re: Access
and Waiver
Waiver of
Statute of
Access and
(filed May
17, 2017),
2017), (3)
May 17,
(3)
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Defendant’s Motion
Defendant’s
Partial
Motion to
Motion for
for Partial
to Bifurcate
Bifurcate (filed
June 22,
(filed June
22, 2017),
2017), (4)
(4) Plaintiffs’

Summary
Right to
of Right
to Condemnation
Condemnation Award
Judgment Re:
Award (filed
Re: Conveyance
Conveyance of
Summary Judgment
(ﬁled July
July 7,
2017), (5)
7, 2017),
(5)
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Plaintiffs’
No Marketable
Title (filed
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
Marketable and
Insurable Title
Judgment Re:
Re: No
and Insurable
Summary Judgment
(ﬁled

Plaintiffs’ Motion
Defendant’s Motion
July
Motion to
Motion to
Dismiss (filed
to Dismiss
to
(ﬁled July
11, 2017),
15, 2017),
July 11,
July 15,
2017), (6)
2017), (7)
(6) Defendant’s
(7) Plaintiffs’
Defendant’s
Strike
Franklin (filed
Nick Schug
Strike Affidavits
Ken Franklin
Afﬁdavits of
of Nick
and Ken
and (8)
Schug and
August 7,
(ﬁled August
2017), and
7, 2017),
(8) Defendant’s

Motion
No
Motion to
Strike Affidavits
Affidavits of
Donna Day
to Strike
of Glen
Glen Lorensen,
and Counsel
Re: No
Counsel Re:
Jacobs and
Lorensen, Donna
Day Jacobs
Marketable
Title (filed
Marketable and
Insurable Title
and Insurable
August 8,
(filed August
2017).
8, 2017).

Memorandum
and Order
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
Order -- 1l

000934

Hearings
were held
wherein the
the parties
Hearings were
held on
on June
parties presented
August 14,
presented
and August
June 14,
2017, wherein
14, July
12, and
14, 2017,
July 12,
argument
the various
The parties
the Court
argument on
on the
Motions. The
parties agreed
to have
issuing aa decision
Court defer
defer issuing
decision
various Motions.
have the
agreed to
regarding
pending issues,
until after
mitigation of
all the
the pending
for the
the issue
after
regarding all
regarding mitigation
of damages,
except for
issue regarding
issues, except
damages, until
14 hearing.
the
the Court
the August
hearing. On
On July
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
Court issued
Order
and Order
August 14
issued aa Memorandum
2017, the
28, 2017,
July 28,
14 hearing,
solely
with respect
mitigation of
the August
the
the issue
Following the
to the
of mitigation
of damages.
respect to
August 14
issue of
damages. Following
hearing, the
solely with

parties requested
the opportunity
ﬁle additional
the Court
The entire
entire
which the
parties
to file
additional briefing,
granted. The
Court granted.
requested the
brieﬁng, which
opportunity to
matter
was taken
matter was
taken under
on September
under advisement
advisement on
2017.
September 8,
8, 2017.

For
Plaintiffs have
forth herein,
that none
the Plaintiffs
For the
the reasons
the Court
standing to
none of
of the
to
Court concludes
set forth
reasons set
have standing
concludes that
herein, the
pursue the
breach of
time of
the breach
the owners
the Day
the time
the
of contract
contract claims
claims and
of the
at the
of the
and only
owners of
pursue
Property at
only the
Day Property
taking
pursue an
taking (i.e.
Donna Day
standing to
R. Day)
to pursue
an inverse
inverse
David R.
and David
have standing
Jacobs and
(i.e. Donna
Day Jacobs
Day) have
condemnation
been untimely
untimely filed
under the
that the
the
The court
the case
filed under
further concludes
condemnation claim.
claim. The
court further
has been
concludes that
case has
applicable
with prejudice.
limitations and
DISMISSED with
therefore DISMISSED
of limitations
is therefore
applicable statute
and is
statute of
prejudice.

UNDISPUTED
UNDISPUTED FACTS
FACTS

In 1935,
in an
In
Ernest George
of property
an area
160 acres
located in
purchased approximately
area
George Day
acres of
approximately 160
1935, Ernest
propeny located
Day purchased
Isaac’s Canyon,
Property”).11
(“Initial Day
in Ada
now
known as
of Boise
Boise and
now known
southeast of
and in
Ada County
as Isaac’s
County (“Initial
Canyon, southeast
Day Property”).

(“SH-30”) and
Initial Day
The
bisected by
by State
The Initial
State Highway
and had
had approximately
was bisected
30 (“SH-30”)
approximately
Property was
Highway 30
Day Property
SH-30 on
highway.22
1000
with SH-30
both sides
the highway.
frontage with
feet of
of frontage
on both
of the
1000 feet
sides of

1

“Compl.”); Second
Complaint
Nov. 1,
Trial p.
Donna Day
Complaint &
Aff. of
Demand for
for Jury
of Donna
Second Aff.
& Demand
p. 3
3 (filed
(hereafter, “Compl.”);
(ﬁled Nov.
2016) (hereafter,
Day
Jury Trial
1, 2016)
nd
2‘"1
“Jacobs 2
Aff.”).
Jacobs
Aff.”).
Jacobs ¶
9 (filed
(hereafter, “Jacobs
(ﬁled May
2017) (hereafter,
31, 2017)
May 31,
1] 9
22
“Jacobs 11“st Aff.”)
Aff.”)
Donna
Donna Day
Aff. ﬂ¶ 33 (filed
Jacobs Aff.
(hereafter, “Jacobs
(ﬁled May
2017) (hereafter,
17, 2017)
Day Jacobs
May 17,
1

Memorandum
2
and Order
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
Order -- 2

000935

died.33 On
In
In 1953,
Initial Day
the owners
the Initial
Ernest George
of the
On November
November 17,
owners of
George Day
1961, the
1953, Ernest
17, 1961,
Day
Day died.

Day’s wife)
Property,
their three
Emma Day
three sons
which included,
and their
sons (Don
George Day’s
included, Emma
(Ernest George
wife) and
(Don Day,
Property, which
Day (Ernest
Day,
4
(“1961 Agreement”)
Agreement”) with
Bob
), entered
into an
with the
Ernest E.
the Idaho
E. Day
an agreement
agreement (“1961
entered into
Idaho
Bob Day,
and Ernest
Day4),
Day, and

“IDH”) (predecessor
Department
Department of
the Idaho
Transportation
of Highways
to the
Idaho Transportation
(predecessor to
Highways (hereafter,
(hereafter, “IDH”)
5
Department).5 The
IDH could
provided that
possession of
Department).
nine acres
that the
the IDH
The 1961
Agreement provided
take possession
of nine
1961 Agreement
acres
could take

IDH was
of
uncertain as
Initial Day
the Initial
for construction
the interstate
interstate highway.
of the
of the
to
construction of
was uncertain
as to
Property for
highway. IDH
Day Property
“character of
the
plans concerning
next section
the next
the “character
the highway,
concerning the
of future
of the
section of
construction plans
and
future construction
highway, and
”66
Owners’ property
further
The
the effect
the Owners’
rights.
The 1961
Agreement provided
further the
thereof on
effect thereof
on the
1961 Agreement
provided
property rights.”

further:
further:
Owners’ property
all
property on
present U.S.
rights from
from Owners’
all access
the present
on both
both sides
of the
sides of
access rights
US.
Highway
Interstate Highway
to Interstate
to U.S.
and to
80N as
constructed
30 to
US. Highway
30 and
as constructed
Highway 30
Highway 30
Highway 80N
Owners’ propeny
and
between Owners’
property as
from and
all easements
of access
and between
and all
easements of
divided by
as divided
access to,
to, from
by
said
the property
shall be
extinguished where
Where the
and extinguished
upon
said highways
abuts upon
waived and
be waived
highways shall
property abuts
said
said highways.
highways.

It is
It
with respect
ﬁnal plans
that the
further agreed
its final
the Department
Department shall
shall determine
determine its
plans with
is further
respect
agreed that
Owners’ property
Within
to
within
a
reasonable
period
of
time
consistent
with
the
time
with
the
to Owners’
of
consistent
period
a reasonable
property
in good
complexity
project, and
the project,
negotiate in
of the
and will,
upon such
such determination,
determination, negotiate
good
complexity of
will, upon
faith with
faith
with Owners,
price
that Owners
Will receive
fair and
the end
to the
end that
Owners will
and reasonable
reasonable price
receive aa fair
Owners, to
Nothing herein
for
for the
the property
herein
including severance
severance damages
damages if any.
so acquired,
acquired, including
property so
any. Nothing
rights which
shall
shall be
which they
to deprive
of any
deprive Owners
Owners of
have as
construed as
be so
so construed
as to
as
they may
any rights
may have
provided by
them for
for such
suffer
to fairly
compensate them
provided
such damage
damage as
as they
fairly compensate
law, to
they may
may suffer
by law,
7
presents.7
taking
by
reason
of
such
taking
and
by
reason
of
these
presents.
of
of
these
and
reason
reason
such
by
by
IDH entered
Right of
On
with Emma
into aa Right
Emma Day,
Don Day,
On October
of Way
Contract with
entered into
Bob
October 23,
1967, IDH
23, 1967,
Way Contract
Day, Don
Day, Bob
Contract”).88
(“1967 Right
in furtherance
Right of
Day,
the 1961
Ernest E.
Agreement (“1967
E. Day,
of the
1961 Agreement
of Way
furtherance of
and Ernest
Way Contract”).
Day, and
Day, in

33

nd
2‘"1
Aff. ¶1] 9.
Jacobs
Aff.
Jacobs 2
9.
9—10.
Id. 11¶ 11¶ 9—10.
Id.
55
A (filed
April 28,
Compl.
Aff. 1]¶ Ex.
Ex. 2;
Ex. A
Kronberg Aff.
Compl. Ex.
2017).
(ﬁled April
28, 2017).
2; Kronberg
66
Id.
Id.
77
Id.
Id.
88
Compl.
Aff. Ex.
Ex. 3;
Ex. D.
Kronberg Aff.
D.
Compl. Ex.
3; Kronberg

4
4
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The
Right of
provided as
The 1967
of Way
Contract provided
follows:
1967 Right
as follows:
Way Contract
9
1.
pay Grantor(s)
Grant0r(s)9 and
the lienholder(s),
shall pay
1. State
of moneys
State shall
and the
such sums
sums of
as
lienholder(s), if any,
moneys as
any, such
are
all taxes
to pay
taxes and
are set
set out
out below.
and assessments
and
assessments due
below. Grantor(s)
due and
Grant0r(s) agree(s)
agree(s) to
pay all
owing,
year 1967.
for the
the year
including those
those for
1967.
owing, including
2.
be binding
until executed
This contract
not be
binding unless
the State
shall not
2. This
contract shall
State Highway
unless and
and until
executed by
Highway
by the
Engineer
parties have
Engineer or
The parties
herein set
the
his authorized
or his
authorized representative.
representative. The
set out
out the
have herein
whole of
their agreement,
the performance
the entire
entire
which constitutes
performance of
of which
of their
constitutes the
Whole
agreement, the
right of
consideration
grant of
for the
the grant
the State
all
shall relieve
of said
of way
of all
consideration for
relieve the
State of
and shall
said right
way and
further
that account
the location,
further claims
claims or
or obligations
obligations on
on that
or on
on account
of the
account or
account of
grade
location, grade
and
proposed highway.
the proposed
of the
construction of
and construction
highway.
3.
for 8.99
the Interstate
Interstate Highway
control of
of land
land and
full control
of access
to the
and full
acres of
3. Payment
8.99 acres
access to
Payment for
Highway
&
$6,000
the remainder
lump [sic]
remainder . . lump
to the
sum.
damages to
& damages
$6,000
[sic] sum.
4.
pay all
all taxes
including 1967
4. Grantors
Grantors agree
to pay
taxes and
and assessments
assessments including
1967 taxes[.]
agree to
taxes[.]
5. Access
will be
remaining property
the Interstate
Interstate Highway
to Grantors
Grantors remaining
of the
Access to
be
southerly of
property southerly
Highway will
available
from the
the future
the southwesterly
frontage road
on the
stock drive
drive on
available from
and stock
road and
side
future frontage
southwesterly side
10
I-80N. (I-IG-80N-2(16)54)[.]
(I-IG-80N-2(16)54)[.]1°
of
of I-80N.
.

.

LII

Right of
in accordance
The
with the
the 1967
The parties
of Way
parties also
1967 Right
also executed
executed aa Warranty
Deed in
accordance with
Contract,
Warranty Deed
Way Contract,

conveying
which 4.43
be aa portion
public
portion of
13.42 acres
4.43 is
is acknowledged
to be
of aa public
acknowledged to
acres (of
approximately 13.42
conveying approximately
(of which
11
State.11
The
provided:
road)
the State.
The Warranty
to the
Deed also
also provided:
Warranty Deed
road) to

right of
TOGETHER
way of
rights of
TOGETHER WITH
WITH all
the said
the right
all rights
of way
of the
of access
said
between the
access between
project and
the
remaining
contiguous
real
property
belonging
to
the
Grantor(s),
remaining
the
the
belonging
real
to
project
and
contiguous
property
Grant0r(s),
except
the Future
the
Frontage Road
for: access
to the
Future Frontage
Drives on
on the
except for:
Stock Drives
and Stock
Road and
access to
I-IG-80N-2(16)54
Southwesterly
side
of
Interstate
80N,
Project
No.
I-IG-80N-2(16)54
Highway
Interstate
of
Project
No.
side
Highway
SON,
Southwclazsterly
12
Survey.
Survey.

I-IG-80Nin the
The
The location
the future
the plans
for the
the I-IG-80Nfrontage road
location of
of the
is shown
plans for
stock drive
drive is
shown in
future frontage
and stock
road and
right of
2(16)54
project.13 The
purchased aa 50
public right
bordered the
that bordered
The State
the interstate
interstate
foot public
of way
State purchased
50 foot
2(16)54 project.13
way that

for
for the
the future
the State
the future
built the
frontage road
frontage road
or stock
stock drive;
State never
never built
road or
road
future frontage
future frontage
however, the
drive; however,
14
14
right of
Initial Day
or
The
way for
The right
for the
the future
the Initial
frontage road
or stock
of way
stock drive.
drive.
future frontage
road approached
approached the
Day

99

“Emma N.
“Grantors” were
Day.”
The
N. Day,
The “Grantors”
Ernest E.
and Donald
Donald M.
identiﬁed as
as “Emma
E. Day,
Robert L.
L. Day,
M. Day.”
were identified
widow, Ernest
Day, aa widow,
Day, Robert
Day, and
Id.
Id.
10
10
Id.
Id
11
Compl.
Aff. Ex.
Ex. 4;
Ex. E.
Kronberg Aff.
E.
Compl. Ex.
4; Kronberg
12
12
Id.
Id.
13
13
Aff.”).
Morrison
(“Morrison 115‘st Aff.”).
A (filed
April 28,
Aff. ¶1] 3,
Ex. A
Morrison Aff.
2017) (“Morrison
(ﬁled April
28, 2017)
3, Ex.
14
14
st
1SI
Jacobs
Although
that the
plain
Although the
frontage road,
Ex. I.
the State
the future
the Court
the plain
State never
built the
Aff. Ex.
1.
never built
Court notes
notes that
future frontage
Jacobs 1 Aff.
road, the
language
Right of
plain
frontage road.
language of
the 1967
The plain
not require
the State
Contract did
State to
of the
of Way
require the
to build
build aa future
road. The
did not
future frontage
1967 Right
Way Contract
11
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15
16
16
15
Property
It
It did
Initial Day
from the
the Initial
the west.
not extend
through or
extend through
or bisect
bisect the
did not
west.
Property.
Property from
Day Property.

As
Initial Day
with the
point of
the agreements
the IDH,
the Initial
single point
As aa result
result of
of the
of access
agreements with
had aa single
access
Property had
IDH, the
Day Property
Day’s were
right of
to
were compensated
taking
the future
the Day’s
for the
the taking
frontage road
to the
of way,
and the
compensated $6,000
road right
future frontage
$6,000 for
way, and

and
points.
other access
of other
and loss
loss of
access points.

April 30,
On
purchased an
Initial Day
the Initial
Don Day
adjoining the
On April
an additional
additional 160
160 acres
acres adjoining
1975, Don
30, 1975,
Day
Day purchased
17
“family” owned
Property”).17
(“Subsequent Day
Property
Thus,
the Day
total acres
owned about
about 300
acres
300 total
Property (“Subsequent
Thus, the
Day Property”).
Day “family”

(“Day
(“Day Property”).
Property”).

18
died.18
Day’s estate,
In 1984,
In
On
Emma Day
Emma Day’s
all of
the
which included
On May
of the
included all
estate, which
1984, Emma
1989, Emma
17, 1989,
Day died.
May 17,

in equal
Initial Day
Initial
third shares
Don Day,
Ernest
transferred in
to Don
one third
shares to
Bob Day,
and Ernest
equal one
was transferred
Property, was
Day Property,
Day, Bob
Day, and
19
Day.19
Day’s estate,
E.
Don
which
Emma Day’s
Don Day
the Subsequent
to Emma
E. Day.
quitclaimed the
also quitclaimed
Subsequent Day
Property to
estate, which
Day also
Day Property
20

brothers.20
in equal
third shares
was then
passed in
then also
the three
three brothers.
to the
one third
shares to
also passed
equal one
was

In 1992,
in the
third interest
In
Ernest E.
his one
the Day
the Ernest
Ernest and
interest in
transferred his
E. Day
to the
one third
and
1992, Ernest
Propeny to
Day transferred
Day Property
21
Trust.21
In 1994,
their one
third
Living Trust.
Lois
In
wife, Sue
Don Day
his Wife,
transferred their
Lois Day
and his
one third
Sue Day,
1994, Don
Day Living
Day and
Day, transferred

in the
interest
which then
then
Marital Trust,
the Day
the Donald
interest in
to the
Donald M.
M. Day
and Marital
Property to
Family and
Trust, which
Day Property
Day Family
22
Day.22
Day’s children,
ninth shares
On
transferred
Don Day’s
transferred equal
R. Day.
On
to Don
David R.
one ninth
shares to
and David
equal one
children, Donna,
Donna, Ben,
Ben, and

Right of
Initial Day
language
language of
the 1967
available to
the Initial
Contract only
of the
of Way
to the
where access
speciﬁed where
1967 Right
would be
access would
be available
only specified
Day
Way Contract
Property.
Property.
15
nd
Aff.”).
Second
Aff.”).
(“Morrison 22“1
A (filed
Aff. 11¶ 99 Ex.
Ex. A
Morrison Aff.
June 6,
Second Morrison
(ﬁled June
2017) (“Morrison
6, 2017)
16
1:’
Id.
Id.
17
nd
17
2'“1
Aff. ¶1] 11.
11.
Jacobs
Aff.
Jacobs 2
18
18
Id. ¶ 15.
101.1115.
19
1"
Id. ¶ 16.
101.1116.
20
201d
Id.
21
21
Id. ¶ 18.
18.
[(1.1]
22
nd
22
2“1
Jacobs
Aff.
Aff. ¶1] 19.
19.
Jacobs 2
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23
died.23
August
Don Day
August 27,
1997, Don
27, 1997,
Day died.

As
the ownership
the Day
Ben Day,
Donna
As of
of December
ownership of
of the
December 5,
follows: Ben
was as
as follows:
Property was
1997, the
Day Property
5, 1997,
Day, Donna
ninth share),
Day
the
holding an
R. Day
an equal
David R.
and David
and Bob
Bob Day
and the
one ninth
equal one
Jacobs, and
(each holding
share), and
Day Jacobs,
Day and
Day (each
24
share).24
Ernest
Living Trust
third share).
Ernest and
holding an
Lois Day
an equal
Trust (each
and Lois
one third
equal one
(each holding
Day Living

On
the Idaho
Department (successor
Transportation Department
On December
to IDH,
Idaho Transportation
December 5,
hereafter,
(successor to
IDH, hereafter,
1997, the
5, 1997,

“ITD”) substantially
“ITD”)
the construction
the Isaacs
The
Interchange project.
of the
construction of
completed the
project. The
Isaacs Canyon
substantially completed
Canyon Interchange
parties have
Plaintiffs contend
that December
the date
the alleged
parties
of the
stipulated that
contend
take. Plaintiffs
December 5,
alleged take.
have stipulated
1997 was
date of
was the
5, 1997
that
that as
original future
the project,
the Day
the original
longer had
no longer
result of
of the
to the
had access
future
as a
a result
access to
Property no
project, the
Day Property
right of
frontage
unimproved right
way and
after
frontage road
of way
is essentially
landlocked. However,
and is
before and
and after
road unimproved
essentially landlocked.
However, before

ITD purchased
purchased several
the
the construction
the Isaacs
Interchange Project,
of the
near
construction of
easements near
several easements
Isaacs Canyon
Project, ITD
Canyon Interchange
25
Road.25
in an
ITD contends
the
ITD
with Eisenman
effort to
the Day
the Day
Eisenman Road.
an effort
to connect
connect the
contends
Property with
Property in
Day Property
Day Property

State’s public
that
from one
from Eisenman
that the
the State’s
the Day
Eisenman Road
of the
is accessible
public access
one of
Road from
accessible from
access
Property is
Day Property
26
landlocked.26
easements
not landlocked.
is not
easements and
and is

In 1998,
in the
third
In
by conveying
half of
his interest
the Day
his one
interest in
of his
of his
Bob Day
one third
disposed of
conveying half
Property by
1998, Bob
Day disposed
Day Property

Living Trust
interest
half to
the Ernest
Ernest and
the other
the Donald
interest to
other half
to the
Lois Day
to the
Donald M.
M. Day
Trust and
and Lois
and the
and
Day Living
Day and
27
Trust.27
gift
Living Trust
Later
Marjorie
that same
the Ernest
Ernest and
Later that
Marjorie Day
Lois Day
Trust gift
and Lois
same year,
Family Trust.
Day Family
Day Living
year, the

in the
Ernest
all of
its interest
the Day
Dan E.
deeded
interest in
of its
to Dan
E. Day
John F.
F. Day
of Ernest
and John
deeded all
(children of
Property to
Day (children
Day Property
Day and
23
23

Id. ¶11 20.
Id.
20.
Id. ¶1] 21.
21.
Id.
25
25
16—19.
Compl.
¶¶ 16—19.
Compl. w
26
2"
“Because the
“Because
public access
property is
ITD public
their property
Eisenman Road,
the Days
can connect
the ITD
not
easement to
to Eisenman
is not
connect the
access easement
Road, their
Days can
At minimum,
ITD public
that the
landlocked.
the Days
the ITD
the public
easement to
to build
road that
landlocked. At
public access
build aa road
public could
minimum, the
could use
could
access easement
use the
Days could
road.” Amy
use, although
private road.”
see
maintain it
it as
a private
11 (filed
Aff. ¶1] 11
although the
the Days
to maintain
as a
ReVis Aff.
need to
(ﬁled May
use,
Days may
31, 2017);
may need
Amy Revis
May 31,
2017); see
also
Szplett Aff.
David Szplett
Aff. 1]¶ 10
10 (filed
also David
2017).
(ﬁled May
31, 2017).
May 31,
24
2“

27
27

nd
2'“1
Jacobs
Aff.
Aff. ¶1] 22.
22.
Jacobs 2
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28
Day).28
and
Accordingly,
the end
the Day
the Donald
Lois Day).
at the
of 1998,
Donald
and Lois
end of
owned by
was owned
Property was
Accordingly, at
1998, the
Day Property
by the

M.
sixth interest),
fourth interest),
Marjorie Day
M. Day
John F.
F. Day
Trust (one
and Marjorie
Family Trust
interest), John
interest),
(one sixth
(one fourth
Day and
Day Family
Day (one
ninth interest),
ninth
Dan
Dan E.
fourth interest),
Ben Day
Donna Day
E. Day
Jacobs (one
interest), Donna
interest), Ben
(one fourth
(one ninth
(one ninth
Day (one
Day (one
Day Jacobs
ninth interest).
interest),
R. Day
David R.
and David
interest).
interest), and
(one ninth
Day (one

ITD worked
From
with the
From 1996
the Day
the Day
to about
to establish
to the
establish new
worked with
new access
1996 to
about 2001,
access to
family to
2001, ITD
Day family
Day

it to
Property,
– an
the
Eisenman Road.
connecting it
to Eisenman
On July
an attorney
at the
Steven Parry
Road. On
attorney at
2000, Steven
Parry 7
Property, connecting
19, 2000,
July 19,

,

“I will
family’s attorney
in part,
ITD – wrote
time
wrote the
will also
time for
the Day
for ITD
which stated
stated in
also
letter, which
attorney aa letter,
part, “I
Day family’s

if
represent
will not
that the
limitations defense
the Department
Department will
not assert
represent to
to you
of statute
of limitations
assert any
statute of
defense if
any type
type of
you that
29
reached.”29
an
be reached.”
an agreement
on new
cannot be
agreement on
new access
access cannot

ITD developed
On
with aa design
Department Memorandum
Memorandum with
of an
an access
On September
design of
September 6,
developed aa Department
access
2000, ITD
6, 2000,
30
Property.30
road
However,
ACHD
the Day
Eisenman Road
connecting Eisenman
on February
to the
Road to
road connecting
However, on
February 21,
2001, ACHD
21, 2001,
Day Property.

family’s lawyer
sent
letter stating:
the Day
stating:
sent the
lawyer aa letter
Day family’s

The
with your
your letter
information submitted
limited amount
The limited
letter of
amount of
of information
of January
2001
submitted with
January 31,
31, 2001
if the
it difficult
makes
the proposed
difﬁcult to
to state
meet Highway
state definitively
makes it
road would
would meet
proposed road
deﬁnitively if
Highway
minimum
District
District standards.
District standard
The District
stand out.
standard minimum
One deficiency
did stand
standards. One
out. The
deﬁciency did
loo-feet. The
centerline
for aa local
The drawings
centerline radius
at least
street is
is 100-feet.
indicated at
drawings indicated
least two
local street
radius for
two
50-foot radius.
corners
plans would
with aa 50-foot
for review
to
More detailed
corners with
required for
detailed plans
review to
radius. More
would be
be required
if the
determine
District standards.
the design
all District
determine if
design meets
meets all
standards.
The
would depend
the land
The designation
the road
the
of the
on the
land use
planned and
designation of
and the
road would
depend on
use planned
volumes of
trafﬁc anticipated.
the design
For
of traffic
affect the
anticipated. These
These issues
design standards.
standards. For
volumes
could affect
issues could
example,
than aa local
different standards
residential street
street has
commercial
local residential
local commercial
has different
standards than
example, aa local

street.
street.
District does
that all
The District
all public
The
by aa
improvements be
require that
street improvements
public street
designed by
does require
be designed
in the
the state
The plans
professional engineer
be
engineer licensed
of Idaho.
plans would
to be
professional
state of
licensed in
Idaho. The
have to
would have
District for
the District
for review
for public
submitted
to the
street constructions
submitted to
public street
constructions
review and
and accepted
accepted for
right-0fright-of-Way. The
in the
prior
the issuance
the public
The right-ofprior to
permit to
to the
of aa permit
to work
work in
public right-of-way.
issuance of

” [(1.1]
Id. ¶ 23.
23.

28
29
29

Comp.
Ex. 15.
15.
Comp. Ex.
Id. Ex.
Ex. 16.
16.

30
301d.
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31

acceptance.31
way would
would need
prior to
to be
to plans
plans acceptance.
need to
dedicated prior
be dedicated
way

There
with respect
that the
nor is
the parties
There are
there evidence
further action
no allegations
allegations nor
is there
parties took
took any
action with
are no
respect
evidence that
any further
ACHD’s letter.
in the
to
the Day
the years
following ACHD’s
letter. Instead,
establishing access
to establishing
to the
on
access to
Instead, on
Property in
years following
Day Property

December
the Day
the Day
for $10,010,000.
to R.
R. Craig
Craig Groves
December 2,
sold the
Groves for
Property to
family sold
2005, the
$10,010,000.
Day family
Day Property
2, 2005,
property for
until December
Groves
the property
for about
three years
when he
he defaulted
on
December 2008
defaulted on
2008 when
owned the
about three
Groves owned
years until
re-acquired the
payments for
property. The
for the
the propelty.
The Day
the property
retained approximately
and retained
approximately
family re-acquired
property and
payments
Day family

million from
$4.9
from the
the sale.
sale.
$4.9 million

in early
Between
the last
there is
further
communication in
last communication
is no
no evidence
of any
2001 and
and 2010,
Between the
evidence of
2010, there
early 2001
any further

ITD to
communication
the Day
effort between
the Days
communication or
to establish
to the
or effort
establish access
and ITD
between the
access to
Groves) and
Days (or
(or Groves)
Day
re-acquired the
In 2010,
Property.
property, Donna
the Day
the property,
after the
Donna Day
two years
Jacobs
Property. In
family re-acquired
2010, two
years after
Day family
Day Jacobs
32
ITD’s attorney,
Property.32
ITD’s
sought
title insurance
for the
the Day
to obtain
obtain title
insurance for
sought to
Steven Parry,
also
attorney, Steven
Parry, also
Day Property.
33
insurance.33
in the
in April
April of
However,
assisted
Title
title insurance.
the attempt
attempt to
Pioneer Title
to obtain
obtain title
of 2010,
assisted in
However, in
2010, Pioneer
34
Property.34
title due
declined
with the
the Day
the access
to insure
insure marketable
marketable title
to the
declined to
issue with
due to
access issue
Day Property.

In 2013,
in the
ninth interest
In
Ben Day
his one
his one
eighteenth interest
the
interest in
interest and
transferred both
both his
one ninth
and his
one eighteenth
2013, Ben
Day transferred

,

in the
Donald
the Day
LLC – aa
Marjorie Day
Donald M.
M. Day
to Holcomb
Holcomb Road
Trust in
and Marjorie
Road LLC
Property to
Family Trust
Day and
Day Family
Day Property

company
wholly owned
by him.
him. Accordingly,
the Day
the current
current
now owned
owned by
owned by
was now
Property was
Accordingly, the
company Wholly
Day Property
by the

,

ninth interest),
Plaintiffs – Holcomb
sixth interest),
Plaintiffs
LLC (one
Donna Day
Holcomb Road
Road LLC
Jacobs (one
interest), Donna
interest),
(one sixth
(one ninth
Day Jacobs
ninth interest),
ninth
David
the Donald
Marjorie Day
Donald M.
M. Day
David Day
Trust (one
and Marjorie
Family Trust
interest), the
(one ninth
(one ninth
Day (one
Day and
Day Family

interest),
fourth interest).
Dan E.
fourth interest),
E. Day
John F.
F. Day
and John
interest).
interest), Dan
interest), and
(one fourth
(one fourth
Day (one
Day (one
31
31

Id. Ex.
Ex. 17.
Id.
17.
th
th
4‘11
4‘11
Aff.”).
Donna
Aff.
Aff.”).
(“Jacobs 4
Donna Day
Aff. ¶1] 66 (filed
Jacobs 4
11, 2017)
(ﬁled July
2017) (“Jacobs
July 11,
Day Jacobs
33
33
Compl.
Ex. 19.
Compl. Ex.
19.
32
32
34
3“

th
4‘11
Jacobs
Aff.
Aff. ¶1] 10.
10.
Jacobs 4
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Between
effort
the years
there is
communication or
is again
again no
no evidence
of any
or effort
2010 and
and 2014,
Between the
evidence of
2014, there
years 2010
any communication
ITD to
between the
the Days
the Day
to establish
to the
establish access
and ITD
between
access to
Propeny.
Days and
Day Property.

ITD
In February
In
2014, ITD
February 2014,

“Green
(“ACHD”) for
applied
point at
District (“ACHD”)
for aa temporary
the “Green
to Ada
at the
applied to
Ada County
access point
temporary access
Highway District
County Highway
35
Gate” on
Property.35
ITD-created easement
ACHD
Gate”
ACHD
the ITD-created
the Day
Eisenman Road
to the
to access
on Eisenman
easement to
Road to
access the
Day Property.

ITD appealed,
in March
denied
but then
then withdrew
the application,
its appeal
March 2014.
2014.
withdrew its
denied the
and ITD
appeal in
application, and
appealed, but

In January
ITD offered
In
build aa public
public access
the Day
to build
offered the
road
access road
family $560,000
2015, ITD
January 2015,
$560,000 to
Day family
36
themselves.36
On
themselves.
the Day
the offer.
On August
offer.
rejected the
August 28,
family rejected
2015, the
28, 2015,
Day family

it would
On
ACHD advised
that it
On May
would
advised that
2016, ACHD
16, 2016,
May 16,

not
between the
not accept
the off
off ramp
ramp and
the future
street between
Lake
public street
and the
accept aa public
future Lake
1800-feet from
Hazel/Eisenman
from the
the current
which is
intersection which
current
Hazel/Eisenman intersection
is approximately
approximately 1800-feet
in this
gate.
this area
ACHD is
existing accesses
not commenting
commenting on
There are
is not
on
are existing
area today.
gate. There
accesses in
today. ACHD
37
way.37
in
these
nor
stating
that
ACHD
will
restrict
or
alter
them
in
any
way.
them
that
ACHD
will
nor
stating
restrict
alter
or
these accesses
accesses
any
in original.)
(Emphasis
original.)
(Emphasis in

On
Bennett G.
the Donald
Marjorie D.
of the
Donald M.
M. Day
D. Day
On November
November 1,
and Marjorie
trustee of
G. Day
as trustee
2016, Bennett
Day as
Day and
Day
1, 2016,
Family
Dan E.
Donna Day
John F.
F. Day,
E. Day,
Holcomb Road
and
Road Holdings,
Holdings, LLC,
Family Trust,
Trust, John
Jacobs, and
LLC, Donna
Day Jacobs,
Day, Dan
Day, Holcomb

,

7 the
“Plaintiffs”) filed
David
this
the owners
the Day
R. Day
of the
2013 – (hereafter,
ﬁled this
David R.
since 2013
owners of
Property since
(hereafter, “Plaintiffs”)
Day –
Day Property

ITD alleging
suit
breach of
alleging the
the following
for relief:
following claims
relief: (1)
suit against
against ITD
claims for
of
inverse condemnation,
condemnation, (2)
(1) inverse
(2) breach
faith and
fair dealing.
implied covenant
contract,
of implied
of good
dealing.
covenant of
and (3)
breach of
and fair
good faith
contract, and
(3) breach

35
35

Compl.
Ex. 21.
21.
Compl. Ex.
Id. ¶11 38.
Id.
38.
37
37
Id. Ex.
Ex. 23.
Id.
23.
36
3"
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On
April 28,
ITD filed
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
the following
following issues:
On April
ﬁled aa Motion
on the
Judgment on
issues:
2017, ITD
Summary Judgment
28, 2017,
Plaintiffs’ breach
(1)
breach of
their associated
for breach
the implied
implied
claim for
of contract
contract claim,
of the
breach of
and their
associated claim
claim, and
(1) Plaintiffs’

covenant
faith and
fair dealing,
that any
claim or
of good
of contract
contract claim
or inverse
inverse
covenant of
and fair
breach of
good faith
dealing, (2)
any breach
(2) that
in 1997
condemnation
that
the Isaacs
claim arose
Interchange was
condemnation claim
when the
1997 when
arose in
Isaacs Canyon
was constructed,
constructed, (3)
Canyon Interchange
(3) that

only
time any
the owners
the Day
the time
of the
at the
condemnation occurred
inverse condemnation
owners of
alleged inverse
occurred have
have
Property at
only the
Day Property
any alleged
Plaintiffs’ have
standing
bring aa claim
their
that Plaintiffs’
for inverse
mitigated their
claim for
standing to
to bring
inverse condemnation,
and (4)
have mitigated
condemnation, and
(4) that

damages.
damages.

On
Plaintiffs filed
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
filed aa Motion
On May
Judgment Re:
Re: Access
and
Access and
2017, Plaintiffs
Summary Judgment
17, 2017,
May 17,
Waiver
Limitation Defense.
of Statute
of Limitation
Defense.
Waiver of
Statute of

In this
In
Plaintiffs asserted:
this Motion,
the Day
asserted: (1)
Motion, Plaintiffs
Day
(1) the

Property’s
Property
taking the
the State
for taking
the Day
no direct
direct access
to public
is liable
liable for
public roads,
State is
has no
access to
Property has
roads, (2)
Day Property’s
(2) the

in
direct
public roads,
justly compensated,
taking occurred
this taking
the public
which must
must be
direct access
to the
occurred in
be justly
access to
compensated, (3)
roads, which
(3) this

1997
the State
the completion
the Isaac
completion of
to 1998
at the
of the
State has
has waived
and (4)
1997 to
1998 at
Isaac Canyon
waived
Interchange, and
Canyon Interchange,
(4) the
Plaintiffs’ delay
in bringing
bringing this
any
this inverse
the Plaintiffs’
condemnation action.
to the
inverse condemnation
action.
related to
defense related
delay in
any defense

parties’ Motions
A hearing
A
was held
Partial Summary
hearing was
the parties’
for Partial
regarding the
Motions for
held on
on June
June 14,
2017, regarding
Summary
14, 2017,

ITD filed
Judgment.
was under
under advisement,
the matter
matter was
Motion to
While the
filed aa Motion
Bifurcate on
to Bifurcate
on June
Judgment. While
June 22,
advisement, ITD
22,
Right to
Plaintiffs filed
2017,
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
filed aa Motion
of Right
to
Judgment Re:
Re: Conveyance
Conveyance of
2017, Plaintiffs
Summary Judgment
38
2017,38
Condemnation
and
No
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
Condemnation Award
on July
Judgment Re:
Award on
and Motion
Re: No
Summary Judgment
July 7,
7, 2017,
39
2017,39
ITD filed
Title on
Marketable
and
Motion to
Dismiss on
Marketable and
on July
ﬁled aa Motion
to Dismiss
on July
Insurable Title
and Insurable
and ITD
11, 2017,
15,
July 11,
July 15,

38
38

In
In this
that the
Plaintiffs assert
rights to
this Motion,
the
the applicable
applicable rights
award have
condemnation award
to the
assert that
to aa condemnation
have been
been conveyed
Motion, Plaintiffs
conveyed to
all the
that they
Plaintiffs contend
present title
– as
– own
title holders
title owners
the current
the
the Day
current title
present
of the
as the
holders of
contend that
owners —
own all
Property. Plaintiffs
they —
Day Property.
rule.”
“undivided fee
rights
rights to
the “undivided
award based
condemnation award
to aa condemnation
on the
fee rule.”
based on
39
39
Plaintiffs
that the
Plaintiffs contend
lack of
marketable or
the Day
has no
title. They
the lack
insurable title.
no marketable
or insurable
of access
contend that
contend the
access
Property has
They contend
Day Property
prohibits them
them from
from obtaining
obtaining or
title.
prohibits
clear insurable
insurable title.
or conveying
conveying aa clear
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40
41
2017.40
afﬁdavits.41
2017.
The
parties also
various affidavits.
The parties
Strike various
Motions to
ﬁled Motions
to Strike
also filed

On
was held
wherein the
the parties
having aa
On July
held wherein
parties agreed
to defer
conference was
defer having
status conference
agreed to
2017, aa status
12, 2017,
July 12,
in the
ruling
presented in
Partial Summary
all the
the pending
the cross
for Partial
ruling issued
pending issues
Motions for
on all
cross Motions
issued on
issues presented
Summary

Judgment,
until aa later
mitigation of
for the
the issue
hearing was
later hearing
regarding mitigation
of damages,
held on
on
except for
issue regarding
was held
Judgment, except
damages, until
the
the newly
filed Motions.
Motions.
newly filed

was held
parties presented
presented argument
On
the various
hearing was
the parties
argument on
on the
On August
held and
August 14,
and the
various
2017, aa hearing
14, 2017,
Motions.
parties requested
briefing,
file additional
the hearing,
the parties
the opportunity
Following the
Motions. Following
to file
additional brieﬁng,
requested the
hearing, the
opportunity to
which was
The entire
entire matter
matter was
taken under
which
on September
granted. The
under advisement
advisement on
2017.
September 8,
was taken
was granted.
8, 2017.

LEGALSTANDARD“
LEGAL
STANDARD42

Summary
judgment may
be entered
that there
the movant
there is
is no
no genuine
genuine dispute
movant shows
entered only
dispute as
shows that
as
Summary judgment
only “if the
may be
law.” I.R.C.P.
to
judgment as
the movant
matter of
material fact
entitled to
to any
fact and
movant is
is entitled
to judgment
of law.”
I.R.C.P. 56(a).
and the
as a
a matter
56(a).
any material

“liberally construes
non-moving party”
in favor
in
The
party” in
existing record
The Court
the facts
the non-moving
of the
Court “liberally
facts and
favor of
and existing
record in
construes the
124 Idaho
making such
making
Hall v.
611 (1993).
determination. Hall
P.2d 609,
Idaho 771,
864 P.2d
such determination.
v. Forsloff,
771, 773,
773, 864
609, 611
Forsloﬂ, 124
(1993). “If

40
40

ITD asserts
it exceeds
ITD contends
that the
limitations. ITD
the action
action should
the statute
the
statute of
ITD
of limitations.
asserts the
contends that
should be
dismissed because
because it
exceeds the
be dismissed
July
that the
from Steven
letter from
former deputy
the State
not
State would
wherein he
he stated
stated that
Steven Parry
2000 letter
would not
attorney general),
general), wherein
Parry (a
19, 2000
deputy attorney
July 19,
(a former
ITD contends
limitations defense,
assert
his letter
letter extended
the
not aa perpetual
assert any
of statute
of limitations
statute of
waiver. ITD
contends his
extended the
was not
perpetual waiver.
defense, was
any type
type of
statute
period by
promise.
limitations period
from the
additional statutory
the date
his promise.
of limitations
date of
of his
statute of
period from
one additional
statutory period
by one
41
41
DENIED as
in rendering
Because
the Court
not rely
its decision,
the Motions
Strike are
are DENIED
rendering its
Motions to
Afﬁdavits in
to Strike
as
on these
Court did
these Affidavits
did not
Because the
decision, the
rely on
moot.
moot.
42
42
ITD
ITD filed
Plaintiffs filed
limitations and
their Rule
Motion to
the statute
and Plaintiffs
Dismiss based
ﬁled their
Rule 12(b)(6)
to Dismiss
on the
of limitations
ﬁled aa
statute of
based on
12(b)(6) Motion
corresponding
it is
in
Motion for
for Summary
Motions together
together in
Rule 56
As it
is necessary
to consider
both Motions
corresponding Rule
Judgment. As
consider both
56 Motion
necessary to
Summary Judgment.
limitations issue
plethora of
the statute
the plethora
the Court)
the Court
ruling
will
ruling on
statute of
on the
of limitations
on the
of evidence
Court will
before the
evidence before
issue (and
based on
Court) the
(and based
“The date
analyze
under Rule
when aa cause
that “The
limitations issue
the statute
The Court
for when
of
of limitations
Rule 56.
also notes
date for
statute of
Court also
notes that
issue under
cause of
56. The
analyze the
a question
material fact
action
fact or
fact exist,
action accrues
action
of action
of fact
or law.
law. If no
no disputed
of material
when aa cause
question of
disputed issues
cause of
issues of
accrues may
be a
exist, when
may be
Court.” C
accrues
Inc. v.
Highway Dist.
No. 4,
this Court.”
determination by
law for
for determination
Dist. N0.
is aa question
of law
v. Canyon
question of
139
accrues is
C &
& G,
Canyon Highway
G, Inc.
4, 139
by this
Idaho
it pertains
material fact
fact as
pertains to
the
are no
Idaho 140,
there are
as it
to the
no disputed
of material
196 (2003).
disputed issues
P.3d 194,
issues of
75 P.3d
142, 75
Here, there
140, 142,
194, 196
(2003). Here,
statute
limitations issue.
of limitations
statute of
issue.
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reasonable
from the
the evidence,
the motion
motion
different conclusions
or inferences
inferences from
reach different
conclusions or
reasonable people
people could
could reach
evidence, the
denied.” Jenkins
141 Idaho
must
Jenkins v.
must be
Idaho 233,
108 P.3d
P.3d 380,
Boise Cascade
385
be denied.”
v. Boise
Cascade Corp.,
Corp, 141
233, 238,
238, 108
380, 385

“[a] mere
(2005).
slight doubt
the facts
scintilla of
not
to the
mere scintilla
of evidence
or only
is not
facts is
evidence or
doubt as
as to
Moreover, “[a]
only slight
(2005). Moreover,
sufficient
judgment.” Stafford
for purposes
sufﬁcient to
to create
genuine issue
of summary
create aa genuine
136
issue for
purposes of
v. Weaver,
Weaver, 136
summary judgment.”
Staﬂord v.
Idaho
247 (2001)
31 P.3d
Idaho 223,
P.3d 245,
(citations omitted).
omitted).
223, 225,
225, 31
245, 247
(2001) (citations

The
party bears
burden of
proving the
initial burden
The moving
the initial
the absence
material
moving party
of proving
of aa genuine
genuine issue
of material
bears the
issue of
absence of
fact,
with sufficient
then the
the burden
shifts to
the nonmoving
nonmoving party
sufﬁcient evidence
to the
to come
and then
burden shifts
forward with
come forward
evidence
fact, and
party to
v. Kuna
Kuna Joint
125 Idaho
Sanders v.
to
Joint School
Dist., 125
School Dist.,
See Sanders
material fact.
Idaho
to create
genuine issue
of material
fact. See
create aa genuine
issue of

156 (1994).
872,
bears the
876 P.2d
the nonmoving
the burden
nonmoving party
proving an
P.2d 154,
When the
of proving
an
burden of
154, 156
872, 874,
874, 876
(1994). When
party bears

material fact
element
by
fact by
lack of
the moving
moving party
element at
establish aa lack
of genuine
genuine issue
of material
at trial,
issue of
trial, the
party may
may establish

establishing
Dunnick v.
lack of
the lack
the element.
126 Idaho
establishing the
supporting the
of evidence
element. Dunnick
Idaho 308,
evidence supporting
v. Elder,
Elder, 126
311,
308, 311,
882
App. 1994).
P.2d 475,
478 (Ct.
882 P.2d
1994).
475, 478
(Ct. App.

“may not
A party
in the
A
party opposing
judgment “may
upon mere
motion for
for summary
not rest
the
rest upon
mere allegations
allegations in
opposing aa motion
summary judgment

trial.”
forth by
pleadings, but
but must
for trial.”
there is
must set
afﬁdavit specific
showing there
is aa genuine
genuine issue
facts showing
set forth
speciﬁc facts
issue for
pleadings,
by affidavit
Gagnon
Bldg. Maint.,
Maint., Inc,
Inc., 155
Gagnon v.
Idaho 112,
155 Idaho
199 (2013).
P.3d 197,
Such evidence
evidence
v. W.
W. Bldg.
306 P.3d
112, 114,
114, 306
197, 199
(2013). Such
“the Court
may
that material
will consider
material . . .
of affidavits
or depositions,
afﬁdavits or
consist of
Court will
consider only
but “the
depositions, but
only that
may consist

trial.” Harris
which is
would be
Harris v.
which
which would
is based
at trial.”
personal knowledge
admissible at
knowledge and
upon personal
and which
based upon
be admissible
v.

If the
Dep’t of
Health &
State,
123 Idaho
the
P.2d 1156,
1159 (1992).
Idaho 295,
847 P.2d
& Welfare,
State, Dep’t
1156, 1159
ofHealth
295, 298,
298, 847
(1992). If
Welfare, 123
then only
evidence
material fact,
remains on
no disputed
of material
of law
on
question of
law remains
reveals no
disputed issues
evidence reveals
issues of
fact, then
only aa question
then enter
which the
judgment as
Purdy v.
Ins. Co.
the court
matter of
which
enter summary
of law.
Farmers Ins.
court may
law. Purdy
as a
a matter
v. Farmers
Co.
summary judgment
may then

of
Idaho, 138
Idaho 443,
138 Idaho
186 (2003).
P.3d 184,
65 P.3d
443, 445,
445, 65
184, 186
ofldaho,
(2003).
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ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS

For
forth below,
that the
For the
the reasons
the Court
the issues
the statute
finds that
regarding standing
standing and
Court finds
set forth
and the
reasons set
statute
issues regarding
below, the
of
this case.
limitations are
the other
other issues
of limitations
of this
dispositive of
these issues
are dispositive
are dispositive,
issues are
issues
Because these
case. Because
dispositive, the
raised
by the
pending Motions
the pending
Motions are
moot.
raised by
are moot.

1.
Standing
1. Standing
ITD contends
ITD
that none
the Plaintiffs,
for Donna
Donna Day
none of
of the
R. Day,
except for
David R.
contends that
and David
have
Plaintiffs, except
Jacobs and
Day Jacobs
Day, have

standing
bring an
property at
not the
the owners
the property
claim as
standing to
to bring
an inverse
condemnation claim
of the
at
inverse condemnation
owners of
were not
as they
they were
“run
Right of
ITD also
the
that the
time of
not “run
the 1967
the time
the alleged
taking. ITD
of Way
Contract did
of the
did not
alleged taking.
asserts that
1967 Right
also asserts
Way Contract
land” and
with the
Plaintiffs were
with
instant Plaintiffs
the land”
the instant
the contract,
not
none of
of the
to the
and none
and therefore,
were party
do not
therefore, do
contract, and
party to

have
for any
standing to
to sue
alleged breach.
breach.
have standing
sue for
any alleged

intraPlaintiffs contend
Plaintiffs
because they
that they
rightful beneficiaries
the rightful
standing because
of intracontend that
beneﬁciaries of
are the
have standing
they have
they are

Plaintiffs also
family
proper
all takings
takings claims
the State.
the proper
transfers of
of all
claims against
against the
State. Plaintiffs
assert they
are the
also assert
family transfers
they are

holders
breach of
were transferred
jointly with
with the
the Day
the breach
the claims
transferred jointly
of the
of contract
contract claims
claims because
claims were
holders of
because the
Day
43
intra-family.43
Property
Property intra-family.

“The doctrine
maintaining aa suit.
Standing
prerequisite to
Standing is
standing focuses
is aa constitutional
constitutional prerequisite
to maintaining
doctrine of
of standing
suit. “The
focuses
adjudicated.” Miles
on
party Wishes
wishes to
Miles v.
the party
relief and
not on
the issues
the party
on the
seeking relief
on the
to have
and not
have adjudicated.”
issues the
v.
party seeking
43
43

rule” prohibits
“undivided fee
Plaintiffs
prohibits ITD
ITD from
in the
Plaintiffs also
from questioning
This
the “undivided
the property.
interest in
questioning any
also asserted
asserted the
fee rule”
property. This
any interest
that the
fair market
taking is
market value
this rule
the fair
argument
value of
whole taking
argument fails,
of aa whole
is to
to be
determined
provides that
rule merely
because this
fails, because
be determined
merely provides
without consideration
various claims
fair market
market value
after determining
determining the
the various
claims and
and interests.
the fair
the
without
consideration of
of the
interests. Then,
of the
value of
Then, after
a whole,
property as
various interested
parties. See
Seliga
among the
the award
the various
award of
condemnation is
aggortioned among
as a
of condemnation
is apportioned
interested parties.
See Seliga
whole, the
property
Shoe Stores,
Inc. v.
Maplewood, 558
This rule
inapplicable to
the
v. City
App. 1977).
is inapplicable
to the
332 (Mo.
Ct. App.
Shoe
rule is
S.W.2d 328,
558 S.W.2d
Stores, Inc.
ofMaplewood,
328, 332
1977). This
City of
(M0. Ct.
determination
whether various
parties have
an inquiry
this rule
into
standing to
prohibit an
determination of
claim. Nor
Nor does
of whether
have standing
to pursue
various parties
rule prohibit
pursue aa claim.
does this
inquiry into
whether the
parties have
the parties
standing.
whether
have standing.
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Idaho Power
Power Co.,
116 Idaho
The major
the
P.2d 757,
major aspect
of the
Idaho 635,
Idaho
aspect of
778 P.2d
763 (1989).
641, 778
635, 641,
757, 763
(1989). The
Ca, 116
standing
standing inquiry
explained as
follows:
has been
been explained
as follows:
inquiry has
The
parties seeking
The essence
the standing
the parties
the
standing inquiry
whether the
of the
is whether
seeking to
to invoke
invoke the
essence of
inquiry is
court’s jurisdiction
“alleged
in
court’s
jurisdiction have
“alleged
such
a
personal
stake
in
the
outcome
of
the
the
the
of
personal
stake
outcome
have
such a
controversy
which sharpens
that concrete
the
to assure
concrete adverseness
sharpens the
adverseness which
assure that
as to
controversy as
presentation of
which the
illumination of
the court
for illumination
presentation
of issues
of
court so
upon which
issues upon
depends for
so largely
largely depends
questions.” As
difficult
this
difﬁcult constitutional
constitutional questions.”
As refined
reﬁned by
subsequent reformulation,
reformulation, this
by subsequent
stake” has
“personal stake”
requirement
be understood
not only
requirement of
to be
to require
require not
of aa “personal
has come
understood to
come to
only aa
“distinct and
traceable” causal
“fairly traceable”
“distinct
plaintiff, but
but also
injury,” to
the plaintiff,
to the
and palpable
palpable injury,”
also aa “fairly
causal
connection
between the
the claimed
the challenged
connection between
challenged conduct.
claimed injury
and the
conduct.
injury and
Duke Power
Inc., 438
Power Co.
Envtl. Study
438 U.S.
Ct. 2620,
Carolina Envtl.
Duke
2630
Co. v.
v. Carolina
US. 59,
98 S.
S. Ct.
Grp., Inc,
2620, 2630
Study Grp.,
72, 98
59, 72,
in order
plaintiff must
(1978)
bring suit,
standing to
to have
to bring
must have
order to
have standing
have (1)
(citations omitted).
omitted). Thus,
Thus, in
suit, aa plaintiff
(1978) (citations
(1)
in fact,
suffered
the injury
the conduct
sufﬁcient causal
an injury
connection between
suffered an
and the
between the
conduct
causal connection
fact, (2)
injury in
injury and
(2) aa sufficient

it is
complained
that the
will be
the injury
is likely
to merely
complained of,
and (3)
speculative that
as opposed
opposed to
be
likely as
merely speculative
injury will
of, and
(3) it
112 S.
redressed
Lujan v.
Defs. of
560-61, 112
favorable decision.
decision. Lujan
504 U.S.
Ct.
redressed by
v. Defs.
US. 555,
S. Ct.
555, 560-61,
Wildlife, 504
by aa favorable
of Wildlife,

2130,
D'Alene Tribe
Denney, 161
161 Idaho
2136 (1992);
Tribe v.
Idaho 508,
P.3d 761,
Coeur D’Alene
v. Denney,
387 P.3d
766
2130, 2136
513, 387
761, 766
508, 513,
(1992); Coeur
(2015)
(2015)

in
Although
jurisdictions hold
Although Idaho
not addressed
the issue,
of jurisdictions
hold that,
Idaho has
has not
addressed the
majority of
that, generally,
issue, aa majority
generally, in

order
maintain an
standing to
must have
an
to have
to maintain
an inverse
condemnation suit
suit aa party
inverse condemnation
order to
had an
have had
have standing
party must
7 one
in the
ownership
– or
the property
interest in
ownership interest
or stated
stated otherwise
otherwise –
one
taking 7
at the
the time
time of
the alleged
alleged taking
property at
of the

title to
taking is
who acquires
bring an
time of
eminent
the time
not entitled
entitled to
of taking
is not
to property
to the
to bring
an eminent
who
acquires title
subsequent to
property subsequent
20721, 78
domain
Dow, 357
104344 (1958)
domain proceeding.
proceeding. United
Ct. 1039,
United States
States v.
v. Dow,
357 U.S.
US. 17,
78 S.
S. Ct.
1039, 1043–44
17, 20–21,
(1958)

‘taking’ occurred
if the
(citations
while he
the ‘taking’
the
prevail only
he was
Dow can
can prevail
occurred While
(“Accordingly, Dow
was the
(citations omitted)
omitted) (“Accordingly,
only if

it is
that ‘(since)
‘(since) compensation
time of
owner.
the owner
For it
the time
is undisputed
is due
at the
of taking,
at
compensation is
owner at
owner. For
undisputed that
due at
taking, the
payment.”’); Wyatt
that time,
that
not the
the owner
the payment.’”);
later date,
earlier or
at an
an earlier
or later
owner at
receives the
United
v. United
time, not
date, receives
Wyatt v.

(“It is
that only
with aa valid
States,
persons with
271 F.3d
axiomatic that
Cir. 2001)
is axiomatic
valid
F.3d 1090,
1096 (Fed.
States, 271
1090, 1096
2001) (“It
(Fed. Cir.
only persons
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property interest
taking are
time of
the time
the taking
compensation”); Fritz
interest at
entitled to
Fritz v.
at the
of the
to compensation.”);
are entitled
v. Washoe
Washoe Cty.,
property
Cty.,
(“Takings claims
376
property at
with the
lie with
the party
the property
the
claims lie
at the
who owned
P.3d 794,
owned the
376 P.3d
796 (Nev.
2016) (“Takings
(Nev. 2016)
794, 796
party who

time
Dep’t’t of
Forests, Parks
Parks &
Recreation v.
Ludlow Zoning
taking occurred.”);
time the
Town of
the taking
occurred”); Dep
Zoning Bd.,
& Recreation
v. Town
ofLudlow
Bd.,
of Forests,
well-settled law
in
right to
869
that the
the right
A.2d 603,
is well-settled
to recover
law that
recover damages
damages in
869 A.2d
607 (Vt.
(“[I]t is
2004) (“[I]t
603, 607
(Vt. 2004)
‘belongs solely
in the
condemnation
proceedings ‘belongs
the person
the land
interest in
owning or
having an
condemnation proceedings
to the
or having
an interest
land
person owning
solely to

‘taking’ and
land.’”); Canney
it does
at
St. Petersburg,
Petersburg,
time of
with the
the time
not run
the land.’”);
the ‘taking’
at the
of the
run with
and it
does not
v. City
Canney v.
ofSt.
City of
(“Damages to
466
taking of
for the
the taking
Dist. Ct.
2d 1193,
1195 (Fla.
App. 1985)
to compensate
of
466 So.
Ct. App.
compensate for
So. 2d
1193, 1195
(Fla. Dist.
1985) (“Damages

land
belong to
for injury
not taken
the one
the land
taken belong
land or
or for
to land
land not
to the
land at
one who
who owns
owns the
taking
at the
the time
time of
the taking
injury to
of the
or
or injury.”);
App. 1998)
534 (Mo.
Ct. App.
Crede v.
S.W.2d 529,
v. City
Oak Grove,
979 S.W.2d
injury”); Crede
Grove, 979
(damage
1998) (damage
529, 534
(M0. Ct.
City of
of Oak
claim
pass to
not pass
claim based
on inverse
condemnation does
to subsequent
of land);
inverse condemnation
grantees of
subsequent grantees
Riddock v.
based on
does not
v.
land); Riddock
(“The only
City
Helena, 687
entitled to
to recover
P.2d 1386,
person entitled
recover
1388 (Mont.
687 P.2d
(Mont. 1984)
1386, 1388
1984) (“The
only person
City of
of Helena,

taking”); Hoover
damages
Hoover v.
time of
for condemnation
the owner
the land
the time
the taking.”);
condemnation is
is the
of the
land at
at the
of the
Pierce
owner of
damages for
v. Pierce
“Because the
right to
County,
the right
for an
to damages
an injury
P.2d 464,
App. 1995)
469 (Wash.
Ct. App.
damages for
903 P.2d
464, 469
(Wash. Ct.
injury
1995) (( “Because
County, 903

right belonging
right does
to
property is
property owner,
the property
the right
not pass
belonging to
to property
is aa personal
to the
to aa
personal right
does not
pass to
owner, the
Eminent Domain
subsequent
purchaser unless
unless expressly
Nichols on
Domain §§ 5.01[5][d],
on Eminent
at
subsequent purchaser
conveyed”); Nichols
expressly conveyed.”);
5.01[5][d], at

(“if the
5-37 (rev.3d
taking is
which the
5-37
from which
the parcel
the taking
after
of land
land from
is made
parcel of
hands after
changes hands
made changes
ed.2003) (“if
(reV.3d ed.2003)
right to
taking has
the
before compensation
been paid,
the taking
the right
the
to receive
compensation has
has occurred
but before
has been
receive the
occurred but
paid, the
land”).
compensation
with the
not run
the land”).
compensation does
run with
does not

In sum,
it is
the land
the taking,
the owner
In
been transferred
transferred or
land has
or sold
to the
is the
of
Where the
owner of
has been
sold subsequent
subsequent to
taking, it
sum, where
right to
taking who
time of
the propeny
the time
the taking
the right
the
property at
entitled to
of the
is entitled
to compensation.
to
at the
compensation. Accordingly,
who is
Accordingly, the
right is
time of
that right
the taking,
the owner
the time
not transferred
compensation
belongs to
transferred to
to the
at the
of the
is not
to aa
compensation belongs
owner at
and that
taking, and

subsequent
subsequent owner.
owner.
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Here,
taking occurred
that the
the parties
the taking
the Isaacs
parties stipulated
on December
when the
stipulated that
December 5,
occurred on
Isaacs
Here, the
1997, when
5, 1997,

At that
Canyon
project was
that time,
the owners
the Day
Interchange project
of the
completed. At
owners of
was substantially
substantially completed.
time, the
Canyon Interchange
Day
Property
Ben Day,
holding an
Donna Day
an equal
David Day
included: Ben
and David
one
equal one
Property included:
Jacobs, and
(each holding
Day Jacobs,
Day (each
Day, Donna
ninth share),
ninth
Living Trust
the Ernest
Ernest and
holding an
Lois Day
an equal
Trust (each
and Bob
Bob Day
and the
and Lois
one
equal one
(each holding
share), and
Day and
Day Living

In 1998,
third
third share).
Living Trust
the Ernest
Ernest and
transferred and
Lois Day
Trust transferred
Bob Day
and the
and Lois
and
share). In
1998, Bob
Day and
Day Living
in the
In 2013,
disposed
their respective
Ben Day
his
the Day
interests in
transferred his
of their
respective interests
disposed of
2013, Ben
Propeny. In
Day transferred
Day Property.

At the
interest
was filed,
was owned
by
time the
his LLC.
the time
the Complaint
the Day
interest to
Complaint was
to his
LLC. At
owned by
Property was
ﬁled, the
Day Property
Holcomb
the Donald
Donna Day
Marjorie Day
Donald M.
M. Day
Holcomb Road
David Day,
and Marjorie
Road LLC,
Jacobs, David
LLC, Donna
Day Jacobs,
Day and
Day
Day, the
Family
Dan E.
E. Day,
John F.
F. Day.
and John
Family Trust,
Trust, Dan
Day.
Day, and

in the
Only
the date
the
the Day
interest in
Donna Day
held any
on the
of the
David Day
and David
date of
Jacobs and
Property on
Only Donna
Day Jacobs
Day held
any interest
Day Property
7 December
taking
taking –
Plaintiffs assert
that this
this is
the Day
is irrelevant,
December 5,
assert that
1997. Plaintiffs
irrelevant, because
because the
Property
Day Property
5, 1997.

right to
(and
within the
for inverse
the family
transferred within
to sue
inverse condemnation)
has merely
been transferred
sue for
condemnation) has
family
merely been
(and any
any right
in 1935.
first acquired
Plaintiffs
since
by the
the Day
the Day
since the
acquired by
1935. However,
was first
However, Plaintiffs
Property was
family in
Day Property
Day family
in 2005
third party
overlook
was sold
party buyer
that the
that
the fact
the Day
fact that
to aa third
overlook the
and owned
sold to
2005 and
owned by
Property was
buyer in
Day Property
by that

If that
third party
third
buyer for
purchase of
that buyer
the
the purchase
for three
three years.
of the
on the
never defaulted
had never
defaulted on
years. If
buyer had
party buyer
in the
property, the
would have
the Days
the Day
interest in
again acquired
never again
acquired any
have never
Therefore,
Property. Therefore,
property,
Days would
any interest
Day Property.

Plaintiffs assert.
the
been merely
the Day
intra-family transfers
the Plaintiffs
not been
transfers as
to intra-family
has not
assert.
subject to
as the
Property has
merely subject
Day Property

it is
in 2005,
Moreover,
undisputed that
that Groves,
is undisputed
no
purchaser in
had no
have had
subsequent purchaser
would have
as a
a subsequent
Moreover, it
Groves, as
2005, would
right to
in 1997.
taking that
that occurred
right
bring suit
to bring
suit based
on aa taking
occurred in
1997.
based on

Plaintiffs contend
that they
the 1997
the various
Plaintiffs
because the
standing to
to sue
on the
contend that
alleged taking,
various
1997 alleged
have standing
sue on
taking, because
they have
“hereditaments” or
transferring the
transferring “hereditaments”
the Day
all contained
deeds
or
contained language
language transferring
deeds transferring
Propeny all
Day Property
“appurtenances,” which
ITD asserts
right to
that an
“appurtenances,”
which included
for inverse
an
to sue
condemnation. ITD
inverse condemnation.
included aa right
asserts that
sue for
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and Order
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inverse
personal property,
property, which
which was
not explicitly
claim constitutes
transferred
condemnation claim
inverse condemnation
constitutes personal
was not
explicitly transferred
through
through the
the various
various deeds.
deeds.

Idaho
provides:
Idaho Code
Code §
73-114(2)(c), (e)
(6) provides:
§ 73-114(2)(c),
“Personal property”
property” includes
in action,
“Personal
things in
includes money,
evidences
chattels, things
action, evidences
goods, chattels,
money, goods,
code-in the
of
uniform commercial
the uniform
intangibles as
of debt
commercial code-general intangibles
defined in
and general
debt and
as defined
secured
transactions.
secured transactions.
...

“Real propeny”
“Real
property” is
with lands,
tenements and
is coextensive
coextensive with
and hereditaments,
hereditaments,
lands, tenements
possessory rights
rights and
claims.
and claims.
possessory

“thing in
“chose in
action” (or
action”) is
in action”)
right to
A “thing
in action”
(Emphasis
is essentially
to sue:
sue:
essentially aa right
(Emphasis added.)
added.) A
(or “chose

A proprietary
right in
in personam,
1.
person, aa share
another person,
1. A
share
such as
debt owed
as a
a debt
owed by
personam, such
proprietary right
by another
right to
in aa joint-stock
in tort.
in
joint-stock company,
bring an
The right
for damages
claim for
tort. 2.
to bring
an
2. The
or aa claim
damages in
company, or
action
person
thing. 3.
that one
action to
to recover
or thing.
Personal property
one person
recover aa debt,
3. Personal
property that
debt, money,
money, or
owns
possession
the owner
regain possession
another person
being able
to regain
person possesses,
owner being
but another
owns but
able to
possesses, the
thing in
in action;
right in
in action.
through
through aa lawsuit.
Also termed
termed thing
action.
lawsuit. — Also
action; right

7

“chose” (10th
Black’s Law
Black’s
Law Dictionary,
ed. 2014).
2014).
Dictionary, “chose”
(10th ed.

“thing
A claim
right or
A
based on
for damages
claim for
or aa “thing
on inverse
condemnation is
is thus
thus aa personal
personal property
inverse condemnation
damages based
property right
action.” Idaho
55-402 provides
in action.”
thing in
in action
in
provides that
be transferred
that aa thing
the owner:
transferred by
action may
Idaho Code
owner:
Code §§ 55-402
may be
by the

A thing
thing in
in action
right of
A
violation of
arising out
the Violation
action arising
of the
of aa right
of property,
or out
of an
an
out of
out of
property, or
it
obligation,
by the
the owner.
the death
the owner
transferred by
of the
death of
owner it
owner. Upon
Upon the
be transferred
obligation, may
may be
in the
in the
passes to
where, in
his personal
the cases
the
to his
personal representatives,
except Where,
provided in
passes
representatives, except
cases provided
it passes
in office.
Code
passes to
his devisees
CiVil Procedure,
of Civil
to his
or successor
office.
devisees or
successor in
Code of
Procedure, it
A thing
thing or
in action
in Idaho:
A
or chose
action can
can generally
Idaho:
assigned in
chose in
be assigned
generally be
“choses in
assignable.” Purco
It is
in Idaho
in action
that “choses
It
is settled
action are
settled in
Idaho that
Purco Fleet
are generally
Fleet
generally assignable.”
Servs.,
Inc. v.
Idaho State
Dep’t of
Fin., 140
140 Idaho
Idaho 121,
351
P.3d 346,
v. Idaho
State Dep’t
90 P.3d
Servs., Inc.
121, 126,
126, 90
346, 351
0fFin.,
“An
in action
(2004).
the chose
the assignee
transfers to
of the
action transfers
to the
assignment of
and divests
assignee and
divests
chose in
(2004). “An assignment
right to
the
the assignor
all control
the cause
the assignee
control and
of all
to the
of action,
assignor of
and right
and the
assignee
cause of
action, and
interest.” Id.
in interest.”
becomes the
Id. Thereafter,
the assignee
the real
real party
assignee may
becomes
Thereafter, “[o]nly
“[o]nly the
party in
may
action.”
in action.”
prosecute an
the chose
an action
action on
on the
prosecute
chose in
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St.
Luke’s Magic
Magic Valley
Reg’l’1 Med.
Med. Ctr.
Luciani, 154
154 Idaho
Idaho 37,
293 P.3d
Ctr. v.
P.3d 661,
St. Luke’s
v. Luciani,
665 (2013).
661, 665
Valley Reg
41, 293
(2013).
37, 41,

In Purco
in
In
Purco Fleet
Fleet Services,
the Supreme
the assignment
assignment of
explained the
of aa chose
further explained
Court further
Supreme Court
chose in
Services, the

action:
action:
“the transfer
“Assignment” is
Black’s Law
property.” Black’s
“Assignment”
rights or
transfer of
is defined
of rights
or property.”
deﬁned as
Law
as “the
Dictionary
115 (7th
American Jurisprudence,
deﬁnes
Second Edition,
Edition, defines
Dictionary 115
Jurisprudence, Second
ed.1999). American
(7th ed.1999).
“assignment” as:
“assignment”
as:
right from
. . . aa transfer
property or
person (the
from one
transfer of
other right
of property
or some
one person
some other
(the
‘assignor’)
‘assignee’), which
‘assignor’) to
which confers
another (the
to another
confers aa complete
complete and
and
(the ‘assignee’),
right in
in the
An assignment
present right
the subject
matter to
the assignee.
present
to the
is a
assignment is
assignee. An
subject matter
a
contract
the assignor
the assignee,
interpreted or
contract between
is interpreted
or
and the
and is
assignor and
between the
assignee, and
in accordance
construed
the
to rules
of contract
contract construction.
construction. Ordinarily,
construed in
accordance to
rules of
Ordinarily, the
‘assignment’ is
in its
word ‘assignment’
limited in
intangible
its application
transfer of
application to
of intangible
is limited
to aa transfer
word
in action,
in or
rights,
rights in
including contractual
or
contractual rights,
and rights
choses in
rights, choses
rights, including
action, and
connected
with property,
property
from transfer
the property
transfer of
distinguished from
of the
connected with
as distinguished
property, as
right
itself.
the Restatement
itself. According
Restatement of
According to
to the
of Contracts,
an assignment
of aa right
assignment of
Contracts, an
assignor’s intention
it by
is
virtue
of
intention to
the assignor’s
transfer it
manifestation of
is a
of the
to transfer
of
ViITue
a manifestation
by
assignor’s right
right to
in
which the
by the
the assignor’s
the obligor
which
to performance
performance by
obligor is
is extinguished
extinguished in
in part
right to
whole or
part and
performance.
the assignee
or in
to such
Whole
and the
assignee acquires
acquires aa right
such performance.
.

66 Am.Jur.2d
Assignment §§ 11 (1999).
Am.Jur.2d Assignment
(1999).
To
be effective,
be completed
with aa delivery,
the
assignment must
To be
an assignment
must be
completed with
and the
effective, an
delivery, and
right on
delivery
present right
the transferee.
The
on the
must confer
confer aa complete
transferee. The
complete and
and present
delivery must
assignor
the authority
not retain
retain control
the property
control over
must not
assignor must
over the
authority
assigned, the
property assigned,
to
the power
to collect,
or the
to revoke.
revoke.
power to
collect, or
66 Am.Jur.2d
Assignment §§ 132
132 (1999).
Am.Jur.2d Assignment
(1999).
3507
125726, 90
Purco Fleet
Fleet Servs.,
Inc. v.
Idaho State
Dep’t’t of
Fin., 140
140 Idaho
Purco
Idaho 121,
P.3d 346,
v. Idaho
State Dep
90 P.3d
Servs., Inc.
121, 125–26,
346, 350–
0fFin.,

‘assignment’ is
in its
forth above,
51
word ‘assignment’
limited in
the word
its application
transfer of
application to
51 (2004).
As set
is limited
to aa transfer
of
set forth
above, the
(2004). As

in action,
from the
intangible
intangible rights,
the transfer
the
transfer of
which is
is distinguishable
distinguishable from
of the
such as
choses in
as choses
rights, such
action, which

property itself.
itself.
property

“intra-family” transferred
transferring the
None of
personal property
the deeds
the Day
transferred personal
None
of the
deeds transferring
Property “intra-family”
property
Day Property
right to
rights such
Plaintiffs did
maintain an
rights
present any
not present
to maintain
an inverse
condemnation suit.
inverse condemnation
suit. Plaintiffs
did not
such as
as a
a right
any
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member’s personal
evidence
personal property
property rights.
rights. Moreover,
assignment of
of any
of aa family
none of
of
evidence of
Moreover, none
family member’s
any assignment

the
proposition that
property also
Plaintiffs stand
that deeds
transferring property
the cases
for the
the proposition
transfer
cited by
stand for
also transfer
cases cited
deeds transferring
by Plaintiffs
44
condemnation.44
right to
aa personal
personal property
property right,
The
for inverse
The clear
weight of
to sue
of
inverse condemnation.
clear weight
such as
as a
a right
sue for
right, such

right to
authority
personal to
that aa right
maintain an
the owner
the
is that
to maintain
an inverse
condemnation suit
suit is
is personal
to the
of the
inverse condemnation
owner of
authority is

property at
time of
the time
the taking.
taking.
at the
of the
property

right to
Although
be assigned,
that the
Although aa right
the owners
the Day
there is
to sue
is no
no evidence
of the
can be
owners of
evidence that
sue can
assigned, here,
here, there
Day
in 1997
right to
Property
for inverse
the current
current
to sue
condemnation to
t0 the
inverse condemnation
1997 explicitly
assigned any
sue for
explicitly assigned
Property in
any right

owners
time of
the time
the
the Day
the owners
the Day
at the
of the
of the
of the
owners of
owners of
Therefore, only
Property. Therefore,
Property at
only the
Day Property.
Day Property
taking
taking have
that alleged
for that
taking. Accordingly,
all of
the Plaintiffs,
for
standing to
to sue
of the
except for
alleged taking.
have standing
Plaintiffs, except
sue for
Accordingly, all
Donna
Donna Day
DISMISSED.
R. Day,
David R.
and David
are DISMISSED.
Jacobs and
Day Jacobs
Day, are

Moreover,
breach of
Plaintiffs have
the Plaintiffs
standing to
none of
of the
to sue
on any
of contract
contract based
on
alleged breach
have standing
sue on
based on
Moreover, none
any alleged
45
contract).45
Right of
Plaintiffs were
the
None of
were
the Plaintiffs
the 1967
other 1960s
of Way
Contract (or
None
of the
1967 Right
19605 contract).
(or any
any other
Way Contract

party to
with the
that any
ran with
the Day
the contract.
there
There is
is no
no evidence
contract ran
to the
contract. There
and there
evidence that
Property, and
patty
Day Property,
any contract
rights to
is
that Emma
Emma Day
her three
the 1967
the
three sons
is no
no evidence
or her
Contract rights
to any
of the
assigned the
evidence that
sons assigned
1967 Contract
Day or
any of

Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs.

Accordingly,
the breach
the accompanying
implied
of contract
contract and
of implied
breach of
breach of
and the
accompanying breach
Accordingly, the

faith and
covenant
fair dealing
DISMISSED.
dealing claims
claims are
of good
covenant of
and fair
are DISMISSED.
good faith

44
44

right to
in
intra-family transfers
chain of
transfer some
Even
was broken
the chain
transfers was
the deeds
to sue,
of intra-family
broken in
Even if the
did somehow
somehow validly
some right
deeds did
validly transfer
sue, the
2005
property was
the property
the Day
when the
to someone
was sold
someone outside
outside the
2005 when
sold to
family.
Day family.
45
45
“The parties
Right of
The
provided: “The
whole of
their
The 1967
parties have
herein set
the whole
Contract specifically
of Way
have herein
of their
set out
out the
1967 Right
speciﬁcally provided:
Way Contract
agreement,
performance of
which constitutes
way and
grant of
right of
shall
the performance
the entire
entire consideration
for the
the grant
and shall
consideration for
of which
of said
said right
of way
constitutes the
agreement, the
relieve
all further
that account
the State
claims or
the location,
and
State of
obligations on
further claims
of all
or obligations
on that
or on
on account
of the
grade and
relieve the
account or
account of
location, grade
highway.”
construction
the proposed
of the
construction of
proposed highway.”
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2.
Limitations
Statute of
2. Statute
of Limitations

Plaintiffs’ claims
ITD asserts
ITD
barred by
by the
that Plaintiffs’
the applicable
claims are
of limitations,
applicable statute
are barred
and Steven
Steven
asserts that
statute of
limitations, and
Parry’s promise
promise to
Parry’s
limitations defense
not assert
the statute
to not
of limitations
of
extended the
assert aa statute
statute of
defense only
statute of
only extended

ITD also
limitations
by one
from the
limitations by
the date
his promise.
of his
additional statutory
promise. ITD
period from
contends
one additional
date of
also contends
statutory period
Plaintiffs’ equitable
that
waiver defenses
that Plaintiffs’
fail.
equitable estoppel
estoppel and
and waiver
defenses fail.

Plaintiffs
begin to
until 2016
when the
Plaintiffs contend
taking
that the
limitations did
the statute
not begin
the taking
of limitations
to run
2016 when
contend that
run until
did not
statute of
doctrine”
“justifiable uncertainty
became fully
permanent. Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs contend
the “justifiable
apparent and
contend the
and permanent.
became
uncertainty doctrine”
fully apparent
Parry’s promise
delayed
waived the
their claims.
Plaintiffs assert
that Parry’s
the accrual
the
of their
promise effectively
claims. Plaintiffs
assert that
accrual of
effectively waived
delayed the

statute
until such
Plaintiffs
time as
limitations defense
of limitations
both parties
parties failed
failed to
to agree
on access.
statute of
defense until
such time
as both
agree on
access. Plaintiffs
assert
that they
that these
principles mandate
mandate
these principles
equitable estoppel,
assert that
pled waiver
waiver and
and equitable
and that
estoppel, and
adequately pled
they adequately
in turn.
that
Will be
that the
limitations cannot
the statute
argument will
Each argument
of limitations
cannot be
turn.
statute of
asserted. Each
addressed in
be asserted.
be addressed

a.
Date of
Condemnation Date
Accrual
a. Inverse
of Accrual
Inverse Condemnation

“must be
A claim
Within four
A
be commenced
years after
for inverse
the cause
claim for
after the
condemnation “must
four (4)
of
inverse condemnation
commenced within
cause of
(4) years
accrued.” I.C.
5-224; C
action
Inc. v.
Highway Dist.
Dist. N0.
No. 4,
shall have
action shall
Idaho
139 Idaho
have accrued.”
I.C. §§ 5-224;
C&
& G,
v. Canyon
Canyon Highway
G, Inc.
4, 139

“project completion”
completion” rule
140,
determining
the “project
for determining
follows the
Idaho follows
197 (2003).
P.3d 194,
rule for
75 P.3d
140, 143,
143, 75
194, 197
(2003). Idaho

“a private
citizen Whose
when aa claim
private citizen
whose land
for inverse
claim for
taken by
when
condemnation accrues:
land is
is taken
inverse condemnation
means
accrues: “a
by means
right to
of
project has
wait until
until completion
project before
the right
the project
his or
her
completion of
of aa construction
to wait
of the
or her
construction project
has the
before his

limitations.” C
inverse
for purposes
the statute
claim accrues
condemnation claim
of calculating
calculating the
of limitations.”
inverse condemnation
statute of
accrues for
purposes of
C&
&
“The project
G,
Inc., 139
judicial
completion rule
at 144,
at 198.
promotes judicial
Idaho at
project completion
139 Idaho
P.3d at
198. “The
rule promotes
75 P.3d
144, 75
G, Inc.,
case.” Id.
in aa takings
economy
which benefits
parties involved
Id.
all parties
takings case.”
beneﬁts all
involved in
and certainty,
economy and
certainty, which
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Here,
parties stipulated
was substantially
that the
the parties
the Isaacs
Interchange project
stipulated that
project was
Isaacs Canyon
substantially
Here, the
Canyon Interchange
completed
project was
was
taking occurred
the date
the alleged
of the
on December
December 5,
completed and
and the
alleged taking
date of
occurred on
1997. (The
(The project
5, 1997.

April 6,
deemed
of April
completed as
deemed fully
as of
1998.)
fully completed
6, 1998.)

Plaintiffs
until the
became fully
Plaintiffs assert
taking became
that the
limitations did
the statute
not begin
running until
the taking
of limitations
begin running
assert that
did not
statute of
fully
apparent
permanent. They
their inverse
limitations on
the statute
apparent and
of limitations
on their
condemnation
contend the
statute of
inverse condemnation
and permanent.
They contend
ITD was
it became
claim
when it
became clear
was not
until May
that ITD
not going
going to
not start
claim did
start accruing
to
clear that
did not
accruing until
2016, when
16, 2016,
May 16,

provide access
the Day
to the
provide
access to
Property.
Day Property.

Plaintiffs’ assertion,
Contrary
was fully
the lack
the Day
to Plaintiffs’
lack of
of access
to the
apparent and
and
access to
assertion, the
Property was
Contrary to
fully apparent
Day Property
in their
permanent as
Plaintiffs even
their Complaint:
permanent
Complaint:
of December
December 5,
acknowledged as
even acknowledged
such in
1997. Plaintiffs
as of
as such
5, 1997.
in approximately
13.
the construction
ﬁnished in
When the
construction had
had finished
13. When
approximately 1997,
however,
1997, however,
Eisenman
been
not extended
the Day
Eisenman Road
or connected
to the
extended or
had been
connected to
Road was
was not
as had
Property as
Day Property
Property’s direct
failing to
promised. By
public
the Day
the public
to restore
direct access
to the
restore the
promised.
access to
Day Property’s
By failing
ITD took
roads
the Day
the frontage
frontage road
took
to near
near the
when the
extended to
road was
roads when
was extended
Property, ITD
Day Property,
Family’s recorded
right without
the
without providing
just compensation.
the Day
providing just
compensation.
recorded property
property right
Day Family’s

14.
was also
portions of
14. The
The Interchange
the top
the
Interchange was
top of
of portions
of the
constructed over
also constructed
over the
right-of-Way jeep
trail that
unimproved 50
public right-of-way
jeep trail
that had
the
ft. public
unimproved
had previously
connected the
50 ft.
previously connected
Gowen
with the
the
the Day
Eisenman Road
Interchange and
and Eisenman
Road with
Gowen Interchange
Therefore, the
Property. Therefore,
Day Property.
Day
with no
further landlocked,
frontage on
no direct
direct access
or frontage
on any
was further
access or
landlocked, with
Property was
Day Property
any
public road
unimproved
the public
through an
Without even
to the
an unimproved
public
public roads
and without
road and
even access
roads through
access to
“right-of-Way” jeep
ITD took
“right-of-way”
jeep trail,
before the
the case
the Interchange.
Interchange. ITD
took
had been
been the
as had
case before
trail, as
46
compensation.46
right-of—way
that
without providing
just compensation.
that right-of-way access
providing just
access Without

ITD’s post-project
Plaintiffs’ arguments
with access
that ITD’s
the Day
Plaintiffs’
post-project efforts
provide the
efforts to
to provide
arguments that
access
Property with
Day Property
limitation’s date
the statute
not supported
somehow
by
unavailing and
of limitation’s
of accrual
is unavailing
extended the
and not
somehow extended
statute of
supported by
date of
accrual is

If anything,
this argument
the equitable
Idaho
waiver
is more
more applicable
to the
Idaho law.
applicable to
equitable estoppel
estoppel and
and waiver
argument is
law. If
anything, this
defenses
defenses discussed
below.
discussed below.
46
4"

13—14.
Compl.
¶¶ 13—14.
Compl. w
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Based
parties’ stipulation,
project was
the date
the Isaacs
the parties’
Interchange project
on the
and the
date the
Based on
Isaacs Canyon
was
stipulation, and
Canyon Interchange
substantially
that the
limitations on
the Court
the statute
the inverse
ﬁnds that
of limitations
on the
condemnation
inverse condemnation
Court finds
statute of
substantially complete,
complete, the
claim
claim began
December 5,
accruing December
began accruing
1997.
5, 1997.

47
Accrual47
b.
Date of
Breach of
Contract Date
of Contract
of Accrual
b. Breach

“A
5-216. “A
An action
An
based upon
upon aa written
be commenced
within five
written contract
contract must
must be
action based
commenced Within
ﬁve years.
I.C. §§ 5-216.
years. I.C.
cause
breach of
breach even
for breach
the breach
though no
of action
action for
no damage
of contract
contract accrues
upon the
even though
damage may
occur
cause of
accrues upon
may occur
later.” Mason
Mason v.
Assocs., 125
until later.”
until
125 Idaho
App. 1994).
P.2d 846,
Idaho 429,
871 P.2d
Tucker &
853 (Ct.
v. Tucker
& Assocs.,
1994).
429, 436,
846, 853
436, 871
(Ct. App.

in their
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs alleged
their Complaint:
Complaint:
alleged in

In 1996-97,
ITD breached
In
by constructing
the
the agreement
the Interchange
Interchange and
agreement by
constructing the
1996-97, ITD
and the
breached the
extension
but not
with the
the frontage
not connecting
the Day
the
frontage road
extension of
connecting the
of the
road but
Propeny with
Day Property
48
roads.48
public roads.
public
Plaintiffs now
their breach
However,
breach of
that their
not accrue
claim did
of contract
contract claim
now contradictorily
did not
argue that
contradictorily argue
accrue
However, Plaintiffs
State’s promise
“permanently breached,”
until
until the
promise to
provide access
was “permanently
breached,”
the State’s
the Day
to provide
to the
access to
Property was
Day Property

in May
Plaintiffs provide
which was
was alleged
provide no
this bare
for this
which
no authority
of 2016.
to have
2016. Plaintiffs
alleged to
bare
have occurred
occurred in
authority for
May of
making this
and
judicially estopped
from making
this
the Court
ﬁnds they
Court finds
and conclusory
and the
are judicially
estopped from
assertion, and
conclusory assertion,
they are
49
claim.49
claim.

47
47

Although
that the
fail based
Although the
standing analysis,
the Court
the breach
claims fail
the Court
contract claims
breach of
of contract
on aa standing
Court previously
found that
Court
based on
previously found
analysis, the
also
untimely.
fail as
the breach
claims fail
are untimely.
contract claims
also finds
ﬁnds the
breach of
of contract
as they
they are
48
48
Compl.
Compl. 11¶ 55.
55.
49
49
taking one
from advantageously
then subsequently
Judicial
party from
position, then
Judicial estoppel
seeking aa second
estoppel precludes
one position,
precludes aa party
second
advantageously taking
subsequently seeking
position that
A&
J Const. Co.
141 Idaho
that is
14 (2005).
116 P.3d
the first.
incompatible with
ﬁrst. A
position
is incompatible
with the
v. Wood,
Idaho 682,
Co. v.
P.3d 12,
& JConsl.
12, 14
682, 684,
684, 116
Wood, 141
(2005).
“the integrity
The
policy behind
judicial estoppel
protect “the
judicial system,
the orderly
The policy
the judicial
protecting the
behind judicial
is to
to protect
of the
estoppel is
integrity of
orderly
system, by
by protecting
proceeding.” Id.
administration
justice and
judicial proceeding.”
at 685,
at 15.
having regard
administration of
and having
for the
the dignity
the judicial
116 P.3d
regard for
of the
ofjustice
Id. at
15.
P.3d at
dignity of
685, 116
Broadly
parties from
see also
it is
from playing
fast and
legal system.
and loose
the legal
is intended
intended to
to prevent
prevent parties
with the
31
also 31
loose with
accepted, it
Broadly accepted,
playing fast
system. Id.;
101.; see
C.J.S.
and Waiver
Estoppel and
Waiver §§ 186
186 (2012).
C.J.S. Estoppel
(2012).
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The
breach of
that the
limitations on
The Court
the statute
the breach
thus concludes
of limitations
on the
of contract
contract claims
claims began
Court thus
statute of
began
concludes that
it was
accruing
was fully
that the
the Day
longer had
no longer
apparent that
when it
December 5,
had
accruing December
Property no
fully apparent
1997, when
Day Property
5, 1997,
right of
access
the future
frontage road
to the
of way.
road right
future frontage
access to
way.

Parry’s Promise
c.
Promise
c. Parry’s

,

7 an
Day’s attorney
ITD – wrote
On
wrote the
time for
the Day’s
the time
for ITD
On July
an attorney
at the
Steven Parry
attorney aa
attorney at
2000, Steven
Parry –
19, 2000,
July 19,

“I will
in part,
letter,
part, “I
will also
you that
that the
will not
the Department
Department will
not assert
which stated
represent to
to you
stated in
assert any
also represent
letter, which
any
50
reached.”50
if an
There
type
be reached.”
limitations defense
There
of statute
of limitations
an agreement
agreement on
on new
cannot be
new access
statute of
defense if
access cannot
type of

Parry’s 2000
ITD made
is
promise) that
promise
from Parry’s
that ITD
other promise
allegation (aside
is no
no evidence
or allegation
evidence or
2000 promise)
made any
(aside from
any other

it would
or
limitations defense.
not assert
representation it
or representation
of limitations
assert aa statute
statute of
defense.
would not

Parry’s promise
Plaintiffs contend
Plaintiffs
that Parry’s
limitations defense.
promise effectively
of limitations
contend that
statute of
defense.
waived any
effectively waived
any statute

Plaintiffs assert
their detriment
Plaintiffs
waiver to
that they
the waiver
detriment and
the benefit
the State.
benefit of
relied on
on the
to their
to the
of the
assert that
and to
State.
they relied

Parry’s promise
ITD counters
ITD
promise merely
that under
the statute
5-238, Parry’s
of
under Idaho
Idaho Code
counters that
extended the
statute of
Code §
merely extended
§ 5-238,

ITD also
limitations
by one
from the
limitations period
the date
the promise.
additional statutory
of the
promise. ITD
period by
period from
one additional
date of
also
statutory period
Plaintiffs’ arguments
counters
that the
limitations was
all of
the statute
the
of Plaintiffs’
arguments that
tolled based
on the
of limitations
counters all
statute of
was tolled
based on

justifiable uncertainty
uncertainty doctrine,
justiﬁable
equitable estoppel,
and waiver.
waiver.
doctrine, equitable
estoppel, and

50
50

Comp.
Ex. 15.
15.
Comp. Ex.
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5-238
i.
Idaho Code
i. Idaho
Code §
§ 5-238

5-238 provides:
Idaho
provides:
Idaho Code
Code §
§ 5-238

No
continuing
sufﬁcient evidence
of aa new
N0 acknowledgment
or promise
promise is
is sufficient
or continuing
acknowledgment or
new or
evidence of
contract
which
to
take
the
case
out
of
the
operation
of
this
chapter,
unless
take
this
the
the
contract by
operation
which
to
of
of
out
unless
case
chapter,
by
the
in some
the same
the party
contained in
same is
is contained
to be
charged
signed by
some writing,
be charged
writing, signed
party to
by the
thereby;
payment of
principal or
promise
interest is
of principal
or interest
is equivalent
to aa new
equivalent to
new promise
but any
thereby; but
any payment
in writing,
in
writing, duly
pay the
the residue
the debt.
to pay
of the
residue of
debt.
signed, to
duly signed,
(Emphasis
this statute
interpreting this
all involve
collection actions.
involve debt
actions. However,
statute all
debt collection
Cases interpreting
(Emphasis added.)
However, aa
added.) Cases
plain reading
that the
plain
the statute
the entire
entire chapter
the statute
regarding statutes
to the
chapter regarding
reading of
of the
applies to
statute applies
statute shows
statutes
shows that
5-238 hold
of
interpreting Idaho
that such
limitations. Cases
of limitations.
hold that
an acknowledgement
or
acknowledgement or
Idaho Code
such an
Cases interpreting
Code §
§ 5-238
re-starts the
promise re-starts
Moulton v.
limitations. See
the applicable
of limitations.
promise
Idaho 424,
applicable statute
statute of
See Moulton
v. Williams,
55
Williams, 66 Idaho
424, 55

(“The effect
P.
the bar,
to furnish,
P. 1019,
1019 (1899)
effect of
of said
to remove
acknowledgment was
and to
remove the
said acknowledgment
was to
furnish,
1019, 1019
bar, and
(1899) (“The
‘take the
operation’ of
‘sufﬁcient evidence’
evidence’ to
under the
limitation
the statute,
the operation’
the case
of the
of our
to ‘take
under
out of
our limitation
case out
statute, ‘sufficient
144 Idaho
statutes,
bar of
Horkley v.
Horkley, 144
the running
running of
the bar
the statute.”);
statute.”); Horkley
start anew
of the
of the
Idaho
and start
anew the
v. Horkley,
statutes, and

879,
1140 (2007).
173 P.3d
P.3d 1138,
1138, 1140
881, 173
879, 881,
(2007).

Parry’s promise
Therefore,
promise merely
the Court
5-238, Parry’s
Court concludes
Under Idaho
Idaho Code
concludes that,
Code §§ 5-238,
Therefore, the
that, Under
merely

extended
limitations to
the statute
the inverse
of limitations
to July
2004 on
on the
condemnation claim,
to
inverse condemnation
extended the
and to
statute of
claim, and
19, 2004
July 19,
11 or
12 years
breach of
years later,
July
the breach
The Complaint,
filed 11
of contract
contract claims.
or 12
on the
claims. The
2005 on
was
Complaint, filed
later, was
19, 2005
July 19,

next consider
thus
untimely and
we must
the statute
limitations. However,
Whether
thus untimely
of limitations.
must next
consider whether
and barred
barred by
statute of
However, we
by the

tolling the
various equitable
principles mandate
the statute
limitations.
of limitations.
mandate tolling
equitable principles
various
statute of
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ii.
Justifiable Uncertainty
ii. Justifiable
Doctrine
Uncertainty Doctrine

“justifiable uncertainty”
uncertainty” doctrine
in the
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs assert
this Court
the
the “justifiable
follow the
doctrine developed
Court should
assert this
should follow
developed in

ITD’s failure
United
Plaintiffs contend
that ITD’s
through on
failure to
United States
of Federal
to follow
follow through
on
Federal Claims.
Claims. Plaintiffs
contend that
Court of
States Court

its
promise to
Plaintiffs
the date
the claims
its promise
of accrual
of the
claims to
to 2016.
to provide
2016. Plaintiffs
provide access
has delayed
date of
accrual of
access has
delayed the
rely
Applegate v.
Banks v.
on Applegate
25 F.3d
Cir. 1994)
and Banks
F.3d 1579
1579 (Fed.
United States,
United States,
v. United
v. United
States, 25
States,
1994) and
(Fed. Cir.
rely on
in support
314
their assertion.
314 F.3d
1304 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
of their
support of
assertion.
F.3d 1304
(Fed. Cir.
2003) in

ITD contends
it is
in this
ITD
justifiable uncertainty
uncertainty doctrine
this case,
the justiﬁable
is applied
doctrine is
is inapplicable
inapplicable in
applied
contends the
because it
case, because
in rare
in
where the
promised to
mitigate the
the government
the impact
impact of
government has
of aa
rare cases
to take
take action
action to
to mitigate
has promised
cases Where

gradual
creating aa take.
take.
gradual physical
process creating
physical process

deep-water harbor.
In Applegate,
in 1952,
In
Applegate, in
Applegate
the Army
Engineers constructed
of Engineers
harbor. Applegate
constructed aa deep-water
Corps of
1952, the
Army Corps

v.
year the
From 1952
the lawsuit
1952 to
to 1994
1994 (the
25 F.3d
Cir. 1994).
lawsuit
F.3d 1579,
1580 (Fed.
United States,
v. United
1994). From
States, 25
1579, 1580
(Fed. Cir.
(the year
was filed),
project
the project
was
ﬁled), the
north of
caused
the shoreline
the harbor
the shoreline
the south
shoreline north
shoreline to
of the
harbor to
to accrete
to the
south
and the
accrete and
caused the
to
The landowners
the harbor.
the
to recede.
of the
to the
harbor. Due
landowners own
south of
own property
Due to
recede. The
property south
interruption
littoral flow
the littoral
the landowners
shoreline
interruption of
of the
of sand,
lost shoreline
landowners have
ﬂow of
have lost
sand, the
property. The
washed away
The erosion
portions of
of
inundated portions
erosion has
has permanently
and inundated
permanently washed
property.
away and
landowners’
In
each
the erosion
the shoreline
the landowners’ property.
shoreline threatens
threatens
of the
of the
erosion of
each of
property. In fact,
fact, the
in this
homesites
this region.
region.
homesites in

trial court
the applicable
The trial
the action
limitations.
Id. The
untimely under
under the
action as
of limitations.
court dismissed
applicable statute
Id.
dismissed the
statute of
as untimely
ﬁnding that
that decision,
that under
the Court
However,
of Appeals
under United
Court of
Appeals reversed
reversed that
United States
States v.
v.
decision, finding
However, the

ﬁling aa
plaintiff can
Dickinson, 331
91 L.
L. Ed.
331 U.S.
Ct. 1382,
Ed. 1789
can postpone
postpone filing
1789 (1947),
US. 745,
67 S.
S. Ct.
Dickinson,
1382, 91
745, 67
(1947), aa plaintiff
“continuing process
events.” Id.
taking is
takings lawsuit
the taking
takings
process of
physical events.”
Id. at
is effected
of physical
at
lawsuit where
where the
effected by
by aa “continuing

“slow physical
government’s promise
process,” the
In addition
1581
physical process,”
promise to
the government’s
the “slow
to
1581 (emphasis
addition to
to the
(emphasis added.)
added.) In
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and Order
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in 1962
in 1988)
install
plant (authorized
uncertainty for
install aa sand
for the
the
transfer plant
1962 and
again in
and again
created uncertainty
sand transfer
(authorized in
1988) created

“when or
destroyed.” Id.
if their
landowners
would be
be permanently
permanently destroyed.”
Id. at
their land
to “when
or if
land would
at 1582.
landowners as
1582. Under
Under
as to
“situation becomes
stabilized” in
in order
these
plaintiff can
until the
the “situation
to avoid
wait until
order to
these circumstances,
can wait
avoid
becomes stabilized”
circumstances, aa plaintiff
“piecemeal or
litigation.” Id.
“piecemeal
Id.
or premature
premature litigation.”

Another
by Plaintiffs,
Banks v.
taking due
Another case
the gradual
relied on
on by
to the
involved aa taking
Plaintiffs, Banks
gradual
case relied
v. U.S.,
due to
similarly involved
US, similarly
erosion
Banks v.
314 F.3d
shoreline based
government project.
of aa shoreline
on aa government
erosion of
project. Banks
F.3d 1304,
United States,
based on
v. United
1304,
States, 314
plaintiffs’ suit
1309
was not
barred by
that plaintiffs’
limitations
not barred
the statute
Cir. 2003)
suit was
of limitations
statute of
1309 (Fed.
(holding that
(Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding
by the
“predictability and
because “predictability
permanence
and permanence
because

of
plaintiffs’ land
the extent
extent of
the plaintiffs’
of the
of damage
to the
land was
made
damage to
was made

Corps’ mitigation
efforts”).
justifiably uncertain
uncertain by
mitigation efforts”).
the Corps’
justiﬁably
by the

in this
The
by Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs are
this case.
from the
The cases
the facts
The cases
relied on
on by
distinguishable from
facts in
are distinguishable
cases relied
case. The
cases

invoking
justifiable uncertainty
by aa gradual
taking caused
invoking the
the justifiable
all involve
doctrine all
involve aa taking
gradual and
and
caused by
uncertainty doctrine
government’s promise
continuing
physical events
with the
promise to
mitigate the
the
the government’s
continuing process
to mitigate
of physical
events coupled
coupled with
process of

impact.
impact.

Here,
was due
physical process.
that the
the take
continuing physical
there is
allegation that
is no
no allegation
take was
to aa gradual
gradual and
and continuing
process.
due to
Here, there
in 1997,
Instead,
the full
extent of
the take
the Isaacs
Interchange
full scope
of the
take was
when the
clear in
and extent
Isaacs Interchange
scope and
was clear
Instead, the
1997, when

Plaintiffs stipulate,
Canyon
that the
the
There is
is no
no dispute,
project was
complete. There
and Plaintiffs
was substantially
substantially complete.
stipulate, that
dispute, and
Canyon project

ITD’s continuing
in 1997.
Plaintiffs assert
that ITD’s
the alleged
continuing
date
was in
of the
take was
alleged take
assert that
date of
1997. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs
in filing
filing the
their delay
the Day
for their
the
promise to
provides justiﬁcation
justification for
promise
to provide
to the
provide access
access to
Property provides
delay in
Day Property
in this
This argument
this case
the take
not the
the result
lawsuit.
was not
fails because
argument fails
take in
result of
of aa gradual
lawsuit. This
gradual physical
because the
case was
physical
in delaying
ﬁling suit
Plaintiffs were
not justified
process, and
were not
justified in
suit based
on aa 16
16 year
promise on
on
and Plaintiffs
old promise
based on
process,
delaying filing
year old

in fact
Plaintiffs did
that there
which Plaintiffs
not in
the evidence
ten and
which
there were
fact rely.
of ten
did not
and
evidence shows
were gaps
shows that
gaps of
Instead, the
rely. Instead,
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four
which the
parties did
not communicate
the parties
during which
together to
or work
work together
to come
to any
four years
communicate or
did not
come to
years during
any
Parry’s promise,
agreement
years after
promise, the
the Day
the
after Parry’s
agreement on
on access.
five years
sold the
access. Moreover,
Moreover, five
family sold
Day family

might have
property to
understanding they
terminating any
to Groves,
agreement or
or understanding
have had.
had.
effectively terminating
Groves, effectively
property
they might
any agreement

51
Waiver51
iii.
iii. Equitable
and Waiver
Equitable Estoppel
Estoppel and

“The only
in Idaho
“The
bar to
limitation defense
the doctrine
is the
doctrine of
of equitable
to aa statute
of limitation
Idaho is
equitable
non-statutory bar
statute of
defense in
only non-statutory
estoppel.” J.R.
estoppel.”
J.R. Simplot
Int’l, Inc.,
Inc., 126
1041
126 Idaho
P.2d 1039,
Idaho 532,
Simplot Co.
Co. v.
v. Chemetics
Chemetics Int’l,
887 P.2d
1039, 1041
532, 534,
534, 887

(1994).
The elements
elements of
of equitable
equitable estoppel
follows:
estoppel are
are as
as follows:
(1994). The
(1)
with actual
material fact
representation or
or concealment
of aa material
fact with
or
concealment of
false representation
actual or
(1) aa false
constructive
that the
the truth;
the party
not
of the
asserting estoppel
knowledge of
constructive knowledge
estoppel did
did not
truth; (2)
party asserting
(2) that
know
that
the
false
representation
or
that
not discover
the truth;
the
representation
know or
or could
or
false
discover the
could not
truth; (3)
(3)
it be
concealment
was made
upon; and
intent that
that it
that the
with the
the
the intent
relied upon;
concealment was
and (4)
made with
be relied
(4) that
person to
were
from whom
the representation
the facts
representation was
to whom
Whom the
or from
Whom the
person
facts were
was made,
made, or
concealed,
upon the
the representation
his
representation or
relied and
or concealment
to his
concealment to
and acted
acted upon
concealed, relied
prejudice.
prejudice.
Soc’y of
Ferro v.
Saint Pius
Pius X,
X, 143
143 Idaho
149 P.3d
Ferro
Idaho 538,
815 (2006)
P.3d 813,
v. Soc’y
(citation omitted).
omitted).
ofSaint
540, 149
813, 815
538, 540,
(2006) (citation

“Equitable estoppel
It merely
“Equitable
bars aa
limitations. It
not eliminate,
the statute
of limitations.
or extend
extend the
estoppel does
statute of
does not
eliminate, toll,
toll, or
merely bars

party from
bar does
from asserting
That bar
limitations as
the statute
not last
of limitations
asserting the
last forever,
statute of
defense. That
as a
a defense.
does not
forever,
patty
It lasts
however.
party asserting
time after
for aa reasonable
the party
after the
asserting estoppel
or
lasts only
estoppel discovers
reasonable time
however. It
discovers or
only for
truth.” Id.
815716 (citations
reasonably
Id. at
the truth.”
149 P.3d
at 540–41,
at 815–16
have discovered
P.3d at
could have
discovered the
(citations
reasonably could
54041, 149
“Once the
omitted).
party claiming
with respect
claiming estoppel
the party
the truth
the alleged
truth with
to the
estoppel discovers
respect to
alleged
discovers the
omitted). “Once

in
that party
misrepresentations
which the
based, that
party must
with due
the estoppel
misrepresentations upon
is based,
must act
diligence in
estoppel is
act with
upon which
due diligence

claim.” Id.
asserting
Id. at
the claim.”
149 P.3d
asserting the
at 541,
at 816.
P.3d at
816.
541, 149
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The
waiver. Both
that Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs failed
Both sides
The State
failed to
the issue
and waiver.
State argued
raise the
to timely
of equitable
equitable estoppel
have
argued that
estoppel and
issue of
sides have
timely raise
State’s argument
been
that the
time to
regarding the
and argue
the issue;
the Court
the State’s
the
brief and
argument regarding
given time
to brief
argue the
ﬁnds that
Court finds
been given
therefore, the
issue; therefore,
timeliness
fails.
timeliness of
of these
these defenses
defenses fails.
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Parry’s promise
ITD
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs contend
that Parry’s
limitations defense
not assert
the statute
promise to
to not
of limitations
contend that
assert the
statute of
defense estops
estops ITD
“concealed material
ITD “concealed
from
Plaintiffs also
from raising
that ITD
limitations defense.
raising the
the statute
material
of limitations
assert that
statute of
defense. Plaintiffs
also assert
52
Property.”52
facts
limits on
Plaintiffs regarding
from the
the Plaintiffs
for the
the Day
Eisenman Road
regarding limits
on access
to Eisenman
facts from
Road for
access to
Day Property.”

Specifically,
Plaintiffs alleged
follows:
alleged as
as follows:
Speciﬁcally, Plaintiffs
ITD and
In aa letter
In
their agreement
ACHD memorialize
letter dated
memorialize their
August 27,
agreement
and ACHD
dated August
1996, ITD
27, 1996,
“future approaches
severed” by
upon the
being severed”
by
from new
the “future
to properties
properties being
upon
new roadways
approaches from
roadways to
the
the new
The letter
letter lists
the new
Eisneman Road
lists the
extension of
Interchange. The
of Eisneman
new Interchange.
new extension
Road as
as
having
where public
the location
the
having various
location at
at the
locations Where
connect but
public roads
but the
various locations
roads would
would connect
“Future public
Green
was not
then states,
not listed.
The agreement
agreement then
listed. The
public road
Green Gate
road access
Gate was
access
states, “Future
ACHD.” Attached
Exhibit 99 is
as
that
determined and
Attached as
is aa copy
of that
and approved
approved by
as determined
as Exhibit
copy of
by ACHD.”
“approaches” along
letter.
public road
This agreement
the new
letter. This
along the
agreement about
and “approaches”
new
road access
about public
access and
533
F amily.5
Eisenman
was not
the Day
not disclosed
Eisenman extension
extension was
to the
disclosed to
Day Family.
Parry’s promise,
Neither Parry’s
promise, nor
– namely,
ﬁrst element
Neither
nor the
the letter,
the first
element of
of equitable
meets the
equitable estoppel
estoppel 7
letter, meets
namely, aa

false
Plaintiffs failed
material fact.
representation or
or concealment
of aa material
failed to
to allege,
or
concealment of
false representation
fact. Plaintiffs
allege, identify,
identify, or
fact” that
“material fact”
argue
that would
this
the letter
letter contained
the course
of this
contained aa “material
altered the
how the
argue how
have altered
would have
course of
54
earlier.54
it been
litigation had
litigation
been disclosed
had it
disclosed earlier.

Parry’s promise,
As
promise, “[generally],
not constitute
statement about
As to
to Parry’s
event does
constitute aa
future event
about aa future
does not
“[generally], aa statement

A statement
that an
an
A misrepresentation
misrepresentation.
existing fact.
statement that
misrepresentation must
misrepresentation. A
or existing
must be
to aa past
fact. A
past or
be as
as to

if itit isis proven
that the
act
without
will occur
act will
the speaker
the promise
actionable if
is actionable
speaker made
made the
promise without
proven that
occur is
it.” Ferro
Soc’y of
intending
Saint Pius
X, 143
intending to
143 Idaho
149 P.3d
Ferro v.
to keep
Idaho 538,
keep it.”
819
Pius X,
P.3d 813,
v. Soc’y
ofSaint
544, 149
813, 819
538, 544,
that Parry
(2006)
there is
allegation or
is no
no allegation
or evidence
evidence that
(citations omitted)
omitted) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
Here, there
added). Here,
Parry
(2006) (citations

ITD asserts
intending to
limited to
made
without intending
promise was
was limited
the promise
it. Instead,
the promise
promise without
to keep
to aa
keep it.
asserts the
made the
Instead, ITD
time or
reasonable
or to
to one
additional statutory
period.
one additional
reasonable time
statutory period.
52
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Pls.’ Reply
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Mem. (filed
Re: Supp.
Sept. 11,
Supp. Mem.
11, 2017).
2017).
(ﬁled Sept.
Reply Re:
Compl.
22.
Compl. 1]¶ 22.
54
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Instead,
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Plaintiffs raised
after
this argument
ﬁrst time
time in
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the first
its Reply
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supplemental briefing
argument for
raised this
to supplemental
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Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs fail
fail to
the second
There is
element of
allegation or
to meet
meet the
of equitable
is no
no allegation
or
equitable estoppel.
estoppel. There
second element
In this
argument
Plaintiffs did
that Plaintiffs
this case,
not know,
not have
the truth.
truth. In
the date
argument that
or could
did not
have known,
date
could not
known, the
know, or
case, the

of
breach is
both parties.
parties. There
was no
that
the take
There was
no concealment
of the
take and
is stipulated
to by
concealment that
stipulated to
and alleged
alleged breach
by both

ﬁling suit.
prevented Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs from
from timely
suit.
prevented
timely filing

Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs also
third element
fail to
the third
element of
to meet
meet the
of
also fail

“intent” that
equitable
was an
Plaintiffs
that Plaintiffs
that there
there is
there was
allegation or
is no
no allegation
or evidence
an “intent”
equitable estoppel
estoppel as
evidence that
as there
rely
representation or
or concealment.
on aa false
concealment.
false representation
rely on

,

The
be met
Plaintiffs relied
that Plaintiffs
ﬁnal element
The final
met – namely,
element of
relied
of equitable
cannot be
equitable estoppel,
likewise, cannot
estoppel, likewise,
namely, that
and
their prejudice.
This element
akin to
the representation
element is
representation or
or concealment
to their
is akin
to
concealment to
and acted
upon the
prejudice. This
acted upon
“Waiver is
waiver and
will be
intentional relinquishment
relinquishment of
herein. “Waiver
is aa voluntary,
of aa
waiver
and Will
also addressed
addressed herein.
be also
voluntary, intentional
in
right or
that he
known
has acted
The party
the waiver
asserting the
known right
or advantage.
he has
waiver must
must show
acted in
show that
advantage. The
party asserting

detriment.” Dennett
a waiver
reliance
waiver and
Dennett
and reasonably
his position
his detriment.”
reliance upon
altered his
position to
to his
upon such
such a
reasonably altered
224 (Ct.
v.
Kuenzli, 130
App. 1997)
P.2d 219,
Idaho 21,
130 Idaho
v. Kuenzli,
936 P.2d
(emphasis added).
added).
219, 224
1997) (emphasis
21, 26,
(Ct. App.
26, 936

Plaintiffs relied
Preliminarily,
that Plaintiffs
the concealment
the
there is
allegation or
is no
no allegation
or evidence
relied on
on the
of the
concealment of
evidence that
Preliminarily, there
Parry’s promise,
their detriment.
Plaintiffs did
letter
promise, the
that Plaintiffs
letter to
the undisputed
detriment. As
to their
As to
to Parry’s
did
undisputed evidence
evidence shows
shows that

Parry’s promise,
in fact
their detriment.
not
promise to
years after
promise, the
not in
the promise
the
detriment. Instead,
after Parry’s
fact rely
on the
to their
ﬁve years
Instead, five
rely on

ITD did
Days
work
million. The
the Day
for over
The Days
not continuously
and ITD
did not
sold the
over $10
continuously work
$10 million.
Property for
Days sold
Days and
Day Property
the Day
ten (2000—2010)
together
was aa ten
there was
together to
to establish
to the
establish access
and
access to
(200072010) and
Instead, there
Property. Instead,
Day Property.

7 three
the property
not
subsequent
years of
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three years
which the
of inactivity
of which
four (2010—2014)
subsequent four
(201072014) year
gap of
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inactivity –
year gap
the Day
even
even owned
owned by
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by the

Parry’s promise
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on new
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55
reached.”55
reached.”
When
years later,
the Day
the Day
the sale
the
terminated the
When the
ﬁve years
sold the
sale terminated
later, the
Property five
family sold
Day family
Day Property

Days’ ownership
in the
Days’
This sale
the Day
interest in
terminated any
ownership of
of and
and interest
waiver made
sale also
also terminated
made
Property. This
Day Property.
any waiver

by the
because the
waiver was
premised on
parties reaching
the waiver
the State,
the parties
not reaching)
reaching (or
on the
an
was premised
reaching) an
State, because
(or not
by
agreement
parties could
fail to
the parties
There is
agreement on
on access.
is no
no way
an agreement
to reach
an
reach an
reach an
agreement (or
could reach
access. There
(or fail
way the

if the
agreement)
the Day
the Day
longer owned
on access
no longer
owned the
access if
agreement) on
Property.
family no
Day family
Day Property.

re-afﬁrm or
re-acquired the
When
the Day
the Day
not seek
When the
to re-affirm
or clarify
did not
seek to
Property they
clarify
family re-acquired
they did
Day family
Day Property
Parry’s promise
in effect.
whether Parry’s
was still
waited another
years to
Plaintiffs waited
still in
ﬁle
another eight years
Whether
to file
promise was
effect. Instead,
Instead, Plaintiffs

(1n

in filing
ﬁling this
suit.
with due
Plaintiffs did
this suit,
that aa 16
not proceed
contending that
diligence in
16
suit. Plaintiffs
did not
now contending
proceed with
due diligence
suit, now

ITD’s lawyer
year old
their inaction.
inaction. Moreover,
representation by
promise was
old representation
such promise
excuses their
was
Moreover, any
lawyer excuses
year
any such
by ITD’s
in 2005.
effectively
when they
this suit
the property
not
terminated when
to Groves
suit was
Since this
sold the
2005. Since
Groves in
was not
effectively terminated
property to
they sold

it is
timely
barred by
by the
limitations.
the statute
is barred
of limitations.
statute of
timely filed,
ﬁled, it

ITD’s Motion
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Accordingly,
Partial Summary
Motion to
Motion for
for Partial
Dismiss is
to Dismiss
is GRANTED,
GRANTED, Plaintiffs’
Accordingly, ITD’s
Summary

Judgment
with
limitations is
the case
DISMISSED with
the statute
regarding the
is DISMISSED
of limitations
is DENIED,
statute of
Judgment regarding
and the
case is
DENIED, and
prejudice.
prejudice.

Because
were dispositive
remaining Motions
the case,
the remaining
Motions were
Motions are
of the
these Motions
dispositive of
are
Because these
case, the

rendered
moot.
rendered moot.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

ITD’s Motion
GRANTED
For the
the reasons
herein (1)
Motion to
For
Dismiss (filed
to Dismiss
is GRANTED
stated herein
reasons stated
(ﬁled July
2017) is
15, 2017)
July 15,
(1) ITD’s
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
the statute
and
regarding the
Judgment (filed
and Plaintiffs’
statute
Summary Judgment
(ﬁled May
2017) regarding
17, 2017)
May 17,

ITD’s Motion
limitations is
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
of
regarding standing
standing is
is
of limitations
is DENIED,
Judgment regarding
DENIED, (2)
Summary Judgment
(2) ITD’s
55
55

Comp.
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Plaintiffs’ Motion
GRANTED
Right to
GRANTED and
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
of Right
to
Judgment Re:
and Plaintiffs’
Re: Conveyance
Conveyance of
Summary Judgment

ITD’s Motion
DENIED (3)
Condemnation
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
is DENIED
Condemnation Award
Award (filed
Summary
(ﬁled July
2017) is
July 7,
7, 2017)
(3) ITD’s
Judgment
breach of
the breach
claim (filed
regarding the
is GRANTED,
of contract
contract claim
Judgment regarding
and (4)
GRANTED, and
2017) is
(ﬁled May
17, 2017)
May 17,
(4)
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Plaintiffs’
No Marketable
Partial Summary
Motion for
for Partial
Titled (filed
Marketable and
Insurable Titled
Judgment Re:
Re: No
and Insurable
Summary Judgment
(ﬁled

ITD’s Motion
July
parties’ Motions
Motion for
for Bifurcation,
Motions to
both parties’
to Suppress
and both
are
Suppress are
Bifurcation, and
11, 2017),
July 11,
2017), ITD’s
DENIED as
DENIED
moot.
as moot.

A final
with prejudice.
judgment will
with
The
ﬁnal judgment
Will be
The case
DISMISSED With
is hereby
concurrent with
prejudice. A
issued concurrent
case is
be issued
hereby DISMISSED
this
this Order.
Order.

Signed: 10/11/2017 03:36 PM
IT IS
ORDERED dated
IT
IS SO
dated ___________________.
SO ORDERED

_____________________________
SAMUEL
HOAGLAND
SAMUEL A.
A. HOAGLAND
District
District Judge
Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Signed: 10/11/2017 03:38 PM
I hereby certify that on _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _, I served a true and correct copy of the within

instrument to:
Mr. Chris Kronberg, Esq.
Idaho Transportation Department
PO Box 7129
Boise, ID 83 707
chris.kronberg@itd. idaho. gov
Mr. Fredric Shoemaker, Esq.
Mr. Jason Mau, Esq.
Mr. Slade Sokol, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, PA
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 950
Boise, ID 83 702
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com
jmau@greenerlaw .com
ssokol@greenerlaw .com
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court
By ,&,G;p~an.U. ~Jo=
Deputy Court ClerK
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Signed: 10/11/2017 03:42 PM

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
IN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
OF
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN

BENNETT G.
BENNETT
TRUSTEE OF
AS TRUSTEE
OF
G. DAY,
DAY, AS
B OF
THE DONALD
DAY AND
AND
TRUST
DONALD M.
TRUST B
OF THE
M. DAY
DAY FAMILY
FAMILY TRUST;
MARJORIE
MARJORIE D.
D. DAY
TRUST;
DAN E.
JOHN
HOLCOMB
JOHN F.
F. DAY;
E. DAY;
DAY; DAN
DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD
ROAD HOLDINGS,
limited
an Idaho
Idaho limited
HOLDINGS, LLC,
LLC, an
DAY JACOBS;
liability
DONNA DAY
liability company;
JACOBS;
company; DONNA
and
DAVID R.
R. DAY,
and DAVID
DAY,
Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,

CV01-16-20313
Case
No. CV01-16-20313
Case No.

JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT

vs.
VS.
STATE
STATE OF
IDAHO
OF IDAHO,
IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
Defendant.

JUDGMENT
ENTERED AS
JUDGMENT IS
IS ENTERED
AS FOLLLOWS:
FOLLLOWS:
The
with prejudice.
prejudice.
The case
DISMISSED With
is hereby
case is
hereby DISMISSED

Signed: 10/11/2017 03:38 PM
IT
IT IS
ORDERED dated
IS SO
dated __________________.
SO ORDERED

____________________________________
SAMUEL
HOAGLAND
SAMUEL A.
A. HOAGLAND
District
District Judge
Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Signed:
10/11/2017
I hereby certify that on _
__
_ _03:44
_PM
_ _ , I served a true and correct copy of the within

instrument to:
Mr. Chris Kronberg, Esq.
Idaho Transportation Department
PO Box 7129
Boise, ID 83 707
chris.kronberg@itd.idaho. gov
Mr. Fredric Shoemaker, Esq.
Mr. Jason Mau, Esq.
Mr. Slade Sokol, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, PA
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 950
Boise, ID 83 702
fshoemaker@greenerlaw .com
jmau@greenerlaw .com
ssokol@greenerlaw .com
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court
By ,&,G;p~an.U. ~Jo=
Deputy Court ClerK
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NO.

FII.EO

__u3.-~4~).._._.:

A . M . - - - - .M-

NOV 1 3 2017
CHRISTOPHEA ~. ;t\ICH, Clork
ly KA~INA HOL!J~
I!J!:PU1'Y

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 319-2600
Fax: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case No.: CV01-16-20313

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL·

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
CATEGORY:

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

L4

ADA COUNTY CLERK FEE: $129.00
SUPREME COURT FILING FEE: $109.00
REPORTER'S FEE: $607.50

Defendant/Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, CHRIS KRONBERG, 3311
W. STATE STREET, BOISE, ID 83707-1129, AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Plaintiffs, Bennett G. Day, as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day
and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, John F. Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings,
LLC, Donna Day Jacobs, and David R. Day (collectively "Appellants"), by and through

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL -1
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their counsel of record, appeal against the above-named Defendant, State of Idaho, Idaho
Department Of Transportation (hereinafter "Respondent"), to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the October 11, 2017 Judgment entered by the District Court in the above entitled
action, and including the October 11, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, Honorable
Samuel H. Hoagland presiding. Copies of the Judgment and Order being appealed are
attached to this Notice.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment and Order
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 11(a)(l).

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows:
a. Whether the District Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award.
b. Whether the District Court erred in granting Respondent's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment regarding standing.
c. Whether the District Court erred by ruling that a claim for damages based on inverse
condemnation is a personal property right when there was also evidence that the
Appellants' rights to access arose from the Warranty Deed and were covenants
running with the land.
d. Whether the District Court erred by concluding that intra-family conveyances of
hereditaments and appurtenances did not transfer the Respondent's covenants
expressed in the Warranty Deed and the unchallenged family rights to an inverse
condemnation claim.

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2
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e. Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that there was no evidence that any
contract ran with the land or that the contract rights were not transferred within the
family.
f.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the plain language of the Right of
Way Contract and Warranty Deed regarding access via a Future Frontage Road did
not inherently require its construction by Respondent.

g. Whether the District Court erred by not recognizing that the parties' efforts and
communications in 2014, demonstrating that there was then yet no determination that
an agreement as to access could not be reached, rendered the limited evidence of
communications between or efforts by the parties between 2001 and 2014 irrelevant.
h. Whether the District Court erred by relying on vague allegations of real estate
transactions regarding the property at issue, which were not in the record, and in
presuming that the transactions did not contain suitable conveyance language, or
reserved to the Appellants as mortgagees, the right to make an inverse condemnation
claim against Respondent.
1.

Whether the District Court erred in conflating the date of taking with the date of
accrual.

J.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Appellants were judicially estopped
from claiming that the breach of contract date of accrual was May 2016.

k. Whether the District Court erred in not recognizing that Mr. Parry expressly waived
the defense of the statute of limitations until the occurrence of a future event and was

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3
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more than and significantly different than a mere acknowledgment or promise to pay
, an antecedent debt implicating and limited by I. C. §5-238.
1.

Whether the District Court erred by ruling that an express promise to not raise a
statute of limitations defense until the occurrence of a future event only extends the
statute of limitations period by one additional statutory period.

m. Whether the District Court erred by refusing to apply the justifiable uncertainty
doctrine to toll the statute of limitations.
n. Whether the District Court erred in not recognizing that the easements subsequently
Respondent provided constituted a change in the character of the type of access
promised and therefore constituted a taking.
o. Whether the District Court erred in granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss,
treating it like a motion for summary judgment, and providing Appellants with no
notice that it was treating it like a motion for summary judgment.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES
b. Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript:
(1) The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a),
which recorded the dispositive motions hearings on June 14, 2017, July 12, 2017, and
August 14, 2017.

6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
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a.

All documents filed with the Court applicable to the June 14, 2017 hearing on

pending dispositive motions.
b. All documents filed with the Court applicable to the July 12, 2017 hearing on pending
dispositive motions.
c.

All documents filed with the Court applicable to the August 14, 2017 hearing on

pending dispositive motions and the supplemental documents subsequently filed.
7.

I certify:
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter (name and
address listed below) of whom a transcript has been requested;
Reporter's Name and Address: Christy Olesek, 4883 N. Lake Park Place, Garden
City, ID 83714.
b. That the clerk of the district court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of the
reporter's transcript within the time required by rule after notice to Appellants of the
amount of the estimated fee;
c. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 20.

)}

Respectfully submitted thiJ1 day ofNovember, 2017.
BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

Fre c . Shoemaker I Jason R. Mau I
Slade D. Sokol
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J"":,1l'-day

of~'&2017, a true and correct copy ofthe

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 W. State Street
P. 0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Attorney for Idaho Transportation Department

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
~ EmailliCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov

Court Reporter:
Christy Olesek
4883 N. Lake Park Place
Garden City, ID 83714

Fred V. Shoemaker I Jason R. Mau I
Slade D. Sokol
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Filed
Electronically Filed
12/12/2017
12/12/2017 4:00 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Joseph, Deputy Clerk
By: Austen Joseph,

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440
Slade D. Sokol, ISB #8684
G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208)
(208) 319-2600
319-2601
Fax: (208)
(208) 319-2601
fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
fshoemaker
eenerlaw.com
jmau@greenerlaw.com
jmau@ggeenerlaw.com
ssokol@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN F.
F. DAY; DAN E. DAY; HOLCOMB
ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
an Idaho limited
liability company; DONNA DAY JACOBS;
and DAVID R. DAY,

Case
N0.: CV01-16-20313
Case No.:
PLAINTIFFS’
PLAINTIFF S’ AMENDED NOTICE
OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
V.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Respondent.
Defendant/ Respondent.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT,
RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND THE PARTY’S ATTORNEY, CHRIS KRONBERG, 3311
3311
W. STATE STREET, BOISE, ID 83707-1129, AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL —– 11
PLAINTIFFS’
19807-001 /996738
19807-001
/ 996738

000974

1.
1.

The above-named Plaintiffs, Bennett G. Day,
as Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. Day
Day, as
and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, John F.
F. Day,
Day, Dan E. Day,
Day, Holcomb Road Holdings,
LLC, Donna Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, and David R. Day (collectively “Appellants”), by
by and through
their counsel of record, appeal against the above-named Defendant, State of Idaho, Idaho
“Respondent”), to the Idaho Supreme Court
Department Of Transportation (hereinafter “Respondent”),

from the October 11,
by the District Court in the above entitled
11, 2017 Judgment entered by
action, and including the October 11,
11, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, Honorable
Samuel H. Hoagland presiding.
presiding. Copies of the Judgment and Order being appealed are
are
attached to this Notice.
Notice.
2.
2.

Appellant has
has a
a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment and Order
described in paragraph 11 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 11(a)(1).
11(a)(1).

3.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as
as follows:
a.
a. Whether the District Court erred in denying Appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award.
b. Whether the District Court erred in granting Respondent’s Motion for Partial
b.
Summary Judgment regarding standing.
c.
0. Whether the District Court erred by ruling that a
a claim for damages based on inverse
condemnation is aa personal property right when there was also evidence that the
Appellants’ rights to access
Appellants’
access arose from the Warranty Deed and were covenants

running with the land.
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d.
d. Whether the District Court erred by concluding that intra-family conveyances of
hereditaments and appurtenances did not transfer the Respondent’s covenants
expressed in the Warranty Deed and the unchallenged family rights to an
an inverse
condemnation claim.
e.
was no evidence that any
e. Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that there was
any
contract ran with the land or that the contract rights were not transferred Within
within the
family.
f. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the plain language of the Right of
Way Contract and Warranty Deed regarding access
via aa Future Frontage Road did
access Via
not inherently require its construction by
by Respondent.
parties’ efforts and
g.
g. Whether the District Court erred by not recognizing that the parties’

communications in 2014, demonstrating that there was then yet
yet no determination that
an agreement as
be reached, rendered the limited evidence of
as to access
access could not be
communications between or efforts by
by the parties between 2001
irrelevant.
2001 and 2014 irrelevant.
h.
by relying on vague allegations of real estate
h. Whether the District Court erred by
transactions regarding the property at
at issue,
issue, which were not in the record, and in
presuming that the transactions did not contain suitable conveyance language, or
reserved to the Appellants as
as mortgagees, the right to make an inverse condemnation
claim against Respondent.
i. Whether the District Court erred in conflating
conﬂating the date of taking with the date of
accrual.
accrual.
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j. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Appellants were judicially estopped
from claiming that the breach of contract date of accrual was
was May 2016.
k. Whether the District Court erred in not recognizing that Mr. Parry expressly waived
the defense of the statute of limitations until the occurrence of aa future event and was
was
more than and significantly
signiﬁcantly different than aa mere acknowledgment or promise to pay
pay
an antecedent debt implicating and limited by
LC. §5-238.
by I.C.
l. Whether the District Court erred by
by ruling that an express promise to not raise aa
statute of limitations defense until the occurrence of aa future event only extends the
statute of limitations period by one additional statutory period.
period.
m. Whether the District Court erred by
justifiable uncertainty
by refusing to apply the justiﬁable
.

doctrine to toll the statute of limitations.
n. Whether the District Court erred in not recognizing that the easements subsequently
Respondent provided constituted aa change in the character of the type
access
type of access
promised and therefore constituted aa taking.

o. Whether the District Court erred in granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,
treating it like aa motion for summary judgment, and providing Appellants with no
notice that it was
was treating it like aa motion for summary judgment.
judgment.
4.

No order has
N0
has been entered sealing all or any
any portion of the record.

5.
5.

a.
a. Is a
a reporter’s transcript requested? YES
b. Appellant requests the preparation
b.

of the following portions of
of the reporter’s

transcript:
transcript:
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(1)
deﬁned in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a),
as defined
25(a), which
(1) The reporter’s standard transcript as
recorded the dispositive motions hearings on June 14,
14, 2017, July 12,
12, 2017, and
August 14,
14, 2017.
6.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be
be included in the clerk’s record in
addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.
With the Court applicable to the June 14,
ﬁled with
a. All documents filed
14, 2017 hearing on
pending dispositive motions:
motions:
i.
ii.

Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated April 28,
28, 2017;

Memorandum in Support of Motion Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, dated April 28,
28, 2017;

iii.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Counsel, dated April 28,
28, 2017;

iv.
iV.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of James Morrison, dated April 28,
28, 2017;

v.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of
Plaintiffs’

Statute of Limitation Defense, dated May 17,
17, 2017;
vi.
Vi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation Defense, dated May 17,
17, 2017;
vii.
Vii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs in Support of Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitation Defense,
dated May 17,
17, 2017.
viii.
Viii.
ix.

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Errata, dated May 26,
Plaintiffs’
26, 2017;
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment, dated May 31,
31, 2017;
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x.

Second Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs,
Jacobs, dated May 31,
31, 2017;

xi.
Xi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’

Re: Access and Waiver of Statute of Limitations Defense, dated
May 31,
31, 2017;
xii.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of James Morrison, dated May 31,
31, 2017;

xiii.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Amy Revis, dated May 31,
31, 2017;

xiv.
XiV.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of David Szplett, dated May 31,
31, 2017;

xv.
XV.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

Judgment, dated June 7,
7, 2017;
xvi.
XVi.

Second Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of James Morrison, dated June 7,
7, 2017; and

xvii.
XVii.

“Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant’s
Defendant’s Reply to “Plaintiffs’

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment”, dated June 7,
7, 2017.
b.
b.

All documents filed with
With the Court applicable to the July 12,
12, 2017 hearing on pending
dispositive motions.
i.

[Defendant’s]
[Defendant’s] Motion to Bifurcate, dated June 22,
22, 2017;

ii.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate, dated June 22,
22, 2017;

iii.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate,
Plaintiffs’

dated July 5,
5, 2017; and
iv.
iV.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s
[Defendant’s]
[Defendant’s] Reply to Plaintiffs’

Motion to Bifurcate, dated July 10,
10, 2017.
c.
with the Court applicable to the August 14,
ﬁled With
c. All documents filed
14, 2017 hearing on
pending dispositive motions and the supplemental documents subsequently filed.
ﬁled.
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i.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to
Plaintiffs’

Condemnation Award, dated July 7,
7, 2017;
ii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award, dated July 7,
7, 2017;
iii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Richard G. Smith in Support of Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award, dated
July 7,
7, 2017;
iv.
iV.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Bennett G. Day in Support of Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award, dated
July 7,
7, 2017;
v.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Third Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs in Support of Plaintiffs’

Partial Summary Judgment Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation
Award, dated July 7,
7, 2017;
vi.
Vi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable
Plaintiffs’

Title, dated July 11,
11, 2017;
vii.
Vii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: No
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

Marketable and Insurable Title, dated July 11,
11, 2017;
viii.
Viii.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Glen Lorensen in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title dated July 11,
11, 2017;

ix.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Fourth Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Donna Day Jacobs in Support of Plaintiffs’

Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, dated
July 11,
11, 2017;
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x.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs’

Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, dated July 11,
11, 2017;
xi.
Xi.

[Defendant’s]
[Defendant’s] Motion to Dismiss, dated July 15,
15, 2017

xii.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated July 15,
15, 2017;

xiii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’

Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title, dated August 1,
1, 2017;
xiv.
XiV.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Nick Schug,
Schug, dated August 1,
1, 2017;

xv.
XV.

Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Ken Franklin, dated August 1,
1, 2017;

xvi.
XVi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’

Re: Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award, dated August 1,
1, 2017;
xvii.
XVii.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, dated
Plaintiffs’

August 2,
2, 2017;
xviii.
XViii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

Judgment re Conveyance of Right to Condemnation Award, dated
August 7,
7, 2017;
xix.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Re:
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’

No Marketable and Insurable Title, dated August 7,
7, 2017;
xx.
XX.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affidavits of Nick Schug and Ken Franklin, dated
Plaintiffs’

August 7,
7, 2017;
xxi.
XXi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affidavits
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’
Afﬁdavits of Nick

Schug and Ken Franklin, dated August 7,
7, 2017;
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xxii.
XXii.

Motion to Strike Affidavits
Afﬁdavits of Glen Lorensen, Donna Day Jacobs and Counsel
Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, dated August 8,
8, 2017;

xxiii.
XXiii.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavits of Glen Lorensen,
Donna Day Jacobs and Counsel Re: No Marketable and Insurable Title, dated
August 8,
8, 2017;

xxiv.
XXiV.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to State’s Motion to Strike Affidavits
Plaintiffs’
Afﬁdavits

of Glen Lorensen, Donna Day Jacobs and Counsel Re: No Marketable and
Insurable Title, dated August 10,
10, 2017;
xxv.
XXV.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’

Dismiss, dated August 10,
10, 2017;
xxvi.
XXVi.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Additional Brief Citing Existing Pleadings on
Plaintiffs’
0n the

Issue of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel, dated August 15,
15, 2017;
xxvii.
XXVii.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Re: Application of Waiver and
Plaintiffs’

Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of Limitations Defense, dated
August 15,
15, 2017;
xxviii.
XXViii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Additional Brief Citing Existing
Order Granting Plaintiffs’

Pleadings on the Issue of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel, dated August 29,
29,
2017;
xxix.
XXiX.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Re:
Motion to File Response to Plaintiffs’

Application of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of
Limitations Defense, dated September 1,
1, 2017;
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xxx.
XXX.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Re: Application of
Response to Plaintiffs’

Waiver and Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of Limitation Defense,
dated September 1,
1, 2017;
xxxi.
XXXi.

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Non-Opposition to the State of Idaho’s Motion to File
Plaintiffs’
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Re: Application of
Response to Plaintiffs’

Waiver and Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of Limitations Defense,
dated September 6,
6, 2017;
xxxii.
XXXii.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Reply Re: Additional Brief Citing Existing
Plaintiffs’

Pleadings on the Issue of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel, dated
September 6,
6, 2017;
xxxiii.
XXXiii.

Plaintiffs’ Reply Re: Supplemental Memorandum Re: Application of Waiver
Plaintiffs’

and Equitable Estoppel to the State’s Statute of Limitations Defense, dated
September 6,
6, 2017;
xxxiv.
XXXiV.

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to File Response to Plaintiff’s Additional
Brief Citing Existing Pleadings on the Issue of Waiver and Estoppel, dated
September 11,
11, 2017; and

xxxv.
XXXV.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Reply Re: Additional Brief
Order Granting Plaintiffs’
Brief Citing

Existing Pleadings on the Issue of Waiver and Equitable Estoppel, dated
September 11,
11, 2017.
7.
7.

I certify:
a.
has been served on the reporter (name and
a. That a
a copy
copy of this notice of appeal has
address listed below) of
whom aa transcript has
been requested;
of Whom
has been
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Reporter’s Name and Address: Christy Olesek, 4883 N. Lake Park Place, Garden
City, ID 83714.
b. That the clerk
b.

of the district court will be
be paid the estimated fee for preparation of the

reporter’s transcript Within
within the time required by rule after notice to Appellants of the
amount of the estimated fee;
fee;
c.
paid; and
has been paid;
0. That the appellate filing fee has
d.
has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho
d. That service has
Appellate Rule 20.
12th day
Respectfully submitted this 12th
day of December, 2017.

G
REENER B
URKE S
HOEMAKER O
BERRECHT P
.A.
GREENER
BURKE
SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT
P.A.
R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Jason R. Mau
Mau//
Slade D. Sokol
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th
12th
day
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12
copy of
day of December, 2017, aa true and correct copy

the foregoing document was filed
Eﬁle System
ﬁled with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile
which sent aa Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311
3311 W. State Street
P.
BOX 7129
P. O. Box
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
for Idaho Transportation Department
Attorney for

II
I:
I:I
I:

Court Reporter:
Reporter:
Christy Olesek
4883 N. Lake Park Place
Garden City, ID 83714

I:I
I:I
I:I

U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile: 334-4498
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
IXI Email/iCourt: chris.kronberg@itd.idaho.gov
U.S.
US. Mail
Facsimile:
Facsimile:
Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
IXI Email/iCourt: colesek@adaweb.net

R. Mau
/s/ Jason R.
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Shoemaker// Jason R. Mau
Mau//
Slade D. Sokol
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1
2

To: Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
(208) 334-2616

'3

4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No.

5

6
7
8

BENNET G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF TRUST)
)
B OF THE DONALD M. DAY AND
MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY TRUST,
)
ET AL.,
)
Plaintiffs,
)

45552

ORIGINAL

)

9

VS.

)

)

10

STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

11

)
)
)

Defendant.
12

)
)

13
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 141 PAGES LODGED
14
15
16
17
18
19

Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada.
Honorable Samuel Hoagland, District Court
Judge.
Volume One contains: ·
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement hearing
held on June 14, 2017; Motion to Bifurcate hearing held on
July 12, 2017; Motion for Partial Summary Judgement
hearing held on August 14, 2017.

20
Date:

January 18, 2 018

21
22
23
24
25

~ /l;uu, 0~ {!;S;e-;e{J;e
----------------------------------Christine Anne Olesek, RPR
Official Court Reporter,
Judge Samuel A. Hoagland
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. SRL-1044
Registered Professional Reporter
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL - 1044
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,

Supreme Court Case No. 45552

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 30th day of January, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAy
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,

Supreme Court Case No. 45552
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER

CHRIS KRONBERG

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO ·

BOISE, IDAHO

JAN 3 0 2018
Date of Service: - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BENNETT G. DAY, AS TRUSTEE OF
TRUST B OF THE DONALD M. DAY
AND MARJORIE D. DAY FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN F. DAY; DAN E. DAY;
HOLCOMB ROAD HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; DONNA
DAY JACOBS; and DAVID R. DAY,

Supreme Court Case No. 45552
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was fil~d in the District Court on the 13th
day ofNovember, 2017.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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